or if it is vulnerable such as early life, destroy before we know it is there,

with billions of people in it and numerous other lifeforms in it

We conclude that the complex legal process is both understandable and necessary. It has served us well in the past and needs to be adhered to carefully to ensure a mission that is beneficial for both NASA and the world.

Mare

and

r instance rovers that can be operated by telepresence. Otherwise we risk expensive stranded assets if we find the surface of Mars is not biologically safe for humans.

See:

which includes integrated use of the social sciences which would

This is why, if NASA still doesn’t have a functioning smoke detector in this analogy NASA will have to fix this before 2033.

with expertise in knowledgeable in one or more of the fields of bioethics, law, public attitudes and the communication of science, the Earth’s environment, or related fields, by its charter

but through fora open to representatives from all countries globally because negative impacts could affect countries beyond the ones involved directly in the mission

three

But NASA lost its world-leading expertise on planetary protection for a Mars sample return when it closed its planetary protection office in 2017.

excavated to a depth of at least several meters, deeper than 2 meters. Based on the recommendations of astrobiologists it also needs to return a sample of salts if any can be found nearby, and then the lander itself can scoop up a thimbleful of dirt from nearby similarly to Viking, and a compressed sample of atmosphere and dust all collected in 100% clean containers cleaned even of any trace levels of organics with the scoop also 100% clean.

y

The main take-home messages from this paper are that: We have many knowledge gaps and need a respect for the unknown We could find something as astonishing on Mars for astrobiology as the martian geysers were for geology We need to consider worst case scenarios as well as best case scenarios Quarantine can't protect Earth from lab leaks of extraterrestrial life of unknown capabilities such as mirror life, alien pathogen, or a distantly related novel fungal genus For unsterilized samples returned to Earth's biosphere: We need a new Mars sample return study, as the last one was 14 years ago and much has changed since then We need an update on the size limit to contain and level of assurance A fully telerobotic laboratory is likely sufficient but would cost at least half a billion dollars NASA doesn't have the expertise on its current team to design a biosafety plan for Earth or to run a first of its kind fully telerobotic laboratory NASA would need to assemble a team with the required disciplines, restore its interagency panel and learn to liaise with and listen to experts on human health and biosafety. One solution that plays to NASA's strengths doesn't require NASA to make such substantial changes to its organization and its team: A miniature telerobotic lab above GEO based on "lab on a chip" microfluidics and other novel exquisitely sensitive instruments similarly to Europa / ESA's joint life detection mission plan from 2016 Bonus samples would add greatly to the astrobiological interest This would have many co-benefits including the capability to provide exact simulations of Mars, and other destinations like Europa, complete with artificial gravity, seasons, day night cycles and so on For NASA's plan to send human astronauts to Mars: NASA needs to prove it is biologically safe for astronauts land on the planet However on our present level of understanding, there are scenarios where it is biologically unsafe to land humans on Mars. From a financial perspective, in view of the importance of protecting Earth's biosphere, its inhabitants and the potential superpositive value of Mars NASA and private space have a perverse incentive to reduce planetary protection to save on costs Congress could remedy this with a new organization which can supplement private missions and NASA missions with up to 10% of funding to be used only for planetary protection Staffed with independent planetary protection experts who would be tasked with deciding if planetary protection is needed and what needs to be done This body could also valuably be used to stimulate the technology needed for a rapid biological survey of Mars and safety assessment It could provide additional funding to develop landers that use commercial components (mostly) capable of withstanding a short period of heat to 300°C And additional funding for broadband infrastructure Both seen as public goods similar to public highways In the broader context of enthusiasm for humans in space and space settlement We need a plan b for those who want to establish a terrestrial "planet b" A future where humans can never land on Mars is also an inspiring one to prepare for A future with humans studying a mirror "planet b" from orbit can achieve all the same goals that colonization enthusiasts have for their "planet b" With habitat bubbles in space instead of on Mars Habitat bubbles would be needed anyway for the first few centuries for any attempt to terraform Mars. If we have a terrestrial mirror life planet or other unsafe biology, we can learn to value our terrestrial planet b as it is without changes A novel planet b of mirror life, or early prebiotic chemistry that hasn't quite made its first steps to life and settlers in numerous other locations in our solar system including the Martian moons and in orbit around Mars could be more valuable to our civilization than a less habitable clone of Earth The Moon is ideal for a backup of seeds, a library, and achievements of our civilization with conditions in the lunar poles and lava tube caves better suited for those purposes than anywhere on Mars and closer to Earth if we need to use the backup to replace damaged terrestrial seed banks etc. There are numerous other locations in our solar system that we can expand to after our first experiments in space settlement on the Moon once we find it easier to live in space with minimal resupply from Earth

