I believe this to be an inherent property of Islamic society, but not the overarching goal of it. As we've discussed a good portion of Arabic philosophy stems from translation of Aristotle. While he values political science as the highest good and notes the importance of political freedom, I believe it is his concept of philia that is the center of the Islamic political world. I think achieving political freedom is ensured in the cultivation of philia in a society. Philia holds the notion that we should all treat another as if we are a friend. Rather than just random faces on the street, applying philia makes society more interpersonal. In order to treat someone like a friend, a true friend, equality of persons is required. One could not apply philia to someone they treat like a slave. Political freedom is not necessarily the goal, but an ensured outcome in reaching for the goal of cultivation of philia. Ultimately, I think the goal of Islamic society is to be a virtuous one, under aristotle's definition and conditions. Respecting other's political freedom is simply one aspect of that.

motivation counts as a felt emotion

i reject this on the grounds that a being doesn't need consciousnessness in order to have an emotional response to its environment.

I disagree with this. A being doesn't have to be rationally motivated necessarily in order for it to be happy as a reaction to life and sad as a reaction to death.

might not have to be conscious to show this pleasure or displeasure. If one ate rotten food they could be displeased by it and spit it out instinctively without being conscious of it directly.

It is under these grounds that a creature is not a wellfare subject with no moral status.(For a conscious being)

If blobs are incapable of emotional feeling then they are not wellfare subjects.

i agree with this

no

no

I disagree with this on some occasions. As long as a being has ability to feel emotions it, their lives have value. they just might not be aware of this value.

emotion

however, i hold that a creature doesn't need a consciousness in order to have something go good or bad for it. There are also things that are good or bad for something from an objective point of view. Starvation would be objectively bad for any living creature, while as living is universally good for one.

i disagree as they have the capacity to feel emotion. This moral status , however, is lesser than a human's.

i agree. i also hold that each of these can be held in certain degrees. One welfare subject can have more or less moral staus than another, this is in relation to having greater degrees of wellbeings.

if these zombies exhibit signs of being scared in this situation, perhaps shaking or moving erratically, then i hold it would be wrong to kill them. However, their capacity for emotion is lesser than the human's because they can experience and be self-aware of this capacity. Because they can feel their emotions on a deeper level, they have greater moral status than the zombies.

vulcans, on my view, have wellbeing, however this wellbeing is in proportionate to their capacity for emotion. Humans have more wellbeing, or more complex wellbeing, than vulcans because they have greater capacity for emotion and can also experience this.

I'd like to hold that emotions need not be positively or negatively valanced, there can be neutral emotions. Emotions are often responses to stimuli, and if one is responding to a neutral stimuli, then i believe the emotion caused can be neutral as well. For example, curiosity doesn't always need to be positively or negatively valanced. If it is curiosity of the unknown, not enough information may be available to the subject to form a positive or negative valance.

lets take feldman's example and modify it. suppose this is an unconscious zombie similar to a human in every other way physically. It can do any physical action a human can do. The zombie has the same accident as the motorcyclist in the example. Before the accident, the zombie went through life exhibiting behavior that was neutral in every way, showing no sign of pleasure of displeasure in any sense or at any period of time. After the accident, even if the zombie has no physical sensation, it exhibits behavior that shows it is pleased with life. Even if this behavior is as simple as walking around with a smile on the zombies face, or senselessly humming a joyful tune, it shows taking pleasure in life.

wrongly excludes other beings who are not conscious but still have complex lives and felt emotions

disagree

reject this too

consciousness + autonomy, consciousness without autonomy or bodily control we would not value conscious experience as much.

do blobs have any moral significance then? would it be better to kill 1 blob for 5 zombies? standards for moral significance.

i agree with this

if something can have desires, want or not want to do something, if it has autonomy, it has moral status.

might not have positive or negative affective states, (which to me are kinds of emotion), but does still have capacity to feel emotion, as descibed. The fact that they want to do something shows they feel desire for one thing over the other. Desiring, or wanting something, counts as a instinctive feelings, therefore it counts as an emotion. (therefore vulcans are wellfare subjects) I also think this description of wants and desires is contradictory to the above premises set. if they experience desire i think that entails an experience of a positive affective state. desire has been described, given by a seperate philosopher, as having a 'pro attitude' towards somthing.

these "affective states" are emotions, singer values conscious experience of them however I value them intrinsically for the sake of wellbeing. Doesn't matter if one can experience an affective state, of any kind, as long as it has the capacity for different affective states.

