Why is culture or religion a source of conflict?
Is this issue specific to religion or culture? Nearly any divide or difference between has historically created conflict: from hair, eye and skin color in Nazi Germany to ancient farmer/cattle-herder divides between the Hutu and Tutsis in Rwanda
pre-existing or inherited culture
it had to come from somewhere
culture does not existon its own; it is a creation of individuals
What is culture? Language? Traditions? Geography? Can a culture exist outside of its original location?
Second, why should ethnic or national mobilization be con-ceptualized as a coordination game, whereas other kinds of mobi-lization—such as peasant37 or working-class mobilization38—aremore typical cases of collective action, crippled by free-rider prob-lems?
I think it could depend on the issue one is fighting for and even within that ethnic group, all people are bound to have intersectional affiliation (e.g. poor Egyptian, Egyptian businessman) which can create different demands branching off the main one
First, even if Ibelieve in group goals, contingently or inherently, it is not clearwhy it is rational for me to cooperate when others cooperate withone another. For if they are cooperating, and if “coordinationpower” is “superadditive,” then my group is very likely to cometo power anyway and it is rational for me to take a free ride—unless, of course, someone is monitoring my actions and thenonparticipants will be excluded from the rewards of the group’svictory.
It is much easier to wait for others to achieve a goal that will benefit you without you have to contribute. the issue arises is when everyone has this mentality of the free rider and no one ends up actually instigating the change. Do the actions of one person matter in the grand scheme of things? Probably, if they are the one to begin the chain of change
A purely instru-mental conception of ethnicity cannot explain why leaders mobi-lize ethnic or national identities at all.
Reminds me of Nasser's emphasis on Arab identity rather than Egyptian. Now it would seem that the position of the two has been switched
in this century, many more people have died for anation or an ethnic group—presumed or actual
This was published in 2003. Throughout the 20th Century, liberation from imperialism driven by an ethnic motive occurred in nearly the entirety of Africa and Asia, in addition to the breaking down of empires within Europe along smaller ethnic borders
The analogy of a focal point, however, cannot be extended togroup action when the costs of participation for the masses arevery high.
cost of participation could be imprisonment or even death, in which case one has to analyze whether or not it is worth the risk to attempt to bring about this political change
Ethnic mobilization for political action is not the same as ethniccoordination for economic and social activities.
ethnic coordination: working together to achieve a common goal of development
ethnic mobilization: fighting together to bring about political change
nation
As opposed to the word state
real or imagined
If they are all social constructs, does it really matter? Are skin color and language politicized in the same way everywhere?
nation-al or ethnic identity
Is there a difference?
liberal democracies
liberal democracy: elections + actual liberties, true legislative representatives, separation of powers, ...
illiberal democracy: only elections (meets bare minimum of what it needs to be a democracy
Groups with time, information, and mobile political resources especiallymoney are particularly advantaged in state politics.
are they not just assumed to be advantaged in all levels of politics?
But this is not the right question because, absent federalism,there is a good chance Trump would not have become president in the rstplace.
A centralized government in the US would probably have functioned using popular vote, giving Hillary the presidency
Antidemocratic interests need onlyto take control of a state government for a short period of time to implementchanges that make it harder for their opponents to participate in politics at alllevels local, state, and national.
Major permanent changes can take place within one term limit that can severely affect citizens not only of that state but of the entire country
Another important methodological choice is this book’s focus on the U.S.case rather than comparisons across countries.
Uniquely, with the US being a long-standing federal democratic republic, researches can study longitudinal and latitudinal studies within the same country
Republican governments have gerryman-dered districts, made it more dicult to vote, and restricted civil liberties to adegree unprecedented since the civil rights era.
Are both parties equally contributing to polarization or is the republican party moving further and further away from the center towards the far-right at a pace much faster than that of the democratic party?
and to the extent that success magers,it only does for states controlled by the same political party.
and even then, do they even do that?
inter-est groups
like if a state wants to outlaw cigarettes but representative from Big Tobacco (who might fund the state party or contribute to the provision of legal experts for the purposes of legislation) do not want that, they probably have more power over the final say than the legislators themselves
choosing whether the national DemocraticParty or national Republican Party should control their state
failure of the two-party system to accurately represent citizens
think globally, act locally
Bottom-up legislation: starts in local government then state government then national government
By nationalized parties, I mean po-litical parties in which aligned groups, activists, candidates, and incumbents in all oces at all levels of government share similar policy agendas andsee themselves engaged in broader political conict with the other nationalparty.
E.g., Fighting for the amendment of national gun laws instead of the amendment of state gun laws
variation across states as a way to test theories
it is as if someone ran an experiment 50 times under similar circumstances
laboratories againstdemocracy.
