74 Matching Annotations
  1. Last 7 days
    1. , “Can freedom of the will be proven from self-consciousness?” with a firm “No.”

      Lock IN ANSWER FOR KANT ESSAY Qsn: Does reason entail freedom? consciosuness of outer things: involves the understanding and reason

  2. Dec 2025
    1. [T]o be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character of that which is ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only in so far as Being-in as such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-world can ‘matter’ to it in this way. The fact that this sort of thing can ‘matter’ to it is grounded in Befindlichkeit (BT 176/137).

      to be affected by that which is ready to hand (equipment; given to us in bare nature) is possible only bc of how dasein is i=determined in its nature

    2. refers to the ‘that it is and has to be’ of Dasein (BT 173/134): to the fact that Dasein always already finds itself in social, political, cultural, and historical situations that it did not choose

      Facticity#

  3. Feb 2025
    1. examine the premises of the argumen

      (1). reasonable to assume that there are beings (but starting to argue that nothingness is imporbable from this claim seems to beg the question.) (2) Very reasonable because the properties of thinga can vary infinitleyy (imo the most plausible premise of this argument) (3) There's at most one possible world where there could be nothing again, plausible, bc theres only one way for there to be nothing, implied in its essence of being nothing. (4) *apparently disputed prem: for any 2 possible worlds, probability of their being actual is equal why? bc the mode of disticntion between the two possible worlds is completely arbitrary

    2. RatherIwill arguethat if therebeing nothingis not impossible, it is at anyrate improbable-as improbableas anythingcan be.

      Weaker thesis than original one not impossible for there to be nothing, but imporobable why? to avoid the implication of the PSR that every truth is a necessary truth (bc every truth has an explanation, thus couldnt have been otherwise

    3. Alpha' is apropername of the actualworld; if every fact has an explanation,the fact thatAlpha is actualhas an explanation;but if this fact hasan explanation,then every truthis a necessarytruth.

      read originasl paper

    4. beings entails thatthereis at least one necessarybeing, and henceentails that it is impossible for there to be nothin

      isn't this just begging the question??

    5. f thereare, asa matterof contingentfact, contingentbeings, there are also non-contingent beings-that is, necessary beings.

      existence of contingent beings implies existence of non-contingent (necessary beings) we cannot postulate one w/o the other, as one implies the other

      thus, any objectors would have to show wwhy contingency can exist w/o necesiity

    6. Consider the two properties,necessity (that is, necessaryexistence or existence in all possible worlds) and entity orconcrescence (the property of being a being or concreteobject). These two properties are compatible-it is notabsolutely or metaphysicallyor intrinsicallyimpossible forsomething to have both of them. Therefore,there is some-thing that has both of them; that is, there is a necessarybeing.

      i. property of necessity exists ii. property of entity/ concrescence exists iii. necessity & concrescence are compatible- possible for a being/ thing to have both properties iv. if its not metaphysically impossible for sth to have both of them, then there's sth that has both of them V. a necessary being is sth that has both necessity and concreteness, and there is a necessary being

      Problem: why do we accept premise 3 that they're compatible? consider counterexamples proving this to be false

    7. if there is a necessary being then it isimpossible for thereto be nothin

      central thesis: moving from proving that there's a necessary being from which it logically folllows that there cannot be nothing

    8. I can say only thatit seems to me hopeless to try to devise any argumentfor theconclusion that it is a necessary truththat there are beings that isnot also an argumentfor the conclusion that there is a necessarybeing

      the truth that concrete beings exist is inextricable from the truth that theree are necessary beings.

    9. if everything were an abstract object, if the onlyobjects were abstractobjects, there is an obvious and perfectlygood sense in which therewould be nothingat all, for therewouldbe no physical things, no stuffs, no events, no space, no time, noCartesianegos, no God...

      if there was a world of only abstract objects, unlike concrete objects this would be a world of nothing.

