if it is in our power to prevent something badfrom happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparablemoral importance, we ought, morally, to do it

If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability,equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merelybecause he is far away from us (or we are far away from him).

Again, of course, I admit that there is a psychological differencebetween the cases; one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one

if everyone in circumstances like mine gave ?5to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food,shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why Ishould give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as Iam; therefore I have no obligation to give more than ?5.

To say this is not to deny the principle that peoplein the same circumstances have the same obligations, but to point outthat the fact that others have given, or may be expected to give, is arelevant circumstance: those giving after it has become known thatmany others are giving and those giving before are not in the samecircumstances.

The result ofeveryone doing what he really ought to do cannot be worse than theresult of everyone doing less than he ought to do, although the resultof everyone doing what he reasonably believes he ought to do could be.

We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we wereto continue to wear our old clothes, and give the money to faminerelief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starv-ing

. Unfortunately, for many people the idea that"it's the government's responsibility" is a reason for not giving whichdoes not appear to entail any political action eithe

sions. At the individual level, people have, withfew exceptions, not responded to the situation in any

ns. The decisions and actions of human beings can prevthis kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not mthe necessary dec