that educators and students alike have found themselves more and more flummoxed by a system that values assessment over engagement, learning management over discovery, content over community, outcomes over epiphanies.

becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor.”

Pedagogy is praxis, insistently perched at the intersection between the philosophy and the practice of teaching.

It is through this impatient dialogue, and the implicit collaboration within it, that Critical Pedagogy finds its impetus toward change.

How can we build platforms that support learning across age, race, culture, gender, ability, geography? What are the specific affordances and limitations of technology toward these ends?

A Critical Digital Pedagogy demands that open and networked educational environments must not be merely repositories of content. They must be platforms for engaging students and teachers as full agents of their own learning.

Intellectuals have a responsibility to analyze how language, information, and meaning work to organize, legitimate, and circulate values, structure reality, and offer up particular notions of agency and identity. For public intellectuals, the latter challenge demands a new kind of literacy and critical understanding with respect to the emergence of the new media and electronic technologies, and the new and powerful role they play as instruments of public pedagogy.

Most college educators (at both traditional and non-traditional institutions) do little direct pedagogical work to prepare themselves as teachers. A commitment to teaching often goes unrewarded, and pedagogical writing (in most fields) is not counted as “research.”

This is a lively and intimate space of creativity and inquiry — a space of listening as much as speaking.

Critical Pedagogy is an approach to teaching and learning predicated on fostering agency and empowering learners (implicitly and explicitly critiquing oppressive power structures). The word “critical” in Critical Pedagogy functions in several registers: Critical, as in mission-critical, essential; Critical, as in literary criticism and critique, providing definitions and interpretation; Critical, as in reflective and nuanced thinking about a subject; Critical, as in criticizing institutional, corporate, or societal impediments to learning; Critical Pedagogy, as a disciplinary approach, which inflects (and is inflected by) each of these other meanings.

ritical Pedagogy, no matter how we define it, has a central place in the discussion of how learning is changing in the 21st century because Critical Pedagogy is primarily concerned with an equitable distribution of power. If students live in a culture that digitizes and educates them through a screen, they require an education that empowers them in that sphere, teaches them that language, and offers new opportunities of human connectivity.

Schools are not factories, nor are learning or learners products of the mill.

I’m convinced that Hacking the Accident is not merely a novelty. It’d be all too easy to dismiss the work as a gag, good for a few amusing quotes and nothing more.

I love that The Chronicle of Higher Education always appears as The Church of Higher Efficiency; it’s as if the newspaper was calling out academia for what it has become—an all-consuming, totalizing quest for efficiency and productivity, instead of a space of learning and creativity.

writing, the thing that we produce and consume endlessly and desperately, writing, the thing upon which our lives of letters is founded—writing, it is mere “yacking”

writing, the thing that we produce and consume endlessly and desperately, writing, the thing upon which our lives of letters is founded—writing, it is mere “yacking”

I took the entire contents of Hacking the Academy, some thirty something essays by leading thinkers in the digital humanities, and subjected them to the N+7 algorithm used by the Oulipo writers.

“I study systems that break other systems.”

Carpentry aspires to build from scratch, whereas the Deformed Humanities tears apart existing structures and uses the scraps.

Mashups, remixes, fan fiction, they are all made by breaking things, with little regard for preserving the original whole.

And let’s not soften our critical blow by calling it deformance. Name it what it is, a deformation.

The end result of deformance as most critics would have it is a sense of renewal, a sense of de-forming only to re-form.

say, by focusing on only the nouns in an epic poem or calculating the frequency of collocations between character names in a novels.

damaging to critical seriousness

Reading backwards revitalizes a text, revealing its constructedness, its seams, edges, and working parts.

deliberately misreading a text, for example, reading a poem backwards line-by-line.

The Deformed Humanities is an origami crane—a piece of paper contorted into an object of startling insight and beauty.

not about building. It’s about sharing.

What type of research infrastructure do we need? How do we align ourselves with science and engineering driven agendas, and how can we make a strong and grounded argument for humanities cyberinfrastructure?

Modes of Engagement

As you initially said, while more or less everyone I know in IS is tech-happy and tech-savvy — very few take this to the point of actively constructing alternative environments, etc. in the name of research. There's just so much happening before us that it's all one can do to try to research and explore the diverse social and communicative phenomena from especially (but again, not exclusively) social science perspectives...

