638 Matching Annotations
  1. Mar 2018
    1. It then became necessary to settle the number of members tor the Upper House, and the more so because the Upper House was intended to be the means whereby certain local interests and local rights would be protected in the General Legislature, For this reason it was contended that while the principle of Representation by Population might be properly enough extended to the Lower House, equality of territorial representation should be preserved in the Upper House; and it was proposed in its formation, that the Confederation should be divided into three large districts, Upper Canada being one. Lower Canada another, and the Maritime Provinces the third. Newfoundland not having joined the preliminary Conference, arrangements were made for its coming in with the additional number of four members.

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. It would not become them to object to the nominative plan, because the members for the Upper House would be nominated by the Crown on the recommendation of the General Government. He might say it here, because it was said by everybody outside, that in the event of any thing like injustice being attempted towards the British population of Lower Canada by their French Canadian fellow-subjects, —they would moat unquestionably look for remedy and redress at the hands of the General Government, who would hare the power of causing their interests to be represented in the Upper House of the General Legislature.

      §§.24 and 33 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. Under these circumstances it was believed that the nominative plan in some respects offered greater advantages than the elective principle, and it was decided that we should again revert to nomination by the crown.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. Therefore, as far as Canada was concerned, he was not aware that they could say that the principle of an elective Legislative Council had proved in any degree a failure. There was no doubt that, in some respects, the elective principle was attended with difficulties and objections. It had been found that complaint was made that the expense connected with the elections in many districts was such as to debar many able men from attempting to come forward as candidates. There was no doubt that to canvass a district composed of three constituencies, each sending a member to the Lower House, was a most formidable undertaking, and one from which many excellent and worthy men naturally shrank. An election for one was bad enough, but to have an election for three constituencies, certainly must be three times as bad.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. He did not think that in Canada they had any cause to regret the change which had been made from the nominative to the elective plan. The circumstances under which that change took place were probably familiar to most of them. The Leg. Council had, from one cause or another, under the nominative system, fallen into public discredit.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    6. In the constitution of the Legislative Council it would be observed that the principle which now obtained in Canada, of electing be members of that branch, was proposed to be done away with and that we would again revert to nomination by the Crown.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    7. to the form of government which should be adopted for the administration of the general affairs of the whole union, and that form was copied almost literally from the system existing in the several Provinces.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    8. having decided that the Federative plan, as he had briefly endeavored to explain it, was the one which ought to be adopted, was whether they ought to adopt the mode of government which they now saw in use in the United States, or whether they should endeavor to incorporate in the Union the principles under which the British Constitution had been for so many years happily administered ; and upon this point no difference of opinion arose in the Conference. They all preferred that system which they had enjoyed for the last eighteen years, by which the Crown was allowed to choose its own advisers ; but those advisers must be in harmony with the well understood wishes of the country as expressed by its representatives in Parliament.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    9. It was therefore proposed, that in the Federation of the British North American Provinces the system of government best adapted under existing circumstances to protect the diversified interests of the several Provinces and secure efficiency, harmony and permanency in the working of the Union, would be a General Government charged with matters of common interest to the whole country, and Local Governments for each of the Canadas and for the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, charged with the control of local matters in their respective sections, provision being made for the admission into the Union on equitable terms of Newfoundland, the North-west Territory, British Columbia, and Vancouver.

      Preamble, §§. 91, 92 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    10. a Governor General, who should be appointed by our Gracious Sovereign.

      §.10 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    11. They were unanimously of the opinion that this system was more likely to operate for the benefit of the people than any attempt to introduce the American system of Government. They certainly believed that they enjoyed more practical freedom under the British Sovereign than they could under a dictator who was chosen for only four years. He believed that the administration of the country could be carried on with more advantage to the people and more in harmony with their wishes if that administration was obliged constantly to retain the confidence of the people ; and if the moment the people ceased to have confidence in those in power, they must give place to others who would be able to govern the country more in harmony with their wishes. The secret of the freedom of the British nation from revolution and disturbance was that the people had at any time the power of making the Government harmonise with their wishes, —it was, in fact, the greatest safeguard the British Constitution gave. No government In Canada could venture to set public opinion at defiance. No government could exist, except for a few short months, unless they had the people at their back ; for although parliamentary majorities could be preserved for a short time against the wishes of the majority of the people still it was impossible to deny that public opinion was, in a complete sense, represented by the opinion or the members of the Legislature. They all knew perfectly well that their representatives were chosen from amongst themselves, and he trusted that we should never in this country lose that control which had been so happily exercised by the people over the government of the day. It was, therefore, concluded that in forming an Union of these Provinces it was desirable, in the interest of the people at large, that the system of responsible government now in force should be maintained.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    12. each Legislature, and especially each Local Legislature—acting within the bounds prescribed by the Imperial Parliament and kept within these bounds by the Courts of Law if necessity should arise for their interference—would find in the working of the plan of Federation a check sufficient to prevent it from transcending its legitimate authority.

