It is striking, though unsurprising, that while men tend to respond to sexual marginalisation with a sense of entitlement to women’s bodies, women who experience sexual marginalisation typically respond with talk not of entitlement but empowerment. Or, insofar as they do speak of entitlement, it is entitlement to respect, not to other people’s bodies.

It is precisely woman who is paying the greatest price. Motherhood and virginity (the two loftiest values in which she realizes her profoundest vocation) have become values that are in opposition to the dominant ones. Woman, who is creative in the truest sense of the word by giving life, does not "produce," however, in that technical sense which is the only one that is valued by a society more masculine than ever in its cult of efficiency. She is being convinced that the aim is to "liberate" her, "emancipate" her, by encouraging her to masculinize herself, thus bringing her into conformity with the culture of production and subjecting her to the control of the masculine society of technicians, of salesmen, of politicians who seek profit and power, organizing everything, marketing everything, instrumentalizing everything for their own ends.

for the Church the language of nature (in our case, two sexes complementary to each other yet quite distinct) is also the language of morality (man and woman called to equally noble destinies, both eternal, but different). It is precisely in the name of nature — it is known that Protestant tradition and, in its wake, that of the Enlightenment mistrust this concept

The sacrosanct equality between man and woman does not exclude, indeed it requires, diversity.

It logically follows from the consequences of a sexuality which is no longer linked to motherhood and to procreation that every form of sexuality is equivalent and therefore of equal worth. It is certainly not a matter of establishing or recommending a retrograde moralism, but one of lucidly drawing the consequences from the premises: it is, in fact, logical that pleasure, the libido of the individual, become the only possible point of reference of sex. No longer having an objective reason to justify it, sex seeks the subjective reason in the gratification of the desire, in the most "satisfying" answer for the individual, to the instincts no longer subject to rational restraints. Everyone is free to give to his personal libido the content considered suitable for himself. Hence, it naturally follows that all forms of sexual gratification are transformed into the "rights" of the individual. Thus, to cite an especially current example, homosexuality becomes an inalienable right. (Given the aforementioned premises, how can one deny it?) On the contrary, its full recognition appears to be an aspect of human liberation.

Answer to Secundinus, a Manichean(Contra Secundinum Manichaeum)

two introductory paragraphs in which he explains why he left the Manicheans. He then turns to a refutation of Manicheanism that is based on thecontents of Secundinus' letter. He first focuses upon Secundinus' claim thatJesus Christ is the firstborn of the divine majesty and king of all the lights andshows that Secundinus can only defend such a claim by admitting that the lightsof which Christ is king are creatures, not the same nature as God (sections 3 to11). Then Augustine turns to the soul' s consent to evil and develops a long argument to show that sinful consent cannot be a substance (sections 1 2 to 20). Nexthe replies to Secundinus' objections drawn from the Old Testament (sections 2 1to 24). In conclusion he argues that his own conversion to the Catholic Churchought to have been impossible if Mani's teaching were true. He denouncesMani's having denied that Christ had real flesh, warns Secundinus not to beproud of the small number of Manicheans, and urges him to become a Catholic(sections 25 to 26).

Consequently, salvation is understood as freedom from the body and from the concrete relationships in which a person lives. In as much as we are saved “by means of offering the body of Jesus Christ” (Heb 10:10; cf. Col 1:22), true salvation, contrary to being a liberation from the body, also includes its sanctification (cf. Rom 12:1). The human body was shaped by God, who inscribed within it a language that invites the human person to recognize the gifts of the Creator and to live in communion with one’s brothers and sisters.[22] By his Incarnation and his paschal mystery, the Savior re-established and renewed this original language and communicated it in the economy of the sacraments. Thanks to the sacraments, Christians are able to live in fidelity to the flesh of Christ and, as a result, in fidelity to the concrete order of relationships that He gave us.

salvation does not consist in the self-realization of the isolated individual, nor in an interior fusion of the individual with the divine. Rather, salvation consists in being incorporated into a communion of persons that participates in the communion of the Trinity.

Gnosticism gave way to another heresy, likewise present in our day. As time passed, many came to realize that it is not knowledge that betters us or makes us saints, but the kind of life we lead. But this subtly led back to the old error of the gnostics, which was simply transformed rather than eliminated. 48. The same power that the gnostics attributed to the intellect, others now began to attribute to the human will, to personal effort. This was the case with the pelagians and semi-pelagians. Now it was not intelligence that took the place of mystery and grace, but our human will

“There are activities that, united to contemplation, do not prevent the latter, but rather facilitate it, such as works of mercy and devotion”.

We can think that because we know something, or are able to explain it in certain terms, we are already saints, perfect and better than the “ignorant masses”. Saint John Paul II warned of the temptation on the part of those in the Church who are more highly educated “to feel somehow superior to other members of the faithful”.[41] In point of fact, what we think we know should always motivate us to respond more fully to God’s love. Indeed, “you learn so as to live: theology and holiness are inseparable”.[42]

The questions of our people, their suffering, their struggles, their dreams, their trials and their worries, all possess an interpretational value that we cannot ignore if we want to take the principle of the incarnation seriously. Their wondering helps us to wonder, their questions question us”.

we can and must try to find the Lord in every human life. This is part of the mystery that a gnostic mentality cannot accept, since it is beyond its control.

When somebody has an answer for every question, it is a sign that they are not on the right road. They may well be false prophets, who use religion for their own purposes, to promote their own psychological or intellectual theories. God infinitely transcends us; he is full of surprises. We are not the ones to determine when and how we will encounter him

gnosticism “by its very nature seeks to domesticate the mystery”,[38] whether the mystery of God and his grace, or the mystery of others’ lives.

A healthy and humble use of reason in order to reflect on the theological and moral teaching of the Gospel is one thing. It is another to reduce Jesus’ teaching to a cold and harsh logic that seeks to dominate everything.

Gnostics think that their explanations can make the entirety of the faith and the Gospel perfectly comprehensible.

a person’s perfection is measured not by the information or knowledge they possess, but by the depth of their charity

the gnostic approach is strict and allegedly pure, and can appear to possess a certain harmony or order that encompasses everything

and thus become incapable of touching Christ’s suffering flesh in others, locked up as they are in an encyclopaedia of abstractions. In the end, by disembodying the mystery, they prefer “a God without Christ, a Christ without the Church, a Church without her people”.

They think of the intellect as separate from the flesh

Gnosticism presumes “a purely subjective faith whose only interest is a certain experience or a set of ideas and bits of information which are meant to console and enlighten, but which ultimately keep one imprisoned in his or her own thoughts and feelings”.

Chapter 42.— Exhortation to the Chief Good

And when distress comes to us through their peculiar beauty, by the loss of beloved temporal things passing away, we both pay the penalty of our sins, and are exhorted to set our affection on eternal things.

And why do you inquire for a nature contrary to God, since, if you confess that He is the supreme existence, it follows that non-existence is contrary to Him?

Did they read the Old Law in this spirit, they would both find many admirable things in it; and instead of spitefully attacking passages which they did not understand, they would reverently postpone the inquiry.

