674 Matching Annotations
  1. Mar 2018
    1. He had omitted referring to these, when be was reading the list of subjects confided to the General Legislatures, in which they were also included—because he was aware they would come up again, in going over the subjects to be dealt with by the Local Legislatures. These two matters of Agriculture and Immigration must certainly be considered as common in a great measure to all, but at the same time legislation with regard to them might be affected by certain measures which might have only a local bearing. Consequently it was provided that there should be concurrent jurisdiction on these two questions. But, with this concurrent jurisdiction, in the event of any clashing taking place between the action of the General Government and the action of the Local Governments, it was provided that the general policy, the policy of the General Government, that which bad been adopted for the good of the country at large, should supersede and override any adverse action which the Local Legislature might have taken with a view to purely local purposes. The design was to harmonize the system of Immigration and Agriculture over the whole of British North America, while locally it might be subjected to such regulations and stipulations as the Local Legislatures might determine from any cause to apply to it.

      §.95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. “The establishment and tenure of local offices, and the appointment of local officers,”—these were functions which plainly belonged to the Local Legislatures.

      §.92(4) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. For, while they would be selected from among ourselves, they would be required to administer the Governments of their respective Provinces, not according to their own will and pleasure but according to the advice of officers who possessed the confidence of the Local Legislatures of those Provinces. Consequently we should always have the means of bringing about harmony, if any difficulty arose between any of the local bodies and the General Government, through the Lieutenant Governor, and we should have a system under which, all action beginning with the people and proceeding through the Local Legislature, would, before it became law, come under the revision of the Lieutenant Governor, who would be responsible for his action, and be obliged to made his report to the superior authority.

      §.58 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. It was well that there should be those objects of ambition. At present the Bar and the Bench might be said to possess almost the only prizes the country offered to its public men. It was desirable, he thought, that we should have within our reach the opportunity of rewarding merit by appointing from among ourselves in the several Provinces those who should be the heads of the Local Governments and who should form the links of connection between the Local Governments and the General Government, holding to that General Government the same relations as were now held by the heads of the Provincial Governments to the imperial Government, and discharging the duties [Page 14] of their offices under the same local advice as that which the Governors now acted on.

      §.58 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. it was felt there was no necessity whatever for their being in communication with the Imperial Government, but that on the contrary very great mischief might arise, if they were permitted to bold that communication. It was also thought that, in keeping the appointment of the Lieutenant Governors in the hands of the General Government, this further advantage would be gained ; the appointments would be conferred on men in our own country. (Hear, hear.) There would be a selection from the public men of intelligence and standing in the respective Provinces, and they would go to the discharge of the duties imposed upon them with experience gained in public life in the colonies whose local affairs they were called on to administer, so that they would carry to the administration of public affairs in the respective Provinces that valuable acquaintance with the feelings and habits of thought of the people which they had gained during their public life.

      §.58 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    6. And the first change he had to draw their attention to was with reference to the appointment of the Lieutenant Governor who it was proposed should be appointed by the General Government. The reason why this was preferred to the appointment taking place as heretofore by the Crown was that it was intended that the communication between all the several Provinces and the Imperial Government should be restricted to the General Government.

      §.58 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    7. that the Local Governments should be constituted, to the powers to be committed to them, and the exercise of those powers. It was proposed that in the meantime they should be constituted as at present, that is to say, consisting of a Lieutenant Governor, a Legislative Council, and a Legislative Assembly.

      Part V and §§.64, 65, 69, 71, 80, and 82 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    8. He might remark, with reference to the appointment of Judges by the general Government, that they were to be selected from the Bars of the several Provinces, and the idea was thrown out at the Conference that there was such a similarity in the laws of Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island—all of them possessing the English law–that the probability was that they would be able to consolidate their laws, and that of course, if that were done, there would be a larger scope for the selection of the Bench— and in other respects also he believed that great advantages would result from it. But, in the case of Lower Canada, where we had a different system of law altogether, it was plain that the Judges could be selected only from among gentlemen conversant with that law, and therefore it was provided that the Judges should be selected from the Bars of the respective Provinces in which they were to act, but in the case of the consolidation of the laws of the several Maritime Provinces and of Upper Canada, the choice would extend to the Bars of all those Provinces.

