s Luce Irigaray (1985) would say, through this speculum women's genitals were simply those of a man turned inside out and upside down.

men's bodies were believed to be the true form of human biology and the stan- dard against which female structures-bones, brains, and genitalia alike-were to be compared

they often do not include a sketch of the clitoris; and when they do, it is seldom detailed.

t, though their information about the aver- age size of erect penises is sometimes shockingly inflated-a consequence, I suspect, of the size of male erections in porn mov

oris. The vast majority of my female students have no idea how big their clitoris is, or how big the average clitoris is, or what types of variations exist among wo

What we do and do not know about women's genitalia is a case study of the politics of ignorance. The "we"s I speak of here are both the "we"s of the general population in the United States7 and the "we"s of scien

UNVEILING THE CLITORIS

so because of a firm belief that as we come to understand our orgasms, we will find a site of pleasure that serves as a resource for resisting sexual normalization through the practices of becoming sexua

My goal is to understand what "we" do and do not know about women's orgasms, and wh

But women's bodies and pleasures provide a fertile lens for understanding the workings of power/knowledge-ignorance in which we can trace who desires what knowledge; that is, we can glimpse the construction of desire (or lack thereof) for knowledge of women's sexuality.

Bodies and their pleasures are not natural givens, not even deep down. Nor do I believe in a true female sexuality hidden deep beneath the layers of oppressive socialization

a fertile

Bodies and pleasures, as Foucault well knew, have histories.

Can my investigations of the power dimensions of ignorance concerning women's orgasms not fall prey to a constructed desire for the "truth of sex?"

T]he truth of sex became something fundamental, useful, or dangerous, precious or formidable; in short, that sex was constituted as a problem of truth"

Female sexuality is a particularly fertile area for tracking the intersections of power/knowledge-ignorance.2 S

nnot fully account for what we know without also offering an account of what we do not know and who is privileged and disadvantaged by such knowledge/ig

common knowledge has been actively "disappeared" amongst certain groups. We must also ask the question now common to feminist and postcolonialist science studies of who benefits and who is disadvantaged by such ignorance (see,

Midwives in most settings and physicians in many other countries still possess this knowledge and employ it regularly. Epist

because medical practices, which are in large part fueled by business and malpractice concerns, have shifted knowledge practices in cases of breech births to Caesareans. Midwives in most settings and physicians in many other countries still possess this knowledge and employ it regularly. Epis

Epistemologies that view ignorance as an arena of not-yet-knowing will also overlook those instances where knowledge once had has been lost. What was once common knowledge or even common scientific knowledge can be trans- ferred to the realm of ignorance not because it is refuted and seen as false, but because such knowledge is no longer seen as valuable, important, or functional

it is important to be aware of how often oppression works through and is shad- owed by ignorance.

"On matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made" (1997, 18)

An important aspect of an epistemology of ignorance is the realization that ignorance should not be theorized as a simple omission or gap but is, in many cases, an active production

The persistence of contro- versy is often not a natural consequence of imperfect knowledge but a political consequence of conflicting interests and structural apathies.

shion it is important that our epistemologies not limit attention simply to what is known or believed to be known. If we are to fully understand the complex practices of knowledge production and the va

The appeal to reality thus does not suffice in explaining why a belief has come to be accepted by sci

ly by their truth. Bloor and other SSK theorists argue that such appeals to truth are inadequate, insisting that the acceptance of a belief as true, even in science, inv

ologies. Ignorance is not a simple lack. It is often constructed, maintained, and disseminated and is linked to issues of cognitive authority, doubt, trust, silencing, and unc