Again, seeing as each state now has its own say on the legality of abortion, women in some states now are at a disadvantage from women in different states seeing as the former do not have the same rights as the latter
authoritarian enclaves
Republican counties/districts?
historical scholarsof race and democracy would note that state governments were the institutionalenemy of abolitionists, anti-lynching activists, and civil rights pioneers
if the civil rights act was not a top-down piece of legislation, it would probably have been several more years, if not decades, until all 50 states had seen similar progressive frameworks
the apparent inability of the rules of the Constitution to contain the erosion.
Is it because it is too vague and not detailed enough
policy learning between states controlled by opposing parties
more polarization, less cooperation
Classic theories of federalism oenlead us to expect that institutional decentralization is a “safety valve” in timesof political crisis, and such an agitude is commonplace in contemporary po-litical discourse
Just like what happened after the overturning of Roe v. Wade. Because some states did not believe in abortion rights, the overturning of Roe v. Wade allowed them to criminalize it while states that did believe in abortion rights, maintained its legality and protected it. Had the US been a centralized state, the overturning of Roe v. Wade might have meant that abortion would be criminalized and banned nationwide
One challenge of writing histories of any of these civil wars is that there are ele-ments of so many different processes in the multitudes of particular events, motiva-tions, and agendas.
It is hard to keep track of numbers and actors in African civil wars and when its gets too confusing and messy, it is much easier to label them all war criminals than to actually figure out who is defending themselves and who is oppressing the others
One major consequence of this shift isthat liberation and, to some extent, self-protection are less widely accepted as legiti-mate reasons to fight.
Probably why Palestine is not supported by those who support others in similar circumstances
Though the CDF fighters were responsible for numer-ous violations of human rights, they battled the government soldiers and RUF fight-ers who had joined forces in “Operation No Living Thing” against the civilianpopulation of the capital in 1999.
At that point supporting the lesser evil probably does more good than supporting neither. But how do you determine the lesser evil?
This broader power imbalance widened the political space for ac-tivists and organizers who wanted to strengthen international laws and norms thatpromoted human rights.
They only promote human rights when it serves them to
This shift to the criminal war narrativeleaves some rebel leaders deeply frustrated that international actors lack a clearmechanism for recognizing a legitimate right to armed rebellion.48 They face a globalnarrative that elevates the assumption that the violent pursuit of political objectivesis synonymous with criminal activity
Sometimes, big stick diplomacy does not work and, in combination with the security dilemma, results in armed conflict
External resources such as the United Nations Institute for Namibia,based in Zambia, educated future administrators under SWAPO control to eventu-ally serve in an independent Namibia in which SWAPO would become the govern-ment.
good solution. should be employed more often, however it should choose its groups more wisely
A month later, the U.S. Congressvoted to repeal the Clark Amendment, a law that prohibited official U.S. assistanceto Angolan rebel groups, including UNITA.
what changed?
Showing that liberation narratives were notthe exclusive preserve of left-leaning observers, U.S. conservative activists and otheranti-communist rebel leaders with tacit U.S. government support met at UNITAheadquarters in June 1985.
primarily BECAUSE they were right-wing and anti-communist during the Cold War were they supported. Liberia's civil war took place during and AFTER the end of the Cold War, where anti-communist sentiments in the US had faded to a level much lower than they were just a decade ago.
A New York Times correspondent who visited NPRAG’s base found “ministries” in“one-room shacks staffed by untrained and illiterate people.”
Not too far from some governmental offices in Egypt, yet it is still recognized as a state with a legitimate government. So why is one recognized and not the other?
Taylor thus createda National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) in July 1990to administer the 90 percent or more of Liberia that the NPFL controlled. NPRAGdocuments conveyed to foreign officials and others an image of the NPFL as therightful ruler of Liberia, since “the NPFL assumed and has effective control over theentire land mass of Liberia, except the city of Monrovia,” and a civilian administra-tion governed what the NPFL essentially claimed was a liberated zone that demon-strated its intent to govern. Documents claimed that within this zone, citizens votedfor their representatives and security forces maintained order
had democratic order, military power, documentation, foreign relations...why was it denied recognition? on what grounds? the way it cam to power?
Taylor complained that“ECOMOG invaders have insisted that they must dominate our sovereign state andpeople,
So does he want intl actors to interfere to combat the interference of other intl actors???
Taylor stated repeatedly that he was entitled to be the presi-dent of Liberia because the NPFL
Not democratic
even though child soldiers had been routine
problematization of rights
The journalist Robert Kaplan interpreted theseimages of violence in terms of “intense savagery of fighting in such diverse culturalsettings as Liberia . . . something very troubling to those of us inside the stretchlimo.” 21 The international media published photos of the fighters’ strange attire, withcaptions such as “rebel soldiers dress gaudily in outlandish clothes and make-up,”and played up stories of a population “terrorized by teen-agers in N.B.A. T-shirts.”
