- Sep 2013
-
caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.netGorgias73
-
GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states.
Essentially defining political discourse.
-
SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse? GORGIAS: Certainly not.
An interesting distinction in the scope of rhetoric, and something that would be up to debate by some nowadays.
-
I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?
Pushing him towards the point by keeping him on the same train of though, I suppose- Socrates is good at that.
-
O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest
The best in an ambiguous art, apparently
-
may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong
Socrates's conclusion of "what is rhetoric."
-
where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?
The purpose of the arguments above.
-
And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.
"What is Rhetoric?" precisely "what is rhetoric?"
-
Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
Rhetoric as solely the art of persuasion
-
Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?
If this is that, then is that also this?
Socrates method of persuasion seems to be to tease out distinguishing elements in such a manner as to expand the view and scope of the proposition. it feels like kind of a psychological exercise. I feel like he is going somewhere with this and that he has used several rhetorical tactics and tricks of persuasion that are about be revealed.
-
And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own
not arguing for the sake of argument, but clearly in pursuit of truth - the psychology of his approach - his method
-
in my admiring mind
a cute turn of phraze
-
And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.
the ethics of rhetoric, sportsmanship, and conduct
-
say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted:
verbal sparring that made good rhetoricians
-
to set it on its legs
to give it ground, in contemporary terms, since our teachers no longer travel and teach door to door in the same way. Yet, "to give it legs" still works for our times.
-
the province of rhetoric
-
Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
defining and distinguishing rhetoric and dialogue
-
a maker of rhetoricians
wouldn't that make him a sophist?
-
exhibit
"exhibit"
what today we call a lecture, or presentation
-
with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.
Personal: Perhaps use to reference Stiglitz chapter on framing, and also Bertels on the uninformed public. The ill informed and ignorant are subject to the powers of persuasion.
-
I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone.
Socrates using rhetoric to prove Gorgias wrong about rhetoric?
-
in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers.
Who determines the proper behavior of the rhetor? What if the rhetor believes it is necessary to defraud of the physician? obviously, the physician and others may oppose. There is no constant truth, so there is no constant fairness that the rhetor can exercise. POLITICS. This is ideal, but it is not practical.
-
knowledge and belief differ.
separation in our types of personal language, we have language of belief and language of intellect/mind. Disconnect? how does this change rhetoric?
-
I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.
here rhetoric is dependent on audience? Rhetoric primarily meant for politics?
-
Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?
rhetoric outside of language. Visual rhetoric.
-
persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric
Is rhetoric just the title we give to innate, self-interested, behavior? Is the term 'rhetoric' to blame, or is it simply just a label we give to human interactions?
-
art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion
Defining rhetoric as persuasion.
-
hat is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.
Relatioship between rhetoric and power. Dominance.
-
Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:—seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned
Defining qualities of rhetoric.
-
in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater—they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?
When is the verbal most powerful? Dependent on audience or on the art itself?
-
but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse.
?
-
Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric
I really like the layers, if language is the means in which other "arts" or professions are expressed, and rhetoric is language, is not rhetoric the root of all discourses?
-
for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.
Are they not engaging in a conversation then, if it is more rhetoric than dialectic? Is Polus the Rhetor?
-
great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power
Definition of power.
-
it is not an art at all, in my opinion
Socrates denies Gorgias's definition of rhetoric as an art.
-
Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens.
Socrates denies Gorgias's belief of rhetoric as a power.
-
POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery? SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus.
So maths is an art until it comes to the use of cooking? Not sure I agree, Socrates.
-
Clearly not
Alright, this is a total slippery slope here, but is Gorgias proclaiming an inability to be unjust now or ever? Quite the bold statement. Not knowing anything about Gorgias, did he have anything to say about objectivity within the personal narrative (sorry that sounds like an egg-head phrase, it's the best I can think of) or did he believe in absolutism? If so, he could be best friends with Ayn Rand.
-
And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.
It was mentioned above that Gorgias made rhetoric sound sinister, and think this is a good follow up. We tend to receive persuasion and rhetoric when mixed with politics with bad connotation. And I saw where the poster was coming from. I am glad this clears the air up. However, I think Rhetoric Man is on par with Captain Hindsight as the lamest of the super heroes.
-
Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.
Definition of rhetoric as politics.
-
and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ
Not to the human brain. If you believe Strawberry Pop-Tarts are better than Blue Berry Pop-Tarts and you know that 1 + 1 = 2 your brain processes the information in the exact same way. This is what can make persuasion difficult: how to you get someone to view an idea they see as true in a different way? This is a little off topic, but still relevant in the way Gorgias explains his views.
-
Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?
This can lead to what we call "The Authority Bias." Saying something is true simply because a person of power, like a teacher, said it was so. "Dr. Cruise from L. Ron Hubbard College University said e-meters really work, so they must."
