his is a good example of the view that tohave good reason for holding a theory is, ipso facto, tohave good reason for believing in the existence of theentities postulated by that theory
Highly disagree! Consider isomorphic models of the same axioms
48 Matching Annotations
- Feb 2019
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Obviously Millikan did not expect them to be able todo so. He was also adopting a clearly "realist" positionabout the Bohr atom. Millikan was not always so san-guine that satisfying an equation proved the existence ofthe postulated underlying entities. Discussing Einstein'spostulation of photons to explain the photoelectric effect,Millikan wrote, "Despite then the apparently completesuccess of the Einstein equation, the physical theory ofwhich it was designed to be the symbolic expression isfound so untenable that Einstein himself, I believe, nolonger holds to it."
Seemingly lacking a comprehensive philosophy
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The total number of changes whichwe have observed would be between one and two thousand,and in not one single instance has there been any changewhich did not represent the advent upon the drop of onedefinite, invariable quantity of electricity or a very smallmultiple of that quantity."5
Since measurements are always going to be rational, there will ALWAYS be a perfect divisor, just depending on the precision of the measurement. Further, this divisor would be a false positive.
How was Millikan sure that that wasn't the case?
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These two time measurements let him determine both theFIGURE 3.THOMSON'S TUBEfor demonstratingthat cathode rays aredeflected by anelectric field. It wasalso used to measureelm. (Courtesy ofCavendishLaboratory.)FIGURE 2. J. J. THOMSON'S 1897 APPARATUS fordemonstrating that cathode rays have negative electric charge.The slits in the cylinders are shown. (Adapted from ref. 3.)mass of the drop and its total charge
How?
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fundamental unit ofelectricity
Similar to the pennies lab!
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hisratio appeared to be independent of both the gas in thetube and of the metal in the cathode, suggesting that theparticles were constituents of the atoms of all substances.
huh?
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homson thenperformed the experiment at lower pressure and, indeed,observed the deflection.
Controlling for variables
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Nowthe supporters of the aeth-erial theory," Thomsonwrote, "do not deny that elec-trified particles are shot offfrom the cathode; they deny,however, that these chargedparticles have any more todo with the cathode raysthan a rifle-ball has with theflash when a rifle is fired."
They're questioning correlation vs causation
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We are completely con-vinced of the reality of elec-trons when we set out tobuild—and often enough suc-ceed in building—new kindsof device that use variouswell-understood causal properties of electrons to interferein other more hypothetical parts of nature."
i.e. "electrons are a system of description"
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you can spraythem, then they are real.
This seems like a circular definition to me.
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www.psychologytoday.com www.psychologytoday.com
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If you are sitting on the edge of a jetty in summer, a nice breeze blowing in your hair and a cold beer in your hand, instead of taking in the beautiful day you might find yourself thinking about what to cook for dinner tonight
There's a beautiful moment, and you're not enjoying it. And that this is the "default" is rather concerning.
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- Jan 2019
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www.jstor.org www.jstor.org
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anything is less dense than water, it floats on water;
I'm not sure this is always implied. Consider
Because I am hungry, I am angry.
Certainly it is not always true that "If I am hungry then I am angry". But I currently point to it being the cause.
I could see the argument that my statement is just incomplete and therefore wrong, that I am angry for several reasons including hunger, so to be correct I must instead say:
One of the reasons that I am angry is that I am hungry.
or else specify every reason why I am angry.
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the time is the present, that is to say, definite
This is really important. Frege is taking this statement,.
If the Sun has already rise, the sky is very cloudy
to be a statement about the here and now rather than a general statement. This statement may or may not be true a second after or before this very instant, but we don't care.
This type of thinking is useful, but subtle. I could also say, for instance,
If I am not writing a comment with hypothes.is, I am dead
and this is true because it speaks about the here and now. Since I am writing a comment with hypothes.is, the whole statement is true, regardless of whether or not I am dead. If we take the statement to be more general, clearly it's false--there are times when I am not dead despite not writing a comment with hypothes.is.
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This conjunction actually has no sense and does not changethe sense of the clause but only illuminates it in a peculiar fashion.*
In
although I like candy, I do not like chocolate
"although" acts to combine the two clauses the same as "and" would, like:
I like candy and I do not like chocolate
and only differs from "and" by suggesting that there is some kind of contradiction or dissonance between "I like candy" and "I do not like chocolate".