      Preamble, §§. 91, 92 and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    13. in laying a basis for the union of these Provinces, it was not proposed that the General Government should have merely a delegation of powers from the Local Governments, but it was proposed to go back to the fountain head, from which all our legislative powers were derived—the Imperial Parliament—and seek at their hands a measure which should designate as far as possible the general powers to be exercised by the General Legislature, and also those to be exercised by the Local Legislatures, reserving to the General Legislature all subjects not directly committed to the control of the Local bodies.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    14. that the reservation of what were popularly known as State rights had been to a great extent the cause of the difficulties which were now agitating that great country.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    15. liar. But it must not be supposed, on account of the use of that term, that in the Union now proposed to be established it was intended to imitate the Federal Union which we had seen existing in the United States. In the United States, the general Government exercised only such powers as were delegated to it by the State Governments at the time the Union was formed. Each State was regarded as a sovereign power, and it chose for the common interest to delegate to the general Government the right of deciding upon certain questions, which were expressly stated All the undefined powers, all the sovereign rights, remained with the Governments of the several States

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    16. having unfortunately for our common interests comparatively little intercourse with each other, the difficulty was felt that, if we attempted to make a Legislative Union of these Provinces in the first instance, the dread, in the case of the Lower Provinces and probably of many among ourselves that peculiar interests might be swamped and certain feelings and prejudices outraged and trampled upon, was so great that such a measure could not be entertained and we were compelled to look for what was sought in a form of government that would commit all subjects of general interest to a general Government and Legislature, reserving for local Legislatures and Governments such subjects as from their nature required to been trusted to those bodies. (Cheers.) The term Federation was used with reference to the proposed Union, because it was that with which the public mind was most fami

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    17. to determine whether it should be a Federal or a Legislative Union. A Legislative Union, as they were all aware, had certain advantages over one based on the Federal system. It was a more complete union, and implied a more direct action and control of the government over the interests of the people at large. And, where a people were homogeneous, and their interests of such a character as to admit of – niformity of action with regard to them, it could not be doubted that a government on the principle of a Legislative Union was the one which probably operated most beneficially for all

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    18. the Hon. Mr. Brown and two other gentlemen representing the Liberal party of Upper Canada had entered, to address themselves to the preparation of a measure that would partake of a federal character as far as necessary with respect to local measures, while it would preserve the existing union in respect to measures common to all ; that they would endeavor, if necessary, to strike out a federal union for Canada alone, but that at the same time they would attempt, in considering a change in the Constitution of this country, to bring the Lower Provinces in under the same bond, as they were already under the same Sovereign. It was highly proper that, before touching the edifice of Government that had been raised in Canada they should address the statesmen of the Lower Provinces, and try to induce them to form a common system If it were found impossible to have a legislative union of all the British American Provinces, then they could reserve to the local governments of the several Provinces the control of such subjects as concerned them, while the rest should be committed to the cue of the General Government

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    19. should have been a concession to Upper Canada, of additional members in proportion to its population, but that concession would, as be had already remarked, have been an invasion of the Federal principle, contained in the Union Act, and would unquestionably have been represented to the uttermost by a large proportion if not by the whole of Lower Canada.

      §§. 3 and 12 of the Union Act, 1840; §§. 51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    20. indeed, extend them in such a way as to promote the peace contentment, and prosperity of the people, at the same time preserving in the new constitution those rights they were afraid would be subjected to injustice.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

  2. Jan 2018
    1. Plus qu’une vérification des informations, la multiplication des fakes appelle un travail d’éditorialisation, qui recontextualise les contenus partagés en explicitant les logiques transactionnelles[+] NoteVoir les travaux de Manuel ZACKLAD, notamment Transactions communicationnelles symboliques et communauté d'action : réflexions préliminaires , colloque de Cerisy "Connaissance Activité Organisation », 2003 ou « La théorie des transactions intellectuelles : une approche gestionnaire et cognitive pour le traitement du COS », Intellectica, Paris, ARCo,2000/1, 30, pp. 195-222. [9] qui les motivent. Cela suppose non seulement de reconnaître la multiplicité des points de vue, mais aussi leur mobilité dans l’espace et le temps en tant que productions sociales situées, le vrai n’étant que le frottement continu des informations et des contre-informatio

