The discussion of privacy, intellectual property rights and freedom of information has shown that a good case can be made for the descriptive culture-relativity of these values. These values are central in information ethics, as it has been developed in the West. Moreover, it was argued that the uncovered cultural differences in the appraisal of these values can be placed in the context of a dichotomy between two fundamentally different kinds of value systems that exist in different societies: rights-centered and virtue-centered systems of value. Information ethics, as it has developed in the West, has a strong emphasis on rights, and little attention is paid to the kinds of moral concerns that may exist in virtue-centered systems of morality. In sum, it seems that the values that are of central concern in Western information ethics are not the values that are central in many nonwestern systems of morality. The conclusion therefore seems warranted that descriptive moral relativism is true for information ethics.
This conclusion proves the point that I made in my alternate annotation. We are obviously able to see so many differences propagated by cultural relevancy phenomenon. In fact, each case study outlines this very thing. There are countless examples down to even when a person becomes an autonomous human entity. So why must we resort to categorizing in such a primitive other-ing way? I think that there could have been many stronger conclusions to this piece and I am disappointed to see the author resort to the insufficient cop out method of binary categorization.