      §§.97 and 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    9. He felt that to the gentlemen who had so worthily filled tor so many years the positions of our Judges, was due in a great measure the prosperity of the country, the happiness of the people, and the security to life and property we enjoyed. He thought that the higher their position was made and the more respect paid them, the better it would be for the general interest, and were the appointment and payment of the judges put into the bands of the local legislatures it would be a diminution of the importance the former were entitled to expect at our hands ; he thought there was no one in the country, with the exception of the Governor General himself, whom we should so desire to see upheld in the public estimation as those men who administered justice in the Courts.

      §.96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    10. It was also proposed that the Judges of the Superior Courts in each Province, and of the County Courts of Upper Canada, should be appointed by the General Government and paid by it. He was glad this power had been conferred, believing that if there was one thing more than another which they should seek to do in this country, it was to elevate the character of the Bench.

      §.96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    11. It was proposed to ask the Imperial Government to confer upon the General Government the power of constituting such a court, not, however, with the desire to abolish the present right of appeal to England.

      §.101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    12. At present appeal lay from our courts ultimately to the Queen in Privy Council, and it was not intended to deprive the subject of recourse to this ultimate court ; but at the same time it was well, in assimilating the present systems of law, for the benefit of all the Provinces, that they should have the assembled wisdom of the Bench brought together in a general court of appeal to decide ultimate causes, which would before long doubtless supersede the necessity of going to the enormous expense of carrying appeals to England.

      §.101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    13. It was thought proper to give to the General Government the right to establish a general Court of Appeal for the federated Provinces He thought that while there was no express provision for the establishment of such a court, many who had studied the question would agree that it was desirable the General Legislature should have the power of constituting such a court, if it saw fit to do so.

      §.101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    14. rime should meet with the same punishment no matter in what part of the Country committed. The right hand of justice should be as sure of grasping the criminal and punishing him for his offence in one part as in another. There should be no distinction anywhere in regard to the amount of punishment inflicted for offences.

      §.91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    15. It was desirable the General Government should have the control of the medium through which the trade and commerce of the country was carried on, and that in the establishment of banks, the issue of paper money and in offering to the public the paper representative of their labor, in whatever part of the country, there should be the same legislative security for the people

      §§.91(2)(14)(15)(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    16. and in framing a union of these Provinces it was desirable that whatever might be the inducement that brought foreigners hither, whether a desire to embark in the Fisheries of Newfoundland, in the Lumbering of New Brunswick, or in the agricultural and manufacturing industries of Upper or Lower Canada, we should hold out to them the utmost facilities for becoming subjects of the British Crown here.

      §.91(25) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    17. The protection of the Indians, and the naturalization of aliens were matters which necessarily fell to the general Government.

      §§.91(24)(25) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    18. The control of the Militia was certainly a subject which they must all feel ought to be in the hands of one central power. If them was one thing more than another which required to be directed by one mind, governed by one influence and one policy, it was that which concerned the defence of the country.

      §§.15 and 91(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    19. In fact he might say that lines of telegraph, railways, etc., and all works of an essentially general character, as distinguished from those merely local, were intended to be under the control of the General Government who would administer them for the common Interest. They would be put beyond the power of any local government to obstruct or interfere with, they being a means by which the trade and industry of the country at large would benefit. It would not be found possible in any part of the united ter- [Page 12] ritory to offer objection to that which was in the common interest, simply on account of its being situated in any particular locality.

      §.91(29) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    20. Lines of steam or other ships, railways, as well as canals and other works connecting any two or more of the Provinces together, or extending beyond the limits of any Province, would be under the control of the General Government.