This is the main concern raised by the public, a risk of large-scale or even unprecedented impacts on public health or the biosphere. This is one example of many: I am extremely concerned that this proposed action could potentially contaminate native life forms on Mars and/or bring back alien virus, bacteria, or other life forms from Mars to Earth. I understand that there are planetary protection protocols. However, Murphy's Law says that if something horrible could happen, it eventually may indeed occur. History is filled with examples where Acts of God and/or human arrogance caused otherwise unforeseen disasters. .... The Earth is already dealing with increasingly serious problems from invasive or alien species being transported to new locations, and viruses mutating and causing deadly pandemics. We have not been able to solve many of these problems. What happens if a Mars life form escapes containment and, without evolving in Earth's ecosystems, spreads uncontrollably and devastates Earth's species including us humans? There might be no way to reverse or even mitigate for that devastation. I support scientific research when it is safe and in the public interest. However, I oppose research when there is no absolute guarantee of safety and when the risks outweigh the potential benefits. (Spotts, 2022) I provide direct links to all the comments submitted in the final round of public comments with a brief summary of the level of concern for each one here: Most public comments share Sagan's priority that NASA can't take a risk of large-scale harm NASA's response to Spotts was: "Refer to the previous response for HS-002" (NASA, 2023 : B-5) HS-002 is their answer to another similar question: Granger:Are you certain that in any way, this mission won’t end with the total annihilation of the entire planet, or force us to live in biomes for the rest of time? NASA: As discussed in Section 3.2 of the PEIS, the exact nature of the Mars sample constituents regarding biosignatures and potential biological activity is currently unknown. The PEIS cites several sources supporting the position that contamination of Earth by Martian microorganisms is extremely unlikely to pose a risk of significant harmful effects. However, the risk cannot be demonstrated to be zero (see Response ID HS-001 for information regarding containment measures). As a result, a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the potential impacts of a sample release in the event of an off-nominal landing and the effects of Mars samples on Earth’s environment cannot be accomplished with current data; any such analysis would be theoretical at best, involving substantial speculation and supposition. For this reason, the emphasis of the MSR approach is on sample containment (NASA, 2023 : B-43) So even in response to a concern by a member of the public who asked NASA if it is possible that one consequence would be that we have to live in biomes on Earth for the rest of time or total annihilation of the planet (presumably meaning extinction of all terrestrial life) NASA were not able to rule this out as a possible consequence of their mission. Instead NASA responds by saying that the emphasis is on sample containment, since they can't predict consequences if the samples are not contained. As we saw at the start expert opinion is that the risk of such scenarios is very low, and the analogy of a house fire and a smoke detector fits them well. But we take great care to protect our houses from the very low risk scenario of a house fire. Smoke detector analogy for the low risk of large-scale harm to human health and Earth's biosphere Later in this paper we look at a couple of examples of a likely very low risk but of unprecedented harm. The mirror life scenario in worst case where we can't engineer microbes to stop it could be incompatible with our ecosystems and take over the soils, and then we'd need to maintain the terrestrial ecosystems in biomes and keep out mirror life. It wouldn't happen instantly but as it radiates and spreads through the ecosystems we'd then need to work to rescue them and the only solution might be large dome-like biomes covering them and barriers in the soil and then measures within to sterilize them of mirror life and to keep it out. Detailed scenarios of mirror life and a novel fungal genus to motivate biosafety planning This doesn't fit their conclusion in the PEIS itself that any environmental effects would not be significant. A non zero risk of large-scale harm to Earth's biosphere that could lead to humans having to live in biomes for the rest of time is NOT identical to NASA's conclusion in the PEIS of no risk of global harm. Chester Everline, the expert on probabilistic risk assurance who commented on the last day of public comments put it like this: Given our lack of scientific insight into possible life on Mars, relics of life we may return from Mars, or simply organic substances from Mars that could interact with certain life forms on Earth, how can we possibly assert with confidence that MSR poses an acceptable risk to Earth's biosphere, even if the incredibly difficult target of a 99.9999% target for successful containment is satisfied? Given that sample return missions of the type proposed for MSR have never been attempted before, is it even feasible to do enough testing to assure that a 99.9999% target can be achieved? (NASA, 2023 : B38) NASA's response: Please see Response IDs HS-001 and HS-002 regarding risks to Earth’s biosphere and NASA’s approach to addressing that. With regards to the assurance case (HS- 017), no outcome in science and engineering processes can be predicted with 100% certainty. NASA’s extensive testing activities serve to support the assurance case (NASA, 2023 : B38) NASA's statement there "no outcome in science and engineering processes can be predicted with 100% certainty" is not valid. It is frequently the case that we can predict outcomes in science and in engineering with 100% certainty. In this case, for instance, we can predict with 100% certainty that if NASA doesn't return these samples, there is no risk to Earth;s biosphere or inhabitants from the samples that Perseverance is currently caching on Mars. We can also achieve the very high level of "no appreciable risk" or essentially 100% safety by sterilizing all samples returned to Earth with a sufficiently high level of ionizing radiation. We are not required to take ANY risks with Earth's biosphere. Whether to take such a risk is an ethical decision and not a decision that can be mandated by scientists or engineers. Chester Everline continues: Does NASA intend to impose a threshold for acceptable risk (i.e., a value above which the mission is considered too risky to proceed)? A possible consequence of unsuccessful containment is an ecological catastrophe. Although such an occurrence is unlikely, NASA should at least be clear regarding what level of risk it is willing to assume (for the biosphere of the entire planet)