-
that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion
This is also how I defined rhetoric as well. As articulated ad nauseum in this piece so far, Rhetoric is all encompassing and has a part in many things. While I might disagree that it is all powerful in all things as is hinted at, it is always there.
-
the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference? GORGIAS: In the case supposed:—yes. SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?
Question to rhetoric as a power.
-
And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do.
I know Boyle said the repetition is used for effect, but that doesn't work for me. I find it as rambling, and I start losing interest in what is said because I want to further the discussion. One could argue it is a lack of patience on my part, but I see it as "shit or get off the pot." Examples are not explanations. I know, I know... I am a stick in the mud
-
he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers
Gorgias's strong belief of rhetoric as a power of words (3).
-
he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!
Gorgias's strong belief of rhetoric as a power of words (2).
-
Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?
Definition of rhetoric (2 - revised).
-
rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion
Definition of rhetoric (1).
-
rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust
Definition of rhetoric (2).
-
is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect?
Question to definition (1).
-
if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.
Gorgias's strong belief of rhetoric as a power of words.
-
Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice,
a foretelling of his own, indisputable fate
-
The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast
The wise man is "a lover not a fighter" or, "call me anything but late for dinner". Early beginnings of contemporary expressions.
-
you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
presented a defense rather than answering the question.
-
here it changes from praise to product
-
And are we late for a feast?
skepticism already
-
And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!
Okay, the rhetorician is a better orator, but what about medical knowledge? Sure, the rhetorician could win over people unfamiliar with the medical field, but I doubt he would do so well with physicians.
-
GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.
He makes rhetoric sound so sinister.
-
Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.
Reminiscent of the section in the Encomium of Helen regarding persuasive discourse used for deception.
-
POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery? SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus.
Our modern day creators of baked confections would have your head for such words!
-
For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice?
Reminds me of Section VI in Dissoi Logoi.
-
SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?
Hefty repetition begins here from an earlier point in the discussion.
-
SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference? GORGIAS: In the case supposed:—yes.
Supports what I mentioned earlier. You don't need to understand it, just convince everyone else you do.
-
but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!
Heart of the matter. This is what it is.
-
When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not.
Not a proclaimed Rhetorician, like Gorgias here, no.
Though, rhetoric would have to show up in the discussions as to who makes the cut in the election. The physician being elected would have to make some sort argument as to why he's the best.
Rhetorician: The profession within a profession
-
What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?
He left off the good qualifier, in terms of what Socrates was saying about the greatest good above. It's not a greater good, it's just greater.
Also qualitative and moral alignment seem to have no role in Gorgias' definition, whereas I think Socrates is focusing on qualitative.
-
SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate? GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
I'm still stuck on this. Affixed and fascinated, but not stumped. The idea of attaching meaning to rhetoric is unfurling more and more to be entirely circular in logic.
-
And to understand that about which they speak?
I wouldn't go that far. I'm more inclined to believe that rhetoric enables men to speak, and to give everyone else listening the impression the speaker understands that about which they speak.
Maybe they do understand, but this understanding shouldn't be a prerequisite. An added incentive, as it were.
-
Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
Using rhetoric within rhetoric to make it more... rhetoric?
-
And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
Setting Up Repetition. If one agrees with A and believes in B etc etc then you will agree with the main point made. It's a logical fallacy, but a debate tactic we commonly see. It can be an effective tactic in relation to logic (seems paradoxical).
-
Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.'
It's interesting how if this were a friend on Facebook, you'd probably be aggravated by such bravado. Confidence and arrogance is a fine line, but with the power of Hindsight we can see it's justified. I wonder if it was used to boost his status or as a sign of confidence for more students?
-
Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we were to describe Gorgias.
I'm glad this is here. I began to feel a little lost in the reading, as if I wasn't catching on to the answer and was caught in word-salad. I'm no philosophy buff, so a lot of this is foreign to me.
-
CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?
I think this is where we stop. I will double check with the PDF for my own sake. This note is for my sake.
Tags
- distinction
- persuasion
- rhetoric
- Egghead
- AWaveofBabies
- rhetorician
- refute
- callicles
- behavior
- LearningAsIGo
- sidestepping
- Rhetoric
- Dissoi_Logoi
- Descriptive
- StickintheMud
- Authority
- LRonHubbard
- Logos
- politics
- argument
- Power
- conduct
- stoppingpoint
- OldManYellsatCloud
- sport
- BrainFunction
- dialogue
- visualrhetoric
- Randomaside
- clarification
- pursuit
- definition
- sacrates
- truth
- neuroscience
- selfinterested
- Inception
- reptition
- legs
- AwesomeX
- Encomium_of_Helen
- exhibition
- fairness
- verbal_sparring
- uses
- pathos
- sassfromsocrates
- BioshockwasAwesome
- gorgias
- human
- sophist
- LearningasIgo
- Biases
- Persuasion
- province
- circularlogic
- Definition
- define
- admiring_mind
- method
- LobstersforDinnerAgain
- Repetition
- socrates
- fate
- expression
- CaptainHindsight
- Gorgias
- NotPhilosophySavy
- injustice
- 3860
- defined
- LogicalFallacy
- NowWithPowerStach
- power
- Disagreement
- publicpolicy
- TheRoadisAttackingMe
Annotators
URL
-
-
caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.net
-
For the incantation's power, communicating with the soul's opinion, enchants and persuades and changes it, by trickery.
