 Nov 2023

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H2a: Affiliating with AQ increases an affiliate’s use of terrorism
Since AQ has longer history, could it be due to larger local terrorist groups have affiliated with AQ so left smaller one to affiliate with IS?
Could it be possible control the terrorist groups affiliated with AQ or IS after 2014?

We present reasons why affiliation with AQ inparticular should lead to more violence, while affiliation with IS offers a less clearrelationship
Looks to me it makes more sense to focus on the different effects of affiliation between AQ and IS.

Conflict dynamics are influenced by patterns of relationships among nonstateactors.
What distinct your research since similar research has been done and three possible outcomes have been argued?

Affiliation with IS is not robustlyassociated with a change in violence.
 Only works for AQ?
 How about those without affiliation with external networks?
 How to distinguish whether they affiliate or not? Is it supposed to be secretive?


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conservative or traditionalist political ideologies and favour authoritarian governance structures
H1:

Majority or minority?

Choose policy or elect candidates? Who propose the policy? Is there a candidate from their own ethnicity?

The correlation between conservative, traditionalist and authoritarian? Should it be left vs. right?



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Why do criminal groups provide public goods and services to civilians in Mexico?
 Who are the main victims of the criminal groups? Local or remote? if main victims are remote, local provision of public goods might gain support from local communities, even from local government.
 Scale of size of the criminal groups: To provide public goods, they have to be big enough; if they are big enough, they need internal governance as well and public goods provision might be a good approach of internal governance. Otherwise, members of the criminal groups might ask for troubles in their spare time.
 Could be a way to laundry money?
 The relationship with government authority: competitive, cooperation, or dominant?
 Who pays the bill? Local residents or profits that criminal groups gained somewhere else?
 Would it make more sense: Why do some criminal groups provide public goods but others do not?

 Oct 2023

cloudflareipfs.com cloudflareipfs.com

Empirical Rule


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no two democracies are alike, nor are any twoautocracies, monarchies, or juntas.
Very true!

The Emperor, therefore, was their sole support andthey lived or died, rose or fell, entirely by his favour.
Unfortunately, this is not true. Eunuchs were not more loyal at all. They killed many emperors.

He is especially concernedabout coming to power because if he fails, having once challenged theincumbent, in our model he is eliminated from the prospective futurerole of challenger.
This is an unreasonable assumption either in democracies or in autocracies.

she will always form the cheapest coalition possible.
The issue is that is not easy to price. There is no such free market to find the price.

her current supporters understand that they willcontinue to receive private benefits as long as they remain loyal.
That's not always the case either.

The inability ofthe challenger to guarantee that the prospective defectors will alwaysbe members of his winning coalition is a substantial advantage forthe incumbent leader.
Incumbent advantage.

Unfortunately for the challenger, such a promise lacks longtermcredibility.
However, this is not the key point. The issue is that you cannot discuss it without cost. It's not like a bargain in a free market where you just leave without any negative effect if you fail to make a deal with each other.

nomenklatura
特供？

within the “rules” or norms of transition inthe existing system
This excludes nondemocratic countries.
Of course, in some forms of gov ernment the standard rules or norms for transitions include coup d’état, execution, and the like, so that the theory is not restricted to orderly transitions.
This is confusing: how come disorderly transitions are counted as "within the 'rules'"?

leader or leadership
those who have the authority to raise taxes and allocate government funds to pursue chosen policies, including private uses of the monies as well as uses aimed at the general welfare.

Because of the loyalty norm, leaders who rely on a broadbasedcoalition to remain in office cannot keep their supporters from defecting to a rival by offering substantial private benefits.
This is different in totalitarian countries where there are no such thing as rivals.
In totalitarian countries, the concept of rivals doesn't exist.

Leopold II
Very good example.

Why, if oppression is the solution to political longevity, are therelonglasting autocrats who avoid extreme oppressiveness and who,instead, provide peace and prosperity? Lee Kwan Yew held power inSingapore for twentysix years before voluntarily stepping aside.
Good point and good examples.

