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    1. “embodied cognition” cannot attach to a single, unified, conception of the mind.

      I understand now why Embodied Cognition was something challenging to define in lecture. It clearly lacks a definite structure and defining constraints to give it a definition.

    2. The world out there has pregiven properties.

      Is this to state that the world exists? That the world exists when it is not being percieved? I don't understand the pregiven world idea. Is the Egg position to reject that the world exists outside of our perception?

      I see VTR as carrying more of a philosophical argument than a scientific one, they seem to be debating what amount of the world exists beyond how we percieve it.

    3. Similarly, the second organism will perceive portions of the world that remain hidden from the first organism. Given the differences in what the organisms perceive, there may well also be differences in the actions the organisms choose to take, which in turn lead to further differences in perception, and then action, and so on.

      In this argument it is important to agknowledge that these features of animals ie. 270 degrees of vision or electromagnetic spectrum detection have most likely evolved due to their newly gained survivability. Animals develop tools like this in order to survive. So perception would likely vary between creatures with different roles and functions in the environment.

    4. allegiance to computationalism, sympathy for Gibsonian

      These are not contrasting because the way in which Gibson theorized our cognition was in the end computational. By using the word "resonates" without definition in regards to how we perceive stimulus then saying that resonating is most likely a computational process, he inadvertently aligned himself with a standard cognitive science approach to perception.

    5. bodies, motions, and interactions

      Wouldn't bodies, motions, and interactions fall into the umbrella of standard cog sci visual perception. As in, we use our bodies to perceive the world around us and the motion of our body and the motion of the eye can all be explained with the nervous system and visual processing system?

    6. resonate to the information already within the stimulation.

      I do think this is a very interesting way of thinking about sensory processing, but I don't fully understand what resonate means in this context other than being synonymous with process. Why use the word resonate if not to bring a specific mental image to mind?

    7. embodied cognition is often presented as an alternative to cognitive scienc

      It would be interesting to see researchers break away from what feels like a forcefully imposed binary, what makes embodied cognition and cognitive science entirely alternate to each other? Is there not some combined understanding of Cognition that shows how cognition extends to the environment while still appreciating the symbolic representation system of standard cog sci?

    8. needn’t concern itself with understanding the cognizer’s environment nor with examining the interactions between the two.

      I do not follow the conclusion that Standard Cog Sci is not interpreting the interactions between a cognizer and their environment. Part of the foundation of Standard Cog Sci is studying the interaction between subject and environment, so how is there a lack of an examination of the interaction between the two?

    9. The first, exhaustive search, requires that you compare the test stimulus to each item on the memorized list before rendering the judgment that the stimulus is or is not a member of the list. The second search strategy, self-terminating search,

      This uses an inherent assumption that the way our brain stores memory is Serial, similar to a directed graph or tree structure. To create a computer program that performs Sternberg's retrieval task in a way similar to the brain, we would first have to have a good understanding of how the brain stores information. It could be more similar to a heap, or a linked-list depending on the information we are storing and depending on the person.

      How I think about the way I am storing numbers then comparing a number to my stored digits, it is most similar to a set that I am looking for membership in. I do not compare each digit in my memory with the digit I am given to retrieve, I simply ask myself in no particular order, "Is this item in my set?"

    10. neurons, or their activities, can be symbolic.

      Both the brain and computers create symbolism out of lower levels of symbols, neuron produced chemical signals or transistor produced binary. I still disagree with the equivalency of the brain and a computer on the basis of both using symbolic representation for problem solving. I think that one of the greatest issues with our current models in cognitive science is that were draw conclusions about the similarity of the brain and the computer. I'm interested to see how Shapiro address these issues.

    11. computational, that is, that they involve the manipulation of symbols

      For this to be one of the most foundational pieces of evidence for how are brain is similar to a computer seems fraught. The manipulation of symbols is the basis of problem solving which often includes computation. Just because our brain manipulates symbols does not give us enough evidence to suggest that we are similar to computers.