The First TOME.

The first concerned specific attributes relating to the bio technology being considered: is it useful, moral, reckless, natural, risky; does it involve ‘playing God’, ‘scientific arrogance’, the interests of pharmaceutical multinationals; in the case of animal pharming, is it incom-patible with the dignity of animals or does it cause animals to suffer? The second assessed the influence of more abstract factors such as individual worldviews, including percep-tions of nature and values, scientific knowl-edge and trust in the scientific community and regulatory agencies

“it promises discovery, things not yet dreamed of, lying in the bosom of reality

If his third, integrationist scenario fails to be taken up by humanities scholars, it will be, he writes, because of an entrenched “mind/body dualism” and an ideological “pluralism” based on habit, convention, and scholars’ ignorance of science

Outside some departments of philosophy, however, it is generally not scholars in the humanitieswho overvalue rationality. After all, the idea of reason has not had a very good press among writers, critics, and theorists for some time now—one may think of the doubts about it raised (as E. O. Wilson is aware) by the Roman-tics or of its treatment by Nietzsche or psychoanalytic theory. Nor is it humanists who need to recognize the existence of what Hayles calls “systemic human blind-nesses.” On the contrary, if we have a concept like hubris and a chastened sense of human capacities more generally, it has come largely from poets, humanistic philosophers, and those who study and transmit their views. Humanities scholars these days generally acknowledge—and many of them stress—the continuities between humans and other animals; and, although a strong suspicion of a not well-understood Darwinism remains widespread, most of them, I believe, would acknowledge that our capacities, impulses, and responses reflect, among other things, the evolutionary history of the species.

But the anthropocentrism of the humanities is as definitive as the “astro”-centrism of astronomy or the biocentrism of biology, with the addi-tion, among humanities scholars, of a type of interest in their defining objects of study—that is, human ideas, artifacts, practices, and events—that comes from a particular bond of kinship with the authors, agents, or subjects of those ideas, artifacts, practices, and events

true.

A good part of the interest of the actions and productions of other humans may have to do with our experiencing the world, fairly uniquely among machines and animals, as subjects—experiencing it, that is, with what we call consciousness or a sense of self. Hayles, having no doubt heard such observations from digital-resistant humanists, goes to some trouble to expose subjectivity, consciousness, and a sense of self as “illusions.” But the effort is, again I think, misplaced. Recognizing that subjective experiences—one’s own and other peoples’—are, as she terms them, “epiphenomena of underlying material processes” does not make them any less interesting as experiences.17 Nor does it erase the differ-ence that we generally register—perceptually, conceptually, and emotionally— between experiencing beings as such and material processes as such

Contrary to charges com-monly leveled by enthusiasts of artificial intelligence, artificial life, and other computational wonders, the interest in question does not reveal a prejudice in favor of carbon- versus silicon-based “cognition,” “intelligence,” or “life.” What makes the actions, performances, and productions of other humans—writers and composers, artists and critics, kings and revolutionaries—especially interesting to us is not our conviction that humans are superior to machines and nonhuman animals; it is our recognition that they are the same sorts of machines and animals that we ourselves are.

the episteme

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that chaos theory has no significant consequences for the humanities. On a deep level, it embodies assumptions that bring into question presuppositions that have underlain scientific conceptualizations for the last three hun-dred years. Among the challenges it poses are whether an effect is proportional to a cause; how scale variance affects facts; what it means to model a physical system; and what cosmological scenario we are taking part in. Through its concern with the conditions that make movement from local sites to global systems possible, it ex-poses presuppositions within older paradigms that made universaliz-ation appear axiomatic. In this sense it is an underestimation to say that chaos theory has redefined what science means. Changed are not the disciplinary procedures and criteria of normal science but the epistemic ground on which it—and much else in contemporary cul-ture—rests

In brief, the order-out-of-chaos branch has more philosophy than results, the strange-attractor branch more results than philosophy.

The more chaotic a system is, the more information it produces.

Consider the following question: Why should John Cage become interested in experimenting with stochastic varia-tions in music about the same time that Roland Barthes was extoll-ing the virtues of noisy interpretations of literature and Edward Lorenz was noticing the effect of small uncertainties on the non-linear equations that described weather formations? An influence ar-gument would look for direct connections to explain these conver-gences. Sometimes such connections exist. It is possible that Barthes listened to Cage, Cage studied Lorenz, Lorenz read Barthes. But it stands to reason that, of all the interdisciplinary parallels one might notice, only a few will be connected by direct lines of influence, which are usually conveyed through disciplinary traditions.

One of the challenges in literature and science is to develop methodologies that can illuminate convergences between disciplines, while still acknowl-edging the very real differences that exist. In my view, analogies be-tween literary and scientific versions of chaos are important both forthe similarities they suggest and for the dissimilarities they reveal. The similarities arose because of broadly based movements within the culture which made the deep assumptions underlying the new paradigms thinkable, perhaps inevitable, thoughts.

