5 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2018
    1. ” Tools and skeletons evolved synchronously. We might say that with the Archanthropians, tools were still, to a large extent, a direct emanation of species behavior” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 97).

      Stiegler > Leroi-Gourhan: " tools were still, to a large extent, a direct emanation of species behavior"

    2. With flaked pebbles, there was only one gesture in the handling of the pebble (a blow struck at 90 degrees, to which corresponded one sharp edge and a technical consciousness). With the Archanthropian stereotype, the gesture is combined with others: “This [acquisition] was more than simply the addition of something new, for it implied a good deal of foresight on the part of the individual performing the sequence of technical operations” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 97). Anticipation was present from the start, from the first gesture, with somewhat less foresight. But what does this “good deal of foresight” mean? As soon as there is any sort of anticipation, in whatever “quantity,” has not a qualitative threshold been surpassed that should first be described for itself before wishing or being able to measure it? If it is possible to measure this “thing,” should one not know what is being measured? Because it is affected with anticipation, because it is nothing but anticipation, a gesture is a gesture·, and there can be no gesture without tools and artificial memory, prosthetic, outside of the body, and constitutive of its world. There is no anticipation, no time outside of this passage outside, of this putting-outside-of-self and of this alienation of the human and its memory that “exteriorization” is. The question is the very ambiguity of the word “exteriorization” and the hierarchy or the chronological, logical, and ontological preeminence that it immediately induces: if indeed one could speak of exteriorization, this would mean the presence of a preceding interiority. Now, this interiority is nothing outside of its exteriorization: the issue is therefore neither that of an interiority nor that of exteriority— but that of an originary complex in which the two terms, far from being opposed, compose with one another (and by the same token are posed, in a single stroke, in a single movement). Neither one precedes the other, neither is the origin of the other, the origin being then the coming into adequacy [con-venance] or the simultaneous arrival of the two— which are in truth the same considered from two different points of view. We shall later name this structure the complex of Epimetheus, and shall see that for Simondon it is a question of a transduc- tive relation. A “prosthesis” does not supplement something, does not replace what would have been there before it and would have been lost: it is added. By pros-thesis, we understand (1) set in front, or spatialization (de-severance [e-loignement]); (2) set in advance, already there (past) and anticipation (foresight), that is, temporalization. The prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the constitution of this body qua “human” (the quotation marks belong to the constitution). It is not a “means” for the human but its end, and we know the essential equivocity of this expression: “the end of the human.” What is called “interiority” nevertheless indicates the problem of a potentiality of which “exteriorization” seems to be the act, that is, according to the Aristotelian theory, of which it is the truth, the sole truth. “Interiority” would be only the expectation, the call, or the promise of exteriorization— the tendency to exteriorization. Now, expectation means projection and future— anticipation. The whole problem, which thus becomes the distendedness of the past, the present, and the future, is caught in a circle in which the tool appears at one and the same time qua the result of anticipation, exteriorization, and qua the condition of all anticipation, anticipation appearing itself qua the interiorization of the originary fact of exteriorization. Exteriorization qua the act that is the horizon of anticipation, qua the gesture, is also an Erinnerung, the very moment of reflexivity, of the affection of self as a return to self. The problem remains that it does not seem that such a reflexivity may be manifestly characterized as a relation to the grammē as such.

      Stiegler: "The prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the constitution of this body qua “human”" ||

    3. What is specific to the human is the movement of putting itself outside the range of its own hand, locking onto the animal process of “liberation”: “the brain was not the cause of developments in locomotor adaptation but their beneficiary” (26). The hand never has anything within its range. Prostheticity, here a consequence of the freedom of the hand, is a putting-outside-the-self that is also a putting-out- of-range-of-oneself. Pursuing the “process of liberation,” the installation of this techno-logical complex nevertheless brings on a rupture. The conquest of mobility, qua supernatural mobility, qua speed, is more significant than intelligence— or rather, intelligence is but a type of mobility, a singular relation of space and time, which must be thought from the standpoint of speed, as its decompositions, and not conversely (speed as the result of their conjunction). It would be necessary, moreover, to analyze the relation of différance to speed: différance is itself also a conjunction of space and time more originary than their separation. It is in this sense, then, that différance will, perhaps, have to be thought as speed.2

      Stiegler > Derrida / Leroi-Gourhan: "différance will, perhaps, have to be thought as speed" || I would think of this primarily in terms of academic-educational technology where the speed of access is paramount.

    4. Flint is the first reflective memory, the first mirror.

      Stiegler > Leroi-Gourhan: "Flint is the first reflective memory, the first mirror" ||

    5. The movement inherent in this process of exteriorization is paradoxical: Leroi-Gourhan in fact says that it is the tool, that is, tekhnē, that invents the human, not the human who invents the technical. Or again: the human invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool— by becoming exteriorized techno-logically.

      Stiegler > Leroi-Gourhan: "the human invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool— by becoming exteriorized techno-logically" ||