      §.92(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    21. If there was one branch of the public service which, more than another, should be under the control of the general government it was the Postal Service ; and it had been agreed to leave it entirely in the hands of the General Government.

      §.91(5) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    22. the Central Government would have the power of raising money by all the other modes and systems of taxation—the power of taxation had been confided to the General Legislature—and there was only one method left to the Local Governments, if their own resources became exhausted, and this was direct taxation.

      §§.91(3) and 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    23. its representatives at the conference urged that if the General Government should put an export duty on coal, one of their most important resources would be interfered with, and Nova Scotia was therefore permitted to deal with the export duty on coal and other minerals, just as New Brunswick was with regard to timber.

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    24. The correct interpretation of the clause would, however, leave to the General Government the power of levying a duty on exports of lumber in all the Provinces except New Brunswick, which alone would possess the right to impose duties on the export of timber.

      §§.121 and 124 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    25. Now inasmuch as the territorial possessions of each Province were reserved as a means of producing local revenue for the respective Provinces, it was evident that if the Province of New Brunswick were deprived of this privilege of imposing an export duty it would be obliged to revert to the old expensive process of levying stumpage dues, against which its representatives in Conference very strongly protested.

      §.92(5) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    26. He might remark that in the published statement it was said the General Government should not have the right of imposing duties on exports of lumber, coal and other minerals, but the understanding was that the clause should be limited in the case of timber to the Province of New Brunswick, and in the oas3 of coal and other minerals to the Province of Nova Scotia. The reasons for this prohibition were that the duty on the export of timber in New Brunswick was in reality only the mode in which they collected stumpage.

      §§.121 and 124 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    27. The regulation of duties of customs on imports and exports might perhaps be considered so intimately connected with the subject of trade and commerce as to require no separate mention in this place ; he would however allude to it because one of the chief benefits expected to flow from the Confederation was the free interchange of the products of the labor of each Province, without being subjected to any fiscal burden whatever ; and another was the assimilation of the tariffs. It was most important to see that no local legislature should by its separate action be able to put any such restrictions on the free interchange of commodities as to prevent the manufactures of the rest from finding a market in any one province, and thus from sharing in the advantages of the extended Union

      §§.121 and 122 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    28. It would have the regulation of all the trade and commerce of the country, for besides that these were subjects in reference to which no local interest could exisit, it was desirable that they should be dealt with throughout the Confederation on the same principles.

      §§.91(1a) and (2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    29. Home change would have to be made in the duration of the Parliaments of the local systems, and it was thought desirable that the term of existence of the General Legislature should be longer than any that could possibly be adopted for the local bodies.

      §.50 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    30. What was desired was that elections and dissolutions of Parliament should take place with sufficient frequency to ensure that the representatives should truly represent the people.

      §.50 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    31. It was also proposed that the duration of Parliament should be extended from four to five years. The reason for adopting this coarse was that under our present system Parliaments seldom lasted longer than three years. In England where their legal duration was seven years, it was found, on an examination of the records of the last sixty or seventy years, that the average length of each Parliament was only a trifle over four years.

      §.50 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    32. tion they might be inclined to appoint their own political friends to the exclusion of the others. But it was intended that the nomination should be so made that not only the members composing the Government but also the Opposition to the Government should be fairly represented in the Legislative Council. So far as Canada was concerned, there was no likelihood of difficulty arising on this point, because the coalition which was formed between the Liberal and Conservative parties would preclude any attempt calculated to injure the interests of either. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) In the case of the Lower Provinces the same reasons did not exist. Their governments were still party governments, and though they had associated with them, in the Conference which had taken place, the leaders of the Opposition, still the action to be taken would necessarily be the action of the governments of the Lower Provinces. It was therefore proposed that there should be a guarantee given that all political parties should be as nearly as possible fully represented.