This means that all decisions have to be discussed and negotiated which means that one is forced to reflect on what one is doing, which was the point for us.

ore mundane issues such as actual research and real implementation

Some pieces might be described as installations while others are more akin to traditional humanities computing tools, or standard, if multi-modal, articles.

Although the ACTLab relates to many different disciplines and institutions, there seems to be a clear sense of being outside the traditional structures.

he individual term digital humanist may be problematic because it may seem both too general in not relating to a specific discipline or competence (thus deemphasizing the discipline-specific or professional) and too specific in emphasizing the "digital" part of the scholarly identity (if you are scholar) or giving too much prominence to the humanities part of your professional identity (if you are a digital humanities programmer or a system architect). The more general and non-personal term digital humanities is more inclusive, but somewhat limited because of its lack of specificity and relatively weak disciplinary anchorage

The answer has to do with how we relate to divisions between the humanities and art, the humanities and science, thinking and making, and the university and the outside world.

Here we are concerned with a rather future driven, positivistic and arguably techno-romantic presentation (starting from "the spectacular emergence of new media innovations") that lists a number of contemporary media representations, as well as suggesting an ongoing creative transformation of society, culture and politics as a result of "strikingly original developments in technologies of digital communication" — a movement described by [Raley 2009, 25] as "the wired Left."

Like cultural studies, critical cyberculture studies strives to locate its object of study within various overlapping contexts, including capitalism, consumerism and commodification, cultural difference, and the militarization of everyday life

Libraries are an important part of the infrastructure of the humanities, and in a sense, a kind of humanities laboratory [7] placed outside the departments and schools. Libraries are also, by default, important players in relation to humanities-based information and information technology.

t probes how these common tools may be used to make new knowledge from our cultural inheritance and from the contemporary world.

ow have reading and writing changed in the digital era? What new forms of cultural expression emerge with the advent of the digital age and how do they build upon or break with the old? How should we assess the ethical and political implications of digital technologies? What kinds of tools do we have or do we need to develop in order to make sense of and/or to take advantage of these new technologies?

there is definitely a tension between the traditional disciplines and some of the scholars and initiatives engaged with the digital as a study object.

Digital Humanities is not a unified field but an array of convergent practices that explore a universe in which: a) print is no longer the exclusive or the normative medium in which knowledge is produced and/or disseminated; instead, print finds itself absorbed into new, multimedia configurations; and b) digital tools, techniques, and media have altered the production and dissemination of knowledge in the arts, human and social sciences. [original emphasis]  #manifesto

Bell notes that the " 'field' of cyberculture (or whatever) studies is diverse and heterodox, too undisciplined to be called a discipline

assimilation and distinction. According to Hayles, assimilation extends existing scholarship into digital domains whereas distinction emphasizes new methodologies, novel research questions, and the emergence of new fields

Humanities 2.0 is distinguished from monumental, first-generation, data-based projects not just by its interactivity but also by openness about participation grounded in a different set of theoretical premises, which decenter knowledge and authority"

Humanities 1.0 and Humanities 2.0

computing humanities, blogging humanities and multimodal humanities.

I argue that a better understanding of the landscape of the digital humanities is vital to the continued growth and consolidation of the field, and necessary to meet a range of exciting upcoming challenges.

he borderline work of culture demands

Beingin-the 'b e yond', th en-is tojn habit an intervening space, a s any dictionary will tell you. But to dwell 'jn the Jreyond' is also, as I have shown, to be part of a revisionary time, a return to the presenTto redescribe our cultural COntem pnranpit y: tr> rpjnsrrihp n nr hiiman, higz toric comm onality; to touch jhejut ure on its hither side.

