48 Matching Annotations
  1. Aug 2019
    1. This principle holds that we can only adopt something as an aim when we are able to recognize that it has been achieved. And since we are fallible, we are never in a position to prove that one of our beliefs is actually true—all we can recognize is that it meets standards of acceptance that are endorsed, for the time being, in our community (Rorty 1991a: chapter one; 2000; Hookway 2007).

      Anything that can't be falsified can't be true. And anything that can be falsified can't be 100% true.

    2. Peirce’s semiotics offers an account of the contents of thoughts as well as language, visual media, music and any other item that can be said to have meaning (for introductions to this area of Peirce’s thought, see Liszka 1996; Short 2007). Unlike Saussure, Peirce insisted that the sign-relation was essentially triadic in structure, comprising a representation, an object and an interpretation. In other words: a sign is ‘about’ some object because it is understood, in subsequent thought, as a sign of that object. This subsequent thought Peirce calls the sign’s interpretant. In understanding or interpreting a sign, we may feel things about it (which at times Peirce called the emotional interpretant), undertake actions that are rational in the light of the sign and the other information we possess (the dynamic interpretant), or an indefinite number of inferences may be drawn from it (the logical interpretant) (Jappy 2016). Interpretation is generally a goal-directed activity and, once again, the content of a sign is determined by the ways in which we use it (or might do so).

      Semiotics: representation, object, and interpretation. Three pieces unlike Saussure's work.

    3. It has been common for philosophers to assume that the ‘content’ of a thought, judgment or proposition is a kind of intrinsic property that it possesses. Perhaps it offers a ‘picture’ or ‘idea’ of some state of affairs, and we can identify this content simply by reflecting upon the item itself, and its structural properties. All pragmatists have rejected this idea as a key driver of an antinaturalistic Cartesian dualism. Instead, they have held that the content of a thought, judgment or proposition is a matter of the role it fills in our activities of inquiry, and is to be explained by reference to how we interpret it or what we do with it.

      Thought happens in the context of its usefulness.

    4. All the pragmatists, but most of all Dewey, challenge the sharp dichotomy that other philosophers draw between theoretical beliefs and practical deliberations. In some sense, all inquiry is practical, concerned with transforming and evaluating the features of situations in which we find ourselves. Shared inquiry directed at resolving social and political problems or indeterminacies was also central to Dewey’s conception of the good life and, relatedly, the democratic ideal.

      It's impossible to have a philosophy that doesn't rely on pragmatism at its foundational level.

    5. The kind of passages just noted may seem to support Bertrand Russell’s famous objection that James is committed to the truth of “Santa Claus exists” (Russell 1946, p, 772). This is unfair; at best, James is committed to the claim that the happiness that belief in Santa Claus provides is truth-relevant. James could say that the belief was ‘good for so much’ but it would only be ‘wholly true’ if it did not ‘clash with other vital benefits’. It is easy to see that, unless it is somehow insulated from the broader effects of acting upon it, belief in Santa Claus could lead to a host of experiential surprises and disappointments.

      Fantastic metaphor illustrating the lines around relation of ideas as truth.

    6. Ideas … become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience. (1907: 34) Any idea upon which we can ride …; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. (1907: 34)

      Truth as the useful relations of ideas.

    7. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. (1907: 42) ‘The true’, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course. (1907: 106)

      James' truth is closer to the abstract ideal of pragmatism... it's what we agree to, just as what is useful is the abstract ideal relative to its purpose.

    8. The objectivism of Peirce’s account of truth derives not from a world entirely external to our minds (a famously difficult thing to know), but from the potential infinity of the community of inquiry, which exposes all of our beliefs to future correction: ‘reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of [persons] may think about it…’ (EP1: 139).

      Pierce's truth leans on the infinite ability to know more in the future.

    9. All this has led Peirce’s account of truth to be expressed in the slogan: truth is the end of inquiry, where ‘end’ is to be understood not as a ‘finish’ (some point in time when all human questions will be settled) but as a goal, telos or final cause.

      Truth is the thing we all agree upon.

    10. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.

      Pierce's definition of reality.

    11. Peirce and James differed in how they applied their respective pragmatisms to clarifying the concept of truth. Peirce’s account of truth is presented as a means to understanding a concept that he claimed was vital for the method of science: reality (3.1). James used his account to defend pluralism about truth (3.2).