It is very disturbing to see how such a horrifying event is mocked because of the poverty of the people involved. It is incredibly unlikely that if an image of, say, a Ukrainian child throwing a rock at a Russian soldier would be treated as anything but a demonstration of the will and power to fight against oppression, rather than calling it a joke and making fun of it.
but such actions wereseen as necessary if it was to pursue the noble cause of liberation from the oppres-sion of Ethiopia’s Marxist government.
do the ends really justify the means here?
CHARLES T AYLOR ENTERED L IBERIA FROM neighboring Coˆte d’Ivoire with about a hun-dred NPFL fighters on December 24, 1989, in what he said was a struggle against op-pression. This force included non-Liberians
It's safe to say that the more actors that are involved in a "civil war", the less likely it is to be taken seriously, most especially if those actors are not from the country the civil war is taking place in. See: Syria, Yemen
Al Shabaab
It is denied recognition because of its jihadist ideology despite it checking off all the other boxes
This leads to greater group cohesion as the commandersucceeds in channeling outsiders’ support to a single dominant group.
If multiple rebel groups are fighting, to gain intl support, one of the groups must absorb all the other groups (but the one which is its main target) to to be able to gain intl support and have a clearly defined enemy
Those who work within this liberation narrative during a civil warderive considerable strength from being able to convince observers to lend financialand political support and thereby tilt the balance in favor of the narrative’s goals.
Is this only in hindsight?
Political actors who tap into that emotion and action areable to harness its power.
Rewriting history, essentially
Ideally there is only onegroup of rebels. To receive international recognition, a rebel group needs to showthat it mobilizes fighters for “liberation,” that it can manage internal factional splits,and that it has the capacity to fight in a disciplined fashion. It seeks internationalsupport to reinforce these rebel characteristics.
Rebel group must act as a united, organized, state to be treated like a state
A N IMAGINARY TIME TRAVELER TRANSPORTED back to a civil war in the 1960s or 1970swould encounter the “liberation narrative.”
e.g. Algerian War of Independence
The changing character of this in-tervention toward a criminal war narrative has had the consequence of dismissing ordevaluing the goals of rebel fighters and forestalling decisive rebel victories or de-feats.
People fighting against a warlord may be lumped in with the warlord themselves by international actors and refused help altogether
By the 1990s, a transition was well underway from a goal-oriented “war of libera-tion” narrative toward a “criminal war” narrative that stresses the illegitimacy of war-fare and insists that international intervention be neutral in character.
European countries who supported African states in times of wars of liberation stopped supporting them when criminal wars started to emerge
By intervening to help, NGOSsystematically impede the progress of their enemies toward a decisivevictory that could end the war.
By intervening, NGOs do not allow a winning side to decimate its opponents and swiftly end the war. However, were they to not intervene at all, they would be putting many in the hands of danger, especially noncombatants fleeing war zones and conflict areas
Regular warfare among well-developed countries is rare andoffers few opportunities for such NGOS, so they focus their efforts onaiding refugees in the poorest parts of the world. This ensures thatthe food, shelter, and health care offered-although abysmal byWestern standards-exceeds what is locally available to non-refugees.
This might explain why you don't see refugee camps at ukrainian borders but instead the absorption of Ukrainian refugees into neighboring countries and global support for them as opposed to refugees from poorer countries who are often either placed in refugee camps with limited access to essential resources or refused refuge altogether
Such a Europe would have remained a mosaic of warring tribes,undigested and unreconciled in their separate feeding camps.
Such camps incubate the feelings of resentment people have once they come to these refugee camps. These growing feelings of resentment could be attributed to the isolation necessarily imposed by refugee camps and the lack of communication with the outside world
By its very existence, the UNRWA dissuades integrationinto local society and inhibits emigration.
The fact that it was a refugee camp made it so that those inside could not leave and thus isolated them from other refugee communities and kept them away from their homelands
But UNRWA camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan,the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip providedintegration, inhibit on the whole a higher standard of living thanemigration, and keep most Arab villagers had previously enjoyed
UNRWA camps became high quality refugee camps, but refugee camps nonetheless.
because it could not be done inperfect safety
NATO values itself above the people it supposedly sacrificing itself for
This seemingly miraculous immunity fromYugoslav anti-aircraft guns and missiles was achieved by multiple layersof precautions.
They avoided any and all instances of direct conflict and instead targeted defense systems, all while using threatening and manipulation tactics
Their interventions still have thedestructive consequence of prolonging the state of war, but theycan at least protect civilians from its consequences.
They are actually armed and consist of members of the militaries of NATO member states, whose main priority is not self preservation, but actual peacekeeping
The very presence of U.N. forces, meanwhile, inhibits the normalremedy of endangered civilians, which is to escape from the combatzone.
