Oh wow neuroscience just invented...Kant!

This suggests that there is an "external world" giving us information, and our perceptions are best guesses. That seems different from the idealism of QBism.

Heidegger seemed somewhat opposed to views like idealism, or even this predictive coding approach, right? He thought the problem of the external world (how we do we know anything about noumena when all we experience are phenomena) dissolves under a careful attention to how we operate. We are already part of and operating within the world - beings in the world - using and manipulating entities as they exist in the totality. It's only when things break down that we perceive objects as objects, and the problem seems to arise?

Interesting. So QBism is a form of idealism?

It's hard to know how to understand this claim, phenomenologically. It's true that in the theory of relativity, time is just another dimension like the spatial dimensions. There is a lot to say about this (the vast majority of what I don't know: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/)

I guess it depends by what we mean by experience. But I do think there is a sense in which we experience the past. Traumatic experience that we relive might be one extreme example.

Very convincing

I don't know if "common sense" dictates this. I think there was a time that I might have desired suffering for the reprehensible. So if common sense means something like "what we first thought about morality, before challenging any of those suppositions" maybe he is right.

But idk. Maybe I've absorbed too much utilitarianism, or too much of a Christian ethic, that suggests that those who do wrong do not necessarily deserve to suffer for their wrongs. But maybe they do not deserve it because there is the possibility for rehabilitation.

Obama was promoting this ( through AmeriCorps, which was a bush 1 and clintong endeavor). I did AmeriCorps in 08

Go ask administrators in DPS what this call to education might look like? What pandangle means here is a specific kind of education, which is a bit question begging.

Tall orders.

Does the lesser of have evils suggest that a king of cost benefit analysis is underlying this concerto of justice? Utilitarianism all the way down???

Gentleman…?

“they”? Who? Sometimes I hate vague shit like this.

Lol

So reason here is not just the “science of correct reasoning”, i.e., how to take inputs and infer outputs, but some kind of higher guiding principles?

Also, whenever I read philosophers talking about “our” yearning for something higher, I wonder whether “our” means “all humans” or “the kinds of high minded humans that philosophers hang out with.” I know plenty of humans that lead reasonably good lives and don’t necessarily express this kind of deeper yearning; and I’m sure LCL can tell us about some SF street-humans who don’t seem to have much yearning at all…maybe the teen has been beaten out of them?

Are we political “by nature” only because, if we were not, the state of nature would be all that’s left, and we sort of intuit that that would be bad? I know Pandangle said above that the modernist “state of nature” isn’t our true nature. But that was basically just an assertion.

“Believed” here must mean historically/anthropologically justified? The next paradox is that lay belief in this premise has caused harm

Most interesting to me, I think.

I know this is contentious territory in this group, but the relationship between "natural" and "ethical" is complicated. There are many things that are natural but unethical. The real question is: what are the criteria that we might use to judge natural things as being ethical or unethical? Singer seems to have some.

There's a bit of a slight of hand here, I think. Above, we were talking about "ethical obligations". Now we are talking about "care". These are different concepts: What I care about and what I might be obligated to do are not coextensive concepts.

I really appreciate this kind of objection. I recently heard this called the tyranny of the easily measureable. There's a serious problem here though. Things that cannot be measured are very hard to reason about. And I think much (maybe not all) of ethics is about reasoning through what is right and wrong. So, not every good should be measurable, but that doesn't mean there isn't a place for measurability.

I think at his strongest, this is true. There's so much to be said here though. Related to the last comment, his argument almost forces us to come to some version of this conclusion ourselves, by relying on our intuitions. "Oh, you think it's immoral to let this kid that you don't really know but is proximate to you drown? Why is that different from a kid on the other side of the world that you don't know? That seems like a legitimate question. The assertion that distance matters is not much more than an assertion. If this thought experiment doesn't cause you to completely flatten your concern curve, should cause you to question its derivative...

This may be a minor point, but I sometimes think Singer is more sublte than this. I think he is saying that we have a strong intuition that saving the kid is the moral thing to do, and that intuition is also relevant to saving other kids. I think that's slightly different than saying it's "clearly immoral" not to save the kid. I think if you want to bite that bullet, he doesn't have much more to say (at least the old PS; I hear he's changing his views a bit).

I think I agree with this claim. But doesn't it make sense of what you state as being odd above. Specifically, here, you are claiming that there has always been a component of progress in classical liberalism. I think that is exactly what Gray is claiming with meiorism. But above, you say, "But perhaps the most interesting claim of Gray’s list is that liberalism is 'meliorism.' If you think about it, it is quite odd that a political philosophy founded on freedoms could evolve to the point where its defenders believe its purpose is to make the world better."

I can see how one might go in this direction, and how it leads to neoliberalism. But I think that is part of Fuk's point: liberalism exists on a knfe edge; there are excesses in both directions (left/right). In a liberal society, neither the Catholic church nor racial, ethinc, or gender groups have a claim on the individual.

I don't come to this conclusion at all. For example, the fact that all people are of equal moral status does not imply that all people will have the same outcomes. The fact that everyone has the right to, idk, a k12 education, does not imply that everyone do the same thing with that opportunity--some will rise to the occasion, some just won't have what it takes to achieve, and others will squander the opportunity. I don't think anything Gray is saying here is blocking these different outcomes. .

My view is that there is a relatively clear mapping from Locke to Gray. The list that is given here for Locke is clearly lacking details. For example, who are the bearers of these rights? Locke had an asnwer, but it's not here. Gray gives us an answer: Individuals, not collectives; it's not the case that some get more rights than others; all humans, not just some.