      §.25 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    33. The House would never have lees than 194 members, but it would increase at a very slow rate, as it would only be the greater increase of any Province over that of Lower Canada which would entitle it to additional representation, while, if the agricultural resources of Lower Canada became developed, and its mineral wealth explored, so that it increased faster than Upper Canada, then the number of representatives for Upper Canada would be diminished, not those for Lower Canada increased. Of course, to provide for the settlement of the remote portions of the country which might be brought in from time to time, power was reserved to increase the number of members ; but such members could only be increased preserving the relative proportions. One advantage which would flow from this was that white 194 or 300 members were certainly sufficient to carry on the business of the country, we should be spared the enormous expense which would be entailed upon us if the representatives were rapidly to grow up to 300 or perhaps 400 members.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    34. Population was made the basis, and to prevent any undue augmentation in the numbers of the Lower House as population increased, it was settled that there should be a fixed standard on which the numbers of the House should be calculated, and Lower Canada was selected as affording the proper basis.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    35. Now unless this were done, it was plain that Upper Canada would not, under any circumstances, have consented to be a party to the Union, since for many years it had been claiming additional representation as a matter of right, and would certainly not have entered a Confederation, unless a due share of control were given it over the expenditure and taxation to which it so largely contributed.

      §.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    36. Consequently there was a greater certainty that fairness would be meted out to both parties, if the representatives in the Upper House were to be chosen from the electoral limits which now existed. It was intended that the first selection of Legislative Councillors should be made from the present Legislative Councils of the several Provinces, and without referring to the reasons which actuated gentlemen from the Lower Provinces in regard to this matter, he thought it might be sufficient to point out that in Canada, where we had forty-eight gentlemen sitting in the Upper House by the right of election, it would have been doing a wrong, not merely to them individually, but to their constituents too, if they had from any cause been attempted to be overlooked. It was quite evident even if no such clause had been inserted, that no attempt would have been made to pass over those gentlemen who had been selected by the people themselves as the most fit and proper persons to represent them in the Legislative Council. However, the arrangement was that they should be chosen, regard being held in that selection to the relative position of political parties. If the power of nomination were entrusted to the Government without restric-

      §.25 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    37. It then became necessary to settle the number of members tor the Upper House, and the more so because the Upper House was intended to be the means whereby certain local interests and local rights would be protected in the General Legislature, For this reason it was contended that while the principle of Representation by Population might be properly enough extended to the Lower House, equality of territorial representation should be preserved in the Upper House; and it was proposed in its formation, that the Confederation should be divided into three large districts, Upper Canada being one. Lower Canada another, and the Maritime Provinces the third. Newfoundland not having joined the preliminary Conference, arrangements were made for its coming in with the additional number of four members.

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    38. It would not become them to object to the nominative plan, because the members for the Upper House would be nominated by the Crown on the recommendation of the General Government. He might say it here, because it was said by everybody outside, that in the event of any thing like injustice being attempted towards the British population of Lower Canada by their French Canadian fellow-subjects, —they would moat unquestionably look for remedy and redress at the hands of the General Government, who would hare the power of causing their interests to be represented in the Upper House of the General Legislature.

      §§.24 and 33 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    39. Under these circumstances it was believed that the nominative plan in some respects offered greater advantages than the elective principle, and it was decided that we should again revert to nomination by the crown.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    40. Therefore, as far as Canada was concerned, he was not aware that they could say that the principle of an elective Legislative Council had proved in any degree a failure. There was no doubt that, in some respects, the elective principle was attended with difficulties and objections. It had been found that complaint was made that the expense connected with the elections in many districts was such as to debar many able men from attempting to come forward as candidates. There was no doubt that to canvass a district composed of three constituencies, each sending a member to the Lower House, was a most formidable undertaking, and one from which many excellent and worthy men naturally shrank. An election for one was bad enough, but to have an election for three constituencies, certainly must be three times as bad.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    41. He did not think that in Canada they had any cause to regret the change which had been made from the nominative to the elective plan. The circumstances under which that change took place were probably familiar to most of them. The Leg. Council had, from one cause or another, under the nominative system, fallen into public discredit.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    42. In the constitution of the Legislative Council it would be observed that the principle which now obtained in Canada, of electing be members of that branch, was proposed to be done away with and that we would again revert to nomination by the Crown.