In cases like these, the UN could actually be upholding and supporting failing/weak regimes
But the first priority of U.N. peacekeeping contingentsis to avoid casualties among their own personnel. Unit commanderstherefore habitually appease the locally stronger force, accepting itsdictates and tolerating its abuses.
This is often why many claim that UN Peacekeeping missions do not actually maintain peace and security in a region but rather fuel the corruption there
Although imposed cease-fires ultimately did increasethe total quantity of warfare among the lesser powers, and armisticesdid perpetuate states of war
Then what is the right course of action?
shielding the weaker sidefrom the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace
peace deal is made for them so they don't have to actually give anything up
armistices
permanently stopping the conflict
cease-fires
temporarily stopping the fighting
This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which mighthave come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordainedby the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate.
US influence and veto power in the security council combined with its alliance to and support of Israel are probably why such a ceasefire was not ordered
Using a simple phase model of democratisation and believingthat democracy is our final destination and the paradise we all want to go
similar to Fukuyama's end of history argument that liberal democracy is the final step in development
consolidationcan take a long time, for nothing can be taken for granted until democraticprinciples are widely supported and entrenched in daily political life.
this is a major issue: people expect to see immediate results from democracy but often forget that the institutions that bring about certain results associated with democracy (economic development, higher literacy rates, better healthcare, etc.) take a lot of time to work and produce these results. It can be tempting at that point to label democracy just as ineffective as authoritarianism, making society more like to revert back to the latter
Emerging phase The old undemocratic arrangements no longer functionand new ones are set up; liberty is still the main common concern; a newconstitution is declared and general elections are introduced for the firsttime; return to the old system is no longer easily feasible.
this would require the elections resulting in the leadership of someone unconnected to the old regime
. Quite a number of these newly founded statestried to implement democratic rule, but not all survived as democracies
Why?
mass democracies
these were not, by our current standards, full democracies since they often left out women, those who didn't own land, non-white persons, and those not highly educated or of noble blood
kind of ebb and flow or two-steps-forwards,one-step-backwards process
reverse wave of democracy
ideas about liberty, equality, justice and the good life.
If the citizens of a country associate these ideas with fear or chaos, it is unlikely that they live in a democratic state
Economic development is an ambiguous concep
some indices like the Human Development Index (HDI) helps delineate specific development factors which could be measured against certain democratic criteria to find out how economic development contributes to democracy
Apparently,economic development is conducive to democracy, but it is certainly notthe whole story.
It is also true vice versa: gulf countries are very wealthy but score low on most democratic measures
In the struggle to secure their economic position and political power, therising middle class demands personal freedom and the right to partici-pate in government affairs.
The middle class are not as wealthy or stable as the rich and so they fight to stay out of poverty, and they are also not so impoverished that they give into the "I have nothing to lose" mentality. This grey zone between the two extremes means that they are the ones that are most likely to fuel political participation in a majority based democracy (not elite based)
In this way, democratisationin many countries has been a long, long processlasting for decades – or even centuries. In other countries, however, revolu-tions, wars and foreign intervention have brought about rapid change.
Does the gradual transition into democracy create a more stable democratic regime than the sudden influx of choice and democratic institutions? I think it does.
limited or illiberal forms of democracy
would Egypt be considered an illiberal democracy. What is the difference an illiberal democracy and an authoritarian regime? Would Mubarak's Egypt have been an illiberal democracy?
clear line of demarcationbetween democracies and undemocratic states
Requires a strict definition of democracy
the rational indi-vidual in the large group in a socio-politicalcontext will not be willing to make any sacrificesto achieve the objectives he shares with others.
Under most circumstances, personal gain trumps group objectives
Why would thepeople of this (or any other) country organizepolitically to prevent inflation when they couldserve their common interest in price stabilityjust as well if they all spent less as individuals?
In this case here, as I am sure could be the same as in many others, external forces such as increasing rates work as incentives to achieve these common goals
taxpayers
wouldn't elected legislators sort of function as lobbying/political representation of taxpayers?
Class legislation”
Umbrella group
It would be just asreasonable to suppose that all of the workers ina country would voluntarily restrict their hoursof work in order to raise the wages of labor inrelation to the rewards for capital.
Not worth the risk if everyone else is going to do it
Moreover, in anyevent one individual bourgeois presumably willnot be able to exercise a decisive influence onthe choice of a government. So the rational thingfor a member of the bourgeoisie to do is toignore his class interests and to spend his ener-gies on his personal interests.
spend your efforts on what you can actually change
selling its basicservices on the market
Services like public education and healthcare must be free, with alternatives also existing but requiring extra fees
In otherwords, those who do not purchase or pay forany of the public or collective good cannot beexcluded or kept from sharing in the consump-tion of the good, as they can where noncollectivegoods are concerned.
