section
section? that seems like a strange word here
section
section? that seems like a strange word here
developmental history
no idea what this means in this setting
probe population-level factor responses to categories of discrete events also labeled via LM-QA.
probe responses to categories? I am not following
a stability-based dimensionality criterion
no idea what this means
NMF
?
structured question answering (LM-QA) paradigm
no idea what this means
o label a set of 52 consensus features of depression
so these are depression features established in a different study?
First, we demonstrate that the chosen LM is able to produce automated, dense, high-dimensional time series annotations of mental health–related symptom scores from a cohort of hundreds of individuals, followed over a full year, by answering natural language questions taken from a broad battery of depression-related symptoms collated post hoc, without directly interacting with subjects.
this is a crazy long sentence! I cannot parse it. Break up into smaller simpler sentences. Also, I don't understand what actually happened. There was a broad battery of depression relation symptoms collated? what does that mean? no direct interaction with subjects? did they ever tell you about their mental states? what is a high dimensional annotation?
aken together, this work demonstrates a practical and generalizable blueprint for using LMs and large, naturalistic, long-timescale behavior observations to identify candidates for granular and robust mental health phenotypes, and to facilitate automated quantification of those phenotypes with data-derived and interpretable behavioral biomarkers. We propose, in line with recent perspectives (Fried, Flake, and Robinaugh 2022), that this blueprint serves as a key building block of a new iterative program for the development and interrogation of better-circumscribed categories in the spectrum of mental life for guiding mechanistic inquiry, clinical decision-making, and public mental health policy.
usually the intro sets up the problem and how we are going to tackle it. It creates the tension. It doesn't summarize the results and conculsions
Here, we apply an off-the-shelf, moderate-sized LM to a recently-proposed framework for data-driven discovery of granular mental health phenotypes (Fried, Flake, and Robinaugh 2022). First, we demonstrate that the chosen LM is able to produce automated, dense, high-dimensional time series annotations of mental health–related symptom scores from a cohort of hundreds of individuals, followed over a full year, by answering natural language questions taken from a broad battery of depression-related symptoms collated post hoc, without directly interacting with subjects. These high-dimensional annotations have a highly interpretable latent factor structure which is more robust than that of some commonly-used clinical depression inventories (Shafer 2006; Furukawa et al. 2005).1 After characterizing the collective time-evolution in these mental factors within individuals in this cohort, we hypothesize that the time-evolution of each individual’s mental state falls within one of a finite collection of common mental dynamical regimes. To tractably address this hypothesis, we discretize the instantaneous mental factor vectors across the cohort into a finite collection of common discrete states, then search for groups of individuals with similar state-state transition probabilities. Finally, we suggest etiological differences in the development of these dynamical regimes in individuals through LM-assisted qualitative analysis of subjects’ self-reported histories.
given that the methods are at the end, I was expecting this to be a light methods introduction not a light introduction to the results.
Here, we apply an off-the-shelf, moderate-sized LM to a recently-proposed framework for data-driven discovery of granular mental health phenotypes
you applied to LM to the framework? I find that confusing. Don't we apply the LM to the text? maybe informing it about the framework?
These advancements raise the promise of being able to leverage the incredible richness of large volumes of extant naturalistic text data to drive foundational research advances in psychiatry.
This I kind of understand but it is a little too broad and vague for my taste. It isn't obious to me yet how that might work
Meanwhile, as these concerns have been brewing, advancements in the development of large, domain-general language models (LMs) have paved the way for radical shifts in empirical approaches to natural language processing tasks like annotation and information extraction (CITES). Most intriguingly, recent work has begun to suggest the tremendous promise that these models might hold for quantitative phenotyping in mental health in their ability to analyze naturalistic text data at massive scale, with LM-based methods demonstrating good performance in tasks like zero-shot psychiatric diagnosis (CITE).