We take as axiomatic that everyonein a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is themaneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime.
I don't think it is central to politics in any type of regime.

The politics behind survival in office is,we believe, the essence of politics.
That's not true in democratic countries which shift leaders on a fixed and frequent schedule.

What leads to the selection and maintenance of democracyin some places, autocracy in others, military juntas in still others, whileothers choose monarchy or some other form of governance?
If you have to say "choose", it is not the choice of all people, but few in power.

the Bolshevik revolutionaries in Russia
This is not a good example. It was not the people's option. They are forced by power.


aau.edu20.org aau.edu20.org

Authoritarian rulers often establish narrow institutions, such as consultativecouncils, juntas, and political bureaus, as a first institutional trench againstthreats from rivals within the ruling elite. But we claim that when they needto neutralize threats from larger groups within society and to solicit thecooperation of outsiders, autocrats frequently rely on nominally democratic institutions. Specifically, partisan legislatures incorporate potentialopposition forces, investing them with a stake in the ruler’s survival. Bybroadening the basis of support for the ruler, these institutions lengthen his 1tenure.
So this paper focused on the threat from outsiders.

Mao ruled over China for 33 years,and each was responsible for millions of deaths
Where did you get the 33 years?

 Sep 2023

www.candoso.org www.candoso.org耕读社  关雎2

以前常把这诗解释为“民间情歌”，恐怕不对头，它所描绘的应该是贵族阶层的生活。
测试一下。

乐
Le 之还是 yue 之？

 Mar 2023

s3.uswest2.amazonaws.com s3.uswest2.amazonaws.com

EANWHILE THE7ORLD"ANKqSrGOODGOVERNANCEsDATA ESPECIALLYITSrCONTROLOFCORRUPTIONsSCORES PROVIDETHEBESTAVAILABLEMEASUREOFTHEDEGREETOWHICHTHOSEINPOWERABIDEBYTHELAW
good dataset.


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Democratic backsliding connotes a process related to yet still distinct from reversion to autocracy.
Definition of democratic backsliding.


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On the one hand
This is a test for CanDoSo.

 Nov 2022

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30
30 children?


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a survey conducted in east Asia found that 57% of thechildren had volunteered
East Asia?


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three institutional options
What are other two options?

Presidential term limits are often the first casualty of authoritarian backsliding,and in many jurisdictions have been extended or abolished entirely throughconstitutional amendments” (Choudhry and Bisarya 2014: 190)
Authoritarian backsliding.

When undemocratic practicespersisted, the AU elaborated various norms and set up an increasingly robustenforcement and sanctioning apparatus on unconstitutional changes of government (Vandeginste 2013).
This is a great mechanism. But, does it work?

the issue of a presidential term limit was raised by one speaker.
Only one speak, just like the case in Russia in 1993.

In theFifth Republic, no president was reelected more than once before the introduction of term limits in 2008.
What about Mitterrand?

1 December 1991
But it announced the independence on 16 December 1991. How?

The current political landscape of Kazakhstan bears strikingsimilarities to postcolonial African “imperial presidencies” (Prempeh 2008)
Prempeh, Kwasi H. 2008. ‘Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial Presidency in PostAuthoritarian Africa.’ Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 35(4): 761–834.

there is no turnover in power of the regime.
the term limits that take place in authoritarian regimes constitute leadership turnover that takes place within the regime itself, or restrictions to the tenure of the president/leader.

Fixed terms will continue and the 2018 constitutional change only meant that the top leader would be able to serve morethan two, but certainly not infinite, lifelong terms.
Naive.


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If a third party agreed to enforcethe terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initialgoals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants.
Not in Chinese Civil War between 19471949.


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In the absence of a supreme authoritythere is then the constant possibility that conflicts will be settled
What to define "constant possibility"?