So, as far as earthly things are subject to you, they teach you that you are their ruler; as far as they distress you, they teach you to be subject to your Lord.

there is impiety in calling it a defect in anything not to be what God is, and in denying a thing to be good because it is inferior to God.

Accordingly, the natures supposed to exist in the region of darkness must have been either corruptible or incorruptible. If they were incorruptible, they were in possession of a good than which nothing is higher. If they were corruptible, they were either corrupted or not corrupted.

Nature Cannot Be Without Some Good. The Manichæans Dwell Upon the Evils

the fierce prince himself. If you take away his ferocity, see how many excellent things will remain; his material frame, the symmetry of the members on one side with those on the other, the unity of his form, the settled continuity of his parts, the orderly adjustment of the mind as ruling and animating, and the body as subject and animated.

atures, as far as they are natures, are good; for when you take from them the good instead of the evil, no natures remain.

If then, after the evil is removed, the nature remains in a purer state, and does not remain at all when the good is taken away, it must be the good which makes the nature of the thing in which it is, while the evil is not nature, but contrary to nature.

From this, if they would only think honestly, they would understand that it implies a mixture of good and evil, even in the region where they suppose evil to be alone and in perfection: so that if the evils mentioned were taken away, the good things will remain, without anything to detract from the commendation given to them; whereas, if the good things are taken away, no nature is left. From this every one sees, who can see, that every nature, as far as it is nature, is good

he makes darkness productive, which is impossible.

These things are thought to be blameworthy by the uninstructed when they compare them with higher things; and in view of their want of some good, the good they have gets the name of evil, because it is defective.

for no one can calmly reflect on these things without wonder and praise.

I join with you in condemning the frightfulness of the winds; join with me in praising their nature, as giving breath and nourishment

Darkness, indeed, is not a real substance, and means no more than the absence of light, as nakedness means the want of clothing, and emptiness the want of material contents: so that darkness could produce nothing, although a region in darkness — that is, in the absence of light — might produce something. But passing over this for the present

For this is not like the descriptions or suppositions of poets about an imaginary chaos, as being a shapeless mass, without form, without quality, without measurement, without weight and number, without order and variety; a confused something, absolutely destitute of qualities, so that some Greek writers call it ἄποιον . So far from being like this is the Manichæan description of the region of darkness, as they call it, that, in a directly contrary style, they add side to side, and join border to border; they number five natures; they separate, arrange, and assign to each its own qualities.

And how can that be the perfection of evil than which something worse than itself can be thought of? And to be worse implies that there is some good, the want of which makes the thing worse. Here the want of straightness would make the line worse. Therefore its straightness is something good. And you will never answer the question whence this goodness comes, without reference to Him from whom we must acknowledge that all good things come, whether small or great. But now we shall pass on from considering this border to something else.

But whatever other form you contrive for the junction of these two regions, you cannot erase what Manichæus has written.

It remains, therefore that you must confess that God made the region of light out of nothing: and you are unwilling to believe this; because if God could make out of nothing some great good which yet was inferior to Himself, He could also, since He is good, and grudges no good, make another good inferior to the former, and again a third inferior to the second, and so on, in order down to the lowest good of created natures, so that the whole aggregate, instead of extending indefinitely without number or measure should have a fixed and definite consistency.

For what is generated by God must be what God is, as the Catholic Church believes of the only begotten Son. So you are brought back of necessity to that shocking and detestable profanity, that the wedge of darkness sunders not a region distinct and separate from God, but the very nature of God. Or if God did not generate, but make it, of what did He make it? Or if of Himself, what is this but to generate? If of some other nature, was this nature good or evil? If good, there must have been some good nature not belonging to God; which you will scarcely have the boldness to assert. If evil, the race of darkness cannot have been the only evil nature. Or did God take a part of that region and turn it into a region of light, in order to found His kingdom upon it? If He had, He would have taken the whole, and there would have been no evil nature left. If God, then, did not make the region of light of a substance distinct from His own, He must have made it of nothing.

Contemporary gnosticism [36]

In that book, the devil sought to talk down the righteousness of Job before God as being merely external. And exactly this is what the Apocalypse has to say: The devil wants to prove that there are no righteous people; that all righteousness of people is only displayed on the outside. If one could hew closer to a person, then the appearance of his justice would quickly fall away.

Romano Guardini, almost 100 years ago, expressed the joyful hope that was instilled in him and many others, remains unforgotten: "An event of incalculable importance has begun; the Church is awakening in souls." He meant to say that no longer was the Church experienced and perceived as merely an external system entering our lives, as a kind of authority, but rather it began to be perceived as being present within people's hearts - as something not merely external, but internally moving us. About half a century later, in reconsidering this process and looking at what had been happening, I felt tempted to reverse the sentence: "The Church is dying in souls."

I will never forget the warning that the great theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar once wrote to me on one of his letter cards. "Do not presuppose the triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but present them!"

The counterforce against evil, which threatens us and the whole world, can ultimately only consist in our entering into this love

Only where faith no longer determines the actions of man are such offenses possible.

This dissolution of the moral teaching authority of the Church necessarily had to have an effect on the diverse areas of the Church.

The moral doctrine of Holy Scripture has its uniqueness ultimately predicated in its cleaving to the image of God, in faith in the one God who showed himself in Jesus Christ and who lived as a human being.

God is (about) more than mere physical survival. A life that would be bought by the denial of God, a life that is based on a final lie, is a non-life.

announced in view of the possible decisions of the encyclical Veritatis splendor that if the encyclical should determine that there were actions which were always and under all circumstances to be classified as evil, he would challenge it with all the resources at his disposal.

In the end, it was chiefly the hypothesis that morality was to be exclusively determined by the purposes of human action that prevailed. While the old phrase "the end justifies the means" was not confirmed in this crude form, its way of thinking had become definitive. Consequently, there could no longer be anything that constituted an absolute good, any more than anything fundamentally evil; (there could be) only relative value judgments. There no longer was the (absolute) good, but only the relatively better, contingent on the moment and on circumstances.

Until the Second Vatican Council, Catholic moral theology was largely founded on natural law, while Sacred Scripture was only cited for background or substantiation. In the Council's struggle for a new understanding of Revelation, the natural law option was largely abandoned, and a moral theology based entirely on the Bible was demanded.

all-out sexual freedom, one which no longer conceded any norms.

Part of the physiognomy of the Revolution of '68 was that pedophilia was then also diagnosed as allowed and appropriate.

