This awareness of several different experiences can be helpfully compared with one’s awareness, in short-term memory, of several different experiences

But, they insist, this Replica won’t be you. It will merely be someone else, who is exactly like you.

Buddhists concede that selves or persons have ‘nominal existence’, by which they mean that persons are merely combinations of other elements. Only what exists by itself, as a separate element, has instead what Buddhists call ‘actual exis-tence’.

Bundle Theory.

Cartesian view, each person is a persist-ing purely mental thing—a soul, or spiritual substance

if a person’s dominant hemisphere is destroyed, this person is able to react in the way in which, in the split-brain cases, the sub-dominant hemi-sphere reacts,

With one of his hands the per-son writes ‘Red’, with the other he writes ‘Blue’.If this is how such a person responds, I would con-clude that he is having two visual sensations

ir way of knowledge; — because, in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit: and so the ignorance in drunk-enness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. For, though punishment be annexed to personality, and personal-ity to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did, yet human judicatures justly

But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to any one but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the same man

For the same consciousness being pre-served, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved

it being impossible for any one to per-ceive without perceiving that he does perceive.

No doubt these conscious brain processes move too slowly to be involved in each finger flex as I type, but as long as they play their part in what I do down the road—such as con-sidering what ideas to type up—then my conscious self is not a dead end, and it is a mistake to say my

we should consider the role of con-sciousness in action on the assumption that our con-scious deliberation and rational thinking are carried out by complex brain processes, and then we can examine whether those very brain processes play a causal role in action.

That is, most people judge that you can have free will and be responsible for your actions even if all of your decisions and actions are entirely caused by earlier events in accord with natural laws

We act of our own free will to the extent that we have the opportunity to exer-cise these capacities, without unreasonable external or internal pressure.

Our brains are the most complexly organized things in the known universe, just the sort of thing that could even-tually make sense of why each of us is unique, why we are conscious creatures and why humans have abilities to comprehend, converse, and create that go well beyond the precursors of these abilities in other animals

progress in science comes precisely from under-standing wholes in terms of their parts

s “the idea that we make choices and have thoughts independent of anything remotely resembling a physical process.

simply exposing people to scientific claims that free will is an illusion can lead them to misbehave, for instance, cheat-ing more or helping others less.

First, it needs to have been mewho made the decision; and second, my choice needs to have not been predetermined by prior events.

And finally, while these little torn decisions can seem unimportant while you’re lying on the couch reading about free will, when you’re actually in the moment—when you’re about to make a torn deci-sion—it doesn’t feel unimportant.

If you didn’t have control over any of the little decisions that you made in your life, that would be tantamount to saying that you didn’t have control over your life.

We don’t exercise our free will in cases like these, and once again, we should thank our lucky stars that we don’t have to.

you decide while you’re still torn

torn decision

, is in principle to be blamed on antecedent conditions acting through the accused’s physiology, heredity and environment.

Retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with a scientific view of human behaviour. As scientists, we believe that human brains,

People want to kill a criminal as payback for the horrible things he did. Or they want to give “satisfaction” to the victims of the crime or their relatives. An especially warped and disgusting application of the flawed concept of retribu-tion is Christian crucifixion as “atonement” for “sin

But the trouble about Behaviourism is that it seems so unsat-isfactory as applied to our own case. In our own case, we seem to be aware of so much more than mere behaviour

Perhaps the Behaviourists are wrong in identifying the mind and mental occurrences with behaviour. B

particular change, when a particular condition is realised.

We must try to work out an account of the nature of mind which is compatible with the view that man is nothing but a physico-chemical mechanism.

his is the view that we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms. This view has received tre-mendous impetus in the last decade from the new sub-ject of molecular biology, a subject which pr

2/20/2020A statement from Hannah Black, Ciarán Finlayson, and Tobi Haslett regarding Warren Kanders and the 2019 Whitney Biennial - Artforum Internationalhttps://www.artforum.com/slant/a-statement-from-hannah-black-ciaran-finlayson-and-tobi-haslett-on-warren-kanders-and-the-2019-whitney-biennial-803288/9In line with global politics, the art world is in the midst of a hard rightward swing. But weare concerned less with the state of the art world than with what this world does to ourfriends, peers, and elders, when professionalization at all costs becomes the condition oftheir practice. The ease with which left rhetoric flows from art is matched by a real povertyof conditions, in which artists seem convinced they lack power in relation to theinstitutions their labor sustains. Now the highest aspiration of avowedly radical work is itsown display. Even the strategies of the historical avant-garde (oppositional independentsalons, for instance) seem to have vanished from the realm of possibility, or no longerappear desirable, as institutions are treated like an omnipotent, irresistible force.In 1970, Robert Morris shuttered his own exhibition at the Whitney in protest of the killingof students at Kent State, the suppression of the Black movement, and Nixon’s bombing ofCambodia.

e the political commitment favored by the art world’smanagerial class has made “radical” art party to any and all barbarism—as long as thatbarbarism is structural (that is, implanted in the bureaucracy of institutions) rather than amatter of the sins of particular leaders.

utting collective pressure on theinstitution. We have heard that it would be impossible to remove Kanders; everything isimpossible before it happens

The movement against Kanders is not random or impulsive. The case againsthim has been building, and has now been delivered into the hands of artists, who have anextraordinary capacity to speak and be heard. As Fred Moten put it, on the subject ofsolidarity with Palestine, “the boycott can help to refresh (the idea of) the alternative [. . .]even in the midst of reaction’s constant intensification.”

“cannot right all the ills of an unjustworld.”