    10. assume that David Lewis's metaphysics ofmodality-'Genuine Modal Realism'-is wrong, and that the 'abstractionist'modalmetaphysicof Kripkeand Plantingaand Stalnakeris righ

      What's Lewis' genuine modal realism? What's abstract realism?

    Annotators

    1. ent valid, a further premiss mustthat for mental events to be causally relevmain, mental events mu

      needed formulation to the argument from causal overdetermination against dualism

      what are the implications of adding P4: For mental events to be causally relevant in the physical domain, mental events must cause physical events

      this is shown to be necessaary bc w/o p4 above, it is shown that mental events can be causally relevant even if they arent causes

      Further, we could disagree with her premise that double preventors or enabling events are not causes.

    2. cific case.hence that mental events are notthe event that is

      n1- neuron firing in fred brain (physical event, immediate cause) b1-fred's arm moving (effect) firing of n1 & so on & contraction of muscle fibres-> reciprocal disposition partners. together, they cause the movement of fred's arm i.e the mutual manifestation

      Double prevention: preventor-> freds desire to keep still (m2) double preventor-> stronger desire to move arm (m1) this overriding derire= enabling event & is the double preventor So far, causal chain: n1 -> n2 --> b1 thus: M1 prevents m2 from preventing n2 from causing b1 thus, m1 <- m2; <- n2 -->b1

    3. rought about, ifurther event (the dou

      So for an event to occur: i. complete cause ii. double preventer-> the enabling event mental events are double preventers bring about events that were prevented from occurring to occur by enabling the preventing event (other physical or mental events) from occuring.

    4. ton is

      so, like lowe, she's avoided the no gaps critique by positing relations between causes and different events so in her model: mental events, physical events physical causes and enabling events (mental events)

    5. absences cannot be causes, for an absence cannot bear po

      thus, this is only a defensible thesis if we take the powers of causation approach

      so to critique it, we must hold a different account of causation

    6. nt - is not, ac-cording to the powers theory of causation, a cause of the vase'sbreaking. The vase's breaking is a mutual manifest

      right, so the double preventer is not a cause of the breakin bc the breaking is a mutual manifestation of the dispositional properties of the objects so the cause is the fact of being fragile, and that of being hard, not the explosive device destroying the barrier but this is just a runabout way of saying it's an indirect cause???

    7. tion, a double pre-venter event is not to be counted as a cause of the event that it hasprevented from being preven

      why? what supports the fact that this isnt a cause?

    8. distinction between events that are causes and events that are'causal enabler

      types of events on this account: i. causes ii. causal enablers Proof: double prevention account s

    9. are 'reciprocal dispositionpartners' and the breaking of the vase is their 'mutual manifesta-tion

      Thus effect: breaking of vase Causes: vase's fragility & surface's hardness the causes -> reciprocal disposition partners effect-> mutual manifestation so like a combined cause from the vases dispositional proerty of fragility, and the surface's dispositional property of hardness*

    10. , a porcelain vase is disposed to breakwhen dropped on a hard surface. The power to break is built intosome property of the vas

      like dispositional properties

    11. Relevance : Mental events are causally relevant in the physi-cal domain.(2) Completeness : Every physical event that has a cause has animmediate and complete wholly physical cause.(3) Exclusion : There is no systematic causal overdetermina-tion.Therefore, mental events (that are causally relevant in the phys-ical domain) are identical with physical even

      Argument from causal overdetermination against dualism.

    12. e popular no-gap argument for the completenessprinciple and why it fails to generate a completeness principle of thestrength required to overcome these alternative duali

      main thesis

    1. which have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are eithertrue or fals

      so,truth cant be analysed in reference to facts but only to beliefs, because facts are true (bc of the isomorphic relation) truth is mapped to facts and thus cannot be separated

    1. he entities that are satisfied are sentences both open and closed; the satisfiers are functions that map the variables of the object language on to the entities over which they range—almost everything,

      form of logical atomism@

    1. . Strawson in general, though with reservations, accepted, I believe, that description, but contended that, nevertheless, to say a certain statement is true is not to assert that those conditions are satisfied but to do something else such as endorsing the statement said to ‘be true’. This was the principal issue, I think, between us, but we are not concerned with it here

      Strawson accepted the description (facts and corresponds don't occur as a description of the conditions that must be satisfied) but contended that saying a statement is true is not asserting that conditions are satisfied, but to endorse it.