Another factor that helped to energize the concepts underlying the new paradigms was the realization that as systems became more complex and encompassing, they could also become more oppres-sive

This is a three-sided study, triangulating among chaos theory, poststructuralism, and contemporary fiction. Also of concern is the cultural matrix from which all three sides emerge and with which they interact.

part of my project is to explore what happens when a word such as “chaos,” invested with a rich tradition of mythic and literary significance, is appropri-ated by the sciences and given a more specialized meaning

To introduce them, I want to explain more about the structure and content of chaos theory. First, a dis-claimer: “chaos theory” and the “science of chaos” are not phrases usually employed by researchers who work in these fields. They pre-fer to designate their area as nonlinear dynamics, dynamical systems theory, or, more modestly yet, dynamical systems methods. To them, using “chaos theory” or the “science of chaos” signals that one is a dilettante rather than an expert.

The objection illustrates why it was necessary to separate information from meaning if chaotic systems were to be considered rich in information. Implicit in the transvaluation of chaos is the assumption that the production of in-formation is good in itself, independent of what it means.

create a cultural field

Here influence spreads out through a diffuse network of everyday experiences that range from reading The New YorkTimes to using bank cards on automatic teller machines to watching MTV.

not generally explainable by direct influence.

the cultural matrix.

he dissimilarities, by contrast, point to the importance of disciplinary traditions in guiding inquiry and shaping thought. To account for them, it is nec-essary to understand how and why certain questions became impor-tant in various disciplines before the appearance of the new para-digms

Hesburgh Library Staff Directory

“What’s in a name?” As Shakespeare’s Juliet suggests, “a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,” and yet we are inclined to supply certain names over others to the people, pets, and house plants that we love (Romeo and Juliet 2.1.86).

you have wrought a sudden kind of transformation in 4 me, for I find my self all transformed to admiration, to a thing of wonder,

(Unless, I suppose, you’re working on a variorum, which is another issue.

But I rather like this way of handling footnotes because it keeps the footnotes easily accessible at every point in your reading, doesn’t take you away from the main text when you click a footnote hyperlink, and you can choose how much of the screen you’d like it to take up.

Iamblicus the Chaldean writes that he took the Orphic theology as the model on which he shaped and formed his ow

In a word, there is no point of controversy between the Hebrews and ourselves on which the Hebrews cannot be confuted and convinced out the cabalistic writings, so that no corner is left for them to hide in. On this point I can cite a witness of the very greatest authority, the most learned Antonius Chronicus; on the occasion of a banquet in his house, at which I was also present, with his own ears he heard the Hebrew, Dactylus, a profound scholar of this lore, come round completely to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

these books would be translated into Latin for the public benefit of our faith and at the time of his death, three of them had already appeared. The Hebrews hold these same books in such reverence that no one under forty years of age is permitted even to touch them. I acquired these books at considerable expense and, reading them from beginning to end with the greatest attention and with unrelenting toil, I discovered in them (as God is my witness) not so much the Mosaic as the Christian religion. There was to be found the mystery of the Trinity, the Incarnation of the Word, the divinity of the Messiah; there one might also read of original sin, of its expiation by the Christ, of the heavenly Jerusalem, of the fall of the demons, of the orders of the angels, of the pains of purgatory and of hell.

Origen asserts that Jesus Christ, the Teacher of Life, revealed many things to His disciples which they in turn were unwilling to commit to writing lest they become the common possession of the crowd. Dionysius the Areopagite gives powerful confirmation to this assertion when he writes that the more secret mysteries were transmitted by the founders of our religion ek nou eis vouv dia mesov logov, that is, from mind to mind, without commitment to writing, through the medium of of the spoken word alone. Because the true interpretation of the law given to Moses was, by God's command, revealed in almost precisely this way, it was called ``Cabala,'' which in Hebrew means the same as our word ``reception.'' The precise point is, of course, that the doctrine was received by one man from another not through written documents but, as a hereditary right, through a regular succession of revelations.

Not the Christian religion alone, but all legal codes and every well-governed commonwealth execrates and condemns the first

One consists wholly in the operations and powers of demons, and consequently this appears to me, as God is my witness, an execrable and monstrous thing. The other proves, when thoroughly investigated, to be nothing else but the highest realization of natural philosophy. The Greeks noted both these forms. However, because they considered the first form wholly undeserving the name magic they called it goeteia, reserving the term mageia, to the second, and understanding by it the highest and most perfect wisdom.

Boethius, among Latin writers, promised to compose such a harmony, but he never carried his proposal to completion. St. Augustine also writes, in his Contra Academicos, that many others tried to prove the same thing, that is, that the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle were identical, and by the most subtle arguments. For example, John the Grammarian held that Aristotle differed from Plato only for those who did not grasp Plato's thought; but he left it to posterity to prove it. We have, in addition, adduced a great number of passages in which Scotus and Thomas, and others in which Averroës and Avicenna, have heretofore been thought to disagree, but which I assert are in harmony with one another.