conclusion

microbiome. It's a genus, those strains are like species though as it's asexual they are a little different from how normal species function

but what NASA is unaware of are Chapter 5, Appendix A and numerous remarks in the main body of the text which point to

NASA also aren't doing probabilistic risk assurance. Normally there would be a target probability, often one in a million, in can vary from 1 in 10,000 to less than 1 in a million depending on the level of assurance that seems necessary for a particular risk. This is an ethical rather than an engineering decision. But this mission has no target probability. They bypass that by using reasoning that an expert on risk assurance would never use. See: How NASA deduces no risk of global effects from its attempted proof of near zero risk, bypassing standard probabilistic risk assurance Chester Everline, a co-author of NASA's handbook on probabilistic risk assurance (NASA, 2011) unusually commented on the last day of public comments (about the same time as my last comment). He found the EIS didn’t state clearly what level of risk NASA is prepared to take for Earth’s biosphere and raised many other issues from the perspective of risk assurance. Chester Everline recommended that if NASA can't establish the Mars meteorite argument, it should consider a deferred return until it has the information needed to assess risks better. NASA didn't mention his recommendation in the PEIS saying it was already covered by the "no-action" alternative (which doesn't mention any suggestion of a deferred return). See below: Chester Everline, - a NASA employee and a co-author of NASA's handbook on probabilistic risk assurance - says that he didn't find a target probability - and that if the meteorite argument can't be established (it can't as we saw) the EIS should consider an alternative of deferred return - not to return the samples until the risks are better understood [NEW] I sent an email to Chester Everline to ask if we could liaise– combining his expertise in probabilistic risk assurance and my familiarity with the planetary protection literature. However, I was not surprised when he responded saying "as an employee of JPL I am unable to engage.". I also contacted NASA's first planetary protection officer John Rummel. He is principle author, co-author, or contributor to nearly all the major studies on a Mars sample return. He just said he has retired and I should contact the planetary protection office (which has not replied). However John Rummel did also reassure me that someone would listen I encourage you, however, to respond to NASA’s draft, highlighting the weaknesses that you have found. Somebody will listen – of that I am convinced – but I no longer work for NASA on this or any other project. So there seems no potential for progress at this point through talking to the NASA team or others at NASA. If any do have issues with the PEIS they are likely to be in the same situation as Everline that as NASA employees they can't engage with me on the topic. However, I hope somebody at NASA will listen at some point/