love this. This is much clearer and to the point. Definitely following you here
TE)
I think this whole previous section is saying that we don't have good ways of defining psychiatric disorders and we don't have good ways to measure the symptoms of these disorders. Is that right? I thnk a more direct treatment of this would be better. The DSM for instance puts disorders together based on clusters of symptoms but ignores neurobiology. It is better than the previous alternatives because now at least I know what people mean when they say MDD even if it is not a real entity. And then symptoms are problematic because they are subjective and culturrally influenced. But, for many, psychiatry is the medicine of subjective states. Could someone be depressed who was totally clear that they did not feel sadness? It seems like you are trying to set up the idea that more objective assessments of human behavior, like we do in animals, might be helpful in better defining psychiatric illnesses?
as these concerns have been brewing
I would cut
research optimized for the chosen metric
I am not sure I follow
metrics
do you mean symptom measures? I am a little lost
by lumping populations for whom an intervention is effective with those for whom it is not
There are probably lots of reasons a treatment won't be effective in an individual person even if they have the same underlying biology. receptor differences, comorbidities etc... The easiest way to lump p[eople together who respond to a treatment is to treat them?
improperly delineating indications without a truly shared etiology and mechanism can lead efforts to discover and validate therapeutic efficacy far astray
I think you mean without a clear biologically driven definition, we are likely to group patients with different underlying etiologies into a common group[?
indications
what does an indication mean here?>
concerns of core definitions and measurements have large downstream
concerns of? concerns about? and I don't think you need downstream as consequences always follow
Both the clinical delineation of which ways of mental being which constitute “major depression” as a unified entity
This is quite hard to follow. I think you mean both the definition of MDD and how it is measured?>
two notions interact in a closed loop
notions interacting I understand but in a closed loop? What does that mean?
However, a spotlight of recent interest has been focused instead on more foundational questions:
this is very lofty academic-ease. I usually like more direct and simple writing like, recently, interest has focused on... This is a suggestion for the whole paper. I find it difficult to follow due to the complexity of the language.
converging work in the last few decades has paved the way toward interventions that are hoped to supply more efficacious levers than current agents (Carhart-Harris et al. 2021).
not sure i would put psychedelics here! They didn't really come out of fancy new neuroscience. They came out of DEA loosening restrictions and modern researchers being able to try them again. I think TMS, ketamine, deep brain stimulation are better examples
storically centered on variants in neuromodulatory signaling (Owens et al. 1997; Hirschfeld 2000; Walker 2013; Dale, Bang-Andersen, and Sánchez 2015
this is a little bit of a strawman. We don't really think depression is due to too much or too little serotonin anymore. Most hypotheses focus more on circuit level dysfunction that develops due to psychobiosocial causes. All of these refs are very old!
clinical need
awkward. I would say need for new therapeutic approaches or interventions
,
delete
major depression
would call it major depressive disorder MDD
(Jorm et al. 2017
newer ref? 2017 is a century ago!
to similarly uncovering dynamical regimes in model systems to serve as granular and robustly-quantified phenotypes in investigating, and reverse-generalizing to humans, neurobiological mechanisms impacting long-timescale structure of behavior and mental life.
really having a hard time following
using similar inputs from artificial intelligence–driven behavioral segmentation tools applied to observation modalities adapted to other organisms
Now I am really churning. I assume not language data from other organisms so I am a little lost at what this means
to other domains of psychiatry
other domains? Like what? I am a little lost here
data-driven hypotheses
I am a little lost as it is not yet clear to me what hypotheses you generated with your models. Is it the inferred dynamical phenotypes?
cluster the structure of how individuals’ mental states unfold in time into a small set of “dynamical regimes”, phenotypes capturing subgroups with similar state-transition propensities; and
I kind of understand this
in self-reported developmental contributions behind these inferred dynamical phenotypes
I don't know what this means
(1) estimate high-dimensional time series of symptoms related to anxiety and depression post-hoc with no direct subject input;
I immediately wonder, do you know what the poster's symptoms actually are? How do you know you are right in your estimates? This is a tricky thing because the "gold standard" is people's subjective reports.
misalignment with underlying biology, and incomplete generalization to model organisms
but these don't seem like psychiatry's shortcomings. These are shortcomings of the basic science, no? I mean, shouldn't the model systems get better at representing the human condition and not vice versa?
clinical reliability
this is psychiatry's challenge definitely
shortcomings
Are these really psychiatry's shortcomings?