More than just a gesture ofsolidarity with victims of state repression, withdrawal of work from the gallery disruptsthe actual circuits of valorization—not only of the work and its display in the prestigiousmuseum, but of the museum and its state

Because the power of protest comes from our capacity to gather and act together, tear gasis useful to the state because it forces people to disperse

ystems with the same organization will embody the same information, for example—and it could explain numerous features of our conscious experience

om the infinitesimal to the cosmological, and what we might call psychophysical laws, telling us how some of those systems are associated with conscious experience.

machines with human-level intelligence and behaviors, able to understand speech and talk in many different languages, remember the past and anticipate the future, imagine novel scenarios, write books, compose music, direct films, conceive new goals, as well as move, drive, fly, and, inevitably, fight. From there, thanks to the availability of big data, the power of deep learning, and the speed of computing, it will be a short step to overcoming human limits. The birth of true artificial intelligence will profoundly affect mankind’s future, including whether it has one.

If all of these states are simulated in software on a digital computer, the thinking goes, the system as a whole will not only behave exactly like me but also feel and think exactly like me.

exceed anything and everything that humans are capable of.

Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, Google’s Now, and Microsoft’s Cortana. These virtual assistants will continue to improve until they become hard to distinguish from real people, except that they’ll be endowed with perfect recall, poise, and patience—unlike any living being.

equally intimate conversations with thousands of other customers.

deceive me? Is there also any one of these attributes that can be properly distinguished from my thought, or that can be said to be separate from myself? For it is of itself so evident that it is I who doubt, I who understand, and I who desire, that it is here unnecessary to add anything by way of rendering it more clear.

Moreover, the phrase itself, I frame an image reminds me of my error; for I should in truth frame one if I were to imagine myself to be anything, since to imagine is nothing more than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing;

ount them were idle and tedious. Let us pass, then, to the attributes of the soul. The first men-tioned were the powers of nutrition and walking; but, if it be true that I have no body, it is true likewise that I am capable neither of walking nor of being nourished.

I thought that I possessed a countenance, hands, arms, and all the fabric of members that appears in a corpse, and which I called by the name of body. It further occurred to me that I was nourished, that I walked, per-ceived, and thought, and all those actions I referred to the soul; but what the soul itself was I either did not stay to consider, or, if I did, I imagined that it was something

I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is con-stantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something.

I believe that body, fig-ure, extension, motion, and place are merely fictions of my mind. What is there, then, that can be esteemed true?

I am so greatly discon-certed as to be unable either to plant my feet firmly on the bottom or sustain myself by swimming on the surface.

sense to say in any case that I ought to have done otherwise, since I did the only thing that I could have done? But then what becomes of ethics as ordinarily conceived? If the scientific principle is true, one will have to rethink the ethical ground for remorse and reward and punishment and praise and blame. This

wo true propositions can contradict each other, the results of independent scientific search could not con-flict, and that there is no problem in harmonizing them. On the contrary, when we examine even the most gen-eral results of the several sciences, we see that they clash scandalously

meaning even of these simple and common terms would solve many of the deepest problems in eth-ics and metaphysics. But we must add that Socrates was no ordinary language philosopher. He was not an Athe-nian Noah Webster, collecting the shopworn coins that were current in the marketplace; on the contrary, he took special pleasure in showing that at the level of ordinary usage our meanings were muddled and incoherent. Only by refining and revising them could we arrive at mean-ings that would stan

But it would be absurd to leave these basic ideas unexamined altogether. This somewhat thankless pre-liminary work is the task of the philosopher.We referred to these unexamined ideas as concepts and assumptions.

We stumble upon some fact or event that is unintelligible to us; what would make it intelligible? The first step in the answer is, seeing it as an instance of some rule.

it makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of

Self-assertion, in philo-sophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means to its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than Self, and the Self sets

The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins.

however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such ques-

still remain much to be done to produce a valuable soci-ety

realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for

the Christian doctrine “He whois not with me is against me,” but now voided of any concrete theological content. What remainsis merely the abstract authority of a choice enjoined,7with no regard for the fact that the verypossibility of choosing depends on what can be chosen

The close-up, cut, montage, fade, and many such technologies have en-tered our collective consciousness and stolen theater's former thunder by mak-ing moviegoing more intimate, more real, more palpably visceral than most live events

as well as the use of embryos and early fetuses as sources of neural cells for transplantation to treat brain diseases

Since early embryos and fetuses cannot experience harm, they lack interests of their own which are necessary to have moral rights. Under the higher-brain standard, they do not become persons until the onset of consciousness

So I would prefer if higher-brain death became legally recognized as sufficient for declaring the death of a person, though I doubt that this will be politically possible for many years

If human beings in permanent comas or persistent vegetative states are no longer persons, then life-sustaining medical treatment is qualitatively futile for them. No one is "there" anymore to benefit from such treatment; while biological life may continue, the "subject" of that life is gone. Of course, if life-sustaining treatment were maintained in order to preserve organs for harvesting, then it would not be futile in every sense.

Cessation of cardiopulmonary functions

1. consciousness . . . and in particular the capacity to feel pain; 2. reasoning (the developedcapacity to solve new and relatively complex problems); 3. self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control); 4. the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types . . . ; 5. the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness. . . .

To be classified as a "person" normally entails having strong moral rights and legal protections,

property dualism

immaterial ghosts/spirits could never be seen, heard or felt. On the other hand, if they’re asserted instead to be material beings, then their presence ought to be measurable through controlled scientific tests

Well ... Ther;'s the others, Clem . .. Back jist like they useta be .. . Everythmgs same as al-ways ..

All unwed mothers, loose-hvmg maim erin fathers, bastard children an s 1 _ ess ran ar ents ar e e t occu ied through constructive muscle-thera 'd th N' . .oVI es e igra w1 ess opportunity to in u ge in 1s pleasure-loving amoral inclination

They reopen in greater c-uriosit