In this way we can bring the spotlight of peer review to NASA's biosafety plans.

our

topic

NASA have stepped back from their former world leading position in the field of planetary protection as we'll see. . However with a change of direction which actually has less overall cost and greater science return NASA can return to its world leading role on the topic.

The aim of submitting this paper for publication is to shine the clear light of peer review on these issues and suggestions, and on NASA's plan. Neither NASA's PEIS nor my comments have been through peer review. I will share this preprint with NASA as a courtesy before submitting it for publication. I hope NASA will withdraw their PEIS in response, and find a way to deal with the issues identified here. If so, I'll update this preprint to say NASA withdrew their PEIS. If NASA continue in the view there are no issues with their PEIS after looking over this preprint, then assuming this paper is published, I hope they will be encouraged by this paper to publish a paper of their own in response which would also go through peer review, so we can have a clear look at the scientific basis for their plans. If NASA plan to withdraw the EIS, or delay finalizing, I feel that will be an important move as the discussion can then shift to a new direction, with many others getting involved. As part of that discussion I'd still submit this paper raising the quarantine issues, lab leaks, issues with complying with the ESF standard, vivid planetary protection scenarios like mirror life, impossibility of containing unknown life from another planet without a fully telerobotic facility, and then proposing my solution of a miniature lab above GEO based on the Europa lander in situ life detection mission NASA / ESA designed together in 2016. Essentially the same paper but I hope NASA will defer finalizing the PEIS or withdraw the PEIS which will make things much easier for NASA.