      Different understandings of what truth is.

    12. Pragmatism, described by Peirce as a ‘laboratory philosophy’, shows us how we test theories by carrying out experiments in the expectation that if the hypothesis is not true, then the experiment will fail to have some predetermined sensible effect.

      All edicts of pragmatism are fallible.

    13. James never worked out his understanding of ‘practical consequences’ as fully as Peirce did, and he does not share Peirce’s restriction of these consequences to general patterns of behaviour. Sometimes he writes as if the practical consequences of a proposition can simply be effects upon the individual believer: if religious belief makes me feel better, then that contributes to the pragmatic clarification of ‘God exists’.

      Pierce had broader definition of usefulness to include dissonance reduction and anxiety.

    14. Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

      The Pragmatic Maxim

    15. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? (1907: 27f) James proposed that which answer is correct depends on what you ‘practically mean’ by ‘going round’. If you mean passing from north of the squirrel, east, south, then west, then the answer to the question is ‘yes’. If, on the other hand, you mean in front of him, to his right, behind him, to his left, and then in front of him again, then the answer is ‘no’. After pragmatic clarification disambiguates the question, all dispute comes to an end.

      Story of the squirrel that illustrates pragmatism's usefulness in avoiding useless questions.

    16. William James thus presented pragmatism as a ‘method for settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise be interminable.’ (1907: 28) Unless some ‘practical difference’ would follow from one or the other side’s being correct, the dispute is idle.

      Pragmatism is useful because it can put aside debates of truth that don't result in some useful element as well.

    17. When William James published a series of lectures on ‘Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking’ in 1907, he began by identifying ‘The Present Dilemma in Philosophy’ (1907: 9ff), a fundamental and apparently irresoluble clash between two ways of thinking, which he promised pragmatism would overcome. James begins by observing that the history of philosophy is ‘to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments’: the ‘tough-minded’ and the ‘tender-minded’. The tough-minded have an empiricist commitment to experience and going by ‘the facts’, while the tender-minded prefer a priori principles which appeal to ratiocination. The tender-minded tend to be idealistic, optimistic and religious, believing in free will, while the tough-minded are materialist, pessimistic, irreligious, dogmatic and fatalistic.

      James' style of classic pragmatism, meant to resolve conflicts within the clash of tough-minded and tender-minded temperaments.

    18. For Peirce and James, a key application of the Maxim was clarifying the concept of truth. This produced a distinctive epistemological outlook: a fallibilist, anti-Cartesian explication of the norms that govern inquiry. Within that broad outlook, though, early pragmatists split significantly over questions of realism broadly conceived – essentially, whether pragmatism should conceive itself as a scientific philosophy holding monism about truth (following Peirce), or a more broad-based alethic pluralism (following James and Dewey). This dispute was poignantly emblematized in arguments between Peirce and James which led Peirce to rename his view pragmaticism, presenting this clarified viewpoint to the world as his new ‘baby’ which was, he hoped, ‘ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers’ (EP2: 355).

      2 branches of classic pragmatism: 1) scientific philosophy about truth monism 2) alethic pluralism of truth (multiple truths)

    19. notable contributions to philosophy of race made by Cornel West, who advanced a prophetic pragmatism drawing on both Christian and Marxian thought (e.g. West 1989).

      Prophetic pragmatism wave

    20. Other pragmatists have objected to Rorty’s blithe dismissal of truth as a topic better left undiscussed (Rorty 1982), and have sought to rehabilitate classical pragmatist ideals of objectivity (e.g. Susan Haack, Christopher Hookway and Cheryl Misak). These philosophers are now sometimes referred to as New Pragmatists.

      5th wave new pragmatists

    21. Richard Rorty (1931–2007) turned consciously to pragmatism to rectify what he saw as mainstream epistemology’s crucial mistake: naively conceiving of language and thought as ‘mirroring’ the world. Rorty’s bold and iconoclastic attacks on this ‘representationalism’ birthed a so-called neopragmatism to which a number of influential recent philosophers have contributed (e.g. Hilary Putnam, Robert Brandom and Huw Price).

      4th wave neopragmatism

    22. As the resulting progressive Deweyan ‘New Deal’ era passed away and the US moved into the Cold War, pragmatism’s influence was challenged, as analytic philosophy blossomed and became the dominant methodological orientation in most Anglo-American philosophy departments. Transitional or ‘third generation’ figures included C.I. Lewis and W.V.O. Quine; although these philosophers developed a number of pragmatist themes, their analytic allegiance may be seen in their significant focus on theory of knowledge as first philosophy (which Dewey deprecated as ‘the epistemological industry’).

