FOR quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
This seems very similar to the later protections in the bill of rights to not have to harbour troops in ones home and actually to me makes that section far more understandable then it previously was.
has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome & necessary for the public good.
I feel this goes back to our original discussion of the different forms of public good and was the idea of what the public good was different in Britain vs in the Colonies? And that by refusing to assent to extra laws for the colonies he was hurting their public good.
Here then they have put the axe to the root of all Government; and yet, in the same breath, they talk of “Governments,” of Governments “long established.” To these last, they attribute same kind of respect; they vouchsafe even to go so far as to admit, that “Governments, long established, should not be “changed for light or transient reasons.” Yet they are about to change a Government, a Government whose establishment is coeval with their own existence as a Community. What causes do they assign? Circumstances which have always subsisted, which must continue to subsist, wherever Government has subsisted, or can subsist.
Bentham here argues that the very idea of overthrowing a government that is "long established" is ridiculous and goes completely against their own idea that these governments should not be removed, its somewhat anachronistic that the government whose existence resulted in the colonies existence is being overthrown by those very colonies.
The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the people, and every blessing of society depend so much upon an upright and skilful administration of justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both should be checks upon that. The judges, therefore, should be always men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, coolness, and attention. Their minds should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependent upon any man, or body of men. To these ends, they should hold estates for life in their offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during good behavior, and their salaries ascertained and established by law. For misbehavior, the grand inquest of the colony, the house of representatives, should impeach them before the governor and council, where they should have time and opportunity to make their defence; but, if convicted, should [199] be removed from their offices, and subjected to such other punishment as shall be thought proper. A militia law, requiring all men, or with very few exceptions besides cases of conscience, to be provided with arms and ammunition, to be trained at certain seasons; and requiring counties, towns, or other small districts, to be provided with public stocks of ammunition and intrenching utensils, and with some settled plans for transporting provisions after the militia, when marched to defend their country against sudden invasions; and requiring certain districts to be provided with field-pieces, companies of matrosses, and perhaps some regiments of light-horse, is always a wise institution, and, in the present circumstances of our country, indispensable.
These two paragraphs outline Adam's views on the ideas of judicial independence and militia law, both of which became integral parts of the US constitution but I find it interesting the striking similarity between the two.
4. A representative assembly, although extremely well qualified, and absolutely necessary, as a branch of the legislative, is unfit to exercise the executive power, for want of two essential properties, secrecy and despatch. 5. A representative assembly is still less qualified for the judicial power, because it is too numerous, too slow, and too little skilled in the laws. 6. Because a single assembly, possessed of all the powers of government, would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in their own favor.
I find this an interesting and fairly solid argument for the benefits of separate branches of government. I think this is particularly interesting because of its contrast with the British system at the time and to some extent of today where the executive, legislature and judiciary (at least at the top) were combined to an extent in one body and even today the legislature and executive are one and the same with the executive chosen from the members of the legislature.
A legislative, an executive, and a judicial power comprehend the whole of what is meant and understood by government. It is by balancing each of these powers against the other two, that the efforts in human nature towards tyranny can alone be checked and restrained, and any degree of freedom preserved in the constitution.
This shows early support for the idea of separation of powers between the three branches of government. What I find interesting is Adams's argument that it is to prevent tyranny which is presumably the result of the animosity towards the perceived tyranny of the British government at the time and that such tyranny must be avoided at all costs by allowing no individual branch or person to take all the power.
Some writers have explained the English constitution thus; the king, say they, is one, the people another; the peers are an house in behalf of the king; the commons in behalf of the people; but this hath all the distinctions of a house divided against itself;
I find this an interesting statement which i feel is in many ways an argument that it is inevitable that at least in the colonies the British government must fall and will fall because it cannot overcome its basic anachronistic contradictiveness.
offer a few remarks on the so much boasted constitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected, is granted. When the world was over run with tyranny the least remove therefrom was a glorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions, and incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is easily demonstrated.
