Yet, thisemphasis on the pragmatic and adaptive nature of social thinking needs to bebalanced by a recognition of the pervasive role of unconscious influences onsocial judgment and behavior
Yes, along with our tendency to react irrationally based on emotional energies(?) This process still always includes some level of interpretation.
this metaphor promises toreplace its predecessors—which captured earlier research themes by portray-ing persons either as consistency seekers, wishful thinkers, lay scientists, orcognitive misers—by suggesting that all of them apply under some specificconditions. Yet, the motivated tactician’s ability to flexibly adjust his or hercognitive processes to situational requirements is not without limits, as an in-creasing body of research into unconscious processes and the limits of mentalcontrol indicates.
Yes, multiple things can be true/can happen at once. I think we are always interpreting, but not always pragmatically responding.
“my thinking is first and last and always for the sakeof my doing.”
I like that. But thinking isn't always for the sake of doing.
e do not respond to environments as they are,but as we interpret them to be.
Symbolic interaction
umans as motivated tacticians who pragmaticallyadapt their reasoning strategies to the requirements at hand.
Does this pragmatism have to be explicitly thought-out? Or is this also applicable to Collin's emotional energies?
What if we aren't always pragmatic? We aren't always rational beings.
microsocial interper-sonal relations and/or psychological pro-cesses through which macrosocial struc-tures come to have such effects
Rarely seen as a bottom --> top direction. Structure and agency/microinteraction influence each other.
Marx saw thestructural position of workers in thecapitalist economic system as incompati-ble with the realization of human beings'basic productive natures; the conse-quences of this were both psychologicaland social malaise and disconten
Connecting personal troubles to social issues...
A large essence of what sociology is, is utilizing the "sociological imagination" (Mills). Yet, even with the word "imagination" I never considered this process as being akin to social psychology or even radical microsociology.
Even without developing the sociological imagination, the process of, for example, feeling alienated as a result of structural forces and capitalism is a social psychological process. And being able to cognitively connect your personal trouble to the social issue of capitalism (making sense of, and interpreting your situation as a result of something out of your control) is a social psychological process as well.
Though critical paradigms and interpretive paradigms often like to butt heads, really, they compliment one another well. They each have elements of the other. So, is it possible to be critically-interpretive sociologists? Just a thought.
Although their work constitutes thefoundation of modern sociology, socialpsychology was a central, if not the cen-tral concern of Karl Marx, Emile Durk-heim, and Max Weber
Never thought of it this way!
This thirdface shares the "real-world" concerns ofsymbolic interactionism but puts muchgreater emphasis on both macrosocialstructural concepts and quantitative em-
I like that, but does it focus at all on processes? Or does it focus more on emotion that occurs in relation to structure, but not the processes of how that emotion, interpretation, and behavior occur?
sociologism
Confused here. So, is sociologism just the process of identifying something as sociological?
Thus, to understand social life is tounderstand the processes through whichindividuals interpret situations and con-struct their actions with respect to eachother
Yes! And, there may be the question of whether this process of interpreting and acting is cognitive, explicit, or pragmatic. Going back to Collins, this exact process can be implicit and based on emotion rather than solely cognition. But I believe both are at play and that context matters in how cognitive or emotional this process is.
esearch on psychological socialpsychology clearly neglects the ongoingsocial context in which all human be-havior occurs
True, labs don't show true reality of human life. But even outside of labs, it is difficult to truly understand that reality if conducting research ethically (getting informed consent).
and psychological sociology
Similar, if not the same as Collin's radical microsociology.
Individuals thus do not have to calculate prob-abilities in order to feel varying degrees of confidence in different outcom
In some cases, sure, but not always true.
tion depends upon the emotional and cultural resources acquired fromprevious interactions
Previous interactions definitely inform how we navigate current ones. But, plenty other things inform that as well. Again, depending on context in which an interaction is happening, many people are not afforded the same outcome from "successfully" employing culturally acceptable interactional tactics.
Marginalized folks may navigate interactions according to the "emotional and cultural resources acquired from previous interactions," but in a culture where they are oppressed, they likely won't experience the same outcome as someone who is not (or less) oppressed.
Again, this isn't a one size fits all explanation. People are not perceived solely on their interactional routine (or their emotional or cultural resources). People are also perceived based on marked identities, which have nothing to do with their intersectional history.
Taking a dominant position within an IR increases one's emotionalenergies. Taking a subordinate position reduces one's emotional energies;the more extreme the subordination, the greater the energy reduction
Not necessarily. Being someone in a subordinate position who is engaging with someone who has more power than you can give you emotional energies (for example, networking).