For example the lighting provided by street lights on public roads cannot physically be limited to only those who pay their taxes. So, whether or not someone pays their taxes, they will still be able to use the street lights
the most fundamental services a nation-state provides are, in one important respect, likethe higher price in a competitive market: theymust be available to everyone if they are availableto anyone
non-excludable services
But despite the forceof patriotism, the appeal of the national ideology,the bond of a common culture, and the indispen-sability of the system of law and order, no majorstate in modern history has been able to supportitself through voluntary dues or contributions.Philanthropic contributions are not even a sig-nificant source of revenue for most countries.Taxes, compulsory payments by definition, areneeded.
No one (or at least a minority of people) would pay taxes if it wasn't required of them to do so by law
on the condition that they help bear the costs orburdens involved in the achievement of the groupobjectives.
The cost of having to organize a group of people to do something outweighs the benefit of getting what they would be fighting for
rational, self-interested individuals will not act toachieve their common or group interests.
No one will want to be the one to make the first move/call for collective action
labor unions, in Marxian theories of class action,in concepts of “countervailing power,” and invarious discussions of economic institutions
do political parties apply here too?
Majoritarian proposals like relatively high electoral thresholds and directly elected mayors can strengthen accountability and avoid party fragmentation. On the other hand, Saied and others propose more decentralization, council democracy and a post-party future.
A good compromise of both approaches would be to increase electoral thresholds in the short run (until stable, organized parties form), and use council democracy in local government. The post-party future hopes of Saied can be diluted through using a mixed electoral system which integrates both party-list PR voting (like in Egypt) as well as FPTP voting into different electoral districts. This would likely solve the issue of lack of accountability while still allowing for freedom of association
presidential system
Will result in cabinet being chosen by president. Likely not representative and consisting of only one party
it joined one alongside its largest rival, a party that before the elections it had referred to as the “party of corruption.”
hypocrisy
The exception is likely a lack of support among those who identify closely with Ennahda and Qalb Tounes, as well as some members of the political elite.
Since they were the ones he practically ousted from parliament
The Mechichi government’s failures to contain a deadly coronavirus outbreak and its economic effects contributed to the current crisis and facilitated Saied’s invocation of Article 80.
In context, what seemed as a power-grabbing move is probably the most effective and democratic action to have taken place in the last 3 years
it appointed an unknown figure as prime minister
It seems to be a recent trend in Tunisian politics to appoint a PM not from the party. What is the point of a party then?
A Democracy Without Parties?
Do the democratic ends justify the autocratic means? I think yes and it seems that the Tunisian public would also agree
In 2011, almost 40 percent of respondents expressed “absolutely no trust” in the political parties. That figure grew to approximately 60 percent in 2016 and more than 70 percent in 2018.
It would seem like Abbou was right in that the president needed to restart the parliament and should probably try to implement new legislation with the newly elected parliament (elections are scheduled to take place towards the end of this month) that will consolidate the people's faith in political parties once more by allowing only serious contenders to run for office
trust in political parties writ large dropped
trust in parties and those who ran them dropped since they were not reliable and seemed to not know what they were getting into, resulting in high turnover rates for legislators
According to Abbou, the political class writ large is unreliable and dishonest, and the only way to save Tunisian democracy is to encourage the honest president of the country to take radical measures. Abbou, a prominent political prisoner under Ben Ali, publicly suggested the exercise of Article 80 as early as December 2020.
Odd that someone who participated greatly in the creation of a democracy would fight for measures the reduce its power
Ennahda seemed to invest more resources and effort in building institutions
Why is it that many of the Islamist parties have more functional parties than non-Islamist parties, in terms of structure and organization? Is it because, as is said in the paragraph, they want to avoid being called out and kicked out of the political sphere for any small mistake they make?
“national unity” governments
Maybe a solution would be to encourage smaller parties with less than a certain number of seats in the past X years to merge with similar parties so that maybe 10-20 parties (instead of 40-50) run in the following elections and have more clearly defined goals and agendas
But rather than form a government by allying with smaller secular parties that offered a similar orientation, the party formed a government with its antithesis, Ennahda, thereby engaging in what political scientists Dan Slater and Erica Simmons call “promiscuous power sharing.”
Was this intended to be a way to represent and please everyone?
lower barriers to entry
low barriers to entry meant that quality of candidates and parties could not be ensured and resulted in the existence of overlapping agendas, incompetent leaders, and meaningless elections
anti-corruption campaign and other demonstrations of state capacity
might seem like it is a pro-democracy move, however it may be targeting state/regime enemies
Saied’s actions are not a conventional coup in which dissent and protest are violently repressed—at least not yet
The power of the people is being stripped not through violence but through the breaking down of the institutions which give them those rights
what occurs under authoritarianism has profoundeffects on the transition and the democracy that follow.
pre-democratic institutions and informal political practices and relationships can determine the style, stability, and length of the following democratic regime
Havingwon elections, leaders claim a mandate for such wholesalechanges.