I largely agree with this, however the only difference is I don't believe these emotions have to be experienced in order to matter to contribute to wellbeing/moral status.

this is a specific kind of consciousness though, valence consciousness. this kind of consciousness differs because of its pro or con attitudes. A pro or con attitude is an emotion by my definiton.

emotions*

unconscious emotional creatures may not experience emotion but still demonstrate emotional behavior.

(maybe quote this)- as long as zombies can feel emotions, they can have wellbeing. If, for the sake of the though experiment, these zombies are the closest thing to us without consciousness, then it's reasonable to think they can still have emotions. They lose the ability to experience these emotions like we do, but they can still feel certain things emotionally, like how we can experience emotions unconsciously.

my own view- if it can emotionally feel somethings it has wellbeing (therefore moral status)

curriculum teaches a polarized view of an 'evil' crime, teaches how to prosecute and deal with the most extreme cases. This leads to overcriminalization. Less sever cases and proceedings are dealt with as if it's sever as homocide.

inferring that all acts of crime are some kind of "evil"

villainization of criminals (Lefkowitz quote).

never prompted to question why distinctive penalties are the only option of punishment. Why punishment (not rehabilitation) is the assumed deserved response to crime.

who's to say the enitre legal and prison system isn't the same in nature? what are some fundamental differences in principle or execution of this systems that would make one believe these injustices are not congruent.

rather than prisons, a form a rehabilitation could be the answer. Many drug addicts, addicts in general, are sent to rehab for rehabilitation. Regardless of how violent or severe the addiction is, Rehab is mean to rehabilitate and help these people rather than punish them for their choices and mistakes.

laims that the certainty of his entire system of physics is grounded in the certainty of his metaphysical principles. Descartes believed that by establishing a firm foundation in metaphysics, he could build a system of physics that was equally certain and reliable.

no.

a holistic monistic view approach rather than dualistic.

Descartes brings up the example of heaviness to illustrate the difference between primary and secondary qualities. He argues that heaviness, as a primary quality, is an inherent property of objects that can be objectively measured and understood through mathematical analysis. However, the sensation of heaviness, as a secondary quality, is subjective and varies depending on the observer's perception and physiological state.(distiguishing between objective reality and sensory perceptions)

introspection and a clear + distinct understanding. extension-sensory experiences + introspection. Thought- introspection and reflective counsciousness. union- inference + rational reflection. (introspection, sensory experience, and rational reflection.)

mind and body interact through the union of their primitive notions (thought and extension). Although extension and thought are fundamentally distinct, their union allows for causal interaction. Descartes suggests that the pineal gland, located in the brain, serves as the point of interaction between mind and body. Through this union, mental states can influence bodily states and vice versa, without violating the laws of nature. 3 primitive notions: essense of body- extension, essense of mind- thoug, essence of mind+body- union (know these through intelelct, intellect + imagination, + sensation)

If the mind is distinct from the body and the two are seperate, how sre they connected and how could they interact? Says in order for mind to move the body there needs to be contact or extension present, which isn't possible since the mind is not extented and immaterial

Descartes then argues that, since he himself is a finite and imperfect being, he cannot be the cause of the idea of God. Therefore, the idea of God must have originated from a cause that possesses infinite formal reality—i.e., a perfect being that is God. Descartes concludes that the existence of God is necessary to explain the presence of the idea of God within human minds.

This is the third causal principle: the cause of the idea must be at least as perfect as what the idea represents. He uses this to prove God's existence by saying he has a clear and distinct idea of God as an infinitely perfect being. Therefore the cause of this idea must be infititely perfect, entailing Go'd existence.

The wax example shows how we do not come to know something through our senses. We see and percieve the wqx change form yet we know it's still wax- how? Through our intellect. Establishing we come to know things through intellect not perception.

descartes is establishing the I that we cannot doubt. By questioning the minds existence we are proving that it exists as a thinking thing. the mind is a thinking thing while the body is a sensing thing; soul is NOT made of something physical

sensory doubt- our senses sometimes decieve us (optical illusion, wax ex) dreaming doubt- cant be certain that we arent in a dream rather than reality imperfect creator- cant be certain there isn't a deciever fabricating what we know through senses and even memories/ conceptual truths

agree- but its a difference that doesn't make a difference. A majority of the laws privilege the privlieged so even with the few in place that value equality or equity, the end result of society remains the same.

marxist (or at least marxist adjacent)theory of law