n both the contract case and the criminal case, having a prettygood idea of the lay of the land allows us to reject as fallacious oneline of authority in favor of another — probably without thinkingmuch about it. And often, especially on procedural and evidentiarymatters, we have no compunction about reaching for a case in an-other area, knowing, for instance, that a probate-law case can behelpful in a contract case. While wholly different, the cases are stillsimilar in a useful way. It seems we cannot decide until we have al-ready decided.
This passage points out an interesting quirk in legal decision-making: we often lean on what we already know, sometimes without even realizing it, to decide between legal arguments. This happens because different areas of law, like probate and contract law, often share useful similarities, especially in procedure and evidence rules. In a way, we start deciding based on these familiar patterns before we've fully worked through the issue—almost like our decisions are shaped by decisions we've already made. It reminds me of the idea of not overthinking less we second guess ourselves and eventually get it wrong.