      §.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    43. to the form of government which should be adopted for the administration of the general affairs of the whole union, and that form was copied almost literally from the system existing in the several Provinces.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    44. having decided that the Federative plan, as he had briefly endeavored to explain it, was the one which ought to be adopted, was whether they ought to adopt the mode of government which they now saw in use in the United States, or whether they should endeavor to incorporate in the Union the principles under which the British Constitution had been for so many years happily administered ; and upon this point no difference of opinion arose in the Conference. They all preferred that system which they had enjoyed for the last eighteen years, by which the Crown was allowed to choose its own advisers ; but those advisers must be in harmony with the well understood wishes of the country as expressed by its representatives in Parliament.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    45. It was therefore proposed, that in the Federation of the British North American Provinces the system of government best adapted under existing circumstances to protect the diversified interests of the several Provinces and secure efficiency, harmony and permanency in the working of the Union, would be a General Government charged with matters of common interest to the whole country, and Local Governments for each of the Canadas and for the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, charged with the control of local matters in their respective sections, provision being made for the admission into the Union on equitable terms of Newfoundland, the North-west Territory, British Columbia, and Vancouver.

      Preamble, §§. 91, 92 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    46. a Governor General, who should be appointed by our Gracious Sovereign.

      §.10 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    47. They were unanimously of the opinion that this system was more likely to operate for the benefit of the people than any attempt to introduce the American system of Government. They certainly believed that they enjoyed more practical freedom under the British Sovereign than they could under a dictator who was chosen for only four years. He believed that the administration of the country could be carried on with more advantage to the people and more in harmony with their wishes if that administration was obliged constantly to retain the confidence of the people ; and if the moment the people ceased to have confidence in those in power, they must give place to others who would be able to govern the country more in harmony with their wishes. The secret of the freedom of the British nation from revolution and disturbance was that the people had at any time the power of making the Government harmonise with their wishes, —it was, in fact, the greatest safeguard the British Constitution gave. No government In Canada could venture to set public opinion at defiance. No government could exist, except for a few short months, unless they had the people at their back ; for although parliamentary majorities could be preserved for a short time against the wishes of the majority of the people still it was impossible to deny that public opinion was, in a complete sense, represented by the opinion or the members of the Legislature. They all knew perfectly well that their representatives were chosen from amongst themselves, and he trusted that we should never in this country lose that control which had been so happily exercised by the people over the government of the day. It was, therefore, concluded that in forming an Union of these Provinces it was desirable, in the interest of the people at large, that the system of responsible government now in force should be maintained.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    48. each Legislature, and especially each Local Legislature—acting within the bounds prescribed by the Imperial Parliament and kept within these bounds by the Courts of Law if necessity should arise for their interference—would find in the working of the plan of Federation a check sufficient to prevent it from transcending its legitimate authority.

      Preamble, §§. 91, 92 and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    49. in laying a basis for the union of these Provinces, it was not proposed that the General Government should have merely a delegation of powers from the Local Governments, but it was proposed to go back to the fountain head, from which all our legislative powers were derived—the Imperial Parliament—and seek at their hands a measure which should designate as far as possible the general powers to be exercised by the General Legislature, and also those to be exercised by the Local Legislatures, reserving to the General Legislature all subjects not directly committed to the control of the Local bodies.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    50. that the reservation of what were popularly known as State rights had been to a great extent the cause of the difficulties which were now agitating that great country.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    51. liar. But it must not be supposed, on account of the use of that term, that in the Union now proposed to be established it was intended to imitate the Federal Union which we had seen existing in the United States. In the United States, the general Government exercised only such powers as were delegated to it by the State Governments at the time the Union was formed. Each State was regarded as a sovereign power, and it chose for the common interest to delegate to the general Government the right of deciding upon certain questions, which were expressly stated All the undefined powers, all the sovereign rights, remained with the Governments of the several States