Postcoloniality, for its part, is a salutary reminder of the persistent 'neo-colonial' relations within the 'new' world order and the multi- national division of labour. Such a perspective enables the authentication of histories of exploitation and the evolution of strategies of resistance. Beyond this, however, postcolonial critique bears witness to those coun- tries and communities - in the North and the South, urban and rural - constituted, if I may coin a phrase, 'otherwise than modernity'.

ultures are being produced from the perspective of disenfranchised minorities. The most significant effect of this process is not the proliferation of 'alternative histories of the exclu

The hideous extremity of Serbian nationalism proves that the very idea of a pure, 'ethnically cleansed' national identity can only be achieved through the death, literal and figurative, of the complex interweavings of history, and the culturally contingent border- lines of modem nationhood^

of _^^^t^^__WK_^^v_ca^: structed

interstitial space between the act of representation

Even then, it's still a struggle for power between various groups within ethnic groups about what's being said and who's saying what, who's representing who? What is a community anyway?

The jecognition t hat traditi on besto ws [is a partialform of identif ication. In restaging the past it introduces ot her, incommensurab je^uhuj^ tempofalitie s inlu lite inve it ti en-of-tra^ ditinn

'racialization of religion' as the dominant discourse through which the State represents their conflicts and struggles, however secular or even 'sexual' they may be.

nstitutiona l lgrgtvji gf»"ip^ti*V?i locale, sexual orientation

orjhgreis a sense of disorientation,

ontroversial shiftiness of th e prefi x 'gost': postmodernism, postcolonialism, postfeminism. . . .

The 'bey ond' is neither a new horizon , nor a leav ing b ehind of th e past . . . . Beginnings and~endings ^naybe the sustaining myths of the middle years

At this junction of nature and culture

We can thus understand the inertia characteristic of the formations of the I,

expressing the impotence of a pure consciousness to master any situation; a voyeuristic-sadistic idealization of the sexual relation; a personality that realizes itself only in suicide; a consciousness of the other that can be satisfied only by Hegelian murder.

But \unfortunately that philosophy grasps negativity only within the limits of a self-sufficiency of consciousness, which as one of its premises, links to the meconnaissances that constitute the ego, the illusion of autonomy to which it entrusts itself.

Samaritan of aid

But it also throws light on the dymnamic opposition between this libido and the sexual libido, which the first analysts tried to define when they invoked destructive and, indeed, death instincts, in order to explain the evident connection between the narcissistic libido and the alienating function of the I< the aggressivity it releases in any relation to the other, even in a relation involving the most Samaritan of aid.

dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations.

guiding grid for a method of symbolic reduction.

he mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation - and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic

The objective notion of the anatomical incompleteness and likewise the presence of certain humoral residues of the maternal organism confirm the view I have formulated as the fact of a real specific prematurity of birth in man. It is worth noting, incidentally, that this is in fact recognized as such by embryologists, by the term foetalization, which determines the prevalence of the so-called superior apparatus of the neurax, and especially of the cortex, which psycho-surgical operations lead us to regard as the intra-organic mirror.

These reflections lead me to recognize in the spatial capitation manifested in the mirror-stage, even before the social dialectic, the effect in man of an organic insufficiency in his natural reality-in so far as any meaning can be given to the word 'nature'.

Such facts are inscribed in an order of homeomorphic identification that would itself fall within the larger question of the meaning of beauty as both formative and erogenic.

penumbra of symbolic efficacity

it is still pregnant with the correspondences that unite the I with the statue in which man projects himself, with the phantoms that

must resolve as I his discordance with his own reality.

This form would have to be called the Ideal-I.

For me, this activity retains the meaning I have given it up to the age of eighteen months.

immediately rebounds in the case of the child in a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the relation between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates --the child's own body, and the persons and things around him.

The child, at an age when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize as such his own image in a mirror.

Faeces, penis and baby are all three solid bodies; they all three, by forcible entry or expulsion, stimulate a membranous passage, i.e. the rectum and the vagina, the latter being as it were “taken on lease” from the rectum

aeces, penis and baby are all three solid bodies; they all three, by forcible entry or expulsion, stimulate a membranous passage, i.e. the rectum and the vagina, the latter being as it were “taken on lease” from the rectum,

Interest in faeces is carried over first to interest in gifts, and then to interest in money.

The faecal mass, or as one patient called it, the faecal “stick”, represents as it were the first penis, and the stimulated mucous membrane of the rectum represents that of the vagina.

narcissistic clinging to anal erotism

He either parts obediently with his faeces, “sacrifices” them to his love, or else retains them for purposes of auto-erotic satisfaction and later as a means of asserting his own will.