    1. statings are assessed as, for example, correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate, and so forth.

      that's just another way of saying 'corresponds to truth or doesnt' this is a very circular explanation truth comes in many forms correct= true in regard to the nature of thing or historic event x

    2. as possessing the property

      problem lies in what type of thing truth is to begin with. Is it a property? a predicate? we need to understand it ontological status to be able to make claims about what is or isnt true

  4. academic.oup.com academic.oup.com
    1. in any way, however indirect, any feature whatsoever of the situation or event; a statement no more needs, in order to be true, to reproduce the ‘multiplicity,’ say, or the ‘structure’ or ‘form’ of the reality, than a word needs to be echoic or writing pictographic. To suppose that it does, is to f

      There's no need for words in making a true statement (truthmakers) to mirror any feature of the situation or event

      to be true, a statement foes not meed to reproduce the multiplicity/structure/form of reality

    2. Corresponds’ also gives trouble, because it is commonly given too restricted or too colourful a meaning, or one which in this context it cannot bear. The only essential point is this:

      moving the goal post, by changing/narrowing the definition to avoid too much committment to a theory

    3. act that’ is a phrase designed for use in situations where the distinction between a true statement and the state of affairs about which it is a truth is neglected;

      deflationary approach

    4. I can only describe the situation in which it is true to say that I am feeling sick by saying that it is one in which I am feeling sick (or experiencing sensations of nausea):

      no independent access theory?

    5. ‘Let's look at the facts’ he does not crawl round the carpet, but proceeds to utter a string of statements: we even talk of ‘stating the facts’;

      isn't he collapsing correspondence to deflationism?

    1. ogical atomism is designed to go with the ontological view that the world is the totality of atomic facts (cf. Wittgenstein 1921, 2.04); thus accommodating objection 3.F2 by doing without funny facts

      strategy seems to be restricting the definition of facts to the atomic

    2. isomorphism

      Structural isomorphism is a mathematical concept that describes when two structures have the same properties and can be mapped onto each other while preserving their structure

      Isomorphism: one-to-one mapping; mapping of truth to facts/state of affiars w/o either losing structure;; disambiguation

    3. One would expect a correspondence theory to go beyond a mere definition like (1) or (2) and discharge a triple task: it should tell us about the workings of the correspondence relation, about the nature of facts, and about the conditions that determine which truthbearers correspond to which facts.

      supports sub-thesis that correspondence as a theory is an insufficient account

    4. Definitions like (1) or (2) are too narrow. Although they apply to truths from some domains of discourse, e.g., the domain of science, they fail for others, e.g. the domain of morality: there are no moral facts.

      weak objection?

    5. Form (2) does not imply that things outside the category of truthbearers (tables, dogs) are false just because they don’t correspond to any facts

      take the 2 definition of facts and truth (i.e a state of affairs that obtains

    1. locutionary or illocutionary purposes o

      locutionary: the utterance itself illocutionary: the meaning behind a sentence (the speaker's intention; illocutionary act ~ illocutionary force

    2. Can a declarativesentencefailto describeany type of state of affair

      it can, but negative existentials are not part of this bc if we complicate it, we can see that it describes the state of affairs of my idea of an abstract entity or system

    3. in particular , a statement expressed with a one-word sentence,refer to a state of affairs

      depending on the one word sentence, the meaning may be implicit eg ' actually, cant find examples in english so, more inclined to say that they can't correspond to states of affairs and thus have no truth value, because the meaning is insufficient. meaning is derived from a relation between objects, and in a one word sentence, there is no relation unless that otherwise assumed.