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We cantherefore expect that it may be replaced, without harm to the truth valueof the whole, by a sentence having the same truth value. This is indeedthe case; but it is to be noticed that for purely grammatical reasons, itssubject must be `Napoleon,
i.e. we can replace "who recognized the danger to his right flank" with any other subordinate clause that has the same truth value; however, it must also be talking about Napoleon.
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If one of the parts is false, the whole is false
Not sure I agree with this. Consider, say, "I love my parents, who are younger than me". If asked if this is 'correct' I would not say 'yes' nor 'no' but rather state that I do love my parents, but they are not younger than me. If pushed further, wanting a single truth value for the whole sentence, I (personally) would refuse to give one. I feel that the two contained thoughts are not just combined with a conjunction. They are handled separately, rather than as a unit.
On the other hand, I wold easily state that "I love my parents and my parents are younger than me" is surely false.
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That the name `Kepler' designates something is just as much a presup-position for the assertionKepler died in misery
Frege is saying that the interpretation of
Kepler died in misery
as being
Kepler exists AND Kepler died in misery
is wrong, because the negation of
Kepler died in misery
is simply
Kepler did not die in misery
rather than
Kelper does NOT exist OR Kepler did NOT die in misery
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f this were the case the negation would have to run notKepler did not die in miserybutKepler did not die in misery, or the name `Kepler' has no reference.
This is an application of DeMorgan's law. If "Kepler died in misery" included the assertion that Kelper exists, then it would be "Kepler exists AND Kepler died in misery" and its negation is "Kelper does NOT exist OR Kepler did NOT die in misery"
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If one therefore asserts `Kepler died in misery,'there is a presupposition that the name `Kepler' designates something;but it does not follow that the sense of the sentence `Kepler died inmisery' contains the thought that the name `Kepler' designates some-thing
This is really fascinating and subtle! We can talk about something that may or may not exist. In doing so, we assume it does. However, our statement on that thing does not include the assumption that it exists.
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or whoever takes the whole to be true cannot deny thispart
In order to accept "Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery" as true, we must accept that there was someone who discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits.
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Acommand,arequest,areindeednotthoughts
On the other hand, we could think of all commands such as "wash the dishes" as really meaning "I wish you would wash the dishes", in which case they are thoughts.
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ad he been deceived, he would havebeen no less pleased so long as his illusion lasted
If I think that all fruit are good, and I think that onions are a fruit, then I will think that an onion is good. I will continue thinking this, regardless of the fact that onions are not fruits, until I learn that onions are not fruits.
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n such cases it is notpermissible to replace one expression in the subordinate clause by an-other having the same customary reference, but only by one having thesameindirectreference,i.e.thesamecustomarysense
Frege is discussing the interaction of sentences inside other sentences (subordinate clauses) and how if one replaces a subordinate clause with another that has the same referent (truth value) then we cannot guarantee that the referent of the overall sentence is the same. The merit of the subordinate clauses are in their indirect reference (i.e., their sense), not their reference.
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Wecanneverbeconcernedonlywiththereference of a sentenc
This mirrors the discussion that it would be meaningless to say that
a = bis a statement on the referents ofaandb. We can never be concerned with only the reference ofa = b--it is either true, or false, but what we also care greatly about the namesaandb. Similarly, with sentences, we care greatly about their sense and not just their reference. -
And this is in factthecase
Thus further pushes the idea that the truth value of a sentence has only to do with the references of the contained expressions (which I still think is wrong).
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Bycombining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, neverpasses fromsense to reference, never froma thought to its truth value
Frege is saying that
subject + predicatecan never be more than thought. It cannot have a true referent.This is very curious because
subject + predicateis the basis for first-order logic which is often used as a means for exploring truth. -
e.g., in the mouth of an actor upon the stage
Frege seems to be saying that if an actor is to say "5 is a prime number" then though the sense of the statement remains, the referent does not. It is no longer true nor false, it is meaningless, because it is being expressed by a nonexistent character.
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he step from the level ofthoughts to the level of reference (the objective) has already been taken
He is referring back to when he was talking about how signs can differ in one of 3 ways: 1) idea, 2) sense and idea, 3) reference, sense, and idea.