Election numbers might be/are usually fake
Because people have fundamentaldisagreements about what is democracy
This issue seems to be at the center of nearly (if not actually) all issues relating to democracy or lack thereof
Ideological polarizatio
This might be a result of a two-party system: us vs them mentality is strengthened
In the United States, for example, Bright Line Watch’spublic opinion surveys across 2017–18 show that partisanshipincreasingly colors citizens’ perceptions of which governmentactions constitute democratic backsliding:
No set/universally agreed upon definition for democratic backsliding
But when the accrual of power isaccomplished by following the rules to change laws and in-stitutions or by taking advantage of the gray areas whereformal rules are absent, for citizens, there is no bright line tocoordinate around.
sanctity of constitution is violated and it is demoted to the level of any other piece of legislation which can at anytime be repealed or amended
informal institutions
unwritten practices in the political sphere. E.g. Lebanon's president is always a Maronite Christian, the PM a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shiite Muslim
The problem emerges when executives use the guise ofpopulism to carry out institutional reforms that take aim atthe opposition.
Rewriting the rules to keep you in power. Example: Mubarak's NDP party amended the constitution so only parties that have existed for longer than 5 years and met the 5% electoral threshold (which because of the NDP's overwhelming majority, no one else had met it) can nominate candidates for presidential elections, Might seem like a good idea at first except for that now no one else can have a presidential candidate
When people feel that democracy is a political system con-trolled by the rich and powerful, and elections offer candi-dates who appear the same with little hope of change, theymay withdraw from the political system altogether.
This type of elite-controlled democracy might end up turning into an elitist oligarchy and eventually back to an authoritarian state designed to repress the poor majority
ones that ruled during the authoritarianperiod only to become skilled competitors under democracy
larger, established parties are probably more likely to gain votes than smaller unknown parties. they are probably also aware of the campaigning tactics and voter habits that will result in them gaining the most votes
while radical reform of theinstitutional rules under an elite-biased democracy is rare, itis more likely to happen after the previous autocratic leaderhas died and when the country experiences poor economicperformance. A generational shift among elites accompaniedby clear evidence that the status quo does not work seems keyto institutional change.
Complete overturn and ruin of past regime
New democratic leaders may refrain fromsuch moves simply out of fear of triggering elite backlash inthe form of a coup (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) or ofsetting a bad precedent for institutional instability
Too many changes in such a short time might result in an unexpected backlash effect
The in-troduction of parties and semicompetitive elections allowsautocratic elites to prepare for electoral competition underdemocracy.
parliament-led democratization
Democracy is rarely a concession by elites who feelthreatened by the pitchfork-waving masses
Difference between Egyptian and Tunisian Revolution outcomes. Tunisian Revolution was followed by national dialogues while Egypt's Revolution did not have that and instead had a consolidation of power by the military
limited explanatorypower.
describes what is going on but not why
the elite in a highly unequal society may be moreresistant to leaving power
In a more unequal society, the elite minority would have to give up more to reduce the gap between them and the poor majority
The uncomfortable truth is that this is not a problemjust for new democracies. Old ones are susceptible to suchpathologies as well
I would think that maybe more established democracies (whatever that means, especially in cases like switzerland) that it is still possible to dismantle democratic institutions but it might be a lot harder
First, that de-mocracy is a fragile creation that can be undone by un-scrupulous elites who use the institutions of democracy toslowly but surely undo it.
If there is a system of checks and balances and a strong public will to uphold the democratic systems in place, is democracy then all that fragile? It is just as strong as the actors that participate in it
Institutions in democracies allow forthe solution of a range of problems
Only if the sanctity of these institutions is upheld (parliaments are not rigged or dissolved, constitutional rights are upheld, etc.)
perhaps one that would not have involvedmilitary take-over.
Shafik also had a military past so I'm not sure that things would have been too different
theyare forbidden by Egyptian law
this is to create a separation between the military and civil/political life
surprise
Not really, since in the previous free-ish parliamentary elections in 2005, the MB was the biggest opposition party with almost 20% of the total parliament seats going to MB independents
What this meant was the leading party, the MB, hadless incentive to reach out to non-Islamist constituenciesin society while governing
Did not need to create a coalition government because it had the majority when combined with the Islamist bloc which one around the same number of seats
None of this was carved in stone.
