Within a month, Carter's popularity realized a dramatic boost from a low of 32% to 58%,

Nov. 16: Muhammad Riza Shah Pahlavi said in Washington that Iran would work actively against an increase in oil prices in 1978. [NYTI

in a regional conflict might disrupt the coalition or trigger a geographical escalation, American officials spent considerable time and energy in the wee

334 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL anything against Iraq.'7 Such remarks heightened Israeli concern that Iraq's nuclear programme was approaching a critical phase. Israel began detailed contingency planning for possible opera- tions against Iraq's unconventional military capability and for countering the Scud and Su-24 threats. Another source of Israeli concern was the increasing scope and degree of military co-oper- ation between Iraq and Jordan, including a joint air force squad- ron operating in Iraq, a planned joint me

Israel especially feared that Iraq might use Jordan as a springboard for a surprise attack, an alarming prospect because an attacking Su-24 could reach Tel Aviv from the Israeli- Jordanian border near the Dead Sea in 2.5 minutes.8

ISRAELI DECISION-MAKING IN THE GULF WAR 329 tary operation in the Third World, that the United Nations Secu- rity Council would authorize a collective security action, that the Iraqi air force would seek refuge in Iran, or that Israel would weather a sustained ballistic missile attack against two of its larg- est cities without responding? Any one of these developments would seem to qualify as a talking dog. Of all these features of the Gulf War, the last may be the most remarkable. For the first time in history, one state employed its military forces against the metropolitan territory of another without eliciting so much as a single shot in return. It may be that this was also the first time in history that a state attempting to goad another into war failed to do so. Moreover, by not responding to Iraq's assault, and by accepting the deployment of American Patriot air defence missiles and crews to intercept Scud missiles, Israel forsook two cardinal tenets of its security policy: (i) swift and decisive retaliation to any and all armed attacks; and (2) military self-reliance - a policy reinforced less than a week before the outbreak of war by the statement of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that Israel's defence 'always was and always will be the sole and exclusive responsibility of the government of Israel.'1 To add to the sense of wonder, it may be noted that for several months - indeed, right up to the eve of war itself - Israel's highest officials had stated repeatedly and une- quivocally that Israel would respond if attacked.2 There can be 1 Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1991, 1. Editorially, the Post acknowledged that Israel's dependence on American forces during the Gulf War set a dangerous precedent: 20 January 1991, 4. 2 Shamir, for example, stated: Saddam Hussein knows that it he tries to attack Israel, we shall

ISRAELI DECISION-MAKING IN THE GULF WAR 329 tary operation in the Third World, that the United Nations Secu- rity Council would authorize a collective security action, that the Iraqi air force would seek refuge in Iran, or that Israel would weather a sustained ballistic missile attack against two of its larg- est cities without responding? Any one of these developments would seem to qualify as a talking dog. Of all these features of the Gulf War, the last may be the most remarkable. For the first time in history, one state employed its military forces against the metropolitan territory of another without eliciting so much as a single shot in return. It may be that this was also the first time in history that a state attempting to goad another into war failed to do so. Moreover, by not responding to Iraq's assault, and by accepting the deployment of American Patriot air defence missiles and crews to intercept Scud missiles, Israel forsook two cardinal tenets of its security policy: (i) swift and decisive retaliation to any and all armed attacks; and (2) military self-reliance - a policy reinforced less than a week before the outbreak of war by the statement of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that Israel's defence 'always was and always will be the sole and exclusive responsibility of the government of Israel.'1 To add to the sense of wonder, it may be noted that for several months - indeed, right up to the eve of war itself - Israel's highest officials had stated repeatedly and une- quivocally that Israel would respond if attacked.2 There can be 1 Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1991, 1. Editorially, the Post acknowledged that Israel's dependence on American forces during the Gulf War set a dangerous precedent: 20 January 1991, 4. 2 Shamir, for example, stated: Saddam Hussein knows that it he tries to attack Israel, we shall strike back. Our allies are aware of our position and of our state of readiness.' The foreign minister, David Levy, warned of a 'strong response' and Very painful' retaliation, a point he stressed repeatedly, including to a group of visiting American congressmen. The minister of defense, Moshe Arens, likewise made several similarly definitive statements. On this issue, the cabinet was unanimous. See, eg, Jerusalem Post, 2 January 1991, 1; David Makovsky, 'Scenarios: will Israel hit Iraq?' Jerusalem Post, 4 January 1991, 9; and Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1991, 1. Prominent Israeli military figures echoed the theme. For example, Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli military intelligence, wrote (Jerusalem Post, 8 January 1991, 4): 'Saddam

ve strikes at two airbases in western Iraq (designated h-2 and H-3) from which SU-24S could operate and where Israeli intelligence had identified 10 fixed Scud sites.13 Arens also pressed for an intensive effort to locate and destroy the estimated 25 to 50 mobile Scud launchers deployed in the desert of western Iraq.14 To this end, Israel gave the United States 'most of its intelligence secrets regardi

and shared with the American military the results of exercises Israeli forces had conducted to perfect Scud-hunting techniques in the desert

e and bomb damage assessments, real- time battlefield intelligence on western Iraq, and the iff (Iden- tification Friend or Foe) codes that would have enabled Israeli aircraft to operate in western Iraq without running the risk of being mistaken for hostile aircraft and engaged by coalition interceptors.16 These requests posed a dilemma for Washington: the more it conceded to Israel, the easier it

One source of friction was the fact that the United States was supplying its Arab coalition partners with advanced weapons systems that threatened to erode the qualitative edge upon which Israel relied to compen- sate for its numerical disadvantage.