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indeedthe actor himself would be a representation42Gottlob
This discounts the existence of the character the actor is playing. There are, I think, arguments to be made that characters do, indeed, "exist".
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neither apply nor withhold the predicat
Disagree; it would simply mean that "all those people who match the
sense(Odysseus)also match thesense(was set ahore at Ithaca while sound asleep). -
We now inquireconcerning the sense and reference for an entire declarative sentence
Note that here he assumes that a sentence should, like an expression, have a sense and reference. Personally, I disagree.
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notintendtospeak ofourideaoftheMoon,norarewesatisfiedwiththesense alon
Again, I disagree. Consider "I like video games". The reference of "video games" thus refers to all the video games out now, but I also mean to include e.g. video games coming out next year.
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n account of theuncertain connexion of ideas with words, a difference may hold for oneperson,whichanotherdoesnotfind
Two people may disagree about the difference in ideas of two words. (But they should agree on the sense and reference)
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The difference may concern at most theideas, or the sense but not the reference, or, finally, the reference as well
When two words are different, they may differ in one of 3 ways. 1) They have different ideas; 2) they have different ideas and senses but the same reference; or 3) they have different ideas and senses and references.
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is not a part or a mode of theindividual mind.
Frege seems to be saying that the sense of a word is not relative but absolute. The sense of a word is the same regardless of who says it.
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If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak ofis their reference
I posit that this isn't always true. Consider the statement "nice people are good". While this implies the reference interpretation, that "all people who are in the group
reference(nice)are also in the groupreference(good)", I think what it really means is the sense interpretation: "if a person issense(nice), then that person issense(good)". -
.Butthisisnottosaythat to the sense there also corresponds a reference
Was "proper name" not previously defined to mean "that which has a reference"?
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hesamewordhasthesamesenseinthesamecontext
But it may not, depending on what you mean by "context". Me and my friend may both say, "I like blue", but disagree on what is and isn't blue and thus like different blue-ish things. If "context" includes the speaker, fine, but that seems like an odd use of the word "context".
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completetotalityofsigns
What does he mean by this?
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Comprehensive knowledge of the reference wouldrequireustobeabletosayimmediatelywhetheranygivensensebelongsto it. To such knowledge we never attain.
We may want to be able to combine sense and reference, so that from a sense we would be able to get all things that belong to it, i.e., its reference. Here, Frege is saying that this is impossible and, further, cannot be possible.
I wonder how true this is. While I can certainly see it in natural language, what about something as rigorous as the discourse in Math? I think most people would agree that the reference of "all those
xsuch thatx * 2 = 4" is certainly known--the only element is2. -
a definite object (this word taken in the widestrange), but not a concept or a relation
The reference of a name must be concrete and absolute. Senses, however, need not be.
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It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name,combinationofwords,letter),besidesthattowhichthesignrefers,whichmay be called the reference of the sign, also what I should like to call thesenseof the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained
Frege is splitting signs into two parts: sense and reference. Reference is that which the sign actually refers to. Thus
2andtwoare both references to a particular number (the successor of 1). Sense, on the other hand, contains the "meaning" of the sign. The reference of the sign "red fruit" contains apples--items, but the sense of the sign is more of a condition. Is it red? Is it a fruit? -
.Butthisrelationwouldholdbetweenthenamesorsignsonlyinso far as they named or designated something
This discussion is irrelevant for meaningless names.
Are quinplots and seexinbarnes equal? Meaningless.
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i.e.providedabis true
Seems to contain a catch-22. In this discussion of what equality means, we use equality. Unclear exactly what he's saying here.
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the subject is “sick”
The issue is thought to be in the patient rather than the system
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our lives begin when work ends
A movement I have seen recently is trying to counter this. We have this persistent idea that "our lives will really begin after X" -- we'll start really living once we get married, or buy a new car, or get a new job, or...
But it's not true. There is only now, and we need to learn how to live in the now and enjoy ourselves in the moment.
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under the reigning ideology, our self-worth is measured by our economic output
But also... unemployed people will 1) have less money to get essential items for life 2) be fearful for their future
It seems a bit strong to say that the ideology of "economic output = self worth" is the reason that unemployed people are depressed.
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45 million
Out of ~250mil, so about 1/5 of all adults.
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