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eligious repression fosters regime support and weakens group identityby inducing riskaverse behavioral response at the individual level and eliminating intermediate entities that carry out the transmission of cultural attitudes at the grouplevel.
It could not foster support for regime, but the fear of the regime.


www.jstor.org www.jstor.org

it is sometimesdifficult in a crisis to determine who is the troublemaker and who is the victim.1
Nonsense. It is normally obvious that who is the troublemaker.

 Oct 2022

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As applied to term limits, such asurvey suggests that constitutional changes away from extremely strict onetermlifetime limits should generally be allowed but that judges have strong normativegrounding to place limits on attempts to eliminate or radically ease presidentialterm limits, and that even very strict term limits should not themselves be struckdown as a UCA.
What's point?

Rafael Correa recently tried a version of this in Ecuador. Seeking a thirdterm, he obtained a constitutional amendment in 2015 removing constitutionalterm limits, on the promise that he would step down for a term in 2017. AfterCorrea’s handpicked successor Lenin Moreno assumed the presidency, he calleda referendum that reinstated term limits in early 2018.
This is a special case which the overstayer steps down voluntarily.

These executives are remarkably successful, and their “battingaverage” in the attempts is something like 80 percent.
80%! That is something.

For example,China’s abolition of term limits in the Constitution will likely allow Xi Jinpingto remain president for a very long time, but he will be subject to reelection bythe Chinese People’s Congress every five years.
The author is so naive.

as ofJanuary 2017, 72 percent of presidential constitutions had executive term limitsas against 3 and 4 percent for the upper and lower houses, respectively.
useful data.

Upon hearing a rule, one knows what one is supposed to do (or at least,what the rule says one is supposed to do). But upon hearing a principle, one knowsboth what one is supposed to do and why.
This is so clear.

However, we can rely on previous estimatesindicating that between 20 and 30 per cent of presidents extend the term in oneway or the other (Baturo 2014: 148; Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins 2011: 1845).
This is great information.

“the debate about term limits is the tradeoffbetween the possibility of dictatorial takeover and restriction of democraticchoice.
?

The institution of term limitscan be understood as the dependent variable, as the explanatory variable, as afocal point, and as an indicator—a tripwire.
 focal point
 indicatortripwire


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Empirical Analysis
反送中： AntiExtradition Law Amendment Bill Movement
Movement led by women is more likely nonpolitical, so more likely to be peaceful.

he female group are more united, comparing with men
Any supportive evidence for this argument?



WMD
Weapons of mass destruction


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Why do voters support politicians who undermine democracy?
Good questions.


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I refer to theprobability that an existing democracy will survive long enough to consolidate as theconsolidation odds and find that, on average, only about 1 in 3 democracies can expect todo so at the time of their transition.
1 in 3

Huntington’s twoturnover testand Gasiorowski’s twelveyear threshold
Is it a good index? Doubtful!


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when termlimitextensions are only short term and the incumbent stepsdown immediately thereafter (e.g. Brazil 1988, orComoros 2009).
stepped down voluntarily or by force

We define an incumbent takeover as an event perpetuatedby a ruling executive that significantly reduces the formaland/or informal constraints on his/her power.
Perpetuated or Perpetrated?

However, weare able to account for takeovers in such contexts byfirst using the removal of term limits as an observablemanifestation of expansion of incumbent power,
This is great.


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State Repression
Treat it as number?

the leading actor
Which means there is a leading actor, which is ambivalent with the organization level(spontaneous or well planned).
Maybe "main participants"?

relevant control variables
How about the time (how long does the event last), size (how many participants)

ed by the female (1), or not (0)
Could be dintinguished? How much is led by female?

1) Dissidents; 2) Employed; 3) Youth; 4) Civil Societies; 5) Political Opposition;6) EthnoReligious Minorities; 7) Armed Forces
They are intertwined with each other.

his paper argues that the use of violenceby protesters depends on the actor mobilisation experience.
Main Argument: * iolence is more extensively used in protest events led by actors with limited mobilization capacity, and weakly connected.