Besides, there is this difference, that these carnal people, who think of God as having a human form, if they are content to be nourished with milk from the breast of the Catholic Church, and do not rush headlong into rash opinions, but cultivate in the Church the pious habit of inquiry, and there ask that they may receive, and knock that it may be opened to them, begin to understand spiritually the figures and parables of the Scriptures, and gradually to perceive that the divine energies are suitably set forth under the name, sometimes of ears, sometimes of eyes, sometimes of hands or feet, or even of wings and feathers a shield too, and sword, and helmet, and all the other innumerable things. And the more progress they make in this understanding, the more are they confirmed as Catholics. The Manichæans, on the other hand, when they abandon their material fancies, cease to be Manichæans

For this is the chief and special point in their praises of Manichæus, that the divine mysteries which were taught figuratively in books from ancient times were kept for Manichæus, who was to come last, to solve and demonstrate; and so after him no other teacher will come from God, for he has said nothing in figures or parables, but has explained ancient sayings of that kind, and has himself taught in plain, simple terms. Therefore, when the Manichæans hear these words of their founder, on one side and border of the shining and sacred region was the region of darkness, they have no interpretations to fall back on

How then is it that, dull and carnal as you are, you do not see that unless both regions were material, they could not have their sides joined to one another? How could you ever be so blinded in mind as to say that only the region of darkness was material, and that the so-called region of light was immaterial and spiritual? My good friends, let us open our eyes for once, and see, now that we are told of it, what is most obvious, that two regions cannot be joined at their sides unless both are material.

on one side of the region of light there was the race of darkness, what bounded it on the other side or sides? The Manichæans say nothing in reply to this; but when pressed, they say that on the other sides the region of light, as they call it, is infinite, that is, extends throughout boundless space.

Chapter 16.

To speak of God as an aerial or even as an ethereal body is absurd in the view of all who, with a clear mind, possessing some measure of discernment, can perceive the nature of wisdom and truth as not extended or scattered in space, but as great, and imparting greatness without material size, nor confined more or less in any direction, but throughout co-extensive with the Father of all, nor having one thing here and another there, but everywhere perfect, everywhere present.

Instead, therefore, of promising knowledge, or clear evidence, or the settlement of the question free from all uncertainty, Manichæus ought to have said that these things were clearly proved to him, but that those who hear his account of them must believe him without evidence. But were he to say this, who would not reply to him, If I must believe without knowing, why should I not prefer to believe those things which have a widespread notoriety from the consent of learned and unlearned, and which among all nations are established by the weightiest authority? From fear of having this said to him, Manichæus bewilders the inexperienced by first promising the knowledge of certain truths, and then demanding faith in doubtful things. And then, if he is asked to make it plain that these things have been proved to himself, he fails again, and bids us believe this too. Who can tolerate such imposture and arrogance?

Prove this person to be the Holy Spirit, and I will believe what he says to be true, even without understanding it; or prove that what he says is true, and I will believe him to be the Holy Spirit, even without evidence

Manichæus Promises the Knowledge of Undoubted Things, and Then Demands Faith in Doubtful Things

Where is the proof of all this? And where did Manichæus learn it?

we cannot know it as a fact of experience or as a truth of the understanding

Who can believe that any battle was fought before the constitution of the world? And even supposing it credible, we wish now to get something to know, not to believe. For to say that the Persians and Scythians long ago fought with one another is a credible statement; but while we believe it when we read or hear it, we cannot know it as a fact of experience or as a truth of the understanding. So, then, as I would repudiate any such statement on the ground that I have been promised something, not that I must believe in authority, but that I shall understand without any ambiguity; still less will I receive statements which are not only uncertain, but incredible

This is precisely what I asked for, to have such evidence of the truth as to free my knowledge of it from all uncertainty.

he was sent by the Spirit, or that he was taken into union with the Spirit. If he was sent, let him call himself the apostle of the Paraclete; if taken into union, let him allow that He whom the only-begotten Son took upon Himself had a human mother, since he admits a human father as well as mother in the case of one taken up by the Holy Spirit. Let him believe that the Word of God was not defiled by the virgin womb of Mary, since he exhorts us to believe that the Holy Spirit could not be defiled by the married life of his parents. But if you say that Manichæus was united to the Spirit, not in the womb or before conception, but after his birth, still you must admit that he had a fleshly nature derived from man and woman.

Again, if you say, You were right in believing the Catholics when they praised the gospel, but wrong in believing their vituperation of Manichæus: do you think me such a fool as to believe or not to believe as you like or dislike, without any reason?

If you say, Believe the Catholics: their advice to me is to put no faith in you; so that, believing them, I am precluded from believing you — If you say, Do not believe the Catholics: you cannot fairly use the gospel in bringing me to faith in Manichæus; for it was at the command of the Catholics that I believed the gospel

For my part, I should not believe the gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church. So when those on whose authority I have consented to believe in the gospel tell me not to believe in Manichæus, how can I but consent?

I ask, who is this Manichæus? You will reply, An apostle of Christ. I do not believe it. Now you are at a loss what to say or do; for you promised to give knowledge of the truth, and here you are forcing me to believe what I have no knowledge of.

I cannot but suspect that this Manichæus, who uses the name of Christ to gain access to the minds of the ignorant, wished to be worshipped instead of Christ Himself. I will state briefly the reason of this conjecture. At the time when I was a student of your doctrines, to my frequent inquiries why it was that the Paschal feast of the Lord was celebrated generally with no interest, though sometimes there were a few languid worshippers, but no watchings, no prescription of any unusual fast, — in a word, no special ceremony — while great honor is paid to your Bema, that is, the day on which Manichæus was killed, when you have a platform with fine steps, covered with precious cloth, placed conspicuously so as to face the votaries — the reply was, that the day to observe was the day of the passion of him who really suffered, and that Christ, who was not born, but appeared to human eyes in an unreal semblance of flesh, only feigned suffering, without really bearing it.

But seeing that the advent of the Holy Spirit is narrated with perfect clearness in the Acts of the Apostles, where is the necessity of my so gratuitously running the risk of believing heretics?

But with you, where there is none of these things to attract or keep me, the promise of truth is the only thing that comes into play. Now if the truth is so clearly proved as to leave no possibility of doubt,

though from the slowness of our understanding, or the small attainment of our life, the truth may not yet fully disclose itself.

The consent of peoples and nations keeps me in the Church; so does her authority, inaugurated by miracles, nourished by hope, enlarged by love, established by age. The succession of priests keeps me, beginning from the very seat of the Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord, after His resurrection, gave it in charge to feed His sheep, down to the present episcopate. And so, lastly, does the name itself of Catholic, which, not without reason, amid so many heresies, the Church has thus retained; so that, though all heretics wish to be called Catholics, yet when a stranger asks where the Catholic Church meets, no heretic will venture to point to his own chapel or house

since the rest of the multitude derive their entire security not from acuteness of intellect, but from simplicity of faith,

Let neither of us assert that he has found truth; let us seek it as if it were unknown to us both.

Chapter 3.— Augustine Once a Manichæan

simple truth, which is learned without being recorded in any fanciful legend;

Chapter 1.— To Heal Heretics is Better Than to Destroy Them 1. My prayer to the one true, almighty God, of whom, and through whom, and in whom are all things, has been, and is now, that in opposing and refuting the heresy of you Manichæans, as you may after all be heretics more from thoughtlessness than from malice,

Chapter 2.— Why the Manichæans Should Be More Gently Dealt with

disintegrating Greek thought isthe older crystal of the simile, Eastern thought the new substanceforced into its mold.