Text on graphic: The last meteorites to leave Mars for Earth - left Zunil crater 700,000 years ago (approx) - came from at least 3 meters below the surface - probably from at least 50 meters below In scenarios with present day martian life: - most species in Jezero crater probably can't reach Zunil crater (perhaps biofilms in ultracold brines or in micropores in gypsum) - most terrestrial microbes can't survive sudden ejection at kms / sec or vacuum - the surface dust, salts and dirt can't physically become a meteorite - most species in surface layers probably can't get into deep rocks (e.g. photosynthetic) “We cannot predict with any accuracy life's form and characteristics, whether it would be viable …, or whether it shares a common ancestor with life on Earth.” (Beaty et al., 2017 : 88) Zunil crater, Jezero crater and Elysium Mons labelled Background map: Google Mars doesn't seem to have an option to share this exact scene - but this is a zoom in on Jezero crater in Google Mars and Zunil crater in Google Mars The best case scenario for planetary protection here is for microbes like b. subtilis that may be able to transfer from Mars to Earth (Cockell, 2008, The Interplanetary Exchange of Photosynthesis : 5) (page 5 of the manuscript). But what matters for invasive species are the ones that can’t get here. For instance most photosynthetic life can’t survive impact shock (Cockell, 2008, The Interplanetary Exchange of Photosynthesis). Mileikowsky et al. who first established the potential for microbes to travel from Mars to Earth, say most microorganisms known wouldn’t be able to travel through space: Whereas this harsh environment sets a definite barrier for most microorganisms known, some have developed survival strategies, by transforming into a dry state, the so-called anhydrobiosis ..., (Mileikowsky et al., 2000, Natural transfer of viable microbes in space: 1. From Mars to Earth and Earth to Mars : 392). Birds can be invasive: examining a popular analogy for life on Mars meteoritesskip to next - back ... first - last ... [top level: next - back ... first - last] ... Supplementary ... copy header as link with minimal styling A popular Mars colonization advocate uses the colourful analogy that our use of planetary protection officers rules to protect Earth's biosphere is like a policy to search cars to prevent smuggling canada geese across the border from Canada to the USA. If microbes of any type live in martian surface materials, they don’t need our spacecraft to get here. They have plenty of their own. If the Red Death could come to Earth, it already has. That means that planetary protection rules seeking to impose strict controls on accidental microbial transport by spacecraft make about as much sense as ordering the border patrol to search all entering cars in order to block the importation of Canada geese. (Zubrin et al., 2022) With the background of the previous section it may help to continue this bird metaphor with an example of starlings and barn swallows. The aim here is to show we need to know what the biological situation is on Mars before we can make such decisions and it can't be resolved in such a simple fashion using colourful metaphors. In this analogy, barn swallows are like b. subtilis which may (rarely) be able to cross between planets if there is anything as hardy as b. subtilis on Mars. There is indeed no concern about barn swallows as an invasive species in the Americas, because they can already fly across the Atlantic. But what matters for planetary protection are the worst case scenarios like the starlings which can't fly so far and can never get here. These cause $1 billion of agricultural damage in the USA every year and the only reason this happens is because of the deliberate introduction of starlings to the United States by colonists from Europe. Starling damage reported to the USDA’s Wildlife Services program averages less than $2 million per year, but this is a fraction of all starling damage. Agricultural damage alone is estimated currently at $1 billion per year. Other damage, such as costs for cleaning and maintaining city centers near roosts, veterinary care and loss of production at CAFOs, and public health care, are unknown. A complete inventory of all economic damage likely would show that the starling is the most economically harmful bird species in the United States (Homan et al., 2017 : 16). Text on graphic: Some microbes may be able to get from Mars to Earth – what matters for invasive species are the ones that can’t. Barn swallow - can cross Atlantic Starling - invasive species in the Americas Didymosphenia geminatum invasive diatom in Great Lakes and New Zealand, can’t even cross oceans Microbes can be invasive too. One clear example of an invasive terrestrial diatom is the freshwater diatom "Didymo" (Didymosphenia geminatum) which causes many problems in New Zealand (Spaulding et al., 2010. Diatoms as non-native species). The COSPAR Sample Safety Assessment Framework, say that it's not feasible to predict harmful or harmless consequences if life is detected: Unfortunately, we have only a limited ability to predict the effects of terrestrial invasive species, emerging pathogens, and uncultivated microbes on Earths' ecosystems and environments. This is true even for cultured and fully genome-sequenced terrestrial organisms and more so for potential extraterrestrial life. Thus, conducting a comprehensive sample safety assessment with the required rigor to predict harmful or harmless consequences of potential martian life for Earth is currently not feasible. (Kminek et al, 2022, COSPAR Sample Safety Assessment Framework (SSAF) ) This is something that needs to be expanded on. COSPAR doesn't seem to have incorporated the expertise of scientists who study invasive species. Advances in planetary biosecurity must keep up with the pace of these potential risks, and this goal could be facilitated by collaborations between researchers in invasion science and astrobiology. To our knowledge, invasion biologists have not been involved in development of the COSPAR policy on planetary protection, in spite of obvious conceptual parallels and decades of empirically derived insights that could be applied. (Ricciardi et al., 2021, Planetary Biosecurity: Applying Invasion Science to Prevent Biological Contamination from Space Travel) It would help to fill this gap if we wish to do a future thorough study of potential effects of microbes returned from Mars. Ricciardi et al. warn that the worst case effects of introduction of invasive species into isolated island systems can often be ecologically devastating. The Earth's biosphere would certainly count as biologically isolated from Mars even if occasional very hardy species like b. subtilis do get here: Insular systems are most vulnerable to invasion. A major lesson from invasion science is that ecosystems that have evolved in isolation are exceptionally vulnerable to disruption by introduced alien organisms [CITES]. For insular systems (e.g., islands, lakes, remote habitats), which typically contain endemic species and unique phylogenetic lineages, the consequences of invasion have often been catastrophic, causing cascading ecological effects and extinctions [CITES]. (Ricciardi et al., 2021, Planetary Biosecurity: Applying Invasion Science to Prevent Biological Contamination from Space Travel) Astrobiologists say we also need to be prepared to find unfamiliar life on Mars that has no common ancestor with terrestrial life. That includes the iMOST team NASA assembled to advise them on the science experiments for the samples from Jezero crater. “We cannot predict with any accuracy life's form and characteristics, whether it would be viable …, or whether it shares a common ancestor with life on Earth.” (Beaty et al., 2017 : 88) In short if we look at worst case rather than best case scenarios there are issues here that NASA haven't addressed in its programmatic environmental impact statement. This is due to its reliance on an invalid argument that they found convincing, that any life on Mars has got here already. The Mars meteorite argument is the most important of four arguments NASA relies on to reach the conclusion that the environmental effects of the release of unsterilized martian materials would not be significant and any health impacts negligible. .