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    52. having unfortunately for our common interests comparatively little intercourse with each other, the difficulty was felt that, if we attempted to make a Legislative Union of these Provinces in the first instance, the dread, in the case of the Lower Provinces and probably of many among ourselves that peculiar interests might be swamped and certain feelings and prejudices outraged and trampled upon, was so great that such a measure could not be entertained and we were compelled to look for what was sought in a form of government that would commit all subjects of general interest to a general Government and Legislature, reserving for local Legislatures and Governments such subjects as from their nature required to been trusted to those bodies. (Cheers.) The term Federation was used with reference to the proposed Union, because it was that with which the public mind was most fami

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    53. to determine whether it should be a Federal or a Legislative Union. A Legislative Union, as they were all aware, had certain advantages over one based on the Federal system. It was a more complete union, and implied a more direct action and control of the government over the interests of the people at large. And, where a people were homogeneous, and their interests of such a character as to admit of – niformity of action with regard to them, it could not be doubted that a government on the principle of a Legislative Union was the one which probably operated most beneficially for all

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    54. the Hon. Mr. Brown and two other gentlemen representing the Liberal party of Upper Canada had entered, to address themselves to the preparation of a measure that would partake of a federal character as far as necessary with respect to local measures, while it would preserve the existing union in respect to measures common to all ; that they would endeavor, if necessary, to strike out a federal union for Canada alone, but that at the same time they would attempt, in considering a change in the Constitution of this country, to bring the Lower Provinces in under the same bond, as they were already under the same Sovereign. It was highly proper that, before touching the edifice of Government that had been raised in Canada they should address the statesmen of the Lower Provinces, and try to induce them to form a common system If it were found impossible to have a legislative union of all the British American Provinces, then they could reserve to the local governments of the several Provinces the control of such subjects as concerned them, while the rest should be committed to the cue of the General Government

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    55. should have been a concession to Upper Canada, of additional members in proportion to its population, but that concession would, as be had already remarked, have been an invasion of the Federal principle, contained in the Union Act, and would unquestionably have been represented to the uttermost by a large proportion if not by the whole of Lower Canada.

      §§. 3 and 12 of the Union Act, 1840; §§. 51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    56. indeed, extend them in such a way as to promote the peace contentment, and prosperity of the people, at the same time preserving in the new constitution those rights they were afraid would be subjected to injustice.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

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  2. Jan 2018
    1. Plus qu’une vérification des informations, la multiplication des fakes appelle un travail d’éditorialisation, qui recontextualise les contenus partagés en explicitant les logiques transactionnelles[+] NoteVoir les travaux de Manuel ZACKLAD, notamment Transactions communicationnelles symboliques et communauté d'action : réflexions préliminaires , colloque de Cerisy "Connaissance Activité Organisation », 2003 ou « La théorie des transactions intellectuelles : une approche gestionnaire et cognitive pour le traitement du COS », Intellectica, Paris, ARCo,2000/1, 30, pp. 195-222. [9] qui les motivent. Cela suppose non seulement de reconnaître la multiplicité des points de vue, mais aussi leur mobilité dans l’espace et le temps en tant que productions sociales situées, le vrai n’étant que le frottement continu des informations et des contre-informatio