Our world is shaped by perceptions, defined by words.
-
for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.
Reason for argument.
-
hence it is not now easy to remember the past or consider the present or foretell the future; so that most people on most subjects furnish themselves with opinion as advisor to the soul.
Opinion vs. memory, as if memory were absolute, infallible, objective.
-
For one body many bodies of men came together, men greatly purposing great things, of whom some possessed great wealth, some the glory of ancient and noble lineage, some the vigor of personal strength, and others the power of acquired cleverness.
-
will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought.
Did Helen lack free will?
-
Fortune and plans of the gods and decrees of Necessity she did what she did, or abducted by force, or persuaded by speeches, <or conquered by Love>
Argument that higher powers absolve Helen of responsibility.
-
Encomium
"a speech or piece of writing that praises someone or something highly"
-
lying
I've come to understand "lying" as purposeful deceit, but in this case it seems to mean "misinformed." This may be due to error in translation, or perhaps ignorance was considered as bad as deception.
-
How then is it necessary to regard as just the blame of Helen, who either passionately in love or persuaded by discourse or abducted by force or constrained by divine constraints did the things she did, escaping responsibility every way?
If his argument is correct, how are we supposed to ever give blame or praise to someone's opinion? If we were to anaylze where the opinion comes from we would probably find both truth and error, which negates any responsibility of ever holding the opinion, which kind of contridicts having an opinion to begin with.
-
Accordingly, if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.
Appeal to logos
-
I myself wish to absolve this ill-reputed woman from responsibility, and to show that those who blame her are lying--and, having shown the truth, to put an end to ignorance.
The claim
-
for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.
Presenting his argument
-
By means of words, inspired incantations serve as bringers-on of pleasure and takers-off of pain. For the incantation's power, communicating with the soul's opinion, enchants and persuades and changes it, by trickery. Two distinct methods of trickery and magic are to be found: errors of soul, and deceptions of opinion.
Gorgias seems to be using rhetoric itself as an excuse for Helen, or using rhetoric as a rhetorical device.
-
The power of discourse stands in the same relation to the soul's organization as the pharmacopoeia does to the physiology of bodies.
This is an important sentiment, one that we might see repeating in other readings. In what ways is language a drug? In what ways does language intoxicate or heal?
-
And if persuasive discourse deceived her soul, it is not on that account difficult to defend her and absolve her of responsibility, thus: discourse is a great potentate, which by the smallest and most secret body accomplishes the most divine works; for it can stop fear and assuage pain and produce joy and make mercy abound.
Gorgias truly believes in the power of discourse; to persuade and induce action.
-
For if all people possessed memory concerning all things past, and awareness of all things present, and foreknowledge of all things to come
Another instance where memory is valorized as something having great worth if not power. It will be interesting to keep an eye on this as our readings unfold.
-
how is she not to be pitied rather than reviled?
This "rhetorical" question provokes a feeling of incompetence for those choosing to revile.
-
For it is not natural for the superior to be hindered by the inferior, but for the inferior to be ruled and led by the superior
Is this a form of chiasmus?
-
For it is clear that her mother was Leda and her father was in fact the god, but said to be mortal, Tyndareus and Zeus--of whom the one, by being, seemed, while the other, by speech, was disproved--and the one was the mightiest of men while the other was tyrant over all. Born of such parentage, she had godlike beauty, which having received she not inconspicuously retained.
Gorgias uses logos in an attempt to convince the audience that it was not, or could not have been, Helen's fault that she was "cursed" with such beauty. This implicitly places blame on the men who were tempted by her beauty.
-
It being required of the same man both to speak straight and to refute [crooked speech, one should refute] those blaming Helen, a woman concerning whom the testimony of those who are called poets has become univocal and unanimous--likewise the repute of her name, which has become a byword for calamities. And by bestowing some rationality on the discourse, I myself wish to absolve this ill-reputed woman from responsibility, and to show that those who blame her are lying--and, having shown the truth, to put an end to ignorance.
What ought to be done is followed with how it will be done.
-
I tried to put an end to the injustice of blame and ignorance of opinion; I wanted to write the discourse, Helen's encomium and my plaything.