I think this is an interesting view on the British constitution, no doubt shared by many colonists at the time that the constitution was outdated and not fit for purpose. However, I have some issue with this statement for the single reason that there is no real British constitution, instead it is made up of the entire body of law currently enacted and as such changes all the time making it unlikely to be unfit for purpose or outdated. Despite this, the view of Paine i feel mirrors that of many in the colonise at the time which perhaps gives a greater insight into some of the oppositions to British rule?
For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least. Wherefore, security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expence and greatest benefit, is preferable to all others.
This shows an interesting interpretation of the state of nature somewhat along the lines of the Hobbesian ideas that the state of nature is brutish and has no real natural laws, therefore he argues that the government whilst a necessary evil for security should give the people the most benefit for the least loss of freedom.
First, the people of the Colonies are descendants of Englishmen. England, Sir, is a nation which still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The Colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character was most predominant; and they took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas, and on English principles. Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found. Liberty inheres in some sensible object; and every nation has formed to itself some favorite point, which by way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness.
Burke talks about how the colonists came from England and thus took with them English ideals of freedom and liberty. I wonder if this is to some extent Burke arguing that the colonists should not want to rebel because the value which they hold most dear is the same value that is held in such high esteem in Britain and that to pursue freedom and liberty they would be just as well served as part of the empire than as an independent nation?
The trade to the Colonies, taken on the export side, at the beginning of this century, that is, in the year 1704, stood thus:– Exports to North America and the West Indies. L483,265 To Africa. ……………………………. 86,665 ——– L569,930 In the year 1772, which I take as a middle year between the highest and lowest of those lately laid on your table, the account was as follows:– To North America and the West Indies …… L4,791,734 To Africa. ………………………….. 866,398 To which, if you add the export trade from Scotland, which had in 1704 no existence .. 364,000 ———- L6,022,132 From five hundred and odd thousand, it has grown to six millions. It has increased no less than twelve-fold. This is the state of the Colony trade as compared with itself at these two periods within this century;–and this is matter for meditation.
I think this fits with my earlier point about the actual power of the American colonies and the value of those colonies to the British Empire. Over 68 years the value of the colonies to the Empire increased by over 6 million which when combined with the population increase shows that the colonies were now very much a fledgling nation with the wealth and population to be successful and oppose the Empire from which they came.
Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of governing two millions, we shall find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood than they spread from families to communities, and from villages to nations.
I feel like this shows to some extent the realisation in Britain that the colonies were no longer a small band of people on the edge of a huge continent but a fledgling nation with a rapidly expanding population and that the governing style which was adequate for the colonies in America at the start with a fairly small population were far from adequate for a population of more than 2 million.
Every King of England (apparently for the same reason) is restrained by the Law from changing or making new Laws without the assent or consent of his WHOLE KINGDOM in Parliament ex∣pressed.And the whole King∣dom, even of Great-Britain itself, is only a part of the British Empire; and there∣fore, by a parity of reasoning, cannot justly or equitably be permitted to make laws for the whole; because where the same reason is, the same law (or right) must prevail: for turpis est pars quae non convenit cum suo toto; (Plowden, 161.) and nihil in lege in∣tolerabilius est, eandem rem diverso jure censeri.
I think this is quite an unusual argument to be put forward by an Englishman at the time as Granville is talking about how because the King can't change laws for England the parliament should not be able to make laws for the whole of the empire without consent from representative of those areas. However, this is hardly surprising given Granville's reputation and his later involvement in the abolition of the slave trade in Britain and his understanding of Human Rights.