Its objectsinclude everything that belongs to the divine realm of being,namely, the order and history of the upper worlds, and what is toissue from it, namely, the salvation of man. With objects of thiskind, knowledge as a mental act is vastly different from the rationalcognition of philosophy. On the one hand it is closely bound upwith revelationary experience, so that reception of the truth eitherMEANING OF GNOSIS AND EXTENT OF GNOSTIC MOVEMENTthrough sacred and secret lore or through inner illumination re-places rational argument and theory (though this extra-rational basismay then provide scope for independent speculation); on the otherhand, being concerned with the secrets of salvation, "knowledge"is not just theoretical information about certain things but is itself,as a modification of the human condition, charged with perform-ing a function in the bringing about of salvation. Thus gnostic"knowledge" has an eminently practical aspect.

knowledge and the attainment of the known by the soul areclaimed to coincide—the claim of all true mysticism. It is, to besure, also the claim of Greek theoria, but in a different sense.There, the object of knowledge is the universal, and the cognitiverelation is "optical," i.e., an analogue of the visual relation to objec-tive form that remains unaffected by the relation. Gnostic "knowl-edge" is about the particular (for the transcendent deity is still aparticular), and the relation of knowing is mutual, i.e., a beingknown at the same time, and involving active self-divulgence onthe part of the "known." There, the mind is "informed" with theforms it beholds and while it beholds (thinks) them: here, thesubject is "transformed" (from "soul" to "spirit") by the union witha reality that in truth is itself the supreme subject in the situationand strictly speaking never an object at all.

As for what the knowledge isabout, the associations of the term most familiar to the classicallytrained reader point to rational objects, and accordingly to naturalreason as the organ for acquiring and possessing knowledge. Inthe gnostic context, however, "knowledge" has an emphatically reli-gious or supranatural meaning and refers to objects which wenowadays should call those of faith rather than of reason.

Modern scholars have advanced in turn Hellenic, Babylonian, Egyp-tian, and Iranian origins and every possible combination of thesewith one another and with Jewish and Christian elements. Sincein the material of its representation Gnosticism actually is a productof syncretism, each of these theories can be supported from thesources and none of them is satisfactory alone; but neither is thecombination of all of them, which would make Gnosticism out to bea mere mosaic of these elements and so miss its autonomous essence.On the whole, however, the oriental thesis has an edge over theHellenic one, once the meaning of the term "knowledge" is freedfrom the misleading associations suggested by the tradition of classi-cal philosophy

Finally, if wetake as a criterion not so much the special motif of "knowledge"as the dualistic-anticosmic spirit in general, the religion of Mani toomust be classified as gnostic.

The Church Fathers considered Gnosticism asessentially a Christian heresy and confined their reports and refuta-tions to systems which either had sprouted already from the soil ofChristianity (e.g., the Valentinian system), or had somehow addedand adapted the figure of Christ to their otherwise heterogeneousteaching (e.g., that of the Phrygian Naassenes), or else through acommon Jewish background were close enough to be felt as com-peting with and distorting the Christian message (e.g., that ofMEANING OF GNOSIS AND EXTENT OF GNOSTIC MOVEMENT 3332 Simon Magus)

Actually there were only a few groupswhose members expressly called themselves Gnostics, "the Knowingones"; but already Irenaeus, in the title of his work, used the name"gnosis" (with the addition "falsely so called") to cover all thosesects that shared with them that emphasis and certain other charac-teristics

"Gnosticism," which has come to serve as a collec-tive heading for a manifoldness of sectarian doctrines appearingwithin and around Christianity during its critical first centuries, isderived from gnosis, the Greek word for "knowledge." The empha-sis on knowledge as the means for the attainment of salvation, oreven as the form of salvation itself,

is the prominent characteristic of thesecond phase of Hellenistic culture in general. Second, all thesecurrents have in some way to do with salvation: the general religionof the period is a religion of salvation. Third, all of them exhibitan exceedingly transcendent (i.e., transmundane) conception of Godand in connection with it an equally transcendent and other-worldlyidea of the goal of salvation. Finally, they maintain a radical dual-ism of realms of being—God and the world, spirit and matter, souland body, light and darkness, good and evil, life and death

The enthroning of reason as thehighest part in man had led to the discovery of man as such, andat the same time to the conception of the Hellenic way as a generalhumanistic culture. The last step on this road was taken when theStoics later advanced the proposition that freedom, that highestgood of Hellenic ethics, is a purely inner quality not dependent onexternal conditions, so that true freedom may well be found in aslave if only he is wise. So much does all that is Greek become amatter of mental attitude and quality that participation in it is opento every rational subject, i.e., to every man. Prevailing theory placedman no longer primarily in the context of the polis, as did Plato andstill Aristotle, but in that of the cosmos, which we sometimes findcalled "the true and great polis for all." To be a good citizen of thecosmos, a cosmopolites, is the moral end of man; and his title to thiscitizenship is his possession of logos, or reason, and nothing else—that is, the principle that distinguishes him as man and puts himinto immediate relationship to the same principle governing theuniverse

Indeed, so far astraceable pedigrees of elements go, all investigations of detail over the lasthalf century have proved divergent rather than convergent, and leave us witha portrait of Gnosticism in which the salient feature seems to be the absenceof a unifying character. But these same investigations have also gradually en-larged the range of the phenomenon beyond the group of Christian heresiesoriginally comprised by the name,

. It isgenerally true to say that to this day the "Greek" and "oriental" emphasesshift back and forth according to whether the philosophical or the mytho-logical, the rational or the irrational facet of the phenomenon is seen asdecisive.

To them,their finding that Gnosticism, or what in it distorted the Christian truth,hailed from Hellenic philosophy,

the heirs of a decision made long ago will better understandtheir heritage by knowing what once competed with it for the soul of man.

Our art and literature and much else would be dif-ferent, had the gnostic message prevailed.

Out of the mist of the beginning of our era there looms a pageant ofmythical figures whose vast, superhuman contours might people the wallsand ceiling of another Sistine Chapel. Their countenances and gestures, theroles in which they are cast, the drama which they enact, would yield imagesdifferent from the biblical ones on which the imagination of the beholderwas reared, yet strangely familiar to him and disturbingly moving. Thestage would be the same, the theme as transcending: the creation of theworld, the destiny of man, fall and redemption, the first and the last things.But how much more numerous would be the cast, how much more bizarrethe symbolism, how much more extravagant the emotions! Almost all theaction would be in the heights, in the divine or angelic or daimonic realm, adrama of pre-cosmic persons in the supranatural world, of which the dramaof man in the natural world is but a distant echo. And yet that transcenden-tal drama before all time, depicted in the actions and passions of manlike fig-ures, would be of intense human appeal: divinity tempted, unrest stirringamong the blessed Aeons, God's erring Wisdom, the Sophia, falling prey toher folly, wandering in the void and darkness of her own making, endlesslysearching, lamenting, suffering, repenting, laboring her passion into matter,her yearning into soul; a blind and arrogant Creator believing himself theMost High and lording it over the creation, the product, like himself, of faultand ignorance; the Soul, trapped and lost in the labyrinth of the world, seek-ing to escape and frightened back by the gatekeepers of the cosmic prison,the terrible archons; a Savior from the Light beyond venturing into thenether world, illumining the darkness, opening a path, healing the divinebreach: a tale of light and darkness, of knowledge and ignorance, of serenityand passion, of conceit and pity, on the scale not of man but of eternal beingsthat are not exempt from suffering and error

There is an empathy withGnosticism, an element of topicality to it, which it has not had since thetime when the Church Fathers fought it as a danger to the Christian creed.

