There is something deceptively perverse to this logic. If compensating for localized environmental damage through globalized reparatory measures is the norm, one could easily imagine an scenario in which specific areas, ecosystems, and communities are irreparably ravaged by corporate actors who could, bizarrely, without lying, claim to be carbon neutral or even negative.

Working under the premise that every object is a wish reveals a lot about the technological imaginaries of any given society.

This conclusion mirrors the methodology: to make sense from the fragments, to find value in the broken parts.

This notion is worth highlighting. These fossils account not only for what was, but for what was supposed to be.

The idea of understanding technologies as an assemblage of semiotically dense elements rather than monolithic objects seems particularly fruitful to reveal the complexities of their material history.

I find this idea extremely engaging: that some capacities of our technologies make themselves known only when the technology becomes 'waste'.

It is interesting to think about how when electronics are not trash-yet, they appear to assume the material qualities of the media they mediate. It could be said that these physical objects are , to some extent, perceived to be electric and ephemeral.

This is particularly worrying as not only is the US often used as a reference for digital legislation in other countries, but many of the platforms that monopolize the internet are US-based. As such, they are likely to shape their policies in light of US-specific problems.

While the democratizing affordances of the internet are still there, it is worth asking ourselves to what extend, in practice, the contemporary internet is truly decentralized. The hegemony of certain platforms and companies coupled with legislation that favors them (such as the dissolution of net neutrality) is categorically at odds with the idea of decentralization.

A very succinct rendering of the book´s thesis.

The absence of shared modes of validation seem as relevant to the epistemic crisis as the doctored information itself.

Echoes the idea of assemblages that we discussed early in the semester when talking about the Parikka and Sampson text.

Interesting how opposed this notion is to the distortion of scale that Tolentino argues.

And yet every individual that subscribes, publicly or privately, to these ideals, contributes to a systematic perpetuation of violence.

Using purported biological imperatives to try and justify human agency almost always degenerates into violence.

This aspirational dimension of 'becoming' rather than 'achieving' is quite important. It turns the focus of the community from a result-based operation into a forum to negotiate identity.

It would appear as if the narcissistic renditions of stoicism are, by far, more appealing than its communal nuances.

The negotiation of victimhood is quite interesting. It is also through a projection and shared sense of victimhood that these communities accrue new members.

A nuanced and critical approach to history does not imply a desire to erase it.

Or, in other words, failing to see how toxic masculinity and patriarchal models also affects them negatively.

The way these groups claim victimhood seems painfully ironic.

Given the framing mechanisms that are discussed later in the book, this perception of power transcends self-delusion and becomes part of the communal ethos of these groups. It becomes part of their narrative and justifies their claim to power.

This idea of memes is particularly compelling. Given the manners in which memes circulate the media environment, being able to cipher ideology into them makes up for an extremely effective way of covertly and overly disseminating hate.

I find this idea particularly compelling. An extremely potent act of communication that doesn't rely on the meaning of individual symbols or acts of enunciation, but in the aggregate of communicational agency.

It is, still, very hard to imagine how such a technology would function. By visualizing the functioning of the network? How?

Spectacle as punishment. Interesting to think that spectacle can only be weaponized if the object on display is deemed as spectacular. Chun's ideas about the right to loiter (discussed further down this paper) seem to, incidentally, dampen spectacularization.

Another example of how challenging it is to understand digital agency when the only frame of reference is quotidian physical existence. Inhabiting the digital space as a communal being entails a lengthy learning process, one that poses profound ontological challenges.

A quick note could be made here about the materiality of the experience conjured up by the MOO. The design of the platform affords a sense of bodily presence, a material weightiness to digital agency. This is important as it helps us understand how the affective dispositions of users are configured, and thus how violence enacted upon their textual avatars is perceived.

Another instance of the complexity of digital identity. One could be many just as easily as many could be one. These identitary dynamics pose a significant challenge to regulating and understanding online behavior.

It is in systems such as this one that the ontological resonance between speech and action (that is so easy to overlook in the physical world) becomes evident.

A measure that addresses a systemic problem by transforming the structure of the system rather than dealing with its symptoms.

The categories get problematized. It echoes Baudrillard, "whereas simulation threatens the difference between "true" and "false", between "real" and "imaginary". Since the simulator produces "true" symptoms, is he or she ill or not? The simulator cannot be treated objectively either as ill, or as not ill." - Simulacra and Simulation.

The economy of hate described over the last few pages seems painfully accurate.

A quick note here would be that, as much as mainstream platforms consolidate a particular indentitary performance, there are other platforms and technologies designed to conceal, fragment, or multiply identity (from VPNs to hide online agency to anonymous/pseudonymous social networks).