because the English Law ab∣hors the idea of taking the least pro∣perty from Freemen without their free consent — “It is iniquitous” (iniquum est, says the maxim)that Free∣men should not have the free disposal of their own effects;
Another example of the ideas of private property and natural rights and how taxation could only levied if with the consent of the people otherwise the people can refuse to pay, which brings up the question of the standing of the colonists under English law and if whether or not they are freemen under english law and so are protected in that way
And as all British subjects, whether in Great-Britain, Ireland, or the Colo∣nies, are equally free by the law of Na∣ture, they certainly are equally entitled to the same Natural Rights that are essential for their own preservation; because this privilege of having a share in the legis∣lation is not merely a British Right, pe∣culiar to this island, but it is also a Na∣tural Right, which cannot, without the most flagrant and stimulating injustice, be withdrawn from any part of the British Empire by any worldly authority whatso∣ever; because, by the natural Law, whereunto he [ALMIGHTY GOD] hath made all subject, (says the learned Hooker,)the lawful power of making laws, to command whole po∣litic societies of men, belongeth so pro∣perly unto the same entire societies, that for any Prince or Potentate, of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself,[or themselves,] and not either by express Commission im∣mediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent upon whose per∣sons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny! Laws they are not, therefore, which public Appro∣bation hath not made so. Agreeable to the same just principles of natural E∣quity is that maxim of the English Con∣stitution, that Law, to bind all, must be assented to by all;
I find this a fairly succinct explanation of the Lockeian view of Natural Rights and their application to the real world, particularly to the rights of all people of the British Empire. Granville also states that in his view all laws that bind people must have the consent of all those affected, which leads him to argue that the colonists should be represented because otherwise presumably they would not be subjected any laws passed without their representation and thus consent.
possessed a right which nature has given to all men, of departing from the country in which chance, not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new habitations, and of there establishing new societies, under such laws and regulations as to them shall seem most likely to promote public happiness
Interesting application of the ideas of Locke on natural rights? As well as an interesting link to the earlier discussions about the possibility of two public goods, one in Britain and one in America on the basis that the colonies were a new society distinctly different from Britain.
I find the pragmatic economic arguments laid down by Hamilton over the course of the reading very refreshing, he makes reasoned points based on the economic situation of Britain and other states in order to justify his argument.
It is this, whether we shall preserve that security to our lives and properties, which the law of nature, the genius of the British constitution, and our charters afford us; or whether we shall resign them into the hands of the British House of Commons, which is no more privileged to dispose of them than the Grand Mogul? What can actuate those men, who labour to delude any of us into an opinion, that the object of contention between the parent state and the colonies is only three pence duty upon tea? or that the commotions in America originate in a plan, formed by some turbulent men to erect it into a republican government? The parliament claims a right to tax us in all cases whatsoever: Its late acts are in virtue of that claim. How ridiculous then is it to affirm, that we are quarrelling for the trifling sum of three pence a pound on tea; when it is evidently the principle against which we contend.
I find this an interesting use of the ideas of the laws of nature and the nature of consent to laws of Great Britain as well as a very adept summary of the issues which the colonists had with the British Government especially the no taxation without representation and the foundations of a republican government.
One of the most ancient maxims of the English law is, that no freeman can be taxed at pleasure.p But taxes on freemen were absolutely necessary to defray the extraordinary charges of government. The consent of the freemen was, therefore, of necessity to be obtained. Numerous as they were, they could not assemble to give their consent in their proper persons; and for this reason, it was directed by the constitution, that they should give it by their representatives, chosen by and out of themselves. Hence the indisputable and peculiar privilege of the house of commons to grant taxes
I find this an interesting explanation of the reasons for the taxation and the representation of the people, in this case the "freemen" of England but later all citizens and the basis of representative democracy in the UK and the reasons for it.
All men are, by nature, equal and free: no one has a right to any authority over another without his consent:
Like the next part of this sentence that Maddie has highlighted this first part brings up the continuous debate about what consent is and how it is given. Wilson argues that because all 'men' are free and equal no one should have control over another without their consent (along the lines of locke), which then leads to the discussion of what form of consent is acceptable for one man to have power over another which in Wilsons argument is unclear as to if he includes tacit consent as a valid form of consent.
“They tell us, that it is the true principle of government, that no man should pay a tax to which he does not consent, either in his own person, or by his representative chosen by him; that the Colonies are not represented in the British parliament, and therefore cannot be taxed by it.”
