- Nov 2018
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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Arthur Smith,
Who the heck is Arthur Smith?
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As a result, the Texas law is a permissible regulation of speech.
It is not a permissible regulation. The Court decided in favor of Johnson.
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government may always prohibit the expression of an idea whenever society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.
"Texas' focus on the precise nature of Johnson's expression, moreover, misses the point of our prior decisions: their enduring lesson, that the Government may not prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with the message, is not dependent on the particular mode in which one chooses to express an idea."
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Dissent
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.
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Looking at Johnson's actions, there is no evidence of an expressive element in his actions.
No. "we have not automatically concluded, however, that any action taken with respect to our flag is expressive.
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Second Amendment
The Second Amendment is the right to have a well-organized militia/to keep and bear arms. Texas v. Johnson falls under First Amendment questions.
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painted an American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down.
No--he burned an American flag.
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- Oct 2018
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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Why, then, should we suppose that the people of any one State should be willing to trust those of another with a power to control the operations of a Government to which they have confided their most important and most valuable interests?
Devil's Advocate: why the hell should they trust a federal government that professes itself to possess "the supreme law of the land"?
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It acts upon the measures of a Government created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with themselves.
I wonder if a close reading the second half of this decision would prompt a conservative person to think about giving democratic socialism a try. If the federal government could create a bank to benefit the country, then what would REALLY dissuade them from allowing some form of universal health care? Is Congress really so buddy-buddy with the insurance companies that they would accept $$$ and reelection over what the people of the USA REALLY need? If so, that's f***ing awful and we need term limits right now.
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This, then, is not a case of confidence, and we must consider it is as it really is.
Confidence in what? In the federal government's morality? Like having faith that it won't "carry [taxation and its other powers] to the excess of destruction"?
If so, I really appreciate Marshall's idealism. What a cool guy!
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- Sep 2018
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
Would this decision be more of an example of judicial restraint or activism? I can see both sides: the court didn't tell Madison or Jefferson to appoint the judges (restraint), but Marshall is really showing Congress the power of the judiciary in this decision (activism).
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the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article
So this would be appellate jurisdiction, right? The textbook says that in Article III, congress is given the power to "alter the court's appellate jurisdiction--including to subtract from it."
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To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right
If withholding judicial commission is "violative of a vested legal right," and the court can issue writs of mandamus, then why did this court not give the justices their jobs? Was it only to ameliorate relations between the Federalists and Jefferson's administration?
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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Or how about if it chooses on a sunny day to do its religious instruction outside. How does the State know or how can it control without then controlling on the -- on the basis of belief and viewpoint? How could they control against that involvement?
Pretty sure Sotomayor is a dissenter. She's grilling Cortman with exacerbated hypotheticals.
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Because the kind of examples Your Honor is giving are examples where the -- the benefits are universal. They are not selective, which they are here; they are universal. So we start on the endorsement side.
Isn't children's safety a universal concern whether or not the playground they're using is a part of a religious organization or not? It seems like Layton is really grasping at straws. Like he's pushing hard for a conservatively textual interpretation of Missouri's law based on his own personal beliefs.
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I guess there's something attractive about having some play in the joints where States can go their own way and make their own choices.
Interesting. Justice Kagan is considered a left-leaning judge, and championing for states' rights seems to be a more conservative endeavor. I wonder what the reason for her states' rights rationalization is: is it her own philosophy re: the establishment clause?
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Have they ever said that it prevents the State from, say, having a -- a border guard, you know, crossing guards or fire protection? Or, let's say, health inspections?
I think Breyer is going to side with the church. He gives examples of other ways that public funds already are directed at Trinity, therefore he believes the case is moot.
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But what I'm trying to figure out is, is there a distinction between these two things.
This seems like a genuine question, trying to confirm a suspicion that Justice Kagan has: funding Trinity is not constitutional. She feels that funding religious activity or affiliation in any way is in direct conflict with her interpretation of the establishment clause.
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So if it's controlled.
Knowing that Alito is a more conservative justice, this quote leads me to believe he voted in favor of the church. He is questioning the merits of Cortman's argument based on the word "controlled," which can have connotative implications of "too much," or "tyrannical." Justice Alito could be rationalizing that this organization isn't MAKING anyone choose one belief over another, so it's constitutional to allow funding for the playground.
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and saying he can't both be a minister and also be a constitutional delegate.
This is really thought-provoking. I'm not familiar with this case, but this interpretation of the free exercise clause is very inclusive. It shows a respect for individual rights. It's just... can we apply the same reasoning to ALL religions, and to what extent? So tricky... I guess this big question is a main reason for court cases like this one.
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So this church could say, we will take only Lutheran children.
I think Justice Ginsberg is one of the dissenters. She is grilling Cortman with a lot of hypotheticals and she sounds passionate in her questioning. Also, I know she's a more liberal justice.
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