 Sep 2022

drive.google.com drive.google.com

MajorBlake
?

The Organization of African Unity (OAU)


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Second, many post–Cold War transitions were rooted more inthe weakness of incumbent governments than in the strength, strategies, ormobilization of opposition forces
A corruptive government is more critical.
So, should we wait for the complete corruption of CCP?


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facialrecognition software
面部识别技术

“picking quarrels and provokingtroubles”
寻衅滋事罪

fivehundred Confucius Institutes in foreign universities and other institutions.
So many?

hostile foreign forces
“境外敌对势力”

hide our light and nurture our strength
韬光养晦



the middle class is likelyto support some form of extremism.
That's right.

Chinese middle class is not exceptional at all.
Totally agree. It is not that Chinese middle class, or Chinese people is exceptional, but CCP is such an exceptional regime.

China is where they live and want to live;the Chinese regime is the regime that China has; and the regime’s truthis the truth they are prepared to live with.
Brilliant observation and depiction.

The Chinese middle class has no such associational life. The government outlaws organizations that might compete with the official topdown youth, women’s, and labor “mass organizations.”
老百姓“原子化”。

about 57 percent of the population
Based on a definition of the Asian middle class as those with consumption expenditures of $2 to $20 per person per day in 2005 PPP$, which counts more than 800million Chinese as middleclass in 2005.
Are you kidding? $2 $20 per day!

For example, in the2008 Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), which samples the entire population (both urban and rural) except for Tibet, when respondents wereasked to place themselves on a tenstep ladder from the lowest to thehighest status group in society, 58.2 percent ranked themselves in themiddle positions, 5 through 7.
Interesting! Most people are quite satisfied with their status.
Note that this survey is taken in 2008.

 Feb 2022

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1
Note: 1. Eightyfour percent of autocracies from 1946 to 2010 had a ruling party (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010), and 57 percent of these parties failed to outlive the founding leader (Meng 2019).

2
Note: 2. I use the terms “authoritarian regime” and “dictatorship” synonymously. I also use the terms “dictator,” “authoritarian leader,” and “president” interchangeably.

 Jan 2022

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I claim that constitutional rules thatdesignate a formal successor play a critical role in promoting peaceful leadershiptransitions in dictatorships
to designate a formal successor

Figure 1. Autocratic leadership transitions, 1946 to 2014.
peaceful vs. unpeaceful power transitions:
From 1946 to 2014, only 44 percent of autocratic leadership transitions were peaceful and resulted in the continuation of the regime after the departure of the incumbent.

regimes that formally designate the vice president asthe successor are more likely to undergo peaceful transitions
leadership succession, authoritarian regime, constitutional rules, Africa


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1.1 Bernoulli distribution
$$ Y \sim f_{B}(y ; \theta)= \begin{cases}\theta^{y}(1\theta)^{1y} & \forall y \in\{0,1\} \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases} $$
$$E[Y]=\theta$$
$$var(Y)=\theta(1\theta)$$

1.6 conclusion
The key innovation in the likelihood framework is treating the observed data as fixed and asking what combination of probability model and parameter values are the most likely to have generated these specific data.

maximum likelihood: general
General Steps
 Step 1: Express the joint probability of the data.
 Step 2: Convert the joint probability into a likelihood.
 Step 3: Use the chosen stochastic and systematic components to specify a probability model and functional form.
 Step 4: Simplify the expression by first taking the log and then eliminating terms that do not depend on unknown parameters.
 Step 5: Find the extrema of this expression either analytically or by writing a program that uses numerical tools to identify maxima and minima.