A referral presumably to the slogan of "no taxation without representation"? As well as the argument that consent must be either by an individual or by their chosen representative.
The colonies claim the privileges of British subjects -It has been proved to be inconsistent with those privileges, to tax them without their own consent, and it hath been demonstrated that a tax imposed by Parliament, is a tax without their consent.
This goes back to the central argument of the whole issue, that the government of Britain has no right to tax the colonies without representing them in government and that by doing so they are depriving the colonists of some of the most fundamental rights of British citizenship.
Liberty is the greatest blessing that men enjoy, and slavery the heaviest curse that human nature is capable of. This being so makes it a matter of the utmost importance to men which of the two shall be their portion. Absolute liberty is, perhaps, incompatible with any kind of government. The safety resulting from society, and the advantage of just and equal laws, hath caused men to forego some part of their natural liberty, and submit to government.
Hopkins argues here that in order for people to have liberty there must be no government and therefore by subjecting to a government the people trade a portion of the liberty for protection and justice. I understand this to be Hopkins arguing also that in order to have full liberty you must live in some kind of Hobbesian state of nature and along similarly Hobbesian lines people submit to government to escape the "nasty, brutish and short" life that results from a state of nature.
But they saw clearly, that popular powers must be placed as a guard, a control, a balance, to the powers of the monarch and the priest, in every government, or else it would soon become the man of sin, the whore of Babylon, the mystery of iniquity, a great and detestable system of fraud, violence, and usurpation.
In this part we clearly see a small hint of the ideas of separation of powers and checks and balances which later formed part of the constitution.
which, although it was originally formed, perhaps, for the necessary defence of a barbarous people against the inroads and invasions of her neighboring nations, yet for the same purposes of tyranny, cruelty, and lust, which had dictated the canon law, it was soon adopted by almost all the princes of Europe, and wrought into the constitutions of their government. It was originally a code of laws for a vast army in a perpetual encampment. The general was invested with the sovereign propriety of all the lands within the territory. Of him, as his servants and vassals, the first rank of his great officers held the lands; and in the same manner the other subordinate officers held of them; and all ranks and degrees held their lands by a variety of duties and services, all tending to bind the chains the faster on every order of mankind. In this manner the common people were held together in herds and clans in a state of servile dependence on their lords, bound, even by the tenure of their lands, to follow them, whenever they commanded, to their wars, and in a state of total ignorance of every thing divine and human, excepting the use of arms and the culture of their lands.
I understand this to be Adams's view on the constitution and laws of the British Empire and certainly describes the former feudal system of the UK and most of Europe with the system of patronage and duty. It's also interesting because perhaps this in part is Adams explaining why the government of the UK was corrupt and not acting in the interest of the American Colonists.
Is not every man born as free by nature as his father? Has he not the same natural right to think and act and contract for himself? Is it possible for a man to have a natural right to make a slave of himself or of his posterity? Can a father supersede the laws of nature? What man is or ever was born free if every man is not?
"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, That they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." Otis like may of the writers of the period all stress the ideas of freedom and liberty which form a key part of the declaration of independence.
To those who lay the foundation of government in force and mere brutal power it is objected that their system destroys all distinction between right and wrong; that it overturns all morality, and leaves it to every man to do what is right in his own eyes; that it leads directly to skepticism, and ends in atheism. When a man’s will and pleasure is his only rule and guide, what safety can there be either for him or against him, but in the point of a sword?
Otis seems to some extent to be describing the Hobbesian idea of of the state of nature and the idea in some respects in that he describes the idea of a state where people can only have safety through violence. But he argues that as a result the only way out is through a peaceful democratic government rather than an absolute monarchy.
If we calmly consider the nature of the thing itself, nothing can well be imagined more directly contrary to common sense, than to suppose that millions of people should be subjected to the arbitrary, precarious pleasure of one single man; (who has naturally no superiority over them in point of authority) so that their estates, and every thing that is valuable in life, and even their lives also, shall be absolutely at his disposal, if he happens to be wanton and capricious enough to demand them.