I subscribe to the point made in this page: that one cannot escape the influence of the internet simply by opting-out of it. As with all foundational technologies (like the printing press, or electric light), choosing not to engage with it (if at all possible) does not shield an individual from the fact that pretty much every other human process and interaction in contemporary society is, in one capacity or another, linked to and informed by the internet.

Virtue signaling can definitely become a caricature of self-righteousness (as shown by these examples), and even when it exemplifies a truly commendable sentiment, it is easy to argue that it has very little impact in "the real world". However, given the fact that a significant amount of this virtue signaling usually does signal, at least, a modicum of virtue, is it not, by way of its pervasiveness in the media we consume, fostering a more 'virtuous' public discourse?

I find it refreshing to think of a time where the internet was regarded in positive terms as a venue for wholesome exploration and discovery. There's a sense of wonder and innocence in those early discussions that is pretty much absent in contemporary discourse about online spaces. It's easy to see why, but I wonder if there's any value in bringing some of that childish curiosity to our contemporary relationship with digital spaces.

Purposefully accounting for the emotional dimension of digital communication opens some very compelling lines of inquiry.

The assumption in this normative judgement seems to be that digital movements do not amount to "actual" political activity unless they translate into more conventional (non-digital) forms of activism. Such an assumption is highly questionable.

I wonder to what extent this separation is possible. It would appear as if any manifestation of culture is inevitably mediated by some form of sociality.

In digital spaces, identity and, particularly, the performance of identity is a networked effect.

If a system allows for the possibility of certain event happening, it will eventually happen.

I wonder if is it possible for any expression of language to escape the meaning-making process. I would argue that meaning can be constructed outside the object and in spite of it. Sense, however, is a different thing. The object may be nonsensical, but never meaningless (as long as there is an agent to interpret it).

The public sphere has always been more of an aspirational concept than a concrete phenomenon. Measuring any public forum against the idea of a public sphere, while useful, is bound to find said forum lacking.

Similarly, it could be argued that ‘abnormality’ needs to be typified to justify and build the idea of ‘normality’.

I would note that the notion of 'normality' is often tied to desirability. As such, ‘normality’ is not only the expected output of a system, but the desired one. Desire, however, is contextual and political. Processes of normalization in culture tend to be the result of changes in societal desire. Could it be, then, that anomalous objects in digital culture are simply those that are not desired at a given time/place by a given community? If that would be the case, then abnormality is not intrinsic to the object but the result of a social convention.

This is a point of massive importance. Anywhere where access is not readily available, the internet is not a 'what', it's a 'who'. A completely centralized internet affords orwellian amounts of power.

Another example of how trying to replicate pre-internet measures to deal with internet-based problems is insufficient.

The conventional understanding and enforcement of copyright is ultimately obsolete when it comes to policing content sharing over the internet. The advent of digital objects that can be perceived as valuable requires a whole new way of understanding distribution, access, and ownership. An anti-harassment strategy built upon copyright is bound to fail in the same ways copyright enforcement -fortunately- does.

Worth noting that user moderation may be one of the most organic ways of shaping behavior within an online space. By allowing users to determine what kind of content is acceptable and designing the platform to enforce this moderation automatically, the evolution of the platform, in terms of both content and behavior, would be democratized. Practical implementations of this design approach will probably be problematic but, in theory, it's a beautiful idea.

Code is never neutral. To think that the problem is entirely user-related is a dangerous oversimplification of how behaviors emerge. It is somewhat reminiscent of the equally problematic argument 'guns don't kill people, people kill people'.

This is a very important point. The design of the platforms we inhabit and the affordances built into these spaces shape user behavior in ways that legislation or after-the-fact punitive measures never will.

This is a point worth remarking. The seemingly commonsense solution of curtailing anonymity is highly problematic in and of itself and stems from trying to replicate analog accountability models in the digital spaces with no regard for the nature of the internet as a medium. For more on this debate, it's worth checking out the nymwars conflicts.

I find this phrasing quite interesting. Who is 'the internet'? We know, in the context of this chapter. However, thinking about the specific agents that make up the nebulous, almost hive-entity that 'the internet' evokes is thought-provoking. What other behaviors could 'the internet' have?

The pervasiveness of toxic online behaviors among younger generations normalizes cyberbullying. Toxicity, then, is perceived as a natural trait of digital interactions. Does this lessen the negative effect that it could have on individuals?

The pervasive notion that 'the digital' is somehow disconnected from 'the real' is highly problematic. In this example, the connection is evident. However, as more and more elements of our daily lives are weaved into our digital agency, our understanding of this distinction needs to be redefined.

This points towards an issue that is pervasive even today: most of our laws and law enforcement institutions are ill equipped to deal with problematic online behavior (both from individuals and companies). Legislators lack digital literacy, channels to deal with online threats are underdeveloped or non-existent, and the sheer amount of offenses would be nigh impossible to address with our current legal and technological infrastructure.