Touring Arab capitals the week before the outbreak of war, the secretary of state, James Baker, received quiet assurances that the allies would permit such a

The second track of the American diplomatic effort concen- trated on convincing Israeli leaders of the enormous costs asso- ciated with Israeli military action.

to demonstrate that Israel's patience was wearing thin. Still oth- ers are inclined to think the signal was intended for both audi- ences. A final group admits being baffled by the move, inter- preting it primarily as a sign of Israeli frustration. Whatever the case may be, Israel now began to insist on play- ing a role in hunting the Scuds. The United States initially attempted to deflect the request, arguing that there was nothing Israel could add to the effort and that any overt Israeli partici- pation could disrupt the coalition. But Israel insisted, and the United States ultimately agreed,

The military options Well before the outbreak of war, the idf had prepared and con- ducted exercises on a series of military options,

That Israel came closest to undertaking military action immedi- ately after Scud attacks is hardly coincidental; indeed, both Israelis and Americans indicate that the main source of pressure to respond was emotive. Israeli leaders experienced a perfectly normal phenomenological response to each and every strike: first shock, then anger, followed by an intense desire for retribution

At no point did Israel decide as a matter of policy not to respond to Iraq's attacks. Instead, after each attack, Israeli leaders merely decided not to respond immediately. Thus the 'decision' was under constant review and subject to change at any time.

tary operation; yet the more it resisted, the more difficult it would be to demonstrate to the Israelis that the United States was making every possible effort to find and destroy the Scuds

336 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL war to eliminating the Iraqi threat to Israel, noting that the only sure way to prevent Israel from entering the conflict was to pre- vent or defeat Iraqi attacks against it. The minister of defense, Moshe Arens, pushed for early and massive strikes at two airbases in western Iraq (designated h-2 and H-3) from which SU-24S could operate and where Israeli intelligence had identified 10 fixed Scud sites.13 Arens also pressed for an intensive effort to locate and destroy the estimated 25 to 50 mobile Scud launchers deployed in the desert of western Iraq.14 To this end, Israel gave the United States 'most of its intelligence secrets regarding Iraq'15 and shared with the American military the results of exercises Israeli forces had

Israel pushed hard for an American commitment to give top priority in the event of

As part of his strategy to sow dissension in the ranks of the multinational coalition arrayed against him and to bolster his support in the Arab world, Saddam Hussein repeatedly threat- ened to strike Israel if attacked by the United States and its allies

ndeed, right up to the eve of war itself - Israel's highest officials had stated repeatedly and une- quivocally that Israel would respond if attacked.

Moreover, by not responding to Iraq's assault, and by accepting the deployment of American Patriot air defence missiles and crews to intercept Scud missiles, Israel forsook two cardinal tenets of its security policy: (i) swift and decisive retaliation to any and all armed attacks; and (2) military self-reliance - a policy reinforced less than a week before the outbreak of war

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The vast difference in preparation time between the fire units in Saudi Arabia and Israel is important: whereas the U.S. crews in Saudi Arabia had up to five months in-country to prepare for war, the Israeli equipment and crews were fighting within hours of their deployment. This was due to circumstances beyond anyone's control, but was nevertheless of critical importance in what followe

EVENTS LEADING UP TO DESERT STORM IN ISRAEL As the coalition was being formed during the summer and early fall of 1990, Saddam made clear his intention to strike Israel with TBMs if the coalition attacked. The question of active defense for the major Israeli population centers (Haifa and Tel Aviv) came into focus. Saddam's strategy of attempting to draw Israel into any war that might develop, and thereby to break away the Arab members of the coalitio

THE PATRIOT AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM The Patriot is a complete air defense system. It includes sensors, missiles, launchers, command and control, computers, operator consoles, communications, tactical and maintenance software, training facilities, and an integrated logistics system. Its major elements consist of

The U.S. government has, however, put forth "order of magnitude" performance figures in unclassified publications. Brigadier General Robert Drolet, U.S. Army Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Air Defense, issued a statement on December 6, 1991, stating that: "In Saudi Arabia, Patriot successfully engaged over 80 percent of the TBMs within its coverage zone [and] in Israel . . . Patriot successfully engaged over 50 percent of the TBMs in the coverage zone."

Nevertheless, the casualty rates per TBM in Israel and Saudi Arabia differed from those in the comparison examples by orders of magnitud

Scuds killed 300 people on a single day.5 And in the end, it was Saddam who sued for peace, not the coalition

During the course of Desert Storm, the world witnessed the Patriot-Scud duels night after night on television. Patriot's very credible performance and success can be measured by the events as they occurred. The coalition did not falter. Israel did not have to mount offensive actions against Iraq, and was able to stay out of the war