Soviet economy make it all the more important for him to demonstrate momentum in foreign policy. This momentum must be achieved without giving an impression of weakness or overeagerness. No conceivable economic benefits would be accepted by either the elite or the majority of the Soviet people as adequate compensation for the abandonment of the much cherished dream of Soviet imperial greatness

orbachev's initial cautious optimism was based on two misconceptions. First, the Soviet leader failed to understand that there was more to the differences between the two sides' positions in Reykjavik than just sdi. Reagan's peculiar negoti ating style and his emphasis on the big picture at the expense of crucial details obscured major areas of disagreement on strategic offensive weapons cuts. U.S. efforts to interpret the President's words, contrary to Gorbachev's own perception, evidently touched a sensitive nerve. The Soviet leader sounded particularly angry over the American insistence that all Mr. Reagan had promised was to eliminate ballistic miss'les rather than all strategic arms. Second, Gorbachev's press conference suggested a strong expectation that the public in the United States and particularly Western Europe would pressure the Reagan Administration to accommodate Moscow on sdi. In

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign is a case in point. During Khrushchev's time the Soviet Union underwent a far reaching internal liberalization. Soviet foreign policy?as rap prochement with Yugoslavia and arrangements with Finland and particularly Austria would testify?became more flexible and imaginative. But it also became more vigorous and ambi tious. It was Khrushchev who ordered the crushing of the Hungarian rebellion, built the Berlin Wall and deployed Soviet missiles on Cuba. It was he who presided over the missile buildup and the aggressive effort to organize an "anti-imperi alist coalition" with Third World nations that transformed the U.S.S.R. into a truly global pow