immediate, and that only by means of it is inner experience--not indeed the consciousness of my own existence, but thedetermination of it in time --possible. Certainly, the representation 'I am', which expresses the consciousness that canaccompany all thought, immediately includes in itself theexistence of a subject; but it does not so include any knowledgeof that subject, and therefore also no empirical knowledge,that is, no experience of it. For this we require, in addition tothe thought of something existing, also intuition, and in thiscase inner intuition, in respect of which, that is, of time, thesubject must be determined. But in order so to determine it,outer objects are quite indispensable; and it therefore followsthat inner experience is itself possible only mediately, andonlythrough outer experience.
This is a key section that explains how we need a subject "I" in our narratives, yet it has no definite description, knowledge, or experience. It must rely on inuition--time-- to create such experiences and that intuition of time is predicated on the existence of outside objects to allow for time to even occur.