      On a effectivement intérêt à s'outiller pour être en mesure de qualifier les "logiques transactionnelles" à l'oeuvre en sous-texte de nos discussions (comme des dispositifs tels que hypothèse.is nous aident à le faire). Cependant, je me demande quelle conscience commune nous pourrons cultiver de l'impact de notre manière de vivre l'allure (esthétique) de nos délibérations. Car, cela me semble un horizon à viser en plus (outre la maîtrise des moyens techniques de la construction de connaissances partageables) si nous espérons que notre collaboration (et co-éditorialisation) permette de dégager des conclusions relativement stables - provisoires ou non. Si nous voulons cultiver un milieu propice à élaborer une véritable sphère intersubjective (un espace formé de valeurs et structuré autour de certains repères), la dynamique même de nos échanges doit aussi faire l'objet d'une éducation à la fois théorique et technique et, de ce point de vue, il importe de transformer la crise de la vérité (bien réelle) qui affecte notre société en une opportunité concrète de nous rappeler l'utilité d'une formation critique. Mais, cette occasion de bâtir de manière concertée des bases pour une nouvelle co-appartenance ne portera tous ses fruits que si nous articulons à l'enjeu de la formation à une littératie numérique (où la fonction de l'éditorialisation dans la constitution de l'environnement demeure à définir), le souci pour la sensibilisation du public en général (et du monde de l'éducation en particulier) à la question du rôle du développement d'un sens esthétique dans l'effort collectif pour constituer du sens en communs.

  3. Jun 2017
    1. Prudence indeed will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light & transient causes;

      [I have no doubt that Jefferson studied The genuine principles of the ancient Saxon, or English constitution, Volume 4 prior to writing the Declaration of Independence]

      (https://books.google.com/books?id=jatbAAAAQAAJ&dq=Prudence%20indeed%20will%20dictate%20that%20governments&pg=PA41#v=onepage&q=Prudence%20indeed%20will%20dictate%20that%20governments&f=false)

      <iframe frameborder="0" scrolling="no" style="border:0px" src="https://books.google.com/books?id=jatbAAAAQAAJ&dq=Prudence%20indeed%20will%20dictate%20that%20governments&pg=PA1&output=embed" width=500 height=500></iframe>

    1. Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that Quebecers have been denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development.

      International Law declarations would require some form of exploitation, oppression or exploitation to be proved. In general, the bar would be high for this belief -- as in Quebec citizens being refused the right to vote, for instance.

    2. The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.

      A referendum cannot be used to unilaterally declare independence.

  4. Apr 2017
    1. qualified voters

      "Qualified voters" meant almost exclusively white men. As the former colonies began the process of writing state constitutions, debates over who should be included as a "qualified voter" often divided conventions. Vermont and Pennsylvania had two of the most liberal constitutions. Vermont permitted all men, regardless of color, to vote, while Pennsylvania permitted all white men to vote regardless of income. Other states, like Maryland, had much more restrictive qualifications for voting and required that free white men also hold property.

  5. Feb 2017
    1. "progressive approach"

      Sounds a bit like our discussion on the Constitution/recycling. We use such laws as the basis of our society, yet we are human, every scenario and every circumstance is extreme in its differences.

    1. .

      1) How old do you have to be to be in The House of Representatives?

      2) How many years of citizenship do you need?

      3) T/F - You do not need to live in the state you represent.

      4) T/F - You must be born in America to serve in the House.

  6. Nov 2016
  7. Jan 2016
    1. The explicit right to a free press it seems to me, though I’m no constitutional scholar, should translate today to an infrastructure not only for publishing information but for protecting those publishing, providing, or consuming it, as well as those financially supporting its publication. Just as the rights to speech, assembly, and petition should translate to online infrastructure in which discourse at all levels is protected and groups can meaningfully express their views (let alone the fourth amendment right to protection of your own information). With these essential rights, a democracy can function and use its mechanism of governance to create new rights and protections.
  8. Oct 2015
    1. I. Introduction

      Week 11 Vidoe Lecture

      Study Questions:

      What do Daniel Shays and his followers want? How do they see their efforts as an extension of the Revolution?

      Describe the split in the Constitutional Convention over representation. How was it resolved?

      What were some of the disagreements between by the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists in the debates over ratification of the Constitution?

  9. Feb 2014
    1. The U.S. social contract establishes a utilitarian basis for protection of intellectual property rights: protection as a means of encouraging innovation.

      The social contract of the US Constitution provides a utilitarian basis for protection of intellectual property rights.

    2. As intellectual property lacks scarcity, and the protection of it fails the Lockean Proviso, there is no natural right to intellectual property. As such, the justification for intellectual property rights arises from the social con tract, and in the case of the United States, the Constitution.