      the 'sum' example is a weak cop-out because in our understanding of its meaning, we get a 2 word sentence 'i am' whose meaning is derived from the relation between 'me' and 'being'

    4. The cat is on the mat .'

      what are the implications for negative existentials in this four state structure? change 'the cat is on the mat' to include non-existing, abstract objects in a proposition: 'harry, ron and hermione are in the invisible cloak/ or in gryffindor' this is true, but only corresponds to 'non-facts; a state of affairs' in an abstract system thus, correspondence can only work if facts are broadened to include abstract entiites and situations

      or we can just say that they're false in this world but true in others but that just diminishes the idea of universal truth

    5. nguistic efficiency .They make the language more adaptable and learnable . But they do notmake its expressions any more capable of being true . A correspondence ascongruence theory cannot account , Austin insis

      Situations wherein expressions mirror the facts in the world are a linguistic efficiency but are not necessary eg 'sum' which means 'i am' has a truth value even when they're not isomorphic (i.e correspond to or share the same structure?*) But is this true??? I am does correspond to my being in the world??

    6. ot a matter of the congruence between atruth bearer and a fact : " There is no need whatsoever for the words used inmaking a true statement to ' mirror ' in any way , however indirect , anyfeature whatsoever of the situation or event " ( 1950 , 125). The correspondencebetw

      There's no need for words in a true statement to mirror any feature of a situation/event. The correspondence is conventional

    7. identical to the state of believing that there issomethingthat has the property of being Santa Claus and that has a whitebeard? Second, on Russell's analysis, ' Santa Claus has a white beard'comesout false, but intuitively , it seemsto be true.4

      solution: maybe the true fact that this corresponds to is an abstract one, like, the idea of santa claus is a man with a white beard (thus, the idea is true). seems like he's conflating belief with existence (or equivocating?)

    8. that there is no Santa Claus doesnot prevent themfrom having this belief. Hence, it seemsthat if belief is a relation, it cannotbe a relation betweenreally extant objects.

      how does he move from the explanation of how russels theory allows for false beliefs to this? criticism

    Annotators

  5. Nov 2024
  6. May 2024

    Annotators

    1. rinciples of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely, the same in all men

      We do not all have the same capacity to correctly or accurately judge works of art/engage in aestgetic judgement hence we need true judges/

    2. By comparison alone we fix the epithets of praise or blame, and learn how to assign the due degree of each.

      Because the works of art are no longer self-referential and thus may be contrasted to one another for a judgement to ve made

    3. Not to mention, that there is a species of beauty, which, as it is florid and superficial, pleases at first; but being found incompatible with a just expre

      In our practice, we must learn to reformulate our opinions and position as things reveal themselves to us more clearly. Thus practice allows us to appraise the true nature, and must be done often to equate to true judgement

    4. Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact, as to perceive every ingredient in the composition:

      So the true judges, had they been in the case described from Don quixote, would instantly be able to identify both the leather and the iron and thus present the truth/reality of the wine more accurately and completely.

    5. But who laughed in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom an old key with a leathern thong tied to it.

      they were both right, but one aspect, either the leather or the iron was ignored or not noticed by them. What explaisn this disparity?

    6. If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the perfect beauty; i

      If there were a consensus on what we consider beautiful, then a perfect beauty, a standard which is objectivwly definable and appraisable can be reached;;;; true judges.

    7. that amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, there are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind.

      Amidst the undeniable subjectivism governing our capacity for beauty, there are some general principles (objective) that guide our judgements, not just sentiment. This is governed by our faculty for reason and rationality.

    1. If we believe that inequalityis in itself bad, we may think it bad whoever the people arebetween whom it holds.

      Basically, if we believe inequality to be intrinsically bad, it's irrelevant who this inequality affects, it will still be bad It is simillarly irellevant how the inequality begun, how it plays out eg in health, money, opportunity etc. Its bad in all possible ways, cases