Definition 1.1 (Sum of squared errors (SSE))
$$ \mathrm{SSE}=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left[y_{i}\left(\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} x_{i}\right)\right]^{2} $$
$$ \begin{aligned} &\hat{\beta}_{0}=\bar{y}\hat{\beta}_{1} \bar{x} \\ &\hat{\beta}_{1}=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(y_{i}\bar{y}\right)\left(x_{i}\bar{x}\right)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(x_{i}\bar{x}\right)^{2}} \end{aligned} $$

1.4 Gaussian (normal) distribution
$$Y_i$$
is distributed iid normal with mean $$μ_i$$ and variance$$σ^2$$
$$ Y \sim f_{\mathcal{N}}(y ; \boldsymbol{\theta})=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \pi \sigma^{2}}} \exp \left[\frac{(y\mu)^{2}}{2 \sigma^{2}}\right] $$

Rather than consider the data as random and the parameters asfixed, the principle of maximum likelihood treats the observed data as fixedand asks: “What parameter values are most likely to have generated thedata?”
maximum likelihood:
The MLEs are those that provide the density or mass function with the highest likelihood of generating the observed data.

1.3 Bias and mean squared error
Let $$T(X)$$ be an estimator for $$\theta$$. The bias of $$T(X)$$, denoted $$\operatorname{bias}(\theta)$$, is $$ \operatorname{bias}(\theta)=\mathrm{E}[T(X)]\theta $$ The mean squared error, $$\operatorname{MSE}(\theta)$$, is given as $$ \begin{aligned} \operatorname{MSE}(\theta) &=\mathrm{E}\left[(T(X)\theta)^{2}\right] \ &=\operatorname{var}(T(X))+\operatorname{bias}(\theta)^{2} \end{aligned} $$

1.2 Binomial distribution
$$ \begin{aligned} X & \sim f_{b}(x ; n, p) \\ \operatorname{Pr}(X=k) &=\left\{\begin{array}{lll} \left(\begin{array}{l} n \\ k \end{array}\right) p^{k}(1p)^{nk} & \forall & k \in\{0, \ldots, n\} \\ 0 & \forall & k \notin\{0, \ldots, n\} \end{array}\right. \end{aligned} $$
where $$\left(\begin{array}{l}n \ k\end{array}\right)=\frac{n !}{k !(nk) !}$$ and with $$\mathrm{E}[X]=n p$$ and $$\operatorname{var}(X)=n p(1p) $$ The Bernoulli distribution is a binomial distribution with $$n=1$$.

The value of θ that the maximizes the likelihood function is called the maximumlikelihood estimate
Definition of MLE.

4.2 Mixture distribution/mixturemodel
$$ f\left(x ; w_{j}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\right)=\sum_{j=1}^{J} w_{j} g_{j}\left(x ; \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\right) $$
$$ \mathcal{L}\left(w_{j}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \mid \mathbf{x}\right)=\prod_{i=1}^{n}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{J} w_{j} g_{j}\left(x_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\right)\right] $$

Definition 4.1 (Profile Likelihood)
$$ \begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{p}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}\right) & \equiv \max _{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{2}} \mathcal{L}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_{2}\right) \\ & \equiv \mathcal{L}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{2}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}\right)\right) . \end{aligned} $$

4.1 Uniform distribution
Uniform distribution: $$ f(x)= \begin{cases}\frac{1}{ba} & x \in[a, b] \ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases} $$ $$E[x]={a+b\over2}$$ $$var(X)={(ba)^2\over12}$$


towardsdatascience.com towardsdatascience.com

Central Limit Theorem
the Central Limit Theorem tells us the sampling distribution of X̄ is closely approximated to a normal distribution.

the sample standard deviation S

standard error

Generally, bootstrap involves the following steps:
 A sample from population with sample size n.
 Draw a sample from the original sample data with replacement with size n, and replicate B times, each resampled sample is called a Bootstrap Sample, and there will totally B Bootstrap Samples.
 Evaluate the statistic of θ for each Bootstrap Sample, and there will be totally B estimates of θ.
 Construct a sampling distribution with these B Bootstrap statistics and use it to make further statistical inference, such as:
 Estimating the standard error of statistic for θ.
 Obtaining a Confidence Interval for θ.
