Extensive media control

reaching out to voters.Moreover, a court decision to ban Ekrem İmamoğlu

rust includeindependence on the one hand, and control over the process on the other hand.

When prominent social media platforms eliminate orreduce the ranking of edited content that is contributed by media service providers,the providers’ investments become futile. This loss harms not only media providers,but also the society as a whole, as fewer citizens have access to the range and depth ofinformation that these media services strive to provide

hyper-democratic structure of online platforms benefitfreedom of expression which is helpful against an authoritarian establishment, justas it can also boost extremist movements attacking democratic state institutions.

The actual political pro-cesses have not adjusted to the heightened transparency of public discourse, resultingin a disconnect between the political elite and policies and the genuine needs andfrustrations of societ

neither pluralism, nor democratic processes areoptimally maximised by the current communication structure

houghts, ideas and opinions, or to participatein ongoing discourse through actions such as sharing and liking

old en-try barriers and fostering a hyper-pluralistic and hyper-democratic information land-scape.

Court ordered the removal of social media profilesfor hate speech, or for attacking the Supreme Court with disinformation, affectingseveral of Bolsonaro’s allies and effectively quashing disinformation networks.

Brazil, systematic disinformation and populis-tic propaganda were disseminated in the Bolsonaro re-election campaign until theBrazilian High Court held certain citizens and politicians directly accountable for thedisinformation campaigns

the government may accusethe court of bias, corruption, or tampered evidence, such as in the cases related toelection fraud charges in the US.3

he media, then the ConstitutionalCourt and the entire system of checks and balances, whereas the grip on the judiciaryfastened rather gradually.38

ppositional populist movements often portray the judiciary as ser-vants of a corrupt establishment. Once the populist force assumes governing power,the judiciary can also be labelled as an obstacle to the ‘will of the people’

In Poland, the official narrative of the govern-ing party identified the judiciary with the old communist regime, depicted them asrepresenting communist elites.3

As long as citizens trust in the process which keeps control overexecutive and legislative power, the endowed trust confers legitimacy to the govern-ment.

on the other hand, agencies that provide public goods inwhich there is a substantial agreement, do so on a professional basis, protected bypolitical agendas and patronage, function with trust

This resulted in a worldwide wave of populism,3 forwhich the flat hierarchy of social media networks has provided an ideal basis

ccording to Putnam, American trust inlaw, courts and governments has registered a decrease since 1966 at least.

As such, they are also primarytargets of populist-autocratic movements.

mobilizationof certain popular sentiments – say hostility to capitalism or to foreigners or Jews, or hatredof economic organization or of the market society, or of anything you like – for undemo-cratic ends.

other than those which the populist desired.That is to say – Berlin argues -, their employment by Bonapartists or McCarthyists, orthe ‘Friends of the Russian people,’ or Fascist and so on.

e Alderman seizes uponfestivities for expressions of his good will, much more does he seize upon periods of sorrow. At afuneral he has the double advantage of ministering to a genuine craving for comfort and solace,and at the same time of assisting at an important social function

The successful candidate must be agood man according to the standards of his constituents. He must not attempt to hold up amorality beyond them, nor must he attempt to reform or change the standard.

with indepen-dent but not neutral judges, a government may manipulate judicial ac-tivism in order to consolidate its power and weaken the opposition

ncentivesfor the opposition to embark on such a strategy will be great, unless itcolludes with the government or fears reprisals

emocracy against the rule oflaw, and vice versa

cond,to enforce, through institutions, legal limits to the political discretion

on make armed conflicts more or less likely

n merely Western imperialism in a new guise?

make the world more or less democratic?

make the state obsolete?

positive or a negative development?

best explains the effects of globalization?

phenomenon in world politics?

Second, many think the contemporary, post-Cold War world ismarkedly different from previous periods because of the effects of globalization.

But will the new great powers take responsibility for providing thematerial resources needed to manage global problems? Maybe as important, what set of ideas and norms will guide the actionsof these new leaders? Will the liberal internationalists’ ideas that “won” the Cold War serve as the ruling narrative for leaderstoday or will a non-Western authoritarian set of rules become the ruling narrative?

Brown makes the point that people fail “to see the necessity to actcollectively” when faced with challenges like the pandemic, global poverty, human rights violations, and climate change.Reforming global institutions and defining collective action as a global public good (see Theory in Practice in this chapter), thehistorian, Margaret McMillan, suggests that the pandemic represents a “turning point” in history in that it is challenging the oldglobal order. Consider the priorities of the major players.

With our collective failure to prevent,control, and overcome the pandemic, as well as the challenges of climate change, global governance, and global poverty, theWestern alliance and the rules-based system created after World War II is under siege

“There is only oneanswer: with respect.” Heconcludes that lengthyarticle with the followingwords: “And what Ukraine will be—itis up to its citizens to decide.” It is hardto reconcile these statements with theclaim that he wants to incorporateUkraine within a greater Russia

“ModernUkraine was entirely cre-ated by Russia or, to bemore precise, by Bolshevik, CommunistRussia.” But as he went on to say in thatsame speech: “Of course, we cannotchange past events, but we must at leastadmit them openly and honestly.

“Whoever does not missthe Soviet Union has noheart. Whoever wants itback has no brain.”

Such opaque comments,however, say nothing about his reasonfor going to war.

Western leader, thereis no evidence to support it

Ukraine and othercountries as well—allfor the purpose of creat-ing a greater Russia thatbears some resemblanceto the former SovietUnion. In other words,Ukraine is Putin’s firsttarget,

anctions to greatly weakenRussian power.

the Biden administrationhas reacted to the outbreak of thewar by doubling down against Rus-sia. Washington and its Western alliesare committed to decisively defeatingRussia in

utin responded by invadingUkraine on February 24 th , 2022.

recommitteditself to bringing Ukraine into NATOin 2021.

merica’s obsession with bring-ing Ukraine into NATO and making ita Western bulwark on Russia’s border

Ukraine thatPutin and his colleagues see as anexistential threat to their country

Washington’s leadon Ukraine.

his is not to deny that Putinstarted the war and that he is respon-sible for Russia’s conduct on the bat-tlefield. Nor is it to deny that America’sallies bear some responsibility

first with theVietnam War and second with the IraqWar. In both cases, Americans wantedto know how their country could havemiscalculated so badly. Given thatthe United States and its NATO alliesplayed a crucial role