      3rd wave transitional pragmatism

    23. Its first generation was initiated by the so-called ‘classical pragmatists’ Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), who first defined and defended the view, and his close friend and colleague William James (1842–1910), who further developed and ably popularized it.

      1st wave classical pragmatism

    24. A second (still termed ‘classical’) generation turned pragmatist philosophy more explicitly towards politics, education and other dimensions of social improvement, under the immense influence of John Dewey (1859–1952) and his friend Jane Addams (1860–1935) – who invented the profession of social work as an expression of pragmatist ideas (and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931).

      2nd wave classical pragmatism

    25. Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that – very broadly – understands knowing the world as inseparable from agency within it. This general idea has attracted a remarkably rich and at times contrary range of interpretations, including: that all philosophical concepts should be tested via scientific experimentation, that a claim is true if and only if it is useful (relatedly: if a philosophical theory does not contribute directly to social progress then it is not worth much), that experience consists in transacting with rather than representing nature, that articulate language rests on a deep bed of shared human practices that can never be fully ‘made explicit’.

      High level summary/definition of Pragmatism.

  2. Jul 2019
    1. In the prosumer email market, read statuses have been “must have” for many years. See MixMax, Yesware, Streak, Hubspot, and Mailtrack. These products alone have 3M+ users, and each one provides read statuses by default.

      Defense: safety in numbers. This works in a world where values don't change, but it falls apart in a world where values are still malleable and open to debate. Which I think read statuses certainly are, by the conversation sparked over the last few days.

    2. We did not consider potential bad actors.

      This is the main take-away that applies not only to this case but all cases of technology increasing power and visibility for a few while removing it for others.

    3. Upon reading the commentary, I have come to understand that there are indeed nightmare scenarios involving location tracking.

      This is hard to believe, but I give credit to the specific scenarios that Mike Davidson outlined as helping this sink in. Abstractly, tracking seems more harmless than when wrapped around a narrative.

    4. Our changes

      Summarizing the debate as neutrally as possible is never easy, but this is well-done.

      Then, following, addressing each point with not only opinions but actions, is great.

      Criticism #3 is the only one not fully addressed, but it's mitigated by removing location data and making read statuses off by default. They're now in much larger company with everyone who uses tracking pixels in email, rather than the subset of people who used them and included location data as well.

    5. Does Superhuman show read statuses?

      FACTS

    6. What are read statuses?

      FACTS

    1. I hope Superhuman does the right thing and decides to help stop this problem instead of trying to normalize it.

      A door wide open that is mutually beneficial to users and Superhuman. I do wish there was a final statement on product decisions and cultures as well.

    2. I don’t automatically blame Superhuman designers for this, because I don’t know if they fought for it or against it.

      The fifth or sixth caveat pointing criticism away from people. Mike seems to understand how strong backlash effect is, and is trying really hard to avoid it. Despite all of this work, it still happens, but in combination with many of the other best practices the backlash is a lot weaker.

    3. So what would I do if I were Rahul Vohra, Superhuman’s CEO?

      Yet another best practice in effect here. Sometimes our instincts are to corner an opponent and to give them no way out of their argument, forcing them to surrender. But when the argument is about ideas and decisions and not people, it's very smart to give the person an escape path that preserves their dignity while also allowing the ideas and decisions to be reversed or improved.

    4. otherwise to plan for and enhance our Service

      This is evidence that privacy policies are meant to protect the company and not the user.

    5. Here are just a few:

      More relatable anecdotes to illustrate scenarios where you can viscerally feel the invasion of privacy. Maybe privacy is a hot-button topic in some ways because it lends itself to these threatening feelings in such an accessible way. On the other hand, technology is power that can be used for good and evil, and companies are often more interested in bringing attention to the good uses, but that doesn't stop actual evil uses from also happening. Arguments that the feature is all good or all bad are less compelling that than they can be used for good and bad, and that means companies should consider both equally when weighing their tradeoffs.

    6. We don’t need journalism to tell us where venture capitalists are putting other people’s money. We need it to examine the ramifications of the technology we are pushing into the world and in what ways it might shift the Overton Window for Ethics in either helpful or hurtful ways.