Pascal was the first to face in its frightening implications and toexpound with the full force of his eloquence: man's loneliness inthe physical universe of modern cosmology. "Cast into the infiniteimmensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know menot, I am frightened."2

It is a duality not of sup-plementary but of contrary terms; and it is one: for that betweenman and world mirrors on the plane of experience that betweenworld and God, and derives from it as from its logical ground—unless one would rather hold conversely that the transcendent doc-trine of a world-God dualism springs from the immanent experienceof a disunion of man and world as from its psychological ground.

Western culture is world-affirming in that, first, there is a link between the universe and a positively acknowledged God as its creator and second, divine providence has determined this world as the place for humankind. Against this background, Gnosticism is often defined as a Weltanschauung that rejects this basic affirmation, hence its countercultural character

Christian orthodoxy confined itself by banishing from Christian thought and practice cosmological and anthropological dualism, unauthorized religious authority, non-institutional encratism, and the quest for class and gender equality.

when discussing Gnosticism in any period of the history of religions, it must be kept in mind that one is dealing with the construction of a worldview that always served to emphasize "difference" in order to exclude individuals and groups from the "legitimate." Since late antiquity, certain forms of thought and, in particular, combinations of certain forms of thought, have been perceived as undesirable and therefore heretical

All our dignity consists, then, in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot fill. Let us endeavour, then, to think well; this is the principle of morality. 348 A thinking reed.—It is not from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government of my thought. I shall have no more if I possess worlds. By space the universe encompasses and swallows me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the world.

To understand the method which Pascal employs, the reader must be prepared to follow the process of the mind of the intelligent believer. The Christian thinker—and I mean the man who is trying consciously and conscientiously to explain to himself the sequence which culminated in faith, rather than the public apologist—proceeds by rejection and elimination. He finds the world to be so and so; he finds its character inexplicable by any non-religious theory; among religions he finds Christianity, and Catholic Christianity, to account most satisfactorily for the world and especially for the moral world within; and thus, by what Newman calls "powerful and concurrent" reasons, he finds himself inexorably committed to the dogma of the Incarnation. To the unbeliever, this method seems disingenuous and perverse; for the unbeliever is, as a rule, not so greatly troubled to explain the world to himself, nor so greatly distressed by its disorder; nor is he generally concerned (in modern terms) to "preserve values." He does not consider that if certain emotional states, certain developments of character, and what in the highest sense can be called "saintliness" are inherently and by inspection known to be good, then the satisfactory explanation of the world must be an explanation which will admit the "reality" of these values. Nor does he consider such reasoning admissible; he would, so to speak, trim his values according to his cloth, because to him such values are of no great value. The unbeliever starts from the other end, and as likely as not with the question: Is a case of human parthenogenesis credible? and this he would call going straight to the heart of the matter. Now Pascal's method is, on the whole, the method natural and right for the Christian; and the opposite method is that taken by Voltaire. It is worth[Pg xiii] while to remember that Voltaire, in his attempt to refute Pascal, has given once and for all the type of such refutation; and that later opponents of Pascal's Apology for the Christian Faith have contributed little beyond psychological irrelevancies. For Voltaire has presented, better than any one since, what is the unbelieving point of view; and in the end we must all choose for ourselves between one point of view and another.

Others, again, leadthem to a place where water is, and baptize them, with the utterance of these words, Into thename of the unknown Father of the universe— into truth, the mother of all things— into Himwho descended on Jesus— into union, and redemption, and communion with the powers.

Lastly, the Apostolic Tradition, as he says in the Greek language in which he wrote his book, is "pneumatic", in other words, spiritual, guided by the Holy Spirit

Apostolic Tradition is "one". Indeed, whereas Gnosticism was divided into multiple sects, Church Tradition is one in its fundamental content

Apostolic Tradition is "public", not private or secret. Irenaeus did not doubt that the content of the faith transmitted by the Church is that received from the Apostles and from Jesus, the Son of God. There is no other teaching than this. Therefore, for anyone who wishes to know true doctrine, it suffices to know "the Tradition passed down by the Apostles and the faith proclaimed to men": a tradition and faith that "have come down to us through the succession of Bishops" (Adversus Haereses, 3, 3, 3-4). Hence, the succession of Bishops, the personal principle, and Apostolic Tradition, the doctrinal principle, coincide.

Irenaeus was concerned to describe the genuine concept of the Apostolic Tradition which we can sum up here in three points.

In fact, the Gospel preached by Irenaeus is the one he was taught by Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna, and Polycarp's Gospel dates back to the Apostle John, whose disciple Polycarp was.

Gnosis, a doctrine which affirmed that the faith taught in the Church was merely a symbolism for the simple who were unable to grasp difficult concepts; instead, the initiates, the intellectuals - Gnostics, they were called - claimed to understand what was behind these symbols and thus formed an elitist and intellectualist Christianity.

Irenaeus was first and foremost a man of faith and a Pastor. Like a good Pastor, he had a good sense of proportion, a wealth of doctrine, and missionary enthusiasm. As a writer, he pursued a twofold aim: to defend true doctrine from the attacks of heretics, and to explain the truth of the faith clearly.

The creature willnever become equal with God even if perfect holiness were to be achieved in us.Some think that in the next life we shall be changed into what he is; I am notconvinced’

the deification ofhuman beings is the purpose for which the Word became incarnate and is appropri-ated by them through baptism.

Participation in the divine is for Augustine the heart of redemption’

The grace of God came to you and ‘gave you the power to become the sons of God’ (John 1:12). Hear the voice of my Father saying, ‘I have said, you are gods and all of you children ofthe Most High’ (Ps. 82: 6). Since then they are men, and the sons of men, if they are not thechildren of the Most High, they are liars, for, ‘all men are liars’ (Ps. 116: 11). If they are thesons of God, if they have been redeemed by the Saviour’s grace, if purchased with hisprecious blood, if born again of water and of the Spirit, if predestinated to the inheritance ofheaven, then indeed they are children of God. And so thereby are gods. What then would a liehave to do with you? For Adam was a mere man; Christ, man and God; God, the Creator ofall creation. Adam a mere man, the man Christ, the mediator with God, the only Son of theFather, the God-man. You, O man, are far from God, and God is far above man; betweenthem the God-man placed himself. Acknowledge Christ and by him as man ascend up toGod. (Serm. 81. 6, PG 38. 503

‘for it is one thing to be God, another thing to be a partaker of God. God by naturecannot sin, but the partaker of God receives this inability from God’

Our divinity will only be achieved with the beatific vision,when the promise of the serpent, ‘You shall be as gods’ (Gen. 3: 5) is brought to itstrue fruition by God ‘who would have made us as gods, not by deserting him, but byparticipating in him’

