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ent.
causation or bringing forth is intrinsically knowledge bearing
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et present arrive into presencing. Accordingly, they are unifiedly governed by a bringing thatbrings what presences into appearance. Plato tells us what this bringing is in a sentence from theSymposium (205b): he gar to
all 4 causes are important as the end or reason for a products existnce is also a propelling factor for its existence
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- Mar 2024
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ued a
can't you view that pain as a concept is intrinsically bad instead of specific instances of pain being bad?
like rather than some being hurt by something and others being hurt by something else, the fact of something hurting -- isn't that an evaluative truth. it just happens to match our attitude.
ig they'd argue that view doesn't count as genuinily realist
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already given, is scientifically unaccept-able. The byproduct hypothesis, while it pushes matters off astep by hypothesizing an intervening capacity or set of capac-ities, does not permit escape from the Darwinian Dilemmafor the realist about value.9. THIRD OBJECTION: THE BADNESS OF PAIN AS ANALLEGED INDEPENDENT TRUTH ABOUT VALUEThe case of physical pain for instance, in the various formsassociated with burns, cuts, bruises, broken bones, nausea,and headaches serves as one of the strongest temptationstoward realism about value. Realists frequently appeal to thecase of pain when defending their views, 52 and when pre-sented with the Darwinian Dilemma, another such appealmay seem attractive. One possibility is for the realist to arguealong the following lines. There are obvious evolutionaryexplanations of why we tend to feel physical pain when wedo: roughly, we tend to feel it in conjunction with bodily con-ditions or events that diminish reproductive success, such as acut to the skin or a blow to the head. Pain itself, moreover,due to its very nature, is bad independently of whatever eval-uative attitudes we might hold. Together these points provideSHARON STREET144
objection: what if moral truth tracking ability developed as a byproduct of another ability?
issue: they must explain the relation b/w evolution to capacity C and independent evaluative truths that they posit?
you could claim there is no relation b/w the two, but it is highly unlikely we developed capacity C by chance.
you could claim there is a relation, but you'd have to explain how capacity C arose. same problems as before with tracking issues -- more likely that adaptive theory is true
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So
One possible objection to above: humans are rational creatures, and our evaluative judgements are close to truth not because of evolutionary drift but because we reflect on whatever attitudes we have, and mold them to be closer to truth.
Rebuttal: reflection is a process of reason. reason involves putting together known facts. we can only deduce moral truths by comparing them to other truths or irreducable, given truths. if these fundamental truths are wrong, then our moral evaluative judgdements will be wrong.
The likelyhood that these fundemental truths--which we deem correct--came completely from evolutionary chance is very low. What is more likely is that our moral truths are based on these fundemental truths, and that had we not had these fundamental truths, are moral truths would still be true--just with respect to the new fundemental truth.
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This is the far-fetched skeptical result thatawaits any realist who takes the route of claiming that thereis no relation between evolutionary influences on our evalua-tive judgements and independent evaluative truths.
consequence of denying evolutionary relation to evaluative judgement: 1) evolution influenced our evaluative judgment to favour survival tendencies. If evaluative truths are independent of these judgements, then our evolution would have pushed us off track. Our judgements are wrong and don't align with evlaluative facts
2) our judgements do align with evaluative facts. by chance, the various pulls of evolution on our evaluative attitdes made our evaluative judgements true with respect to moral truths. our moral truths are not influenced by these judgdemnets, but they happen to align. (very low chance)
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In this way, theobserved patterns in the actual content of human evaluativejudgements provide evidence in favor of the view that naturalselection has had a tremendous influence on that content
move 1: tendency to favour pro-survival practices suggests an indirect Darwinian influence on evaluative tendancy,
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