      This is case #3 being made in this post, which is only touched on lightly but could be a separate discussion entirely.

    7. So what this person is essentially saying is that since most people leave their curtains open at night, it’s ethical for the company he funds to film what goes on inside.

      This is one part of the post that I think could have been left out, as it feels unnecessarily speculative and a bit unfair.

    8. Even though most of the feedback I’ve gotten about raising this issue has been supportive, here is a collection of replies I’ve gotten on Twitter, so we can address them all in one place:

      Another best practice to point out. By including counter-arguments to the case within the post itself, people could skip these arguments in their own heads and instead build on them towards even higher quality arguments. Weaving this in is another sign that Mike wants to actually have a conversation about this rather than just bludgeon or shame the recipients of the criticism.

    9. It’s kind of like if you walked by someone’s window at night and saw them naked.

      Another scenario that drives towards an emotional impact, to help people feel the invasion of privacy directly rather than merely thinking about it in abstractions.

    10. Heck, I love a certain showerhead so much that I:

      This aside about showerheads may seem weird but I think it serves as a brilliant way of balancing the serious tone with a more playful one, to help keep people out of outrage mode. Like the caveats woven throughout, these bits of humanity help buffer readers from doubling down on outrage that gets directed at people rather than product feedback that gets directed at features and ideas. I think this is partly responsible for the quality of the discussion sparked by this post.

    11. If you’ve never worked at a tech company before, this is how things go. When faced with making a product decision that is even mildly uncomfortable, employees often first look towards expressed company principles like “Always put the customer first”, but the next thing they look for is precedent.

      An explanation for the mechanism for how early product decisions become precedent to shield future product decisions. It's something we do in all parts of our lives. In fact, some of the response to this post was that other companies did this too, therefore it was wrong to pick on Superhuman. In both cases, precedent is a weak excuse in the matters of what is "right".

    12. Let’s use the dark pattern example.

      Mike uses a lot of real world scenarios to illustrate his point. I think this is an acknowledgment of the fact that this argument is not about what is strictly true, or even what is strictly useful, but primarily about what is morally correct. As such, the right evidence to support this claim is an appeal to values, preferences, beliefs, etc. Were it a claim on truth, direct evidence would work, and were it a claim on usefulness, an experiment could be run.

    13. When a company first forms, there are no norms or principles guiding how its people should make decisions. It’s basically just what’s in the founders’ heads. With each decision a company makes, its “decision genome” is established and subsequently hardened. You’ve decided in your first month that you’re only going to hire engineers from Top 10 engineering schools? That’s now part of your genome and will determine the composition of your company. You’ve decided to forgo extra profits by keeping your prices low for consumers? That’s now part of your genome. You’ve decided to employ a single dark pattern to trick users into adding more things to their shopping cart? Part of your genome.

      Background on case #2 about product decisions leading to company culture. I think weaving this in is useful in order to deflect some of the attention away from Superhuman specifically, and to generalize it as a challenge all companies face.

    14. I know people whom I consider to be ethical people who use workplace software that embeds tracking pixels in emails.

      Additional clarification that criticism of a product decision doesn't reflect directly on the people who made the decision. Mike does this a lot, which I love. Keep feedback about ideas separate from attacks on people.

    15. I want to talk about this issue because I think it’s instructive to how we build products and companies with a sense of ethics and responsibility. I think what Superhuman is doing here demonstrates a lack of regard for both.

      Case #2: early product decisions in a company's history end up informing the culture that forms, and that culture is much harder to change once it is set. Therefore, early product decisions should be considered both for their immediate use as well as their longer-term cultural impacts.

    16. People reasonably expect that when — and especially where — they read their email is their own business.

      This is the statement that, if falsified, would render this argument invalid.

    17. Our inboxes contain everything from very personal letters, to work correspondence, to unsolicited inbound sales pitches. In many ways, they are an extension of our homes: private places where we are free to deal with what life throws at us in whatever way we see fit.

      Opening premise is that we have evolved expectations around our email inboxes where we consider them to be private. We don't expect our location to be tracked every time we open an email. The evidence for this is internal, rather than legal, in most cases. Which makes this argument one without an objective "right answer". Nonetheless, a strong case can be made that if people don't expect to be tracked, then tracking them without their consent (and without a way to opt out) is a bad practice that should be avoided.