ubiquitous

coproduction

promote networks between communities of scientists and policy makers

scientists have a difficult choice to make between the need to specialize and maintain an image of academic objectivity

). Meaningful influence requires a long-term strategy to form alliances and develop knowledge of policy makers and policy making, not a one-off dissemination of state-of-the-art knowledge.

indicating what ways of thinking are in good “currency”

core group of policy makers

use intermediaries such as “knowledge brokers”

. They highlight differences in academic and political “cultures”

The most frequently reported barriers relate to the lack of time, support, resources, and incentives for scientists to disseminate high-quality information effectively (Cairney 2016 ; Oliver et al. 2014).

This takes place in an unpredictable policy-making environment in which attention can lurch from issue to issue, policy is made routinely in networks, and the “rules of the game” take time to learn

This can only be done by directlyjuxtaposing the different takes of lay interests, experts andstakeholder interests relevant in each case-specific instance ofdecision-making.

an understanding of power ascontingent and vested in interaction amongst actors inspecific material contexts could offer a significant methodo-logical option for exposing the ways that actors attempt toengage knowledge to their advantage in the policy process(Law, 1998; Castree and MacMillan, 2001; Latour, 2005).

validity of evidence would benefitfrom a more transparent treatment of the division into lay andexpert knowledge in evidence generation.

Moreover, as environmental problemsthemselves are complex and fall within the realm of a numberof scientific and socio-economic disciplines, knowledge aboutthe environment characteristically involves a degree ofuncertainty.

Our primary goal in this paperhas been to provide a conceptual synthesis of theories andempirical findings pertaining to the evidence–policy relation-ship and contribute towards a better understanding of whyaspirations for achieving better policy through more effectiveuse of evidence in the policy process are more difficult toachieve than might first appear.

This emphasises the need to pay attention tothe context in which knowledge is commissioned or selectedforuse,aswellasproduced.

waywardness

.Radaelli (1999)draws attention to howuncertainty and lack of transparency in policy decision-making procedures provide opportunities for different actorssuch as representatives of research or administrative exper-tise to seize power over the ‘logic’, or mode, of policy decision-making

Consequently, problem framing (i.e. precisely definingthe problem at hand and how severe it is) has become acentral issue in attempts to find policy solutions toenvironmental problems and threats (Hajer and Wagenaar,2003; Gottweis, 2003; Murdoch, 2006).

Not surprisingly, several writers emphasise that thedistinction between lay and expert knowledge is a politicalone, and ultimately concerns the allocation of power in policydecision-making.

Instead of endorsing the polarisation of lay vs.expert in evidence generation, experts’ roles could includedeciphering and interpreting complex issues to a wider publicaudience, thus facilitating public involvement in decision-making (Fischer, 2002).

in orderto qualify as ‘usable knowledge’ for policy decision-making,scientific knowledge needs to be capable of commandingsufficient political support

One ofthe defining claims for scientific knowledge is its objectivity

While the institutionalised practices of policydecision-making seem to place much emphasis on scientifi-cally generated (expert) knowledge (e.g.Turnpenny et al.,2008), in order to qualify as ‘usable knowledge’ (Haas, 2004a:573) scientific information needs to be regarded as relevant,accessible and ‘neutral’ (in other words produced in condi-tions free of the influence of non-scientific interests).

The synthesis aspires to alertknowledge producers and policy practitioners to the chal-lenges posed by the above three dimensions of policy decision-making and to highlight some of the possible implications forhow research priorities are set and how policy decision-making is designed and managed.

We claim that the way evidence is produced,selected for and interpreted in policy-making and implemen-tation is heavily influenced by decisions about social valuesand moral and ethical choices pertinent to environmentalpolicy

We use these todemonstrate that the evidence–policy relationship is not asclear cut as some advocates of more evidence based policymight like.

Indeed, while individuals,organisations and public policy-makers are subjected toincreasing volumes of evidence on the state of the environ-ment and potential impacts of their decisions and activities,experience from OECD countries shows that decisions whichtruly aim to balance environmental considerations withsocial and economic ones still seem rather thin on theground

Gullibility kills.

This rhetoric is only slightly more inflamed than what the tobacco industry has from time to time uttered for public consumption.

You might think that before they denounce unwelcome research findings, major corporations would devote their considerable resources to checking out the safety of the products they propose to manufacture.

But applied judiciously, it can make all the difference in the world—not least in evaluating our own arguments before we present them to others.

Knowing the existence of such logical and rhetorical fallacies rounds out our toolkit.

observational selection

But it can be much more dangerous than that, and when govern-ments and societies lose the capacity for critical thinking, the results can be catastrophic

(I have an opinion myself.)

inuring us to lies lays the groundwork for many other evils.

inuring

rainfall of deception

banal homilies.

facts are more comforting than the fantasy.

Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances requiresomeone to talk without knowing what he is talking about.

Someone who lies and someonewho tells the truth are playing on opposite sides, so to speak, inthe same game. Each responds to the facts as he understandsthem, although the response of the one is guided by the authorityof the truth, while the response of the other defies that authorityand refuses to meet its demands. The bullshitter ignores thesedemands altogether.

It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knowsthe truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction.

our attitude toward bullshit isgenerally more benign than our attitude toward lyin

Unlike plainlying, however, it is more especially a matter not of falsity but offakery.

bullshitting involves a kind of bluff

This is a call for the facts.

Her fault is not that she fails to get things right, but thatshe is not even trying.

germane

If Pascal’s simile is offensive, thenwhat figurative or allusive uses of language would not be?

pretentious

Deceptive misrepresentation

Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short oflying

I am uncertain just how close inmeaning the word humbug is to the word bullshit.

Myaim is simply to give a rough account of what bullshit is and howit differs from what it is not, or (putting it somewhat differently)to articulate, more or less sketchily, the structure of its concept.

we have no theory

Inconsequence, we have no clear understanding of what bullshit is,why there is so much of it, or what functions it serves.