A certain amount of libidinal cathexis which originally attached to the contents of the bowel can thus be extended to the baby born through it. Linguistic evidence of this identity of baby and faeces is contained in the expression “to give someone a baby’. For its faeces are the infant’s firstgift, a part ofhis body which he will give up only on persuasion by someone he loves, to whom, indeed, he will make a spontaneous gift of it as a token of affection; for, as a rule, infants do not dirty strangers.

It is, however, more likely that the wish for a man arises independently of the wish for a baby, and that when it arises - from understandable motives belonging entirely to ego-psychology - the original wish for a penis becomes attached to it as an unconscious libidinal reinforcement. The importance of the process described lies in the fact that a part of the young woman’s narcissistic masculinity is thus changed into femininity, and so can no longer operate in a way harmful to the female sexual function.

So that in this respect too a baby can be represented by the penis.

puts up.with the man as an appendage to the penis

substitute for the penis that has been denied them

In other women we find no evidence of this wish for a penis; it is replaced by the wish for a baby, the frustration of which in real life can lead to the outbreak of a neurosis.

mishaps which are themselves frequently the result of a very masculine disposition, have re-activated this infantile wish and, through the backward flow of libido, made it the chief vehicle of her neurotic symptoms.

castration complex

If we penetrate deeply enough into the neurosis of a woman, we not infrequently meet with the repressedwish to possess a penis like a man.

The “little one’, which originally meant the male genital organ, may thus have acquired a secondary application to the female genitals.

the concepts faeces (money, gift), - baby and penis are ill-distinguished from one another and are easily interchangeable

to what extent and in what way does each of them share in deciding its fate? For the organic sources of anal erotism cannot of course be buried as a result of the emergence of the genital organization.

development of the libido in man the phase of genital primacy must be precededed by a ‘pregenital organization’ in hiwch sadism and anal eroticism play the leading parts.

He is turning away from the father whom he knows today to the father in whom he believed in the earlier years of his childhood; and his phantasy is no more than the expression of a regret that those happy days have gone.

contents itself with exalting the child’s father, but no longer casts any doubts on his maternal origin, which is regarded as something unalterable

Chance occurrences of this kind arouse the child’s envy, which finds expression in a phantasy in which both his parents are replaced by others of better birth.

But here the influence of sex is already in evidence, for a boy is far more inclined to feel hostile impulses towards his father than towards his mother and has a far more intense desire to get free from him than from her.

Consid-erations of the canon, it becomes clear, while vital in themselves cannot take the place of questions of pedagogic relations within and around the canon. Canonicity itself then seems the necessary wadding of pious obliviousness that allows for the transmission from one generation to another of texts that have the potential to dismantle the impacted founda-tions upon which a given culture rests.

o be gay, or to be potentially classifiable as gay-that is to say, to be sexed or gendered-in this system is to come under the radically overlapping aegises of a universalizing discourse of acts or bonds and at the same time of a minoritizing discourse of kinds of persons

Musil, Kafka, Cather, but ... Mann? James, but ... Lawrence? Eliot? but ... Joyce?

Don't ask; You shouldn't know.

The word "homosexuality" wasn't coined until 1869-so everyone before then was heterosexual. (Of course, heterosexuality has always existed.) Or

A short answer, though a very incomplete one, might be that not only have there been a gay Socrates, Shakespeare, and Proust but that their names are Socrates, Shakespeare, Proust; and, beyond that, legion-dozens or hundreds of the most centrally canonic figures

the cult of the individual author and the organiza-tion of liberal arts education as an expensive form of masterpiece theatre.

Socrates of the Orient

now being realized within literary criticism, for assembling alternative canons of lesbian and gay male writing as minority canons, as a literature of oppression and resistance and survival and heroic making.

If it is still in important respects the master-canon it nevertheless cannot now escape naming itself with every syllable also a particular canon, a canon of mastery, in this case of men's mastery over, and over against, women

In fact, though, the most productive canon effects that have been taking place in recent literary studies have occurred, not from within the mechanism either of the master-canon or of a postfractural plurality of canons, but through an interaction between these two models of the canon.

ow may the strategy of a new canon operate in this space

homophobic mastery

a modern homosexual identity

In any gay male canon the two contemporaneous experimental works must be yoked together as overarching gateway texts of our modern period

There are no direct expressive or causal lines between sex, gender, gender presentation, sexual practice, fantasy and sexuality. None of those terms captures or determines the rest.

