I wonder however if intentions are distinctive phenomenon, then, given a certain moral framework, how would they be evaluated within it? Do intentions have moral value, and should they? What about nefarious intentions, and what if they do not translate into action. Moreover, what if one's intentions are well-meaning, but their actions result in chaos. How would the moral value of such an action be evaluated if intentions are distinct phenomenon. Another question that can be posed here is, is it possible to locate where thought gets translated to intention--where that line lies, and if it is so that intention and thought are two distinct phenomenon, then do they lie within each other like sets or are they exclusive.

the author makes the distinction between consciously partaking or committing actions, and deciding to perform or action. The difference between the two, I believe, lies mostly in the performance of the action. I would however, like to add, though it may be too early in the paper to be charitable, that one does not only do things intentionally or intend to do things, sometimes actions come about unintentionally, the nuances of which are rife with potential to be explored.

I believe that confidence is being referred to here as a state of being, rather than a mental state, I wonder if this statement would be subject to changes if the cogito were to be invoked here.

I agree with this, as it recognizes the point that there is no one mental state, but rather multiple, and an individual flows from one to the other, depending upon circumstance and temperament. Mental states do not exist in extremes, but are rather objects that are subject to various things. The cognitive situation here could refer to what the brain is processing at any given moment.

This in between state of believe can potentially be called the state in which belief is being formed, where a person isn't consciously thinking about that which will inform their belief, but their beliefs are being informed nonetheless, by their experiences in the world, and also the lens with which they experience the world. I wonder if Kant would determine this in between state of belief to belong to the noumenal self or the phenomenal self? I would argue for the latter.

I believe that it is plausible to pinpoint such a moment, though it would require an extremely close analysis of the states of mind of the individual involved, their neurological condition, the state of their memory, etc. However, I do believe that there it is not theoretically impossible to pinpoint a moment wherein a belief becomes less accessible. The lessening of his accessibility can then be tracked via the theoretical model, and similarly to a star that twinkles, blinks in and out of existence, and slowly disappears from view, a belief too could function similarly.

I do think that our epistemic obligations are distinct from our moral ones, but not wholly so—I believe that moral obligations are and should be part of our epistemic obligations. If we have committed to a system that aims to determine knowledge based on a fair and just trial of evaluation, then we must consider moral stakes of the matter when dealing with social affairs and human individuals, since morality is inextricable from what governs most human behaviour, as is empathy and emotion. If we accept this, then it should not be difficult to accept that our manner of dealing with beliefs and judgements concerning human affairs should also be subject to moral stakes. Moral encroachment, in its own demanding and rigorous yet empathetic way, seems to offer a propitious resolution to the question of how a belief can be rational in every way required for knowledge but still be morally wrong.

Here, Basu notes that moral encroachment differs from pragmatic encroachment most distinctly in the sense that it does not accept the common assumption that facts, and specifically beliefs based off facts cannot be discriminate. She elaborates that while facts may be a product of probabilistic statistics, when we aim to form judgements about individuals and groups in society based solely on this, we refuse to take into account their individual life experiences, and fail to see them as unique human beings—distinct and independent, but rather reduce them to a statistic. A statistic that may not even be entirely reliable due to the historical experience of oppression faced by numerous marginalised groups. Whereas pragmatic encroachment prioritises one’s own position in the interaction—what harm may be done to me if I form a judgement based on insufficient evidence, moral encroachment prioritises the done imposed onto others due to beliefs and judgements formed on the basis of insufficient data.

It seems as though Basu is arguing for the position that that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations given that the world we occupy today contains several groups which have a historical experience of being oppressed or marginalised, which puts them at risk of being subject to beliefs that are a product of stereotype and/or bias. Although these beliefs may be epistemically justified and rational, and perhaps even true does not eliminate the risk of them being harmful beliefs. She does not just normatively argue for the notion that moral stakes be considered part of forming epistemic judgements, i.e., they should be--but rather that they are and that leaving moral considerations out while forming beliefs is epistemically irrational.

I believe that Basu’s argument holds credence given that the nature of beliefs concerning human affairs and objects are inherently different and thus, should be treated so. I maintain that what comes about when we perceive the world to present completely objective data and form our judgements on the basis of said data--poses a problem since completely objective data also present facts that give rise to bias and stereotype. Given the state of the world that we occupy, it is undeniable that it is an unfair one, due to reasons of historical oppression, war and systemic discrimination. All these aspects pose a problem when we set out to form beliefs and judgements in accordance with our epistemic obligations.

Given the author's thesis, I was wondering if it is a reasonable task to determine/ define the correctness of a belief in such a sense, since many people hold beliefs to be deeply personal and private. Not all beliefs that a person has may necessarily be true, and this knowledge may be possessed by the person themselves as well, but that does not make the belied any less of one. A belief is not fact, and facts are not beliefs--normatively too, when we speak of beliefs, there is an aspect of the personal attached to it. We do not use "believes" as a placeholder for "knows", nor is it a moniker for fact--and i think that inherently suggests that the nature of the correctness of a belief is more subjective, and thus cannot really be said to be determined through the truth value of its propositions. A belief may seem irrational on the surface, but if it holds great value for the person who upholds said belief, it seems uncharitable to suspend judgement on the correctness of it--especially if it a belief that does not have to do with how things are in the world.

This is interesting as it brings up questions regarding the nature of belief and their objects. Or rather what they entail. If the above statement is true, then I wonder what it implies for propositions that cannot be proved empirically or apriori, such as statements regarding a wish, hope or relating to religion or god. There are various beliefs constructed on ones notion of truth, but it may not always be that the proposition entailed in the belief is objectively true. Or does the proposition just need to be true in so far as the speaker holds it to be true in order for it to count as a belief?

The behavioural account of virtue takes virtue to be a kind of deliberate attitude or behaviour, but that seems to imply that one be virtuous only in the presence of others. That Robinson Cruso has a disposition to brag, but cannot do so, and thus isn't immodest--but despite not actually talking or exhibiting his sense of worth does not mean that he does not have those opinions. This would imply that everything, not just in regards to virtue, that a person is--is contingent on external behaviour, and undermines the mental states and internal attitudes of an individual.

I wonder if the quality of modesty is being too harshly characterised here, since modesty does not always imply that one must be ignorant of their self-worth, but rather that they behave in a manner that is humble and gracious. A modest individual may simply be grateful for the opportunities they have been given in life, and are aware of it--and choose to act in a manner that displays this sense of gratitude. Can it be characterised as a defect? Regardless of an epistemic one, or otherwise--since a modest person may be aware of their self-worth, but behave as such due to gratitude.

This statement suggests that the agent must be aware of and be consciously enacting certain attitudes--virtuous attitudes to be precise. However, what about virtues such as innocence and wisdom, assuming they are accepted as virtues--most would argue that their credit lies in the ignorance of the virtue itself, and not the knowledge of it. An innocent person does not enact their innocence deliberately, otherwise that would no longer be the quality of innocence but rather that a form of manipulation, a similar case can be made for wisdom. A wise man who proclaims himself to be wise, would be deemed arrogant. Do these examples not go against the broadly accepted view of what constitutes virtue?