      On a effectivement intérêt à s'outiller pour être en mesure de qualifier les "logiques transactionnelles" à l'oeuvre en sous-texte de nos discussions (comme des dispositifs tels que hypothèse.is nous aident à le faire). Cependant, je me demande quelle conscience commune nous pourrons cultiver de l'impact de notre manière de vivre l'allure (esthétique) de nos délibérations. Car, cela me semble un horizon à viser en plus (outre la maîtrise des moyens techniques de la construction de connaissances partageables) si nous espérons que notre collaboration (et co-éditorialisation) permette de dégager des conclusions relativement stables - provisoires ou non. Si nous voulons cultiver un milieu propice à élaborer une véritable sphère intersubjective (un espace formé de valeurs et structuré autour de certains repères), la dynamique même de nos échanges doit aussi faire l'objet d'une éducation à la fois théorique et technique et, de ce point de vue, il importe de transformer la crise de la vérité (bien réelle) qui affecte notre société en une opportunité concrète de nous rappeler l'utilité d'une formation critique. Mais, cette occasion de bâtir de manière concertée des bases pour une nouvelle co-appartenance ne portera tous ses fruits que si nous articulons à l'enjeu de la formation à une littératie numérique (où la fonction de l'éditorialisation dans la constitution de l'environnement demeure à définir), le souci pour la sensibilisation du public en général (et du monde de l'éducation en particulier) à la question du rôle du développement d'un sens esthétique dans l'effort collectif pour constituer du sens en communs.

  3. Jun 2017
    1. Prudence indeed will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light & transient causes;

      [I have no doubt that Jefferson studied The genuine principles of the ancient Saxon, or English constitution, Volume 4 prior to writing the Declaration of Independence]

      (https://books.google.com/books?id=jatbAAAAQAAJ&dq=Prudence%20indeed%20will%20dictate%20that%20governments&pg=PA41#v=onepage&q=Prudence%20indeed%20will%20dictate%20that%20governments&f=false)

      <iframe frameborder="0" scrolling="no" style="border:0px" src="https://books.google.com/books?id=jatbAAAAQAAJ&dq=Prudence%20indeed%20will%20dictate%20that%20governments&pg=PA1&output=embed" width=500 height=500></iframe>

    1. Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that Quebecers have been denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development.

      International Law declarations would require some form of exploitation, oppression or exploitation to be proved. In general, the bar would be high for this belief -- as in Quebec citizens being refused the right to vote, for instance.

    2. The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.

      A referendum cannot be used to unilaterally declare independence.

  4. Apr 2017
    1. qualified voters

      "Qualified voters" meant almost exclusively white men. As the former colonies began the process of writing state constitutions, debates over who should be included as a "qualified voter" often divided conventions. Vermont and Pennsylvania had two of the most liberal constitutions. Vermont permitted all men, regardless of color, to vote, while Pennsylvania permitted all white men to vote regardless of income. Other states, like Maryland, had much more restrictive qualifications for voting and required that free white men also hold property.

  5. Feb 2017
    1. "progressive approach"

      Sounds a bit like our discussion on the Constitution/recycling. We use such laws as the basis of our society, yet we are human, every scenario and every circumstance is extreme in its differences.

    1. .

      1) How old do you have to be to be in The House of Representatives?

      2) How many years of citizenship do you need?

      3) T/F - You do not need to live in the state you represent.

      4) T/F - You must be born in America to serve in the House.

  6. Nov 2016
  7. Jan 2016
    1. The explicit right to a free press it seems to me, though I’m no constitutional scholar, should translate today to an infrastructure not only for publishing information but for protecting those publishing, providing, or consuming it, as well as those financially supporting its publication. Just as the rights to speech, assembly, and petition should translate to online infrastructure in which discourse at all levels is protected and groups can meaningfully express their views (let alone the fourth amendment right to protection of your own information). With these essential rights, a democracy can function and use its mechanism of governance to create new rights and protections.
  8. Oct 2015
    1. I. Introduction

      Week 11 Vidoe Lecture

      Study Questions:

      What do Daniel Shays and his followers want? How do they see their efforts as an extension of the Revolution?

