4 Matching Annotations
- Aug 2019
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www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au
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First, the respondents rightly submit that, while mindful of the presumption of innocence, an ordinary reasonable member of the public is likely to conclude from the fact that Mr de Belin has been charged with a serious offence that he is a person suspected by the police of having committed the offence and that the police have reasonable cause for laying the charge against him
The problem here is that there is a belief that if the police charge someone they have a view that the person is guilty. In assault cases, this is simply just not the case.
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In any event, even if there were any doubt about the issue, the inference that an ordinary reasonable member of the public would form this view became irresistible once detailed and graphic allegations of the charge emerged when Mr de Belin attended court on 12 February 2019 and were extensively reported in the media. For example, the Channel 9 news report that evening stated that “[p]olice say their case is strong and if convicted he will go to jail” and that it was alleged that the victim “later underwent a rape test at hospital and was observed to have injuries to her legs, neck, lower abdomen and shoulder” (exhibit R4): see also e.g. the reports in the Courier Mail, Brisbane, and the Daily Telegraph, Sydney, on 13 February 2019 (exhibit R6 at pp. 907 and 923 respectively).
Here is a clear example of trial by media affecting a judicial response to a matter. People need to be able to remain anonymous until after they are convicted, because as acknowledged here, the damage is already done.
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This requires an assessment of whether the new rule is objectively reasonable in the relevant circumstances,
There needs to be a human right that prevents people taking action against someone prior to the court's decision (i.e. innocent until proven guilty).
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De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Limited [2019] FCA 688
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