Also NASA is widely respected and other

people

If we look at the meteorite argument more closely, the martian rocks that arrive from Mars today left Mars at least hundreds of thousands of years ago. The most recent rocks to leave Mars for Earth left half a million years before modern humans evolved if we go by the crater counts. They also came from several meters below the surface, and modeling suggests at least 50 meters below the surface. The most recent meteorites arriving from Mars today came from the Zunil crater impact somewhere around 700,000 years ago by direct crater count (Hartmann et al., 2010, Do young martian ray craters have ages consistent with the crater count system? : 626) .   All our Mars meteorites s from rocks from at least 3 meters below the surface by the low levels of radioisotopes produced by cosmic radiation (Eugster et al., 2002, Ejection ages from krypton‐81‐krypton‐83 dating and pre‐atmospheric sizes of martian meteorites : 1355). Impact modeling may suggest a depth of 50 to 100 meters below the surface (Nyquist et al., 2001, Ages and geologic histories of martian meteorites : 152). There’s other confirmatory evidence that they come from at least 1 meter below the surface (Elliott et al., 2022, The role of target strength on the ejection of martian meteorites : 3) because they don’t show any sign of ionizing radiation from the sky on one side of the rock.   In a scenario with present day life in the surface dirt of Jezero crater, there may be many species that couldn’t get into rocks meters below the surface even if the subsurface is habitable. Microbes that can live inside rocks are called endoliths. Many terrestrial microbes can't live in rocks. Of those that can, many need to live near the surface of the rock with access to sunlight.   There are many proposed microhabitats native martian life could inhabit in the top few cms that don't depend on geothermal heat (below)

This also shows NASA has nobody on its team with the necessary level of familiarity with the planetary protection literature for a Mars sample return to read its main cite consecutively and thoroughly as far as page 5.