      Describe the split in the Constitutional Convention over representation. How was it resolved?

      What were some of the disagreements between by the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists in the debates over ratification of the Constitution?

  9. Feb 2014
    1. The U.S. social contract establishes a utilitarian basis for protection of intellectual property rights: protection as a means of encouraging innovation.

      The social contract of the US Constitution provides a utilitarian basis for protection of intellectual property rights.

    2. As intellectual property lacks scarcity, and the protection of it fails the Lockean Proviso, there is no natural right to intellectual property. As such, the justification for intellectual property rights arises from the social con tract, and in the case of the United States, the Constitution.

      The justification for intellectual property from the social contract established by the US Constitution; it otherwise has no justification by natural right because it fails the Lockean Proviso.

    3. As such, the conclusion is that intellectual property is not ‘property’ in the Lockean sense. If it were, then intellectual property protections would deserve no mo re policy debate than whether police ought to chase thieves. As it is not, the justification for intel lectual property must be sought in the social contract. As noted above, the social contract for the United State s, the Constitution, specifies in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 that Congress may pass laws “ To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec t ive Writings and Discoveries.” This background clarifies the discussion considerably : • There is no natural law basis for intellectual property rights • Thus, intellectual property rights must be provided for by the social contract. • The U.S. social contract as elucidated in the Constitution specifies a utilitarian basis for intellectual property rights (“to promote the progress... by securing for limited times...")
      • There is no natural law basis for intellectual property rights

      • Intellectual property rights must be provided for by the social contract

      • The US Constitution as a social contract specifies a utilitarian basis for intellectual property rights.

    4. U.S. intellectual property law originates (as law) from the Constitution: Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution makes copyright and patent law possible (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 4   respective Writings and Discoveries”) ,

      Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 makes copyright and patent law possible.

    5. The U . S . Co nstitution firmly grounds the proper role of intellectual property policy as utilitarian .

      Identify where/how this ground is established.

    1. I n B u r r o w - G i l e s , t h e C o u r t d i s t i l l e d t h e s a m e r e q u i r e m e n t f r o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s u s e o f t h e w o r d " a u t h o r s . " T h e C o u r t d e f i n e d " a u t h o r , " i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e , t o m e a n " h e t o w h o m a n y t h i n g o w e s i t s o r i g i n ; o r i g i n a t o r ; m a k e r . " 1 1 1 U . S . , a t 5 8 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) . A s i n T h e T r a d e - M a r k C a s e s , t h e C o u r t e m p h a s i z e d t h e c r e a t i v e c o m p o n e n t o f o r i g i n a l i t y . I t d e s c r i b e d c o p y r i g h t a s b e i n g l i m i t e d t o " o r i g i n a l i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e a u t h o r , " 1 1 1 U . S . , a t 5 8 , a n d s t r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f r e q u i r i n g a n a u t h o r w h o a c c u s e s a n o t h e r o f i n f r i n g e m e n t t o p r o v e " t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h o s e f a c t s o f o r i g i n a l i t y , o f i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o d u c t i o n , o f t h o u g h t , a n d c o n c e p t i o n . " I d . , a t 5 9 - 6 0 .

      In Burrow-Giles the court defined authors, in a constitutional sense, to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin, originator, maker" and emphasized the creative component of originality.

    2. O r i g i n a l i t y i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t . T h e s o u r c e o f C o n g r e s s ' p o w e r t o e n a c t c o p y r i g h t l a w s i s A r t i c l e I , § 8 , c l . 8 , o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h a u t h o r i z e s C o n g r e s s t o " s e c u r [ e ] f o r l i m i t e d T i m e s t o A u t h o r s . . . t h e e x c l u s i v e R i g h t t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e W r i t i n g s . " I n t w o d e c i s i o n s f r o m t h e l a t e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y — T h e T r a d e - M a r k C a s e s , 1 0 0 U . S . 8 2 ( 1 8 7 9 ) ; a n d B u r r o w - G i l e s L i t h o g r a p h i c C o . v . S a r o n y , 1 1 1 U . S . 5 3 ( 1 8 8 4 ) — t h i s C o u r t d e f i n e d t h e c r u c i a l t e r m s " a u t h o r s " a n d " w r i t i n g s . " I n s o d o i n g , t h e C o u r t m a d e i t u n m i s t a k a b l y c l e a r t h a t t h e s e t e r m s p r e s u p p o s e a d e g r e e o f o r i g i n a l i t y .

      This Court defined the crucial terms authors and writings.