For heaven is not up in the sky. It is thetotality of all holy souls, in whom God is enthroned (Enar. in Ps. 122. 3). The futurehappiness is already present in the saints, but its fulfilment is eschatological

If we have been madesons of God, we have also been made gods: but this is the effect of grace adopting, not ofnature generating. For only the Son of God [is] God. . . . The rest that are made gods are madeby his own grace, are not born of his substance, that they should be the same as he

Psalm 82: 6 in conjunction with an exegesis ofPsalm 116: 11, ‘all men are liars’, that we also find in Didymus of Alexandria

relying more on traditionalbiblical exegesis

Neoplatonist he still held that the soul was fundamentally divine in the sense thatGod was always present to it. Man participated in God’s being simply by existing.The soul may be alienated from God by sin but it cannot escape from his presence,even if it is an angry presence. The ‘divinity’ of the soul thus expresses God’somnipresence

The phrase ‘deificari in otio’ (to attain deification in a life of scholarly seclusion) hasbeen shown to derive from Porphyry’s Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes (Folliet 1962;Bonner 1986a: 371–2). Porphyry was the first non-Christian to speak of the con-formity of the soul to God in terms of deification.

His first reference to deification is directly inspired by his philosophicalstudies.

t is interesting to speculate what might have happened if Augustine had beenexposed more fully to Origen. His approach to deification might have been enrichedby Origen’s discussions of participation

refers more frequently than any other Latin Father tothe doctrine of deification. 10

‘That he should make men gods is to be understoodin divine silence’ (‘Ut deos homines faciat, divino est intelligenda silentio’) (C. Adim.93. 2).

tly identifies the saints’ rest as deification, he includes this provocative imageof the saints as God’s Sabbath.

Deification sought apart from God, then, constitutes humanity’s firstsin. When Augustine comes to describe the eschatological rest of the saints, heincludes a contrast between false and true forms of deification. This passagestands as the culmination of our examination of deification as rest:We ourselves shall become that seventh day, when we have been filled up and madenew by His blessing and sanctification. Then shall we be still, and know that He isGod; that He is what we ourselves desired to be when we fell away from Him and lis-tened to the words of the tempter, “Ye shall be as gods,” and so forsook God, Whowould have made us as gods, not by forsaking Him, but by participating in Him. Forwhat have we done without Him, other than perish in His wrath? But when we are re-stored by Him and perfected by His greater grace, we shall be still for all eternity, andknow that He is God, being filled by Him when He shall be “all in all.”43Before turning to a more in-depth analysis of this passage, we can first notethat Augustine describes the saints’ existence as consisting in that participa-tion in God which was available for Adam and Eve, but they rejected. In otherwords, the saints will attain the deification that Adam and Eve sought after byother, destructive, means.Strikingly, in the first line of this passage, Augustine does not say thesaints will enjoy the rest of God’s Sabbath. Instead he says: “We ourselves shallbecome that seventh day.” 44 In the passage in which Augustine most explic-

Like most of his fellow Latins, it is the ecclesial dimen-sion of deification that most appeals to him. As Vít Hušek shows, Jerome linksdeification—or rather, “becoming gods” —with adoptive sonship, a participa-tion in divine life that is not merely a figure of speech but a reality bestowedas a gift not possessed by right.87 Like Ambrose and Leo, Jerome refers to ourbecoming “partakers of divine nature,” “not in the realm of nature but in therealm of grace” (non naturae esse, sed gratiae).88

in terms of the patris-tic heritage, the differences appear to be ones in emphasis, not sharp distinc-tions in kind.” 80

seem in large part to be due to differences in the reception of the Origeniantradition.All the Greek Fathers after Origen who discuss redemption in terms ofdeification are, at least in this respect, his heirs.

Their choice of texts was usually governed by considerations of theirpractical usefulness to men and women pursuing the ascetic life rather thantheir theological insight.

The majority of readers had to wait until the end of the century before a sub-stantial number of translated works began to circulate in the West, largely as aresult of the labors of Jerome and Rufinus. These works, however, were of lim-ited use for disseminating an understanding of Greek thinking on deification.The demand in the West was for commentaries on books of the Old Testa-ment. Yet two of the most important texts for Origen’s discussions of deifica-tion are his commentaries on Matthew and John. The condemnation of Ori-gen by an Alexandrian synod in 399, which was confirmed by a Roman synodin the following year, left Rufinus as the sole translator of Origen. He pro-duced some magnificent translations before his death in 410 of Origen’s ex-egetical works, but the commentaries on Matthew and John were not amongthem.

He could appeal to 2 Peter 1:4 but only to deny any ontological impli-cation: “We are privileged to partake of His substance not in the realm of na-ture but in the realm of grace.” 59 Participation in the divine is the equivalentof angelification, but in a moral not an ontological sense. The exciting newdevelopments that were then taking place in the Evagrian version of Orige-nian spirituality are ignored by Jerome. But it was these (through John Cas-sian) that were to have an important influence on deification in the West fromthe fifth century until Eriugena’s translations of Dionysius the Areopagite andMaximus the Confessor became available in the ninth century.

Tertullian would return to this passage and,in every case, he changed his translation of μεσίτες from mediator to sequester.This change was intentional, unprecedented, 50 and signaled a shift in his use ofthis passage. In particular, the focus shifts from an emphasis on the manhoodof Christ to the conjoining of divinity and humanity

Baptism is thus a neces-sary element in human salvation and provides the human with the means forreceiving transformation back into the image of God. All of this is possible forthe baptized believer, as baptism restores the body and soul to the prelapsariancondition and enables the beginnings of deification in the present.65

The final victory of Palamism in 1368 gave official approval to the doctrineof theosis as an authentic part of the Orthodox theological tradition.

he Cappadocian Achievement

his physicalemphasis was perhaps required as an antidote to the intellectualism ofOrigen, but it needed the refinement and completion which Cyril ofAlexandria was to bring to it.

n AthanasiusIrenaeus’ teaching on adoption has been combined with Origen’s doctrineof a dynamic participation in the Trinity to produce a concept of deifica-tion as the penetration and transformation of mortal human nature by theeternal Son which enables it to participate in the light and life of theFather.(d) Immanence and TranscendenceNevertheless, it cannot be denied that there are aspects of Athanasius’ con-cept of deification which cause unease to the modern mind. Those who areparticularly struck by his emphasis on the transmission of incorruption andimmortality through the Incarnation to the rest of humanity as a result of14 Demetropoulos (1954: 118) sees adoption, redemption, sanctification, renewal, and perfection asequivalent to deification but temporally prior to it; i.e. he reserves the term θεοπορησι for the eschato-logical fulfilment of deification. For Roldanus (1968: 166–9) the chief elements of deification are (i) anincorruptibility which implies a sharing in the divine life; and (ii) a liberation from sin and death whichresults from man’s re-creation. Norman (1980: 139–71), arguing that deification is more than a Greekattainment of immortality and also more than an ethical attainment of likeness, lists eight differentaspects: (i) the renewal of humankind in the image of God; (ii) the transcendence of human nature; (iii)the resurrection of the flesh and immortality of the body; (iv) the attainment of incorruptibility, impassi-bility, and unchangeableness; (v) participation in the divine nature and qualities of Godliness; (vi) attain-ment of the knowledge of God; (vii) the inheritance of divine glory; and (viii) ascent to the heavenlykingdom. Hess (1993: 371) sees divinization as one of a cluster of eight closely related motifs: renewal,divinization, partaking of God, union, adoption as sons, exaltation, sanctification, and perfection in Christ.He notes the anti-Arian polemical purpose of the divinization motif and its absence from Athanasius’Festal Letters, which he takes as evidence that deification is not a ‘central or controlling motif’. But cf.Cyril of Alexandria, who does not refer to deification in his Festal Letters either.The Alexandrian Tradition II178