Indeed, the Mars meteorite argument is rebutted on pages 4-5 of the summary section of the main cite provided by NASA to support the sentence in the PEIS that describes this argument (SSB, 2019 : 4-5). It is rebutted in more detail on page 45 of the same cite

The astronauts in orbit would be of great value stepping in much as in the “Game of Civilization” to control rovers on the surface that face issues they can’t resolve through their own autonomy and impacted by the long round trip time for control from Earth. By then we likely have hundreds or even thousands of landers for them to use to explore Mars and they can “teleport” from one to another and this would lead to a far more interesting and varied experience for the astronauts too, with telepresence avatars on the surface. We see with the ISS how interesting it can be to orbit a planet. In this vision the surface assets on Mars are dual purpose, and we don't land any habitats there until we know if it will be biologically safe to land humans. This avoids the issue of stranded assets of unusable human habitats on a mirror-life Mars. We can still do things like rovers that use in situ production of fuel on Mars since this is dual purpose and such rovers can be useful for rapid in situ exploration so long as they can be 100% sterilized as they likely can be. But the experiments in human habitation would be done in orbit and on the Martian moons. We keep everything dual purpose until we know if humans can land on Mars and knowing that a possible answer here is "no" depending on what we find on Mars. If we find somethign as interesting as a mirror life planet on Mars, life independently evolved from mirror organics, this would envigorate human space exploration not be a dampener on it, with numerous other places in the solar system humans can explore. NASA themselves don't see Mars as a final goal for humans in space but as a staging post to the rest of the solar system. If we find unsafe biology on Mars it can still be a stimulus leading to a permanent presence in orbit around Mars and likely to a settlement there which could use surface assets too, but remotely from orbit because it is not safe to land there.

another and this would lead to a far more interesting and varied experience for the astronauts too, with telepresence avatars on the surface. We see with the ISS how interesting it can be to orbit a planet.

y to e of use anywhere except on Mars.

for your Venus HOTTECH program that can even withstand 500 C for months on end.

So we need plans flexible enough to be resilient to such discoveries. habitats.

However it may need end of facility life time steriliaation of everything inside including the telerobots, control systems, anything that could contain mirror life after decades of work studying the samples remotely using telerobotics that may have involved several incidents where there was a lab leak but one that only affected the telerobots..

other agencies advised them asking the astronauts to open the door of the capsule and exit into a dinghy in the open ocean

Depending on what we find there Mars could be far more valuable without terrestrial life than with it. Tehre are many places we can send humans in our solar system that have no planetary protection issues right now including the Moon (apart from proably some lunar park areas to be kept clean), Callisto eventually and Titan (most likely assuming it doesn't have cryovolcanoes, even if it has some exotic life highly unlikely to be able to survive on Earth). We don't need to rush into a decision for Mars and as for a backup, the Moon is by far the best place for a backup of seeds, knowledge etc wth its cold traps at the poles at liquid nitorgen temperatures.

Carl Sagan talked about the need for an “exhaustive program of unmanned biological exploration of Mars”. We can actually achieve 100% sterilization by heating landers to 300 C which would completely destroy amino acids and DNA bases. Silicon on insulator chips can be run indefinitely at 300 C and there are many modern components we can use including some in development for your Venus HOTTECH program that can even withstand 500 C for months on en

Mras

The aim of this pape is to help find ways forward for NASA and other space agencies and private space companies as they gear up to send humans to the Moon and elsewhere in the solar system. It may not seem so at first as this paper begins with harsh criticisms of NASA's plans which we need to look at closely as the first ever such Programmatic Envionmental Impact Statement. However we have to cover the issues first to motivate the solutions.

However we have the technology to achieve 100% sterile landers due to remarkable advances in high temperature electronics, with silicon on insulator chips at 0.35 microns resolution able to run indefinitely at 300 C, video cameras that work in ovens, and many otehr capabilities including the Venus HOTTECH, with plans already available for a lander that could survive several months at 500 C on Venus.

NASA's end goal of a human presence throughout the solar system doesn't change, but their intermediate goal of humans to the surface of Mars needs to change as it risks stranded assets if we find the surface of Mars is not biologically safe for humans.

Leading to a proposal for a way forward that plays to NASA's strengths and doesn't require a biosafety plan to protect Earth using a miniature life detection lab above GEO based on a joint ESA / NASA plan proposed for a lander on Jupiter's moon Europa from 2016 and everything returned to Earth is sterilized.