To what extent do peopleactually think of these contingencies from moment to moment in their livesas they act either to respect property and authority or to violate them?
Good question. However, the extent to which people consider certain authority, rules, social norms, etc. is based not only on formal sanctions, but informal sanctions (that can even lead to formal sanctions). People with marked social identities (BIPOC folks, for example) aren't given the benefit of the doubt, or the privilege or making mistakes (like white people are afforded in the dominant culture). Therefore, some folks need to spend more energy cognitively considering rules, norms, and sanctions, and put more effort into adhering to them than white people. Because if they don't, their safety could be compromised.
Thus, in certain contexts, I am sure people largely do not actually think about navigating situations to avoid sanctions. However, it is a privilege to not have to explicitly consider those things. This can't be a one size fits all explanation.
Sanctions tend to be remote and take time to apply, and the very condi-tions of limited cognitive capacities in situations calling for complex coordi-nation or involving uncertainty leave room in the routine for negotiation.
Some rambling thoughts I have:
Sanctions (formal or informal) are often driving forces, just like norms, in even noncognitive interactions (as Collins explains toward the end of 994, when he argues that negotiations are carried out emotionally rather than cognitively). Socialization into understanding what is acceptable becomes something that we often don't need to think about once we mastered navigating typical situations according to what is acceptable. So, we may not always act explicitly in ways that avoid sanctions, but we do so implicitly (and like he says, maybe more emotionally rather than cognitively). Sanctions, culture, norms, etc. have guided what implicitly feels natural or comfortable for us...
I think I agree with Collins. Avoiding even informal sanctions (not following norms) implicitly guide our behavior to adhere to those norms (often more emotional than cognitive). Pushing back against those norms (despite sanctions in place) may be more explicit and cognitive.
any contract, he pointed out, involves onein further obligations not bargained for, such as an implicit obligation touphold the contract.
Can implicit obligation be seen as still something in return for adhering to that obligation? For example, don't we often adhere to an implicit obligation in exchange for comfort, group membership, acceptance, etc.? There is still something gained (or at least nothing lost), even if we don't cognitively recognize that.
there is no first-hand evidence that they guide actors' sponta-neous behavior (see Deutscher 1973; Cancian 1975). Nor is it possible forindividuals to operate cognitively simply by matching external situationsto mentally formulated rules.3
So, it may be beneficial to think of meaning-making and interpretation as happening after the fact, rather than in a given moment.
Maybe we do both. Maybe social rules have been so internalized that they become "second nature," and the only time we explicitly reflect on how we follow these social rules are after we failed to adequately follow them. Or, even after we successfully followed them. Like he explains above when mentioning Scott and Lyman's (1968) accounts, we offer excuses and justifications after our undue behavior or shortcoming, not during it.
But...we also offer accounts before that behavior even happens, as a sort of disclaimer to soften the blow of whatever "unacceptable" behavior will or may happen. For example, saying things like, "I am going to turn in the assignment late because my dog ate it" (excuse...denying full responsibility but accepting pejorative) or "I am going to stand him up because he is leading me on" (justification...accepting responsibility but denying pejorative).
This implies that explanations in terms of norms, rules, and roletaking should be abandoned and that any model of social exchange must beconsiderably modified.
Multiple things can be at play at once. Rather than looking at human behavior and interpretation through just one lens (exchange theory or a mere adherence to rules and norms), we can acknowledge that people aren't always cognitively pragmatic. But we can also acknowledge that we often do strategize, interpret, and act according to our environment and context, even if we do that cognition subconsciously.
The direction that I would argue is most prom-ising for the advance of sociology as an empirical science is not the phe-nomenological analysis of concepts but the emphasis upon ultradetailedempirical research
Still has the goal of legitimizing sociology as a science.
Emphasizes a transition away from solely theoretical work towards doing empirical work that makes statements about the macro through micro analysis. Uncovering structural forces through analyzing microinteractions and emotional energies (as he laters details).
nd new particularized cul-tures (individual reputations) due to dramatic, usually conflictual,events
Such as taking on political stances?
greatest emo-tional returns until they reach personal equilibrium points at whichtheir emotional returns stabilize or decline.
My initial thoughts were that this sounds very similar to exchange theory, though Collins later pushes back against exchange theory. Instead of looking at exchange or reaching an equilibrium interpersonally, Collins looks at how it is happening intrapersonally...and emotionally, not cognitively.