Not really. As was said before, factors like the historical presence of the Egyptian military in political life was not really a choice that an individual or even a multiple interest groups could have easily changed, if at all. Seems like their paths were, for the most part, predetermined; maybe Egypt could have gone on a slightly more democratic (but still authoritarian) path, though
compromise
No compromise in Egyptian revolution
In Egypt, by contrast,such commitment was less clear. Non-Islamists feareddomination by Islamists in popular elections and so leanedtoward prolonging a period of “guardianship” under themilitary
Both sides engaged in vote buying and voter manipulation to protect themselves from the other
defended its interestswithout taking the presidential helm
As did the military of Tunisia which pledged to protect the revolution but did not get involved in its politics.
‘ese efforts proved key to getting a rather liberalconstitution ratified in early 2013.
Egypt's parliament before the revolution was nearly dominanted by the Muslim Brotherhood whose influence had become quite extensive. Could this be another reason why a more liberal constitution could not have been drafted in Egypt?
It was evident in the institutionalization offreedom of the press
In egypt, following the 2011 revolution and the loosening of party creation restrictions, over 80 new political parties were created. Why weren't these cemented? Is it because of the transfer of power to the SCAF very shortly after the beginning of the revolution (18 days)? I think it is because the PM of Tunisia took power after the overthrow of the president
Evidence of civil society playing the watchdog functionwas salient at any number of critical junctures inTunisia
A multitude of protests fighting for different rights and issues allowed for a constant flow civil input in the early stages of democratization which cemented democracy in Tunisian society
the military
the history and nature of the military as well as its switching loyalties (sometimes in favor of the state and sometimes in favor of the people). The Egyptian military has been very political active in Egypt ever since the 50s when they overthrew the monarchy and the leaders of this revolution (all military personnell) became the first 3 presidents of egypt
Hence it is temptingto attribute Tunisia’s greater success at democratizationto the country’s superior performance along standardindices of “modernization.”
Was Tunisia always on a path towards democratization with or without the revolution?
socio-economic standing
pre-revolution
illiberal democracies
nominally democratic
resolve disagreements more effectively than would be the case within existingnational institutions
ICJ?
For poorly governed countries, however, natural resources, especially oil,have been a curse that has feathered the nests of rulers and undermined de-mocracy and economic growth. Oil concentrates resources in the hands of thestate
Like what happened in venezuela
Under pressure from World Bank ofªcials,
is it really their choice then? that in itself takes away from their sovereignty
World Bank
it is important to note that decisions in the World Bank are taking unanimously by government representatives of each member state
Organized hypocrisy is not surprising in anenvironment such as the international system where there are competingnorms (e.g., human rights vs. Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty), power dif-ferentials that allow strong actors to pursue policies that are inconsistent withrecognized rules, and exceptional complexity that makes it impossible to writeany set of rules that could provide optimal outcomes under all conditions.
Not only that, but there would have to be immense monitoring systems that assess the countries' situations and actions taken at every given point to ensure that no one party is exploiting the other, and the ability to impose immediately very harsh and very strict sanctions upon the party that is caught engaging in exploitative behaviour
For states in thethird world
is there any other type of state that would be subject to a trusteeship?
To datethere has been no effort, for instance, to produce a treaty or convention thatwould deªne and embody in international law a new form of trusteeship. Justthe opposite.
Does the author actually not realize why literally everyone thinks trusteeship is a bad idea? He speaks about it as if it is this new idea that no one has tried before and found that it fails every single time, whether under personal selfish agendas, government policies, or even under the supervision of an intergovernmental organization (League of Nations)
MartinIndyk, an assistant secretary of state during President Bill Clinton’s adminis-tration, has argued that the most attractive path to permanent peace in theMiddle East would be to establish a protectorate in Palestine, legitimated bythe United Nations and with the United States playing a key role in securityand other areas. Even if ªnal status talks were completed, the trusteeshipwould remain in place until a responsible Palestinian government was estab-lished.
Is this not what happened before 1948???
authority was shared
key word: SHARED
Transitional administration has been most effective when the level of vio-lence in a country has been low, where there has been involvement by majorpowers, and where the contending parties within the country have reached amutually acceptable agreement
very rare cases that cause these perfect conditions to exist. even if they do, they are likely the outcome of violence and revolution. is it still a failed state then?
Bosnia’s indigenous leaders are acting on the assumption that at somepoint in the not-too-distant future SFOR, the high representative, and otherswill depart, leaving an environment in which they can become the ultimatewinners.
the problem with an indefinite mandate
The permanent members of the Security Council, to whom UNpeacekeeping authorities are ultimately responsible, have not always had thesame interests.
