10 Matching Annotations
- Sep 2018
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a class of men who would not represent the province for which they are appointed, and who could give no pledge that they would maintain its institutions.
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he will see that the first nominations are to be made by the existing governments. Thus the Government of Canada, that of New Brunswick and that of Nova Scotia will appoint legislative councillors, but afterwards the Federal Government will make the appointments. The honorable member for Quebec can, with reason, draw the conclusion that there is no guarantee that the views of the provinces will be respected. I for my part have investigated the matter, more in connection with the power that will be vested in the legislative councillors. I asserted that by appointing them for life and limiting their number, an absolute authority would be created, which would be quite beyond the control of the people and even of the Executive; that the power of this body will be so great, that they will always be in a position to prevent every reform if they thought proper, and that a collision between the two branches would be inevitable and irremediable. The danger arising from the creating of such a power is exactly that of being obliged to destroy it if they resist too obstinately the popular demands. In England there is no necessity for breaking down the obstructions sometimes presented by the House of Lords, because the Crown having it in its power to appoint new peers, can overcome the difficulty. Here there will be no means of doing it, when the number of councillors is fixed. Accordingly, I have looked at the question through the medium of the powers assigned to the councillors, whereas the honorable member for the county of Quebec fears lest the Government should make choice of men who would not represent public opinion in the provinces; that they might appoint members all of French origin or all of English origin to represent Lower Canada, or take them all from among
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In our Constitution it is the duty of the Legislative Council to exercise the conservative influence, and to modify the legislation too energetic and too full of outside effervescence, which is sent for their consideration from the House of Commons. But when public opinion gains vigor from the obstacles which it encounters, and the reforms demanded are rational and come before them in due course, there is no danger that the legislation which embodies them will be obstructed in its progress; for the people will rise in their majesty and in their sense of justice, as did the people of England in 1832, and the obstacles they might meet with on their way would be swept away as by a torrent. (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. DORION—That is exactly where the danger lies. HON. MR. CAUCHON—That is the danger which assailed the House of Lords in 1832, but no one would venture to confront to the last extremity a danger such as this. But the honorable member for Quebec tells us, if I understand him rightly, that we have not sufficient guarantees for Lower Canada in the appointment of the legislative councillors. The selection of legislative councillors has no bearing whatever on the question we are now considering, viz., whether the appointment by the Crown is or is not preferable to the elective principle. But in answer to him I will say, that the scheme before us seems to be quite clear. According to this plan the candidates for the Legislative Council will be recommended by the local governments and appointed by the General Government, and it is by this very division of powers that the selections are sure to be good, and made in conformity with the desire and sentiments of the provinces. HON. MR. DORION—Only the first nominations are to be made in this manner, not those which may be made afterwards. HON. MR. CAUCHON—The first nominations will be made by the present Governments, and the federal councillors will be taken from the present legislative councillors to the number prescribed, 24, provided so many can be found who will accept the post, and who possess the requisite property qualification. The Conference has engaged, by the terms of the scheme, to respect the rights of the Opposition, and any government who should fail to carry out so solemn an engagement would well deserve to lose the public confidence. (Hear, hear.) I repeat that the mode of appointing the councillors in no wise affects the conservative principle of nomination on which the constitution of the Legislative Council ought to be based.
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In order to protect local interests, and to prevent sectional jealousies, it was found requisite that the three great divisions into which British North America is separated, should be represented in the Upper House on the principle of equality. There are three great sections, having different interests, in this proposed Confederation.
§§. 21-36 & § 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867
Referenced in Re: Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 SCR 54, 1979 CanLII 169 (SCC)
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To the Upper House is to be confided the protection of sectional interests ; therefore is it that the three great divisions are there equally represented, for the purpose of defending such interests against the combinations of majorities in the Assembly.
§§. 21-36 & § 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867
Referenced in Re: Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 SCR 54, 1979 CanLII 169 (SCC)
Tags
- Section 24 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 31 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 36 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 91(1) of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 25 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 27 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 23 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 30 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 22 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 29 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 33 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 32 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 34 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 28 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 26 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 21 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1867
Annotators
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But the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step ; and, for my part, I am quite willing they should have it. In maintaining the existing sectional boundaries and handing over the control of local matters to local bodies, we recognize, to a certain extent, a diversity of interests ; and it was quite natural that the protection for those interests, by equality in the Upper Chamber, should be demanded by the less numerous provinces.