Its fundamental tenet, the Irenaean principle thatthe Son of God became as we are that we might become as he is, came to be morewidely diffused. Among Latin speakers we encounter it for the first time in Tertullian(d. c. 225), and among Syriac speakers in Ephrem the Syrian (d. 373). But it neverbecame a prominent theme. Nor do we find in Latin and Syriac writers the carefulelaboration of a doctrine of deification of the spiritual life, such as we have studiedin Maximus the Confessor.

Gregory of Nazianzus, who produces thenoun, θωσι. Cyril of Alexandria follows Athanasius’ terminology, while Ps.-Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor follow Gregory’s. It is therefore the latter setof terms that comes to predominate in Byzantine usage

Clement of Alexandria was first to usethe technical vocabulary of deification, but he did not think it necessaryto explain it. No formal definition of deification occurs until the sixthcentury, when Dionysius the Areopagite declares: ‘Deification (θωσι) isthe attaining of likeness to God and union with him so far as is possible’(EH 1. 3, PG 3. 376a). Only in the seventh century does Maximus theConfessor discuss deification as a theological topic in its own right.

Before the later Neoplatonists––and Proclus in particular––the terminology ofdeification was used much more frequently by Christians than by pagans. Until thebeginning of the Christian era there are only seventeen surviving instances of theuse of the terms. By the end of the third century the number of instances has risento sixty-eight, which is more than equalled by the Apologists, Clement, Origen, andHippolytus, who use the term more often by the middle of the third century than allof their pagan contemporaries and predecessors put together. 62 There seem to betwo fundamental reasons for this. The first is that the imperial cult, although diffusedthroughout the empire, was not much discussed. It was not problematical (except toJews and Christians) and therefore did not excite much comment. The second is thatin Platonism there was no true deification until Iamblichus began to develop theconcept of theurgy. Plotinus, for example, never once uses any of the expressions ofdeification for the simple reason that if the human soul is already divine in essence, itdoes not need to be deified. 63 When Christian authors wished to speak about deifica-tion they therefore had to hand a relatively unexploited set of terms with a widerange of meaning which they could adapt to their own purposes without muchdifficulty.

be changed in a moment into the substance of angels, even by the investiture of anincorruptible nature, and so be removed to that kingdom in heaven of which wehave now been treating’ (cf. 1 Cor. 15: 52–3) (Adv. Marc. 3. 24, CSEL 47. 420. 10–13;trans. Holmes, ANF).

On the second occasion Tertullian uses thesame text against the modalist Monarchianism of Praxeas. Arguing a fortiori (in theway the text is used in John 10: 35) he claims that ‘if Scripture has not been afraid topronounce to be gods those men who by faith have been made sons of God, youmay know that much more has it by right applied the name of God and Lord to theonly true Son of God’

appeals to Psalm 82: 6 on two furtheroccasions as a text with which to counter erroneous ideas about God. On the first hecites it in his polemical work against the Carthaginian Gnostic Hermogenes, whotaught a dualist system in which God and matter were two equal and exclusivelydivine eternal principles. But we ourselves possess something of the divine, Tertul-lian argues. ‘For we shall be even gods, if we shall deserve to be amongst those ofwhom he declared, “I have said, you are all gods” (Ps. 82: 6) and “God stands in thecongregation of the gods” (Ps. 82: 1). But this comes of his own grace, not from anyproperty in us, because it is he alone who can make gods’

turning the argument neatly to the advan-tage of monotheism: if a deifying power exists, it suggests the activity of a supremeGod (Apol. 11. 10). The supremacy of God is not compromised by the references to‘gods’ in Psalm 82: 1 and 6. In Against Marcion Tertullian refutes an objection that hisrational argument for the oneness of God is undermined by the Psalmist. Thesharing of the same name as God by those addressed by him in the ‘assembly of thegods’ does not prove that they share in the reality of divinity

After Irenaeus, Greek thinking on deification underwent its most signif-icant development in Alexandria, to such a degree that many have considereddeification an Alexandrian theologoumenon. The key role was played by Clem-ent and Origen, who devised the technical vocabulary (Irenaeus having onlyspoken of human beings becoming gods), and enriched the concept of deifi-cation by drawing on Hellenistic philosophy (chiefly Stoic and Platonic) andemploying sophisticated techniques of biblical exegesis learned from Philo.

deificatio is coined by Eriugena himself in his translation ofPseudo-Dionysiu

A search in the Brepolis Library of Latin Texts Database yieldsonly seventy-three occurrences of deif- words from the second to seventh cen-tury.5

A search in the Brepolis Library of Latin Texts Database yieldsonly seventy-three occurrences of deif- words from the second to seventh cen-tury.5

Norman Russell had devoted sevenpages to the Latin Fathers in an appendix

n his discussion of Adam and Eve’ssin, for example, Augustine writes that they “would have been better fitted toresemble gods if they had clung in obedience to the highest and true groundof their being, and not, in their pride, made themselves their own ground. Forcreated gods are gods not in their own true nature, but by participation inGod.” 42

are more than any other of his Latin patristic predecessors.2

Meconi suggests, Augustine may have used deificare only sparingly because “itis a term already promoted by Augustine’s opponents. Augustine is very suspi-cious of those who think that they can become equal to God without quali-fication, either in this life or in the next.”

Againstthe Arians, who assert that Christ is distinct from and subordinate to Godthe Father, Jerome emphasizes the difference between Christ’s eternal son-ship according to nature and our adoptive sonship according to grace. In con-trast to the Manichees, who assert that the human soul is of the same natureas God, Jerome stresses that there is only one true God, and that we are called“gods” through our participation in him. What lies behind this anti-Arianand anti-Manichean rhetoric is an echo of the Origenist controversies thatled Jerome—previously a great admirer of Origen’s work but later an avowedcritic—to deny any ontological change, to avoid the direct language of di-vinization, and to reject the Platonic metaphor of the soul’s ascent

In summary, Jerome appears cautious and conservative on the topic of de-ification. He does not use words related to deificare. Rather, he draws on thecomplementary terms: adoptive sonship and spiritual adoption; “becominggods” and participation in divine life; and “rebirth into a new man” and an-gelic life

a human being can be an image of God only when behaving well as a re-sult of freedom, not out of necessity.63

it seems hard to command virgini-ty and “to force men against their nature and to extort from them the life thatangels enjoy.” 59 The statement that virginity is against nature (adversum natu-ram) is moderated by an explanation that virginity goes beyond human pow-ers.60 This is why it is not a command but a counsel, and also why virgins de-serve higher rewards and are compared to angels.6

Rather, as we grow in adoption and participation in God, we areless and less led by the fear of slaves and more and more enjoy the freedom ofsons and every step of our spiritual progress is not a result of necessity but ofour free choice.