Five arguments explained and proven both either right and wrong. I assume the author just wanted to understand, and explain each argument could be right and wrong. Even though, he gives every argument an opportunity; he still proves many of them wrong except Helena being persuaded. He argued for it by using all three: pathos how her opinion was persuaded. Ethos and logos were used by understanding the error of the soul.
I personally believed she was persuaded, because a great challenge for a man is to persuade a woman to fall in love with you, but if you are a prince and have a large sum of wealth that would help as well.
-
The order proper to a city is being well-manned; to a body, beauty; to a soul, wisdom; to a deed, excellence; and to a discourse, truth--and the opposites of these are disorder. And the praiseworthy man and woman and discourse and work and city-state and deed one must honor with praise, while one must assign blame to the unworthy--for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.
It appears that Gorgias is self-justifying his forthcoming backing of Helen. This is his pre-opening argument.
-
But if it is a human disease and an error of the soul, it ought not to be blamed as a sin but ought rather to be accounted a misfortune.
Again, he points out the error of the soul, which is being used in two different arguments. To which I am assuming it is going to be used again because love and stupidity go hand in hand for the, error of the soul.
-
For if all people possessed memory concerning all things past, and awareness of all things present, and foreknowledge of all things to come, discourse would not be similarly similar; hence it is not now easy to remember the past or consider the present or foretell the future; so that most people on most subjects furnish themselves with opinion as advisor to the soul.
This would be our error of the soul to which we, the mortal men, proceed to enjoy and despises this. "furnish themselves with opinion as advisor to the soul." This part is distinct that it tells me, human being look unto themselves and their memories to find answers. However, with the lack of not remembering the past and not predicting the future all humans are at an error; that which rhetoricians take advantage of and persuade.
-
Two distinct methods of trickery and magic are to be found: errors of soul, and deceptions of opinion. Those who have persuaded and do persuade anyone about anything are shapers of lying discourse
Shapers of lying discouse, now I do know what I am going to specialize in. It seems after reading the "Two-Fold Argument" paper, it shows that rhetoric has a two sides good and bad.
-
for it can stop fear and assuage pain and produce joy and make mercy abound.
I had a good laugh at this written sentence proving it shows how rhetoric can be used in any way that it is required to inform or deceive.
-
For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him.
Quite interesting that the author uses an ethos, or an emotional way to persuade you that she is a victim, so that you may pity her instead of reviling her.
-
But truly whenever the painters perfectly complete one body and figure from many colors and bodies, they delight the sight;
Do artists and does art operate within the same societal structures an customs? Or does it exist outside of it?
-
Now in the first case, the responsible party deserves the responsibility. For the will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought. For it is not natural for the superior to be hindered by the inferior, but for the inferior to be ruled and led by the superior--for the superior to lead and the inferior to follow. And a god is superior to a human being in force, intelligence, etcetera. Accordingly, if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.
This is a logos argument using deductive logic quite tasty.
-
For the strong habitual force of law is banished because of the fear prompted by the sight, which makes one heedless both of what is judged by custom to be admirable, and of the good that comes about by victory.
Fear supersedes law?
-
I myself wish to absolve this ill-reputed woman from responsibility, and to show that those who blame her are lying--and, having shown the truth, to put an end to ignorance.
This is what the author is going to argue about. Personal I think Helena made her own decision to leave, I disagree to believe that she was persuaded because given the time and events. Helena was royalty to a certain extent and has been tutored by many people; meaning she is educated. She must have had an understanding to what should have caused if she left. I then again am arguing from a logos point of view which would need more evidence.
-
Persuasion belonging to discourse shapes the soul at will:
Is persuasion then a manipulator in reference to the paragraph above? Or is it a means to find certain truths? (Or maybe I'm off all together)
-
-for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.
An argument of morality is started off. How does one decide on what is the order of a city, or what is praiseworthy versus what to blame?
-
For it is not natural for the superior to be hindered by the inferior, but for the inferior to be ruled and led by the superior--for the superior to lead and the inferior to follow. And a god is superior to a human being in force, intelligence, etcetera.
The hierarchy of power, gives little opportunity for the uprise of 'man' or community. How does one prove to be superior if they are not born as one?
-
The order proper to a city is being well-manned; to a body, beauty; to a soul, wisdom; to a deed, excellence; and to a discourse, truth--and the opposites of these are disorder.
Sets the standards for a proper city. Point of reference to how things will be compared and evaluated.
-
By this discourse I have removed infamy from a woman;
Or through some of that aforementioned persuasion discourse, he has tried to remove infamy.
-
If Love, <being> a god, <has> the divine power of gods, how could the weaker being have the power to reject this and to ward it off?
More of that faulting divinity instead of ourselves.
