. A disaster ends only when recovery becomes possible for everyone.
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2. Betty Hearn Morrow, “Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability,” Disasters 23, no. 1 (1999): 1–18.
some people are denied the resources needed to escape danger’s aftermath.
Betty Hearn Morrow, “Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability,” Disasters 23, no. 1 (1999): 1–18.
insurance barriers, price increases, unstable housing, and uneven public response.
Lynne McChristian, Hurricane Andrew and Insurance: The Enduring Impact of an Historic Storm (Insurance Information Institute, 2012), 2, 17–18. Gary E. Lehman, “Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,” Nova Law Review 17, no. 3 (1993): 1029–1034. Elliott Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew, Working Paper 98 (Natural Hazards Center, 1997), 10–11.
the image of Carmen Rivera,
John Luke, Carmen Rivera Looks over Remains of Her House in Homestead, Florida, 31 August 1992, State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory.
Andrew became slow violence not because the hurricane moved slowly, but because recovery did.
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2.
Weak emergency coordination
Elliott Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew, Working Paper 98 (Natural Hazards Center, 1997), 10–11.
Higher prices for basic materials
Gary E. Lehman, “Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,” Nova Law Review 17, no. 3 (1993): 1029–1034.
waiting for repairs,
Kenneth J. Smith and Lina Liska Belgrave, “The Reconstruction of Everyday Life,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 24, no. 3 (1995): 244–269.
waiting for insurance payments,
Lynne McChristian, Hurricane Andrew and Insurance: The Enduring Impact of an Historic Storm (Insurance Information Institute, 2012), 2, 17–18. Catherine Wilson, “Hurricane Leaves Florida’s Insurance Safety Net Torn,” The Washington Post, December 8, 1992.
slow violence.
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2.
lower-income communities were not only exposed to destruction. They were also exposed to the slow violence of unequal repair.
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2. Betty Hearn Morrow, “Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability,” Disasters 23, no. 1 (1999): 1–18.
Government capacity also shaped recovery
Elliott Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew, Working Paper 98 (Natural Hazards Center, 1997), 10–11.
When prices rise during an emergency,
Gary E. Lehman, “Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,” Nova Law Review 17, no. 3 (1993): 1029–1034.
insurers failed or delayed payment,
Catherine Wilson, “Hurricane Leaves Florida’s Insurance Safety Net Torn,” The Washington Post, December 8, 1992.
Insurance was one of the clearest mechanisms through which recovery became uneven.
Lynne McChristian, Hurricane Andrew and Insurance: The Enduring Impact of an Historic Storm (Insurance Information Institute, 2012), 2, 17–18.
Recovery required access to money, insurance, transportation, contractors, temporary housing, public assistance, and the ability to navigate bureaucratic systems.
Betty Hearn Morrow, “Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability,” Disasters 23, no. 1 (1999): 1–18.
Office of the Attorney General State of Florida. n.d. “Price Gouging | My Florida Legal.” Www.myfloridalegal.com. https://www.myfloridalegal.com/consumer-protection/price-gouging.
Lehman, Gary E. 2017. “Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew.” NSUWorks. 2017. https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol17/iss3/4.
recovery depended not only on the severity of wind damage but also on insurance coverage, transportation, public services, contractors, housing options, and government response.
Betty Hearn Morrow, “Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability,” Disasters 23, no. 1 (1999): 1–18. Elliott Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew, Working Paper 98 (Natural Hazards Center, 1997), 10–11.
Miami-Dade County.
University of Miami Digital Collections, “Damages to Neighborhood after Hurricane Andrew,” Hurricane Andrew Collection.
Jack Beven, “TPC NHC Hurricane Andrew,” National Hurricane Center / NOAA.
Homestead
John Luke, Carmen Rivera Looks over Remains of Her House in Homestead, Florida, 31 August 1992, State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory.
recovery did not happen automatically once the storm ended.
Elliott Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew, Working Paper 98 (Natural Hazards Center, 1997), 10–11.
military personnel assisting with cleanup
University of Miami Digital Collections, “Military Personnel Assist in Clean-up after Hurricane Andrew,” Hurricane Andrew Collection.
damaged residential street
University of Miami Digital Collections, “Damages to Neighborhood after Hurricane Andrew,” Hurricane Andrew Collection.
Carmen Rivera standing near the remains of her Homestead home
John Luke, Carmen Rivera Looks over Remains of Her House in Homestead, Florida, 31 August 1992, State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory.
delayed rebuilding, insurance barriers, rising recovery costs, and uneven public response.
Lynne McChristian, Hurricane Andrew and Insurance: The Enduring Impact of an Historic Storm (Insurance Information Institute, 2012), 2, 17–18. Gary E. Lehman, “Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,” Nova Law Review 17, no. 3 (1993): 1029–1034. Elliott Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew, Working Paper 98 (Natural Hazards Center, 1997), 10–11.
slow violence.
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2.
Hurricane Andrew
Jack Beven, “TPC NHC Hurricane Andrew,” National Hurricane Center / NOAA.
delayed rebuilding, insurance barriers, rising recovery costs, and uneven public response.
Lynne McChristian, Hurricane Andrew and Insurance: The Enduring Impact of an Historic Storm (Insurance Information Institute, 2012), 2, 17–18. Gary E. Lehman, “Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,” Nova Law Review 17, no. 3 (1993): 1029–1034. Elliott Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew, Working Paper 98 (Natural Hazards Center, 1997), 10–11.
slow violence.
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2.
Hurricane Andrew
Jack Beven, “TPC NHC Hurricane Andrew,” National Hurricane Center / NOAA.