Mayhew, in this section, argues incredibly strongly against the idea of a monarchy on the basis that it is completely unreasonable to expect people to submit themselves to the rule of one person. This is particularly interesting when compared to Hobbes who argues that by having a monarchy the interests of the people are the interests of the monarch and that the consistency and stability of a government is founded in monarchy rather than democracy. Although this is somewhat more consistent with Locke and his view that civil society is inconsistent with a monarchy, which is in a sense what Mayhew is arguing here.
Right is of two kinds, right to Power and right to Property
I find Hume's differentiation of rights very interesting as in many ways they are reframing Locke's and Hobbes views on natural rights. Hume proposes two rights, the first of which is Power which is in my view equivalent to Locke's right to liberty with power being power over ones self and ones actions in the way that Hobbes argues that man has the right "to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life". Equally, property being equivalent to Locke's right to estate with individuals having the right to own and profit from property so long as it does not infringe upon the other rights.
The chief alterations that could be made on the British government, in order to bring it to the most perfect model of limited monarchy, seem to be the following. First, The plan of gCromwell’s parliament ought to be restored, by making the representation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county elections who possess noth a property of 200 pounds [527] value. Secondly, As such a house of Commons would be too weighty for a frail house of Lords, like the present, the Bishops and Scotch Peers ought to be removed:i The number of the upper house ought to be raised to three or four hundred: Their seats not hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a seat that was offered him. By this means the house of Lords would consist entirely of the men of chief credit, abilities, and interest in the nation; and every turbulent leader in the house of Commons might be taken off, and connected by interest with the house of Peers.
Whist perhaps not completely relevant to the American revolution I find this paragraph fascinating because the debates which Hume is setting out in it are still being debated today! Although the House of Commons has now come to far outweigh the House of Lords the ideas that there should be no Bishops in the house of Lords and the Lords should be elected for Life, and those lords should be people with experience and useful knowledge pertinent to government, not as hereditary peers. These debates are still being debated in parliament and the reform of the House of Lords has been often proposed in parliament but never passed.
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public good. Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no security at all.
Hume sets out the very basis of the separation and the balance of powers which forms a key part of the constitutional design of the institutions of government in the United States. He argues that there should be a system of checks and balances on the government and on the people in order for there to be cooperation in the interest of the public good, and that without these checks and balances the freedom of the people is at the mercy of the government and therefore there is no real freedom.
All men are born free; liberty is a gift which they receive from God himself; nor can they alienate the same by consent, though possibly they may forfeit it by crimes.
This is somewhat similar to the line of "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." in the declaration of Independence in that Trenchard implies that the right to liberty is a god given right and the right of all 'men' although it is also likely that section 87 (not shown in the readings) of the two treaties of government by Locke is also a source of inspiration for the writers of the declaration of independence.
Like Gordon's letter on freedom of speech, this letter from Gordon (33) also bares striking resemblance to the US constitution particularly in the setting out of the three branches under separation of powers and the checks and balances each possesses over the others. Gordon talks about the necessity of accountable government and the need for restraints to be put both on the leaders and the people.
Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom; and no such thing as publick liberty, without freedom of speech: Which is the right of every man, as far as by it he does not hurt and control the right of another; and this is the only check which it ought to suffer, the only bounds which it ought to know. This sacred privilege is so essential to free government, that the security of property; and the freedom of speech, always go together; and in those wretched countries where a man cannot call his tongue his own, he can scarce call any thing else his own. Whoever would overthrow the liberty of the nation, must begin by subduing the freedom of speech; a thing terrible to publick traitors.
Gordon is talking about the importance of Freedom of speech to liberty and the importance of stopping that freedom to maintaining tyrannical control as is mentioned in the following paragraph. This letter seems likely to have influenced the writing of the first amendment protecting the freedom of speech in order to avoid the rise of another tyrant as George III was seen at the time.