- Feb 2025
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academic.oup.com academic.oup.com
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“because she is a woman” or “because she is Black”
So I guess the social kind that is ontically unjust here is Black women?
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women who have suffered sexual violence are silenced
Men who have suffered sexual violence are silenced in a different way...
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A group that is ‘expelled from useful participation in social life’, as Young puts it, is vulnerable to being expelled en masse from society altogether through either murder or forced removal. This risk does not usually face the exploited who are doing essential, if menial, work that benefits the powerful.
Arbeit macht frei
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- Jan 2025
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academic-oup-com.proxyiub.uits.iu.edu academic-oup-com.proxyiub.uits.iu.eduNorms6
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It potentially matters which members of the community have the attitudes and which don’t.
So "significant proportion" can be weighted by...power?
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such norms
Example?
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But the same is also true of non-formal, non-legal norms. Where we have a recognized shared entitlement to demand things of one another, this affords us comparable opportunities to pronounce authoritatively
Normativity/authority pluralism?
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It is not that we have information about what others will do. Rather, we are in a position to hold one another to account and to demand and expect things of one another.
International law?
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What about the normative attitudes of the men within the community?
What if the community under discussion is that of Muslim women? Of people in America forced to pay taxes to the British?
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believes
This belief is a little unreliable, and that reminds me of the surprize-quiz paradox.
"不勉強"
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- Dec 2023
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cedar.sice.indiana.edu cedar.sice.indiana.edu
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“Integrity” or “sincerity”
or "authenticity"
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One should expect control strategies to concentrate on boundary conditionsand interfaces, on rates of flow across boundaries—and not on the integrity ofnatural objects.
"object-oriented" computational thinking
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- Nov 2023
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cedar.sice.indiana.edu cedar.sice.indiana.edu
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earlier
Where?
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or a car
different even from a moving car?
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- Oct 2023
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cedar.sice.indiana.edu cedar.sice.indiana.edusomeTitle14
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automata, Edelman writes that “[P]erceptual categorization occurs only ... after disjunctive sampling of [visual, tactile, and kinesthetic] signals” (Edelman 1992: 93).
I'm checking this book out
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object-oriented ones
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discloses “so-called ‘inner experience’ (more precisely, self-experience as well as ‘empathy’ [i.e. intersubjective experience]”
✨ a whole lot of confidence ✨
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introspection
introspection of what? sensations?? (volitions??)
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The volition-perception relationship that von Helmholtz discovers is patently something over and above the facts
Is this "something over and above the facts" simply that I could have moved differently and I would have thus perceived differently?
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The focal point of von Helmholtz’s con-cern in these passages is most certainly on how the perception of objects is tied to movement, but the perception of objects already formed, that is, the perception of what we take to be fully-fledged objects of which we have come to a fully-fledged concep-tion; and, most importantly, on the possibility of verifying the correctness of our fully-fledged conception.
I have read no von Helmholtz, but from a (Bayesian?) inference perspective, being able to verify the correctness of a world/object conception (or more generally, the correctness of an explanation of a "volition-perception relationship") is not so far from the search for such a conception/explanation.
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“eidetic intuitions” or “essential insights,”
I can't make much sense of this section, I think because I've read no Husserl and lack some background framework that defines and relates the words "eidetic", "intuition", "fact", and "essence". For instance, lost to me are the spatial metaphors in "hang in an epistemological limbo between factual and eidetic knowledge" and "go beyond intuitive apprehensions to eidetic intuitions" below. I'd appreciate a quick tutorial or a pointer to one.
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imaginative free variation. Clearly, though Husserl himself does not so specify, the phenomenology of kinesthesia presents itself as just such an exception to imagina-tive free phantasy. In effect, active self-experimentation
I'm not sure I understand the difference between imaginative free variation and active self-experimentation anymore.
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the kinestheses, the very stuff of an “I move,” of an “I do,” of an organ body, and so on, can be freely varied imagina-tively only as a visual phenomenon
Is there so fundamental a difference between vision and kinethesia? On one hand, infants need active self-experimentation not just to learn (what to expect in) kinethesia but also to learn (what to expect in) vision. On the other hand, what's so hard about imaginative free variation of kinethesia?
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any uniformity displayed in the observed set of phenomena provides grounds for an extrapolation of the uniformity to the phenomena which were not, but could have been, observed
The notion of interactive proof in modern cryptography http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00636.x
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an attentive introspective scientist
such as von Helmholtz
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one can bring them again to self-evidence
Remind ourselves why we introduced an idea/concept/meaning in the first place
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invariants that are not “time-bound” but stretch across civilizations
"It may seem strange to lump together avowedly imaginary genealogies with genealogies that profess to be historically accurate..."
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reactivate the whole of a history of meanings, not only an original, but further and successive acquisitions
causal naming?
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- Apr 2022
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cedar.sice.indiana.edu cedar.sice.indiana.edu
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he various values at stake andthe diverse prioritization to put the values into practice
我嘗試把文章倒過來寫，開頭可能長得像這樣：
The metaphysics of gender (M), the semantics and classificatory practices of gender terms and concepts (P), and the relationship between the two (M and P) are important and controversial both in society at large and in feminism. I propose to analyze this relationship by grappling with normative pluralism: the variation of values and priorities among contexts and individuals. Normative pluralism is distinct from (but compatible with) ontological pluralism—the existence of many gender kinds, such that someone can easily belong to multiple of them—and conceptual and semantic pluralism—the flexibility and fluidity of gender-term meanings. I argue that unless the multitude of our normative considerations are recognized and addressed, there is little hope to get clear on the metaphysical and semantic or conceptual puzzles when it comes to gender or other social kinds.
Past studies of gender have found the consensus that M and P are connected (Alignment) and so our studies of M and of P can and should inform each other. However, authors such as Dembroff and Barnes have argued that abiding by Alignment universally—that is, in all contexts—leads to undesirable consequences including oppression, marginalization, and confusion. While I concur with Dembroff and Barnes’s criticism of universal Alignment, merely rejecting universal Alignment (Separatism) does not justify the positive proposals made by those authors. Those proposals range from imitating the P of non-oppressive communities and accepting that P is messy to creating contexts in which P respects individuals’ self-ascription. Justifying those proposals requires additional normative assumptions and a pluralistic outlook on gender. I highlight that the central requirement is normative pluralism.
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