That there is a need for a repetition at all is a sign that identity is not self-identical. It requires to be instituted again and again, which is to say that it runs the risk of becoming de-instituted at every interval.

In this sense, gender is not a performance that a prior subject elects to do, but gender is performative in the sense that it constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express.

naturalize itself as the original,

3 that drag is not an imitation or a copy of some prior and true gender; according to Newton, drag enacts the very structure of impersonation by which any gender is assumed.

That is, in a political discourse that wages its violence against lesbianism in part by excluding lesbianism from discourse itself?

What “performs” does not exhaust the “I”; it does not lay out in visible terms the comprehensive content of that “I,”

In other words, the negative constructions of lesbianism as a fake or a bad copy can be occupied and reworked to call into question the claims of heterosexual priority.

If a sexuality is to be disclosed, what will be taken as the true determinant of its meaning: the phantasy structure, the act, the orifice, the gender, the anatomy?

For being “out” always depends to some extent on being “in”; it gains its meaning only within that polarity.

so we are out of the closet, but into what? what new unbounded spatiality? the room, the den, the attic, the basement, the house, the bar, the university, some new enclosure whose door, like Kafka's door, produces the expectation of a fresh air and a light of illumination that never arrives?

invoking the lesbian-signifier, since its signification is always to some degree out of one's control, but also because its specificity can only be demarcated by exclusions that return to disrupt its claim to coherence.

But if the I can so determine itself, then that which it excludes in order to make that determination remains constitutive of the determination itself.

What or who is it that is “out,” made manifest and fully disclosed, when and if I reveal myself as lesbian? What is it that is now known, anything?

If the political task is to show that theory is never merely theoria, in the sense of disengaged contemplation, and to insist that it is fully political (phronesis or even praxis), then why not simply call this operation politics, or some necessary permutation of it?

How do I relate the paradoxical situation of this dependency and refusal?

To install myself within the terms of an identity category would be to turn against the sexuality that the category purports to describe

“homosexuality” is itself an extension of a homophobic discourse

whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the rallying points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression.

For it is a production, usually in response to a request, to come out or write in the name of an identity which, once produced, sometimes functions as a politically efficacious phantasm. I'm not at ease with “lesbian theories, gay theories,” for as I've argued elsewhere,

monstrosity

here are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of freeplay. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin which is free from freeplay and from the order of the sign, and lives like an exile the necessity of interpretation. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology-in other words, through the history of all of his history-has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of the game. The second interpretation of interpretation, to which Nietzsche showed us the way, does not seek in ethnography, as Levi-Strauss wished, the "inspiration of a new humanism"

by failing to pose the problem of the passage from one structure to another, by putting history into parentheses

supplementary allowance [ration supplementaire]-if it is permissible to put it that way-is absolutely necessary in order that on the whole the available signifier and the signified it aims at may remain in the relationship of complementarity

superabundance of signifier, in relation to the signifieds to which this superabundance can refer

permitted by the lack, the absence of a center or origin, is the movement of supplementarily. One cannot determine the center, the sign which supplements it, which takes its place in its absence-because this sign adds itself, occurs in addition, over and above, comes as a supplement.

On the one hand, structuralism justly claims to be the critique of empiricism. But at the same time there is not a single book or study by Levi-Strauss which does not offer itself as an empirical essay which can always be completed or invalidated by new information.

myth: the myth of mythology

In effect the study of myths poses a methodological problem by the fact that it cannot conform to the Cartesian principle of dividing the difficulty into as miany piarts as are necessiary to resolve it. There exists no veritable end or term to mythical analysis, no secret unity which could be grasped at the end of the work of decomposition. The themes duplicate themselves to infinity. When we think we have disentiangled them from each other and can hold them separate, it is only to realize that they are joining together again, in response to the attraction of unforeseen affinities.

If one calls bricolage the necessity of borrowing one's concept from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is bricoleur. The engi~eer, whom Levi-Strauss opposes to the bricoleur, should be one to construct the totality of his language, syntax, and lexicon

Thus it is that the language of the human sciences criticizes itself.