      The justification for intellectual property from the social contract established by the US Constitution; it otherwise has no justification by natural right because it fails the Lockean Proviso.

    3. As such, the conclusion is that intellectual property is not ‘property’ in the Lockean sense. If it were, then intellectual property protections would deserve no mo re policy debate than whether police ought to chase thieves. As it is not, the justification for intel lectual property must be sought in the social contract. As noted above, the social contract for the United State s, the Constitution, specifies in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 that Congress may pass laws “ To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec t ive Writings and Discoveries.” This background clarifies the discussion considerably : • There is no natural law basis for intellectual property rights • Thus, intellectual property rights must be provided for by the social contract. • The U.S. social contract as elucidated in the Constitution specifies a utilitarian basis for intellectual property rights (“to promote the progress... by securing for limited times...")
      • There is no natural law basis for intellectual property rights

      • Intellectual property rights must be provided for by the social contract

      • The US Constitution as a social contract specifies a utilitarian basis for intellectual property rights.

    4. U.S. intellectual property law originates (as law) from the Constitution: Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution makes copyright and patent law possible (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 4   respective Writings and Discoveries”) ,

      Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 makes copyright and patent law possible.

    5. The U . S . Co nstitution firmly grounds the proper role of intellectual property policy as utilitarian .

      Identify where/how this ground is established.

    1. I n B u r r o w - G i l e s , t h e C o u r t d i s t i l l e d t h e s a m e r e q u i r e m e n t f r o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s u s e o f t h e w o r d " a u t h o r s . " T h e C o u r t d e f i n e d " a u t h o r , " i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e , t o m e a n " h e t o w h o m a n y t h i n g o w e s i t s o r i g i n ; o r i g i n a t o r ; m a k e r . " 1 1 1 U . S . , a t 5 8 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) . A s i n T h e T r a d e - M a r k C a s e s , t h e C o u r t e m p h a s i z e d t h e c r e a t i v e c o m p o n e n t o f o r i g i n a l i t y . I t d e s c r i b e d c o p y r i g h t a s b e i n g l i m i t e d t o " o r i g i n a l i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e a u t h o r , " 1 1 1 U . S . , a t 5 8 , a n d s t r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f r e q u i r i n g a n a u t h o r w h o a c c u s e s a n o t h e r o f i n f r i n g e m e n t t o p r o v e " t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h o s e f a c t s o f o r i g i n a l i t y , o f i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o d u c t i o n , o f t h o u g h t , a n d c o n c e p t i o n . " I d . , a t 5 9 - 6 0 .

      In Burrow-Giles the court defined authors, in a constitutional sense, to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin, originator, maker" and emphasized the creative component of originality.

    2. O r i g i n a l i t y i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t . T h e s o u r c e o f C o n g r e s s ' p o w e r t o e n a c t c o p y r i g h t l a w s i s A r t i c l e I , § 8 , c l . 8 , o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h a u t h o r i z e s C o n g r e s s t o " s e c u r [ e ] f o r l i m i t e d T i m e s t o A u t h o r s . . . t h e e x c l u s i v e R i g h t t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e W r i t i n g s . " I n t w o d e c i s i o n s f r o m t h e l a t e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y — T h e T r a d e - M a r k C a s e s , 1 0 0 U . S . 8 2 ( 1 8 7 9 ) ; a n d B u r r o w - G i l e s L i t h o g r a p h i c C o . v . S a r o n y , 1 1 1 U . S . 5 3 ( 1 8 8 4 ) — t h i s C o u r t d e f i n e d t h e c r u c i a l t e r m s " a u t h o r s " a n d " w r i t i n g s . " I n s o d o i n g , t h e C o u r t m a d e i t u n m i s t a k a b l y c l e a r t h a t t h e s e t e r m s p r e s u p p o s e a d e g r e e o f o r i g i n a l i t y .

      This Court defined the crucial terms authors and writings.