Aristotle observed this rule so carefully that Plato called him: auagnooies, that is, ``the reader.'' It is certainly a mark of excessive narrowness of mind to enclose oneself within one Porch or Academy; nor can anyone reasonably attach himself to one school or philosopher, unless he has previously become familiar with them all. In addition, there is in each school some distinctive characteristic which it does not share with any other.

In our own day, many scholars, imitating Gorgias of Leontini, have been accustomed to dispute, not nine hundred questions merely, but the whole range of questions concerning all the arts and have been praised for it.

Next he will warn us of two things to be avoided at all costs: Neither to make water facing the sun, nor to cut our nails while offering sacrifice

to us who live in the desert solitude of the body

through this peace it may become the dwelling of God

If, acting on wiser counsel, we should seek to secure an unbroken peace, moral philosophy will still be at hand to fulfill our desires abundantly; and having slain either beast, like sacrificed sows, it will establish an inviolable compact of peace between the flesh and the spirit

Natural philosophy will reduce the conflict of opinions and the endless debates which from every side vex, distract and lacerate the disturbed mind. It will compose this conflict, however, in such a manner as to remind us that nature, as Heraclitus wrote, is generated by war and for this reason is called by Homer, ``strife.'' Natural philosophy, therefore, cannot assure us a true and unshakable peace. To bestow such peace is rather the privilege and office of the queen of the sciences, most holy theology. Natural philosophy will at best point out the way to theology and even accompany us along the path, while theology, seeing us from afar hastening to draw close to her, will call out: ``Come unto me you who are spent in labor and I will restore you; come to me and I will give you the peace which the world and nature cannot give.''

the words of Job the theologian may well be interpreted for us by Empedocles the philosopher. Empedocles teaches us that there is in our souls a dual nature; the one bears us upwards toward the heavenly regions; by the other we are dragged downward toward regions infernal, through friendship and discord, war and peace; so witness those verses in which he laments that, torn by strife and discord, like a madman, in flight from the gods, he is driven into the depths of the sea.

Equally clear is it that, if we are to overcome this warfare, if we are to establish that peace which must establish us finally among the exalted of God, philosophy alone can compose and allay that strife

The feet, to be sure, of the soul: that is, its most despicable portion by which the soul is held fast to earth as a root to the ground; I mean to say, it alimentary and nutritive faculty where lust ferments and voluptuous softness is fostered.

who wish to imitate the angelic life,

for all things appeared in figures to the men of those times:

who though sleeping in the lower world, still has his eyes fixed on the world above, will admonish us.

Let us observe what they do, what kind of life they lead. For if we lead this kind of life (and we can) we shall attain their same estate. The Seraphim burns with the fire of charity; from the Cherubim flashes forth the splendor of intelligence; the Thrones stand firm with the firmness of justice. If, consequently, in the pursuit of the active life we govern inferior things by just criteria, we shall be established in the firm position of the Thrones. If, freeing ourselves from active care, we devote our time to contemplation, meditating upon the Creator in His work, and the work in its Creator, we shall be resplendent with the light of the Cherubim. If we burn with love for the Creator only, his consuming fire will quickly transform us into the flaming likeness of the Seraphim.

if we will it,

since we have been born into this condition of being what we choose to

if, finally, a pure contemplator, unmindful of the body, wholly withdrawn into the inner chambers of the mind, here indeed is neither a creature of earth nor a heavenly creature, but some higher divinity, clothed in human flesh.

This creature, man, whom Asclepius the Athenian, by reason of this very mutability, this nature capable of transforming itself, quite rightly said was symbolized in the mysteries by the figure of Proteus. This is the source of those metamorphoses, or transformations, so celebrated among the Hebrews and among the Pythagoreans; for even the esoteric theology of the Hebrews at times transforms the holy Enoch into that angel of divinity which is sometimes called malakh-ha-shekhinah and at other times transforms other personages into divinities of other names; while the Pythagoreans transform men guilty of crimes into brutes or even, if we are to believe Empedocles, into plants; and Mohammed, imitating them, was known frequently to say that the man who deserts the divine law becomes a brute.

chameleon

And if, dissatisfied with the lot of all creatures, he should recollect himself into the center of his own unity, he will there become one spirit with God, in the solitary darkness of the Father, Who is set above all things, himself transcend all creatures.

But upon man, at the moment of his creation, God bestowed seeds pregnant with all possibilities, the germs of every form of life.

The brutes, from the moment of their birth, bring with them, as Lucilius says, ``from their mother's womb'' all that they will ever possess.

The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature.

Humanities discourse has rarely needed to aspire to the same standards for making all its data explicit, shareable, and open to critical examination