§§. 21-36 & § 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867
Referenced in Re: Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 SCR 54, 1979 CanLII 169 (SCC)
Tags
- Section 24 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 31 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 36 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 91(1) of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 25 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 27 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 23 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 30 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 22 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 29 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 33 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 32 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 34 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 28 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 26 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 21 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1867
Annotators
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and that that province will approve of our having inserted the clause in question in the resolutions. The vote which took place last night in another place, shews that I am not mistaken in what I assert on this subject. One of the greatest objections which the honorable member for Hochelaga raises to the appointment of the legislative councillors by the Crown, is that their number will be fixed, and that, by consequence, it will prove an obstacle to the decisions and legislation of the Commons House of the Federal Parliament. In a word, the honorable member declares that the Legislative Council, so constituted, will be, to use an English expression, a nuisance. The honorable member should glance back at the past to consider how many councillors appointed for life there were in the Legislative Council at the time of the concession of the elective principle, and how many of those said councillors remain at the present day. He would have ascertained that in eight years the number had diminished by one-half. Of the forty-two or forty-three members which there were then, there now remain but twenty-one or twenty-two. (Hear, hear.) The honorable member for Hochelaga should also have admitted that in those eight years there had been such considerable changes among the elected councillors, that there was no danger of the Legislative Council not being at least accessible to the people. This diminution gives an average of three members a-year, and if we take the proportion between this diminution and that which would necessarily prevail among a larger number of councillors, we shall find that there will be at least five vacancies in each year. The honorable member must then perceive that, if it should happen that the Legislative Council should be so opposed to the views of the Lower House as systematically to reject the measures of the popular branch of the Legislature, at the end of a year or perhaps less, such changes would be effected by death or otherwise, that we should immediately have such an infusion of new blood, that any attempt of this kind could not be repeated for a long time. Besides, the Legislative Council will not constitute a separate class like the House of Lords in England. The councillors will come from among the people, with whom they will have interests in common, and it is absurd to suppose that they will be induced to oppose systematically and constantly the measures which the Lower House may enact in favor of the people and at their instance. The hon. member for Hochelaga, when on this subject, reproached the Attorney General for Upper Canada with having stated in his opening speech, that if he had to preside over the selection of the legislative councillors, he would see that the best qualified men were appointed.
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the Local Legislature of Lower Canada the construction and maintenance of a new Penitentiary, leaving to Upper Canada the Penitentiary now in existence in that province ? HON. MR. CAMPBELL—No doubt ; but Lower Canada may arrange with Upper Canada for the temporary use of the Penitentiary, so long as she requires it, or for its permanent use, if that is thought better.
§.91(28) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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The 9th sub-section of that clause imposes on the local governments, ” the establishment, maintenance and management of penitentiaries, and of public and reformatory prisons.” There is but one penitentiary in Canada, which is situated in Upper Canada. Does this clause impose on
§.91(28) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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If the two Canadas were alone interested, the majority would have its own way—would look into the Constitution closely—would scan its every doubtful provision, and such a proposal as this about the Legislative Council would have no chance of being carried, for it is not very long since the House, by an overwhelming majority, voted for the substitution of an elected for a nominated Upper Chamber. In fact, the nominated Chamber had fallen so low in public estimation—I do not say it was from the fault of the men who were there, but the fact is, nevertheless, as I state it— that it commanded no influence. There was even a difficulty in getting a quorum of it together. So a change became absolutely necessary, and up to the present moment the new system has worked well; the elected members are equal in every respect to the nominated ones, and it is just when we see an interest beginning to be felt in the proceedings of the Upper House that its Constitution is to be changed, to return back again to the one so recently condemned. Back again, did I say ? No, sir, a Constitution is to be substituted, much worse than the old one, and such as is nowhere else to be found. Why, even the British House of Lords, conservative as it is, is altogether beyond the influence of the popular sentiment of the country. Their number may be increased on the recommendation of the responsible advisers of the Crown, if required to secure united action or to prevent a conflict between the two Houses. From the position its members occupy, it is a sort of compromise between the popular element and the influence or control of the Crown. But the new House for the Confederation is to be a perfectly independent body —these gentlemen are to be named for life— and there is to be no power to increase their number. How long will the system work without producing a collision between the
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