5 veto powers: US, UK, France, Russia, China
local leaders who become dependent on external actors
temporary fix. country goes back to chaos after peacekeeping mandate is over
The U.S. occupation of Iraq has followed the same script, albeit with-out any UN endorsement of the occupation itself, although the Security Coun-cil did validate the restoration of international legal sovereignty in June 2004.Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty and sometimes international legal sover-eignty are violated in the short term so that they can be restored in the longerterm; at least that is the standard explanation.
Did they just justify the US invasion of Iraq as being a "peacebuilding mission"?????
The scope oftransitional administration or peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations hasranged from the full assertion of executive authority by the UN
UN Peacekeeping operations are infamous for not only being highly corrupt at times but also harming the people they are supposed to protect (e.g., raping women and children in areas they are stationed in)
Neverthe-less, political leaders may accept undesired and intrusive engagement fromexternal actors because the alternative is loss of access to international capitalmarkets
The fact that a country is willing to comply with and accept the conditions set by the IMF, even though it could impose harsh and highly specific domestic policies, shows that the country is willing to abide by the rules of the intl society and wants to develop itself to be a more active part of it
The conditions attached to lending by the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) have covered a wide range of issues such as aggregatecredit expansion, subsidies, number of government employees, indexation ofsalaries, tariffs, tax rates, and institution building
like now in egypt: conditions are to levy subsidies and devalue the currency (float the currncy)
7.3 percent and 9.6 percent
Then who supports the spending of billions of dollars yearly on USAID? This makes me think that these results are somewhat flawed since they don't depict reality.
Anand and Krosnick asked a random sample ofthe electorate questions about U.S. foreign policy before the 2000 elections suchas, should the United States be “Helping poor countries provide food, cloth-ing, and housing for their people? Helping resolve disputes between two othercountries? Preventing governments of other countries from hurting [their] owncitizens? Preventing people in other countries from killing each other?”
how does the wording of these issues contribute to the results they produce? Could they be worded in a way where most people are unlikely to agree to the premise?
Sovereignty failures may also present problems in the area of transnationalcriminality
Limited ability to ensure and enforce border control measures results in unwanted and most often illicit goods to enter. This is also generally a measure of how in charge domestic law enforcement powers are
Failed or weak states may provide terrorists with territory in which they canoperate freely
Like Afghanistan for example
The largest number of poorly governed states is found on the continent ofAfrica
Effects of post-colonialism
States that experience failure or poor governance more generally are besetby many problems
Not just one issue that can be easily fixed. All issues affect each other and this causes a complete system collapse
In 1955 fewer than 6 percent of the countries were in failure. In the early1990s the ªgure had risen to almost 30 percent, falling to about 20 percent in1998, the last year of the study.
I think this might be in some way related to the limited regime types during the cold war: socialist (siding with the USSR) or capitalist (siding with the US) with even the NAM countries usually having some sort of connection to either one.
Nation-building or state-building efforts are almost always described in terms of em-powering local authorities to assume the responsibilities of conventionalsovereignty. The role of external actors is understood to be limited with regardto time, if not scope, in the case of transitional administration exercising fullexecutive authority.
Is this how it would actually happen in practice though? No one pretty much invades because of the kindness of their hearts. They have to be getting something out of it to put all those resources into it
Ideally,shared sovereignty would be legitimated by a contract between national au-thorities and an external agent.
contractual colonization. ideal, yes, but not likely at all to happen
juridically independent
on paper/nominally independent
international legal sovereignty
external validation
occupied
The solution to occupation is more occupation?
To reduce international threats and improve the prospects for individualsin such polities, alternative institutional arrangements supported by externalactors, such as de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty, should be addedto the list of policy options.
I do not agree with this on so many levels, and this is very obviously written by someone who has not been to or talked to anyone from a conflict/failed/weak state.
Poorly governed societies can generateconºicts that spill across international borders.
Syrian crisis affects lebanon greatly, for example, with conflict spillovers and mass migration being 2 commonly occurring phenomena
government-organized genocide
state terrorism
inºation above 500 percen
hyperinflation still affects zimbabwe which now has a nearly worthless currency
In some cases,decent governance may require some new form of trusteeship, almost certainlyde facto rather than de jure.
This is what happened in early/mid 20th century, which led to situations like Israeli occupation of Palestine, and is still a form of colonialism.
(whether formally authorized by the UnitedNations or engaged in by a coalition of the willing led by the United States
US is the biggest contributor to the UN budget and, being a veto power in the security council, has a lot of influence on what the UN does/objects to (such as US invasion of Iraq which violated intl law but UN did nothing about). So are these two policy tools really all that different?
in principle
No one officially says they oppose sovereignty but will frequently violate it. Hypocrisy?
Sharing Sovereignty
does "sharing sovereignty defeat its meaning?
James Randi
James Randi is a skeptic who has frequently challenged the beliefs of those who claim to have had paranormal experiences
Prove that it didn'texist
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence