Tertullian would return to this passage and,in every case, he changed his translation of μεσίτες from mediator to sequester.This change was intentional, unprecedented, 50 and signaled a shift in his use ofthis passage. In particular, the focus shifts from an emphasis on the manhoodof Christ to the conjoining of divinity and humanity

Baptism is thus a neces-sary element in human salvation and provides the human with the means forreceiving transformation back into the image of God. All of this is possible forthe baptized believer, as baptism restores the body and soul to the prelapsariancondition and enables the beginnings of deification in the present.65

The final victory of Palamism in 1368 gave official approval to the doctrineof theosis as an authentic part of the Orthodox theological tradition.

he Cappadocian Achievement

his physicalemphasis was perhaps required as an antidote to the intellectualism ofOrigen, but it needed the refinement and completion which Cyril ofAlexandria was to bring to it.

n AthanasiusIrenaeus’ teaching on adoption has been combined with Origen’s doctrineof a dynamic participation in the Trinity to produce a concept of deifica-tion as the penetration and transformation of mortal human nature by theeternal Son which enables it to participate in the light and life of theFather.(d) Immanence and TranscendenceNevertheless, it cannot be denied that there are aspects of Athanasius’ con-cept of deification which cause unease to the modern mind. Those who areparticularly struck by his emphasis on the transmission of incorruption andimmortality through the Incarnation to the rest of humanity as a result of14 Demetropoulos (1954: 118) sees adoption, redemption, sanctification, renewal, and perfection asequivalent to deification but temporally prior to it; i.e. he reserves the term θεοπορησι for the eschato-logical fulfilment of deification. For Roldanus (1968: 166–9) the chief elements of deification are (i) anincorruptibility which implies a sharing in the divine life; and (ii) a liberation from sin and death whichresults from man’s re-creation. Norman (1980: 139–71), arguing that deification is more than a Greekattainment of immortality and also more than an ethical attainment of likeness, lists eight differentaspects: (i) the renewal of humankind in the image of God; (ii) the transcendence of human nature; (iii)the resurrection of the flesh and immortality of the body; (iv) the attainment of incorruptibility, impassi-bility, and unchangeableness; (v) participation in the divine nature and qualities of Godliness; (vi) attain-ment of the knowledge of God; (vii) the inheritance of divine glory; and (viii) ascent to the heavenlykingdom. Hess (1993: 371) sees divinization as one of a cluster of eight closely related motifs: renewal,divinization, partaking of God, union, adoption as sons, exaltation, sanctification, and perfection in Christ.He notes the anti-Arian polemical purpose of the divinization motif and its absence from Athanasius’Festal Letters, which he takes as evidence that deification is not a ‘central or controlling motif’. But cf.Cyril of Alexandria, who does not refer to deification in his Festal Letters either.The Alexandrian Tradition II178

Its fundamental tenet, the Irenaean principle thatthe Son of God became as we are that we might become as he is, came to be morewidely diffused. Among Latin speakers we encounter it for the first time in Tertullian(d. c. 225), and among Syriac speakers in Ephrem the Syrian (d. 373). But it neverbecame a prominent theme. Nor do we find in Latin and Syriac writers the carefulelaboration of a doctrine of deification of the spiritual life, such as we have studiedin Maximus the Confessor.

Gregory of Nazianzus, who produces thenoun, θωσι. Cyril of Alexandria follows Athanasius’ terminology, while Ps.-Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor follow Gregory’s. It is therefore the latter setof terms that comes to predominate in Byzantine usage

Clement of Alexandria was first to usethe technical vocabulary of deification, but he did not think it necessaryto explain it. No formal definition of deification occurs until the sixthcentury, when Dionysius the Areopagite declares: ‘Deification (θωσι) isthe attaining of likeness to God and union with him so far as is possible’(EH 1. 3, PG 3. 376a). Only in the seventh century does Maximus theConfessor discuss deification as a theological topic in its own right.

Before the later Neoplatonists––and Proclus in particular––the terminology ofdeification was used much more frequently by Christians than by pagans. Until thebeginning of the Christian era there are only seventeen surviving instances of theuse of the terms. By the end of the third century the number of instances has risento sixty-eight, which is more than equalled by the Apologists, Clement, Origen, andHippolytus, who use the term more often by the middle of the third century than allof their pagan contemporaries and predecessors put together. 62 There seem to betwo fundamental reasons for this. The first is that the imperial cult, although diffusedthroughout the empire, was not much discussed. It was not problematical (except toJews and Christians) and therefore did not excite much comment. The second is thatin Platonism there was no true deification until Iamblichus began to develop theconcept of theurgy. Plotinus, for example, never once uses any of the expressions ofdeification for the simple reason that if the human soul is already divine in essence, itdoes not need to be deified. 63 When Christian authors wished to speak about deifica-tion they therefore had to hand a relatively unexploited set of terms with a widerange of meaning which they could adapt to their own purposes without muchdifficulty.

be changed in a moment into the substance of angels, even by the investiture of anincorruptible nature, and so be removed to that kingdom in heaven of which wehave now been treating’ (cf. 1 Cor. 15: 52–3) (Adv. Marc. 3. 24, CSEL 47. 420. 10–13;trans. Holmes, ANF).

On the second occasion Tertullian uses thesame text against the modalist Monarchianism of Praxeas. Arguing a fortiori (in theway the text is used in John 10: 35) he claims that ‘if Scripture has not been afraid topronounce to be gods those men who by faith have been made sons of God, youmay know that much more has it by right applied the name of God and Lord to theonly true Son of God’

appeals to Psalm 82: 6 on two furtheroccasions as a text with which to counter erroneous ideas about God. On the first hecites it in his polemical work against the Carthaginian Gnostic Hermogenes, whotaught a dualist system in which God and matter were two equal and exclusivelydivine eternal principles. But we ourselves possess something of the divine, Tertul-lian argues. ‘For we shall be even gods, if we shall deserve to be amongst those ofwhom he declared, “I have said, you are all gods” (Ps. 82: 6) and “God stands in thecongregation of the gods” (Ps. 82: 1). But this comes of his own grace, not from anyproperty in us, because it is he alone who can make gods’

turning the argument neatly to the advan-tage of monotheism: if a deifying power exists, it suggests the activity of a supremeGod (Apol. 11. 10). The supremacy of God is not compromised by the references to‘gods’ in Psalm 82: 1 and 6. In Against Marcion Tertullian refutes an objection that hisrational argument for the oneness of God is undermined by the Psalmist. Thesharing of the same name as God by those addressed by him in the ‘assembly of thegods’ does not prove that they share in the reality of divinity

After Irenaeus, Greek thinking on deification underwent its most signif-icant development in Alexandria, to such a degree that many have considereddeification an Alexandrian theologoumenon. The key role was played by Clem-ent and Origen, who devised the technical vocabulary (Irenaeus having onlyspoken of human beings becoming gods), and enriched the concept of deifi-cation by drawing on Hellenistic philosophy (chiefly Stoic and Platonic) andemploying sophisticated techniques of biblical exegesis learned from Philo.

deificatio is coined by Eriugena himself in his translation ofPseudo-Dionysiu

A search in the Brepolis Library of Latin Texts Database yieldsonly seventy-three occurrences of deif- words from the second to seventh cen-tury.5

A search in the Brepolis Library of Latin Texts Database yieldsonly seventy-three occurrences of deif- words from the second to seventh cen-tury.5

Norman Russell had devoted sevenpages to the Latin Fathers in an appendix

n his discussion of Adam and Eve’ssin, for example, Augustine writes that they “would have been better fitted toresemble gods if they had clung in obedience to the highest and true groundof their being, and not, in their pride, made themselves their own ground. Forcreated gods are gods not in their own true nature, but by participation inGod.” 42

are more than any other of his Latin patristic predecessors.2

Meconi suggests, Augustine may have used deificare only sparingly because “itis a term already promoted by Augustine’s opponents. Augustine is very suspi-cious of those who think that they can become equal to God without quali-fication, either in this life or in the next.”

Againstthe Arians, who assert that Christ is distinct from and subordinate to Godthe Father, Jerome emphasizes the difference between Christ’s eternal son-ship according to nature and our adoptive sonship according to grace. In con-trast to the Manichees, who assert that the human soul is of the same natureas God, Jerome stresses that there is only one true God, and that we are called“gods” through our participation in him. What lies behind this anti-Arianand anti-Manichean rhetoric is an echo of the Origenist controversies thatled Jerome—previously a great admirer of Origen’s work but later an avowedcritic—to deny any ontological change, to avoid the direct language of di-vinization, and to reject the Platonic metaphor of the soul’s ascent

In summary, Jerome appears cautious and conservative on the topic of de-ification. He does not use words related to deificare. Rather, he draws on thecomplementary terms: adoptive sonship and spiritual adoption; “becominggods” and participation in divine life; and “rebirth into a new man” and an-gelic life

a human being can be an image of God only when behaving well as a re-sult of freedom, not out of necessity.63

it seems hard to command virgini-ty and “to force men against their nature and to extort from them the life thatangels enjoy.” 59 The statement that virginity is against nature (adversum natu-ram) is moderated by an explanation that virginity goes beyond human pow-ers.60 This is why it is not a command but a counsel, and also why virgins de-serve higher rewards and are compared to angels.6

Rather, as we grow in adoption and participation in God, we areless and less led by the fear of slaves and more and more enjoy the freedom ofsons and every step of our spiritual progress is not a result of necessity but ofour free choice.

Unlike adoptive sonship of all the baptized, angeliclife, for Jerome, concerns a limited group of virgins and hermits who decideto follow Christ in a radical way, and who may experience an anticipated ful-fillment of eschatological promises

“that as He wasadored by angels in heaven He might have angels also on earth.” 51

“who while they are on earth livethe angelic life.” 50

Jerome explains that divine grace together with strict fastingenable the virgin “even in its earthly tenement to live the angelic life.”

A contrast between Christ and us is emphasized again.While Eunomius and Arius stress the similarity between Christ’s and our son-ship,

See, I am sending my messenger [angelum meum]ahead of you.’ ” 4

What the Lord promises to us is not the nature of angels but their mode of life andtheir bliss. And therefore John the Baptist is called an angel even before he is behead-ed, and all God’s holy men and virgins manifest in themselves even in this world thelife of angels. When it is said ye shall be like the angels, likeness only is promised andnot a change of nature.47

“Great and precious are the promises attaching to virginity which He has giv-en us, that through it we may become partakers of the divine nature.” 4

Although Jerome consistently denies any change of human nature, this timehe uses an overstatement by saying that we sow in the Spirit as men, “but whenwe begin to reap eternal life, we will perhaps cease to be men” (homo fortasseesse desistit).35

He emptied himself of the fullness and form of God andassumed the form of a servant so that the fullness of divinity might dwell in us and sothat we might go from being servants to masters.23

he purpose behind the Word becoming flesh (see Jn 1:14) is “thatwe might pass from the flesh into the Word.” The Word does not cease to bedivine; our human nature is not changed but “the glory is increased.” 32While we live in this earthly life, our participation in God consists in pur-suing moral excellence. If we fail to reach perfection, then the whole processof that growth is worthless. Jerome, again, gives us the image of the grape andits maturation “through many stages between the vine and the winepress.”Similarly, the Christian goes through stages of “infancy, childhood, adoles-cence, and young adulthood, until he becomes a mature man.” If the work isnot brought to an end, which indicates perfection and moral excellence, and“if the work lacks that final touch,” the whole effort is in vain. 33

Jerome links adoptive sonship with participation in divine life. In a pas-sage from the Tractates on the Psalms, Jerome uses “adoption” and “participa-tion” as parallel terms. “There is only one true God and many are called ‘gods’by participation in Him, just as there is the only Son of God and many arecalled ‘sons’ by adoption.” 29

For Jerome, the Christian’s growth is theimitation of Christ who “emptied himself and took on the form of a servantand was found in appearance as a man [see Phil 2:6–8], so that we ‘becomegods from humans’ [ut nos dii fieremus ex hominibus, see Ps 81:6] and no lon-ger die but be raised with Christ [see 1 Cor 3:1] and be called his friends [seeJn 15:15] and brothers [see Jn 20:17].” 22

Jerome is much less willing to callthe saints and the perfect Christians “gods,” as if they ceased to be men, 19 andrepeatedly emphasizes that God and men do not share the same nature.

erome states that we “are gods” not by our nature but by grace (quoddii sumus, non sumus natura, sed gratia)

Therefore, “we should believe that we are nowalready what we will become.” 26 This is “a new creation [see Gal 6:15], intowhich our lowly body is being transformed into the glorious body of Christ[see Phil 3:21].” 27 Our future body can be neither circumcised nor kept uncir-cumcised (see Gal 5:6). It is “not to say that its substance changes; it is just dif-ferent in glory.” 28

Despite his vast knowl-edge of Greek literature, his fondness for analyzing Hebrew and Greek words,and his affection for comparing Greek and Latin translations, Jerome neveruses any of the Greek expressions for deification. 1 Neither does he use theLatin words deificare, deificatio, or their derived forms. 2

He suggested that theincarnation was not only a theophany, but at the same time, “an anthropoph-any: the perfect exhibition before God of the beauty and excellencies of man-hood when framed without sin, developed without flaw, and continuouslymaintained in personal union with the eternal Son of God.

Hilary’s ideas of individual, rather than collective, transformation at the es-chaton have received little attention,

Jerome linksdeification—or rather, “becoming gods” —with adoptive sonship, a participa-tion in divine life that is not merely a figure of speech but a reality bestowedas a gift not possessed by right.87 Like Ambrose and Leo, Jerome refers to ourbecoming “partakers of divine nature,” “not in the realm of nature but in therealm of grace” (non naturae esse, sed gratiae).8

All the Greek Fathers after Origen who discuss redemption in terms ofdeification are, at least in this respect, his heirs. It was Origen who trimmedaway Clement’s more exotic utterances and presented deification as the prod-uct of Christian discipleship, namely, the attainment of immortality througha dynamic participation in the Son through the Holy Spirit.

The apparent thinness of the Latin tradition in comparison withthe Greek that some scholars have noticed owes something to the scarcenessof translations but more to the kind of audience the Latin authors were ad-dressing. The readers or hearers of many of the texts we have been consideringwere the simpliciores rather than the spiritually advanced (Eriugena seems tohave been right on that score). 86 The sermons of Augustine or the catechet-ical addresses of Ambrose were addressed to beginners. There was a learnedreadership in the Western provinces of the Empire, but just when the riches ofOrigen’s approach to deification might have been made available to Westernreaders, his texts began to come under suspicion for doctrinal error.

A comparison of the Greek and Latin approaches to deification up tothe time of Gregory the Great reveals a strong common tradition. Deificationis the raising of the Christian to a new level of being by faith in Christ andparticipation in the ecclesial body.

and the culmination of Leo’s theology of deification.” 12 Leo envisages the ad-vancement (provectio) of humanity, by means of this exchange, to the veryperfection of the Godhead (ad summa Deitatis).13

In Ambrose’s own words, Christ “offered himself according to our nature thathe might accomplish a work beyond our nature.”

Deificationis the raising of the Christian to a new level of being by faith in Christ andparticipation in the ecclesial body.

n both the Eastern and Western traditions, deification is Christological-ly based, ecclesiologically expressed, and eschatologically oriented. The dif-ferences of emphasis are due mainly to the different ways in which Origen’sheritage was received, either directly or through writers influenced by him.Despite his condemnation by an ecumenical council in 553, he remained acommon Father who never ceased to be studied eagerly, particularly in monas-tic circles, in both the Greek East and the Latin West. If Irenaeus was the firstto enunciate the exchange formula and to speak of the baptized as gods, it wasOrigen who taught the church at large how Christian discipleship could leadeven in this world to sharing in the divine life.

Leo was asked to adjudicate the caseof Eutyches, the Constantinopolitan archimandrite who held that after theincarnation the human and divine elements in Christ formed a single naturebecause the human had been totally divinized by the divine. Leo was quiteclear that the human and the divine in Christ remained two distinct but in-separable natures. “The terminology of deification,” as Keating suggests, “mayhave seemed to Leo to give unhelpful support and encouragement to what hesaw as a quasi-docetic approach to Christ.” 57

Dunkle has noticed that Ambrose avoids deification terms in his catecheticalmaterial but uses them in texts intended for more advanced Christians.56 Notunreasonably, Ambrose may have regarded deification as a misleading conceptfor catechumens.

The unwillingness of many of the Latin writers we have been consideringto use the technical language of deification is a puzzling feature that several ofthe contributors to this volume have addressed. Brian Dunkle notes that Am-brose omits deification terms even when he comes across them in the Greeksources he is using.52 Vít Hušek is surprised that despite “his vast knowledgeof Greek literature, his fondness for analyzing Hebrew and Greek words, andhis affection for comparing Greek and Latin translations, Jerome never usesany of the Greek expressions for deification.” 53 Peter Chrysologus and PopeLeo the Great, although not Hellenists like Ambrose and Jerome, also attractcomment for their avoidance of the technical terms of deification.54

Eriugena, Periphyseon 5, 1015C.

3 . B E H O L D I N G C H R I S T I N T H E O T H E RA N D I N T H E S E L FDeification in Benedict of Nursia and Gregory the Great

2 . E V E R Y H A P P Y M A N I S A G O DDeification in Boethiu

Daniel Keating

“made every Christian to be what Christ is.” 105 Christ was inthe world like leaven in dough, he says, and Christians share in that, spreadinggrace throughout the whole world. “Whoever, therefore, sticks to the leavenof Christ becomes in turn leaven as useful to himself as he is helpful to every-one else and, certain of his own salvation, he is made sure of the redemptionof others.” 106

When we fast often, part of God’s power dwells in us sinceit is God himself who fasts.” 104

“we have become not only Christians, but Christ himself.” 100

he who did not disdain to take us up into himself, did not dis-dain either to transfigure us into himself [transfigurare nos in se], and to speak in ourwords, so that we in our turn might speak in his.

that the divine birth might shine forthin you, that the deifying discipline [deifica disciplina] might respond to God, the Fa-ther, that in the honour and praise of living, God may be glorified in man.93

PopeGelasius says: “Certainly the sacraments of the body and blood of Christ,which we receive, is a divine thing. On account of this and through the same‘we are made partakers of the divine nature’ (2 Pet. 1:4).” 86

Augustine relates, “I heard Your voice from onhigh: ‘I am the food of grown men; increase and you will eat Me. You will notchange Me into you as food of your flesh, but you will be changed into Me.’ ” 82

What is more awesome . . . that He Himself is born into your state of slavery, or thatHe makes you to be free children of His own? That He takes your poverty upon Him-self, or that He makes you His heirs, yes, co-heirs of His unique Self ? It is indeed moreawesome that earth is transformed into a heaven, that man is changed by a deification[deitate], and that those whose lot is slavery get the rights of domination.5

Yet the merciful God wanted to help the creature “made in his own image” [Gn 1:27]through his only Son Jesus Christ—in such a way that the restoration of its natureshould not be outside of that nature, and that the second creation should advance be-yond the dignity of its original state. . . . It was a great thing to have received a formfrom Christ, but greater still to have its substance in Christ.38Our re-creation in baptism is an advance upon our original creation becausewe now not only have form from Christ (our human nature), but share in hisvery own divine substance.

Verona supports this idea: “not only do you make alive our earthly andmortal material which had died out” —that is, God not only restores the lifewhich was lost in the Fall—“but you even make it divine.” 37

Verona Sacramentary

hey would have known, asAugustine strikingly says, that God “makes his worshipers into gods.”

n the available Latin liturgies, deif-words do not appear (nor do they appear in the Greek ones either), though thecontent of deification is alluded to throughout in both metaphysical and poeticlanguage.

Through participationin the sacraments, meditation on scripture, and the practice of virtue, believersgrow in union with and likeness to God.

For this is the night which has knowledge of the saving sacraments, the night in whichyou offer pardon to sinners, make new men from old, from worn out old men restorefull-grown infants, whom you bring from the sacred font renewed unto a new crea-ture. On this night your people are new born and brought forth unto eternal day, thehalls of the kingdom of heaven are thrown open, by your blessed ordinance human con-versation is changed to divine.29

Christ was made a man of our race, so that we might be able to become “partakers ofthe divine nature.” He placed in the font of Baptism that very origin which he had as-sumed in the Virgin’s womb. He gave to the water what he had given to his Mother.For, the same “power of the Most High” and “overshadowing” of the Holy Spirit thatcaused Mary to bear the Savior makes the water regenerate the believer.2

Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, who did, through Histranscendent love, become what we are, that He might bring us to beeven what He is Himself

For he was made man that we might bemade God

Catechism of the Catholic Church

(Pope John Paul II. "Redemptoris Mater."

Every single Catholic priest every single day at every single Mass for as many centuries as we know has said these deification-rich words: “By the mystery of this water and wine, may we come to share in the divinity of Christ, who humbled himself to share in our humanity.” How can we say deification is absent from the West when it is at the heart of our Eucharistic prayers? Why is it we do not learn about this more frequently except that we have been trained not to see what is before our very eyes?

It means a real transformation of the Christian into a son of God who shares in God’s very own life.

Many people associate this term with emperor worship, though this is not the word the ancient Romans used to describe the elevation of the emperor to a divine status. Deification is not a pagan import, but a Christian revelation. It is deeply Christological and ecclesiological.

Even though the idea is biblical, the word “deification” is not. It comes from two Latin words, deus, which means “(a) God” or “divine” or “holy,” and facere, which means “to make.”

Let me begin by saying that deification is what the Bible means by salvation.

The first answer actually strengthens my overall thesis. Au-gustine limits his use of deificare because he finds the same real-ity in other soteriological models. simply put, he does not useexplicit deification language more than he does because he doesnot need to. At his disposal are more scriptural terms of sal-vation: becoming children of God, becoming members of thebody of Christ, imitating Jesus in his humility and charity, andso on. in Augustine’s mind, these more commonplace Christianimages are instances of the deified life.The second reason Augustine may limit his use of explicitdeification language is that the main Latin predecessors fromwhom he draws (for example, hilary, Ambrose, Victorinus),likewise veered away from any use of the term deificare. Giventhe preference of such theologians in this regard, Augustinetoo may have hesitated to use a term which those in his tradi-tion found avoidable or even misleading.Third, we find that it is a term already promoted by Au-gustine’s opponents. Augustine is very suspicious of thosewho think that they can become equal to God without qual-ification, either in this life or in the next. stressing the lan-guage of “becoming gods,” therefore, may have led the faith-ful astray and promised them something which most are notable to understand rightly. Above we saw how two of his mostrenowned opponents, the Manichees and Donatists, were notat all shy in granting approval to some piece of theology bytheir use of deificus. if Augustine hesitates in using deificarebecause of how the connotations of such a term were beingused by his rivals, we can also argue here that this is preciselywhy he never relies on 2 Pet. 1:4 and humanity’s participationin the divine nature

Au-gustine’s inability to conceive of how God and humanity couldever come into contact without ever lessening the former orobliterating the latter. This is why, she argues, the Augustinianvision of Christianity may be motivated by a promise of beati-tude, but never by deification (mais non à la déification).6 Oth-ers have made the similar case that Augustine’s rendering di-vinity “non-participable and unknowable,”7 caused an absolutebarrier between God and the human soul, concluding that sucha theology was responsible for the eventual divide between theWestern and the eastern understandings of the relationshipbetween creator and creation. That is, whereas the West couldnot explain how the created order could interact with God’s im-mutable otherness, the east made a distinction between the di-vine essence and God’s “uncreated energies,” a move “Augustinecould not admit.”8 each of these scholars has argued that thepurported lack of deification language in Augustine parallelshis supposed inability to bring God and creation into any kindof harmonious relationship

east only, she maintains, because “the Latin tradition, underthe influence of Augustine, tended to set an unbridgeable gulfbetween man and God by way of their doctrine of the falland original sinfulness.”10

Joseph Mausbach wherehe contrasted the east’s understanding of human divinizationwith what he represented as the West’s stress on humanity’senslavement and eventual freedom from sin, naming Augus-tine as the one responsible for advocating such pessimism.Mausbach singled out Augustine as the sole antagonist to theGreeks, the lone representative of a theological vision centeredon humanity’s depravity. Consequently, as Mausbach sug-gested, Augustine is to blame for the Latin West’s dismissingChristian salvation as theosis and transformation, favoring aremedial and reconciliatory construal. Mausbach’s judgmentis not an isolated case, but has been encountered in variousways throughout the twentieth century.5in her groundbreaking work on deification in the Greek Fa-thers, for example, Myrrha Lot-Borodine argued quite stronglythat Augustine was unable to account for any sort of unionor compénétration between God and humanity. According toLot-Borodine, deification has historically been a foreign way5. Joseph Mausbach, “The Greek understanding of grace is a marvelous eleva-tion, enlightenment, and deification of the human person; with Augustine grace is ahealing, a freeing, and a reconciliation of a decrepit, enslaved, person far away fromGod. . . . Augustine sees the human person in his sinfulness, how he is filled with thetragedy of the internal fight, and from this starting point he builds his ethics andspirituality.” Thomas von Aquin als Meister christlicher Sittenlehre unter Berücksichti-gung seiner Willenslehre (Munich: Theatiner Verlag, 1925), 37–38.EBSCOhost - printed on 10/23/2023 5:34 PM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

But the use of this word, Deification, is very rarein the Latin books. However, we often find it implied, especially inthe works of Ambrose. I am not sure of the reason for this reticence :perhaps it is because the meaning of this word Theôsis (the termwhich the Greeks usually employ in the sense of the psychic andbodily transformation of the Saints into God so as to become One inHim and with Him, when there will remain in them nothing of theiranimal, earthly and mortal nature) seemed too profound for thosewho cannot rise above carnal speculations, and would therefore beto them incomprehensible and incredible, and thus the doctrine wasnot to be taught in public, but only to be discussed among thelearned.

it does, it is true, awaken very profound and very tender emotions and impulses, but it leaves them hidden. There are certain feelings of surrender, certain aspects of interior candor which cannot be publicly proclaimed, at any rate in their entirety, without danger to spiritual modesty. The liturgy has perfected a masterly instrument which has made it possible for us to express our inner life in all its fullness and depth, without divulging our secrets--"secretum meum mihi." We can pour out our hearts, and still feel that nothing has been dragged to light that should remain hidden.7

Either the people who use it will take it seriously, and probably will then feel obliged to force themselves into acquiescence with an emotion that they have never, generally speaking, experienced, or which, at any rate, they are not experiencing at that particular moment, thus perverting and degrading their religious feeling. Or else indifference, if they are of a phlegmatic temperament, will come to their aid; they then take the phrases at less than their face value, and consequently the word is depreciated.

he liturgy is emotion, but it is emotion under the strictest control.

Only thought is universally current and consistent, and, as long as it is really thought, remains suited, to a certain degree, to every intelligence. If prayer in common, therefore, is to prove beneficial to the majority, it must be primarily directed by thought, and not by feeling. It is only when prayer is sustained by and steeped in clear and fruitful religious thought, that it can be of service to a corporate body, composed of distinct elements, all actuated by varying emotions.We have seen that thought alone can keep spiritual life sound and healthy. In the same way, prayer is beneficial only when it rests on the bedrock of truth. This is not meant in the purely negative sense that it must be free from error; in addition to this, it must spring from the fullness of truth. It is only truth--or dogma, to give it its other name--which can make prayer efficacious

The claim that the liturgy should be taken as the exclusive pattern of devotional practice in common can never be upheld. To do so would be to confess complete ignorance of the spiritual requirements of the greater part of the faithful. The forms of popular piety should rather continue to exist side by side with those of the liturgy, and should constitute themselves according to the varying requirements of historical, social, and local conditions.

The liturgy is and will be the "lex orandi." Non- liturgical prayer must take the liturgy for its model, and must renew itself in the liturgy, if it is to retain its vitality. It cannot precisely be said that as dogma is to private religious opinion, so is the liturgy to popular devotion; but the connection between the latter does to a certain degree correspond with that special relation, characteristic of the former, which exists between the government and the governed. All other forms of devotional practice can always measure their shortcomings by the standard of the liturgy, and with its help find the surest way back to the "via ordinaria" when they have strayed from it. The changing demands of time, place, and special circumstance can express themselves in popular devotion; facing the latter stands the liturgy, from which clearly issue the fundamental laws--eternally and universally unchanging--which govern all genuine and healthy piety.

If private devotion were non-existent, and if the liturgy were the final and exclusive form of spiritual exercise, that exercise might easily degenerate into a frigid formula; but if the liturgy were non-existent--well, our daily observations amply show what would be the consequences, and how fatally they would take effect.

side by side with the liturgy there must continue to exist that private devotion which provides for the personal requirements of the individual, and to which the soul surrenders itself according to its particular circumstances. From the latter liturgical prayer in its turn derives warmth and local color.

Both methods of prayer must co-operate. They stand together in a vital and reciprocal relationship. The one derives its light and fruitfulness from the other. In the liturgy the soul learns to move about the wider and more spacious spiritual world. It assimilates

Each one is bound to strive within himself, and to rise superior to self. Yet in so doing he is not swallowed up by, and lost in, the majority; on the contrary, he becomes more independent, rich, and versatile.

When we pray on our own behalf only we approach God from an entirely personal standpoint, precisely as we feel inclined or impelled to do according to our feelings and circumstances. That is our right, and the Church would be the last to wish to deprive us of it.

We are, however, not only individuals, but members of a community as well; we are not merely transitory, but something of us belongs to eternity, and the liturgy takes these elements in us into account. In the liturgy we pray as members of the Church; by it we rise to the sphere which transcends the individual order and is therefore accessible to people of every condition, time, and place.