Unlike adoptive sonship of all the baptized, angeliclife, for Jerome, concerns a limited group of virgins and hermits who decideto follow Christ in a radical way, and who may experience an anticipated ful-fillment of eschatological promises

“that as He wasadored by angels in heaven He might have angels also on earth.” 51

“who while they are on earth livethe angelic life.” 50

Jerome explains that divine grace together with strict fastingenable the virgin “even in its earthly tenement to live the angelic life.”

A contrast between Christ and us is emphasized again.While Eunomius and Arius stress the similarity between Christ’s and our son-ship,

See, I am sending my messenger [angelum meum]ahead of you.’ ” 4

What the Lord promises to us is not the nature of angels but their mode of life andtheir bliss. And therefore John the Baptist is called an angel even before he is behead-ed, and all God’s holy men and virgins manifest in themselves even in this world thelife of angels. When it is said ye shall be like the angels, likeness only is promised andnot a change of nature.47

“Great and precious are the promises attaching to virginity which He has giv-en us, that through it we may become partakers of the divine nature.” 4

Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, who did, through Histranscendent love, become what we are, that He might bring us to beeven what He is Himself

For he was made man that we might bemade God

Catechism of the Catholic Church

(Pope John Paul II. "Redemptoris Mater."

Every single Catholic priest every single day at every single Mass for as many centuries as we know has said these deification-rich words: “By the mystery of this water and wine, may we come to share in the divinity of Christ, who humbled himself to share in our humanity.” How can we say deification is absent from the West when it is at the heart of our Eucharistic prayers? Why is it we do not learn about this more frequently except that we have been trained not to see what is before our very eyes?

It means a real transformation of the Christian into a son of God who shares in God’s very own life.

Many people associate this term with emperor worship, though this is not the word the ancient Romans used to describe the elevation of the emperor to a divine status. Deification is not a pagan import, but a Christian revelation. It is deeply Christological and ecclesiological.

Even though the idea is biblical, the word “deification” is not. It comes from two Latin words, deus, which means “(a) God” or “divine” or “holy,” and facere, which means “to make.”

Let me begin by saying that deification is what the Bible means by salvation.

The first answer actually strengthens my overall thesis. Au-gustine limits his use of deificare because he finds the same real-ity in other soteriological models. simply put, he does not useexplicit deification language more than he does because he doesnot need to. At his disposal are more scriptural terms of sal-vation: becoming children of God, becoming members of thebody of Christ, imitating Jesus in his humility and charity, andso on. in Augustine’s mind, these more commonplace Christianimages are instances of the deified life.The second reason Augustine may limit his use of explicitdeification language is that the main Latin predecessors fromwhom he draws (for example, hilary, Ambrose, Victorinus),likewise veered away from any use of the term deificare. Giventhe preference of such theologians in this regard, Augustinetoo may have hesitated to use a term which those in his tradi-tion found avoidable or even misleading.Third, we find that it is a term already promoted by Au-gustine’s opponents. Augustine is very suspicious of thosewho think that they can become equal to God without qual-ification, either in this life or in the next. stressing the lan-guage of “becoming gods,” therefore, may have led the faith-ful astray and promised them something which most are notable to understand rightly. Above we saw how two of his mostrenowned opponents, the Manichees and Donatists, were notat all shy in granting approval to some piece of theology bytheir use of deificus. if Augustine hesitates in using deificarebecause of how the connotations of such a term were beingused by his rivals, we can also argue here that this is preciselywhy he never relies on 2 Pet. 1:4 and humanity’s participationin the divine nature

Au-gustine’s inability to conceive of how God and humanity couldever come into contact without ever lessening the former orobliterating the latter. This is why, she argues, the Augustinianvision of Christianity may be motivated by a promise of beati-tude, but never by deification (mais non à la déification).6 Oth-ers have made the similar case that Augustine’s rendering di-vinity “non-participable and unknowable,”7 caused an absolutebarrier between God and the human soul, concluding that sucha theology was responsible for the eventual divide between theWestern and the eastern understandings of the relationshipbetween creator and creation. That is, whereas the West couldnot explain how the created order could interact with God’s im-mutable otherness, the east made a distinction between the di-vine essence and God’s “uncreated energies,” a move “Augustinecould not admit.”8 each of these scholars has argued that thepurported lack of deification language in Augustine parallelshis supposed inability to bring God and creation into any kindof harmonious relationship

east only, she maintains, because “the Latin tradition, underthe influence of Augustine, tended to set an unbridgeable gulfbetween man and God by way of their doctrine of the falland original sinfulness.”10

Joseph Mausbach wherehe contrasted the east’s understanding of human divinizationwith what he represented as the West’s stress on humanity’senslavement and eventual freedom from sin, naming Augus-tine as the one responsible for advocating such pessimism.Mausbach singled out Augustine as the sole antagonist to theGreeks, the lone representative of a theological vision centeredon humanity’s depravity. Consequently, as Mausbach sug-gested, Augustine is to blame for the Latin West’s dismissingChristian salvation as theosis and transformation, favoring aremedial and reconciliatory construal. Mausbach’s judgmentis not an isolated case, but has been encountered in variousways throughout the twentieth century.5in her groundbreaking work on deification in the Greek Fa-thers, for example, Myrrha Lot-Borodine argued quite stronglythat Augustine was unable to account for any sort of unionor compénétration between God and humanity. According toLot-Borodine, deification has historically been a foreign way5. Joseph Mausbach, “The Greek understanding of grace is a marvelous eleva-tion, enlightenment, and deification of the human person; with Augustine grace is ahealing, a freeing, and a reconciliation of a decrepit, enslaved, person far away fromGod. . . . Augustine sees the human person in his sinfulness, how he is filled with thetragedy of the internal fight, and from this starting point he builds his ethics andspirituality.” Thomas von Aquin als Meister christlicher Sittenlehre unter Berücksichti-gung seiner Willenslehre (Munich: Theatiner Verlag, 1925), 37–38.EBSCOhost - printed on 10/23/2023 5:34 PM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

But the use of this word, Deification, is very rarein the Latin books. However, we often find it implied, especially inthe works of Ambrose. I am not sure of the reason for this reticence :perhaps it is because the meaning of this word Theôsis (the termwhich the Greeks usually employ in the sense of the psychic andbodily transformation of the Saints into God so as to become One inHim and with Him, when there will remain in them nothing of theiranimal, earthly and mortal nature) seemed too profound for thosewho cannot rise above carnal speculations, and would therefore beto them incomprehensible and incredible, and thus the doctrine wasnot to be taught in public, but only to be discussed among thelearned.