This critique may be undertaken along two tracks, in two "manners." Once the limit of nature/culture opposition makes itself felt, one might want to question systematically and rigorously the history of these concepts. This is a first action. Such a systematic and historic questioning

The prohibition of incest constitutes a rule, but a rule, alone of all the social rules, which possesses at the same time a universal character.

let me choose as one guiding thread among others the oppostion between nature and culture. In spite of all its rejuvenations and its disguises, this opposition is congenital to philosophy. It is even older than Plato. It is at least as old as the Sophists. Since the statement of the opposition - Physis/nomos, physis/techne [nature/culture, nature/art or making] - it has been passed on to us by a whole historical chain which opposes "nature" to the law, to education, to art, to technics - and also to liberty, to the arbitrary, to history, to society, to the mind, and so on. From thebeginnings of his quest and from his first book,

Levi-Strauss

But if nobody can escape this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsible for giving in to it, however little, this does not mean that all the ways of giving in to it are of an equal pertinence.

Since these concepts are not elements or atoms and since they are taken from a syntax and a system, every particular borrowing drags along with it the whole of metaphysics.

The concept of the sign is determined by this opposition: through and throughout the totality of its history and by its system.

are trapped in a sort of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relationship between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no language-no syntax and no lexicon-which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.

I would probably cite the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of being and truth, for which were substituted the concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without truth present); the Freudian critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession; and, more radically, the Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the determination of being as presence.

This moment was that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word-that is to say, when everything became a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum.

he repetitions, the substitutions. the transformations, and the permutations are always taken from a history of meaning [sens]-that is, a history, period-whose origin may always be revealed or whose end may always be anticipated in the form of presence. This is why one could perhaps say that the movement of any archeology, like that of any eschatology, is an accomplice of this reduction of the structuralality of structure and always attempts to conceive of structure from the basis of a full presence which is out of play.

The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a freeplay based on a fundamental ground, a freeplay which is constituted upon a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of the freeplay.

The center is not the center.

This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it.

Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which governs the structure, while escaping structurality.

interdicted

notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself.

Qua center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer possible

concept of structure and even the word "structure" itself are as old as the episteme

What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where there is room for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject functions?

even in existence

analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse.

discursive initiation

On the other hand, reexamining Freud's texts modifies psychoanalysis itself, just as a reexamination of Marx's would modify Marxism.

They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts.

It would be just as wrong to equate the author with the real writer as to equate him with the fictitious speaker; the author function is carried out and operates in the scission itself, in this division and this distance.

still defines the author in much the same way

StilI, we can find through the ages certain constants in the rules of author construction.

"Hippocrates said," "Pliny recounts," were not really formulas of an argument based on authority; they were the markers inserted in discourses that were supposed to be received as statements of demonstrated truth.

Texts, books, and discourses really began to have authors (other than mythical, sacralized and sacralizing figures) to the extent that authors became subject to punishment,

The author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society.

The author's name is not, therefore, just a proper name like the rest.

the links between the proper name and the individual named and between the author's name and what it names are not isomorphic and do not function in the same way.

There seems to be an important dividing line between those who believe that they can still locate today's discontinuities [ruptures] in the historico-transcendental tradition of the nineteenth century and those who try to free themselves once and for all from that tradition.

A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory.

If an individual were not an author, could we say that what he wrote, said, left behind in his papers, or what has been collected of his remarks, could be called a "work"?

writing subject

now possesses the right to kill, to be its author's murderer, as in the cases of Flaubert, Proust, and Kafka

immortality of the hero

In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears.

not designating writing as something completed, but dominating it as a practice

n this indifference appears one of the fundamental ethical principles of contemporary writing

I want to deal solely with the relationship between text and author and with the manner in which the text points to this figure that, at least in appearance; is outside it and antecedes it.

deep personal and cultural meanings for consumers

Social semioticians are interested in the way socially accepted meanings change as society evolves

Brands must demonstrate respect for how hard she has worked – and will expect to work – on the day. Don’t suggest she cheat, but do not expect her to feel proud of or loudly celebrate her achievement at creating such a meal, because to some extent she expects to be invisible. This is about the family, not about the cook.

The discourse was almost always about perfection.

from assumed knowledge to education.