-
If it was love that brought all these things to pass, she escapes without difficulty from the blame for the sin alleged to have taken place.
Love DOES conquer all, apparently.
-
The power of discourse stands in the same relation to the soul's organization as the pharmacopoeia does to the physiology of bodies.
Early jabs at psychology?
-
Accordingly what cause hinders Helen ... praise-hymn came ... similarly would ... not being young ... just as if ... means of forcing ... force was abducted. For the mind of Persuasion was able ... and even if necessity ... the form will have ... it has the same power.
Why ellipses? Omission? Redaction? Or simply translation and/or stylistic?
-
But opinion, being slippery and unsteady, surrounds those who rely on it with slippery and unsteady successes.
No wonder the Sophist prioritized and valued memory.
-
And if persuasive discourse deceived her soul, it is not on that account difficult to defend her and absolve her of responsibility, thus: discourse is a great potentate, which by the smallest and most secret body accomplishes the most divine works; for it can stop fear and assuage pain and produce joy and make mercy abound. And I shall show that these things are so: (9) explanation to the audience, by means of opinion, is required. Discourse having meter I suppose and name (in the general sense) to be poetry. Fearful shuddering and tearful pity and sorrowful longing come upon those who hear it, and the soul experiences a peculiar feeling, on account of the words, at the good and bad fortunes of other people's affairs and bodies. But come, let me proceed from one section to another.
Persuasive discourse tends to further murky the already muddy waters any distinction of morality and Rhetoric.
-
For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him.
-
if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.
And if you don't, she remains infamous all the same.
-
For the will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought.
More shifting of the blame. It's all the Gods' fault, isn't it?
-
And they were all there together out of contentious love and unconquerable ambition.
All because of this aforementioned unearthly beauty.
-
Born of such parentage, she had godlike beauty
We're shifting the blame here. Apparently it was divinity's fault that men couldn't help themselves around her.
-
He who persuaded (as constrainer) did wrong; while she who was persuaded (as one constrained by means of the discourse) is wrongly blamed.
It's an interesting point that he makes here. He essentially absolves anyone tricked by rhetoric from any blame and puts it entirely onto the rhetorician. Doesn't this seem like too broad a generalization? For example, is every person who takes Wikipedia information as fact absolved from blame? Some may not understand it's nature, so they may not carry blame. But what about those who understand that it could be bologna and choose to believe it anyway?
-
By means of words, inspired incantations serve as bringers-on of pleasure and takers-off of pain. For the incantation's power, communicating with the soul's opinion, enchants and persuades and changes it, by trickery. Two distinct methods of trickery and magic are to be found: errors of soul, and deceptions of opinion. Those who have persuaded and do persuade anyone about anything are shapers of lying discourse.
-
Either by the wishes of Fortune and plans of the gods and decrees of Necessity she did what she did, or abducted by force, or persuaded by speeches, <or conquered by Love>.
I feel like he's forgetting about logos by not even mentioning the possibility that she was a responsible agent in what happened. All of these examples show her as victim, but I feel like he could have made his argument much stronger by acknowledging her possible choice and arguing against it.
-
how is she not to be pitied rather than reviled? For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him
Argument for cause 2: force.
-
How then is it necessary to regard as just the blame of Helen, who either passionately in love or persuaded by discourse or abducted by force or constrained by divine constraints did the things she did, escaping responsibility every way?
Summary of the arguments.
-
If Love, <being> a god, <has> the divine power of gods, how could the weaker being have the power to reject this and to ward it off?
Argument for cause 4: love.
-
if she was persuaded by discourse, she did no wrong but rather was unfortunate
Argument for cause 3: persuasive discourse.
-
if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy
The argument for cause 1: God.
-
I shall set out the causes through which Helen's journey to Troy was likely to come about
The purpose of his arguments.
-
And if persuasive discourse deceived her soul, it is not on that account difficult to defend her and absolve her of responsibility, thus: discourse is a great potentate
There seems to be a pattern in his argument; the orator begins to defend Helena against more or less uncontroversial claims and transitions into more disputable ones.
-
Accordingly the barbarian assailant deserves to meet with barbarous assault, by speech and custom and deed--deserves to be blamed in speech, dishonored by custom, and penalized indeed. She who was forced and bereft of fatherland and orphaned of friends--how is she not to be pitied rather than reviled? For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him.
Vilifying an imaginary perpetrator and portraying her as (a "possible") victim . Seems to be intending to stir up some pathos and appeal to ethos.
-
Now in the first case, the responsible party deserves the responsibility. For the will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought. For it is not natural for the superior to be hindered by the inferior, but for the inferior to be ruled and led by the superior--for the superior to lead and the inferior to follow. And a god is superior to a human being in force, intelligence, etcetera. Accordingly, if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.
Appeal to logos
-
Having now finished the first section, I shall advance to the beginning of the next section, and I shall set out the causes through which Helen's journey to Troy was likely to come about.
Interesting the orator (I assume this is a speech) flags the division of sections so directly.
-
The order proper to a city is being well-manned; to a body, beauty; to a soul, wisdom; to a deed, excellence; and to a discourse, truth--and the opposites of these are disorder. And the praiseworthy man and woman and discourse and work and city-state and deed one must honor with praise, while one must assign blame to the unworthy--for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.
Appeal to ethos
-
-
caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.netDissoi Logoi66
-
Again, it is the difference between who the act is against and their circumstance.
-
And in saying this, they appear to be making a small addition, "(the) right moment" or "the wrong one," so that the situation is no longer the same.
So things seem to be the same, but the moment differs, so they are essentially different things.
-
From these remarks it is clear that the same statement is false at the time when falsehood is present in it and true at the time when truth is present (just the way a man is the same person when he is a child and a young man and an adult and an old man.)'
Is this saying something about truths or falsehood with age?
-
But to this too an opposite argument is put forward: that the just and the unjust are different things, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named. For instance, if anyone should ask those who say that unjust and just are the same whether they have yet done anything just for their parents, they will say yes. But then they have done something unjust, because they admit that unjust and just are the same thing.
Just does not equal unjust, but a single action could be considered either.
-
(3) Therefore from this one example it is just to tell lies and to deceive one's parents. And, in fact, to steal the belongings of one's friends and to use force against those one loves most is just. (4) For instance, if a member of the household is in some sort of grief or trouble and intends to destroy himself with a sword or a rope or some other thing, it is right, isn't it, to steal these things, if possible, and, if one should come in too late and catch the person with the thing in his hand, to take it away by force?
-
To sum up, everything done at the right time is seemly and everything done at the wrong time is disgraceful.
The right time, or the right place?
-
Thus all things are the same. (4) A talent is heavier than a mina and lighter than two talents; therefore the same thing is both heavier and lighter.
Basically, it's all relative.
-
nothing is always seemly or always disgraceful, but the right occasion takes the same things and makes them disgraceful and then alters them and makes them seemly.
This section re-emphasizes the authors point throughout the essay, that situation and place makes all the difference in how we perceive something to be.
-
a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person.
I think this brings up a good point that situation plays a big role in what we perceive to be good or bad. As situation changes, what we once perceived to be good could be seen as bad, and vice versa.
-
We learn our words in this fashion and we don't know who our teachers are
How do we know what we know is true? An epistemological question that reinforced the notion of absolute truth not existing.
-
And what about breaking an oath: suppose a man is captured by the enemy and takes a firm oath that, if he is set free, he will betray his city: would this man do right if he kept his oath? (7) I don't think so, but rather if he should save his city and his friends and the temples of his fathers by breaking it.
Catch-22. In this instance utilitarianism comes to mind; what does the most good for the most people?
-
At least if people had brought horses or cows or sheep or men, they would not have taken away anything else. Nor, again, if they had brought gold would they have taken away brass, nor if they had brought silver would they have taken away lead. (28) Do they then take away seemly things in exchange for disgraceful ones ? Now really, if anyone had brought an ugly (man), would he take him away handsome? They give as witnesses the poets (who) wrote to give pleasure and not for the sake of truth.
So the limitations on relativism are things having to do with wealth/money and beauty...seems to imply that these are universally valued or viewed the same.
-
everything done at the right time is seemly and everything done at the wrong time is disgraceful
This reminds me of the Old Testament: "To every thing there is a season... A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up."
-
Some say the seemly is one thing and the disgraceful another, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named, and others say that the seemly and disgraceful are the same.
This seems like a chicken-egg type argument. Who invented the idea that a certain action was disgraceful? and who perpetuated the idea or acted in opposition until the majority followed suit?
-
WAY too much of this article is listing examples of what he's talking about.
-
And, further, take the case of various contests, athletic, musical, and military: in a race in the stadium, for instance, victory is good for the winner but bad for the losers. (7) The same holds true for wrestlers and boxers, and for all those who take part in musical contests: for instance, (victory) in lyreplaying is good for the winner but bad for the losers. (8) In the case of war (and I shall speak of the most recent events first) the victory of the Spartans which they won over the Athenians and their allies was good for the Spartans but bad for the Athenians and their allies.
It can be argued that loss in competition and war can be good for the losers as losing can highlight certain weaknesses to focus on in order to improve and strengthen them. Although only time can tell, loss in war sometimes results in a better outcome for more people. For example, Kamehameha was triumphant in war, but those he defeated became more united and it ultimately led to more peace in what later became the Kingdom of Hawaii. Joseph of Egypt's apparent setbacks (losses) ultimately led to his becoming 2nd in command in all of Egypt.
-
For instance, suppose you need to remember the name " Chrysippos ", you must connect it with chrusos (gold) and hippos (horse). (5) Or another example: if you need to remember the name " Pyrilampes " you must connect it with pyr (fire) and lampein (to shine).
early mnemonic action
-
The greatest and fairest discovery has been found to be memory; it is useful for everything, for wisdom as well as for the conduct of life.
And also for establishing precedents.
-
the man who knows the art of rhetoric will also know how to speak correctly on every subject.
Hence Lawyers. Oh, and politicians.
-
and ought to choose suitable people to be in command of the army and others to be the law-officers, and so on.
And aren't the suitable really unsuitable?
-
it is that wisdom and virtue can neither be taught nor learned.
But can it still be acquired?
-
Because if anyone should ask those who say that the same statement is both false and true whether their own statement is false or true, if they answer " false " then it is clear that the true and false are two different things, and if they answer " true ", then this same statement is also false.
Liar's paradox?
-
(1) Two-fold argument's are also put forward concerning the false and the true, concerning which one person says that a false statement is one thing and a true statement another, while others say the true statement is the same as the false. (2) And I hold the latter view : in the first place because they are both expressed in the same words, and secondly, because whenever a statement is made, if things (should) turn out to be as stated, then the statement is true, but if they should not turn out to be as stated, the same statement is false.
The there is no truth until it's true paradox
-
My opponents would declare that it is right and just to do these things to one's enemies but disgraceful and wicked to do so to one's friends. But how is it just to do so to one's enemies and not to one's dearest friends?
The wavy morality of rhetoric in action.
-
if disgraceful and seemly are really the same thing.
Reminiscent of Gorgias, "Nothing is or exists."
-
And I am not saying what the good is, but I am trying to explain that the bad and the good are not the same but that each is distinct from the other.
Key Point
-
I think it would not be clear what was good and what was bad if they were just the same and one did not differ from the other; in fact such a situation would be extraordinary.
And yet we have to make said distinction.
-
Some say that the good is one thing and the bad another, but others say that they are the same, and a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person.
morality and rhetoric
-
And if you investigate in this way, you will see another law for mortals: nothing is always seemly or always disgraceful, but the right occasion takes the same things and makes them disgraceful and then alters them and makes them seemly
Right & wrong, seemly & disgraceful are contextual. Not just in opinions of individual, but in communities, and institutions. Why do we love sinners who have sought redemption? There acts are no less disgraceful or sinister, but "remorse" is enough to shift public opinion. Right and wrong have the value we give them, which is forever changing.
-
democratic
How might the author's sense of democracy be defined? Just for interest's sake.
-
And I don't say that wisdom and virtue are teachable, but that these proofs do not satisfy me.
Yep, proof is tough. So, rhetorically, how do people persuade without adequate proof?
-
And even if a particular man did not teach, this would not prove anything, but if a single man did teach, this would be evidence that teaching is possible.
Issue with forming theories and finding Truth - we don't know all the particulars in the universe. i.e. it's easier to disprove (as the author's doing here) than to prove.
-
"Does he exist with respect to some particular thing, or just in general?" Then if someone denies that the man exists, he is mistaken, because he is treating (the particular and) universal senses as being the same. Because everything exists in some sense.
Aha!
-
And we ought to bring up the question whether it is the sane or the demented who speak at the right moment. For whenever anyone asks this question they answer that the two groups say the same things, but that the wise speak at the right moment and the demented at the wrong one. (10) And in saying this, they appear to be making a small addition, "(the) right moment" or "the wrong one," so that the situation is no longer the same.
Is the author defining sanity/dementia by the "right moment" or "the right moment" by sanity/dementia?
-
A talent is heavier than a mina and lighter than two talents; therefore the same thing is both heavier and lighter.
Important point for the whole argument - the concepts discussed are relative to the world around them.
-
But to this too an opposite argument is put forward: that the just and the unjust are different things, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named.
Good and bad, seemly and unseemly, just and unjust, seem to me to be concepts of individual and social morality, not innate characteristics of an action. In other words: because people project moral convictions on things that happen, and people don't all have the same moral code, the moral judgement for that occurrence won't be constant for all humanity. So, "the thing named" doesn't need to have an innate "justice" or "injustice" for the two words to be descriptors of different concepts.
-
Some say that the good is one thing and the bad another, but others say that they are the same, and a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person.
These two concepts don't seem to actually oppose each other, if broken down to the basic arguments. The first argument is that good and bad are separate things. The second seems to be that the two concepts are subjective, and therefore meaningless. However, because they can still have meaning from the perspective of the individual, it doesn't seem logical to say subjectivity=meaningless division between the terms.
-
Casey, when I click on your username I get the page of "Annotations by user 'caseyboyle' ", but the page is blank. Why is that?
-
as a connected whole. (4) The third step is: whenever you hear something, connect it with what you know already
-
The greatest and fairest discovery has been found to be memory; it is useful for everything, for wisdom as well as for the conduct of life
But can't memory prejudice us, become inaccurate, or narrow our perspective?
-
And if he knows how to play the flute, he will always be able to play the flute, whenever it is necessary to do this. (9) And a man who knows how to give a judgment ought to have a right understanding of the just, because this is what cases are about
False analogy. The metaphor doesn't cross over, too different. But even if it did, a flute player can't play every genre of music so he has limitations, just like a judge can't always be suitable and just.
-
And, first of all, how will it not be possible for a man who knows about the nature of all things to act rightly in every case and (teach the city) to do so too?
But action does not always follow knowledge. Let's forget that it's impossible to know the nature of all things, but even today, many know about the harmful effects of smoking and still choose to act contrary to that knowledge.
-
We learn our words in this fashion and we don't know who our teachers are
We learn through association/experience
-
it is that wisdom and virtue can neither be taught nor learne
Platonic. He is refuting common ideas of the time.
-
Does he exist with respect to some particular thing, or just in general?" Then if someone denies that the man exists, he is mistaken, because he is treating (the particular and) universal senses as being the same. Because everything exists in some sense
Universal vs. particular. Truth vs. truth
-
For whenever anyone asks this question they answer that the two groups say the same things, but that the wise speak at the right moment and the demented at the wrong one
The importance of timing/delivery
-
As a result of the argument they say that if a thing comes to pass, the statement they make is true, but if it does not, then the statement is false.
Too simplistic. What about things which can't come to pass or be proved?
-
I would be the only person making a true statement since I am the only person who is one
Speaker/context play an essential role in the meaning/truth of words.
-
both expressed in the same words
Gorgias, words are both a medicine and a poison.
-
As for the poets, they write their poems to give men pleasure and not for the sake of truth.
Why does he continually tag on references to poets?
-
God does not stand aloof from just deceit, and There are times when god respects an opportunity for lies.
Then does God lie and deceive man? How does this impact religion/power?
Again, evoking higher powers to show it is the same at all levels.
-
And to murder one's nearest and dearest is right: in the case of Orestes and of Alcmaeon, even the god answered that they were right to have done as they did.
Good vs. greater good. Complicates morality.
-
just
Strange view of justice. It seems to be equated with right and conscience not the Christian definition.
-
Take the example of parents: suppose one's father or mother ought to drink or eat a remedy and is unwilling to do so, isn't it just to give the remedy in a gruel or drink and to deny that it is in it
Does the same go for rhetoric? Should we sugar coat topics?
-
And they say that if a group of people should collect from all the nations of the world their disgraceful customs and then should call everyone together and tell each man to select what he thinks is seemly, everything would be taken away as belonging to the seemly things. I would be surprised if things which were disgraceful when they were collected should turn out to be seemly and not what they were when they came
Twists/extends the same metaphor from earlier but using to explain an entirely different point
-
wrong
So what is the right time? He just explained that there is no single right, so how can we figure this out if it's all subjective?
-
handsome
So is it disgraceful to be ugly? He uses handsome/good/seemly/white/right/etc. as almost interchangeable or synonyms. Needs better distinctions.
-
nothing is always seemly or always disgraceful
No absolutes
-
And I think that if someone should order all men to make a single heap of everything that each of them regards as disgraceful and then again to take from the collection what each of them regards as seemly, not a thing (would) be left, but they would all divide up everything, because not all men are of the same opinion.
Individuality/variability even in the same society/ community.
-
the Greeks regard these things as disgraceful and against the la
Reveals law is separate from taboo. Society and law are 2 distinct governing forces.
-
appears to be seeml
Unconcerned with morality. Relativity.
-
wicked
Now he's switched to using wicked and admirable. Are these ideas interchangeable to him?
-
to the Spartans
Highlighting the societal/cultural nature of seemliness.
-
And it is seemly to do good to one's friends but disgraceful to do so to one's enemies
Christianity would disagree.
-
Some say the seemly is one thing and the disgraceful another, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named, and others say that the seemly and disgraceful are the same
IS the connection between good/seemly and bad/disgraceful conscious? It seems there should be a distinction because one is more general while the other is cultural/situational.
-
And I think a person who says these things would be unable to answer if anyone should question him as follows: " Just tell me, did your parents ever do you any good? " He would answer, " Yes, a great deal." " Then you owe them for a great deal of evil if the good is really the same as the bad."
There is some truth to this. The argument makes a good case for the dual-nature of human acts and their ensuing impacts. We live with the dual impacts of all that influenced our developing minds in childhood.
Another branch of the topic/argument might be "intention vs. outcome".
-