The court has set precedent that generally prevents restrictions on speech even if people find it disagreeable or offensive. The Texas law is not permissible under these circumstances.

Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority opinion.

This question relates to the 1st Amendment, not the 2nd.

Johnson burned an American flag, rather than painting it on his chest.

The man in question was named Gregory Lee Johnson.

This should read 491 U.S. 397 (1989)

The majority opinion argued that the program was of private choice, and that religious advancement resulting was completely on behalf of individuals, not the government.

Souter dissented, but in a separate opinion.

Breyer dissented, but not with the separate opinions of Stevens and Souter.

O'Connor offered a concurring opinion.

Most students in the voucher program did attend private schools.

In reality, over 80% of private schools in the district were religious in standing.

Simmons-Harris and company argued that the program violated the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.

The court ruled 5-4 in favor of Zelman.

The Constitutional portion in question was the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment.

The Cleveland School District was the subject of this case, not Baltimore.

This is an incorrect citation. Following the proper format, it should read: 536 US 639 (2002)

The case was decided in 2002, not 1982

How can 'excess' be defined in terms of taxation if the Constitution grants very broad powers in terms of collecting taxes?

I understand his point, but doesn't this statement supplant the idea of federalism? People of one state are willing to trust those of another (the senators and representatives of other states) to control "the operations of a Government to which they have confided their most important and valuable interests"

Given the ruling in this case, how far does this carry in contemporary society, or how specific can it go? If a FBI agent buys a coffee in Michigan with government funds, does he have to pay sales tax?

This is incorrect as the order does not follow procedure outlined in Taft-Hartley, or any other applicable act. Congress has granted power through the proper application of Taft-Hartley and other acts, but as the President was not operating in accordance with those acts, that power has not been delegated by Congress.

In the ruling, President Truman's actions cannot be upheld as the majority and concurring opinions leaned towards presidential authority only stemming from what Congress and the Constitution has outlined.

This act does not make provisions for the explicit seizure of industry, but does outline procedure for executive authority to shut down or disband strikes.

The United States was embroiled in the Korean War, not the Vietnam War.

A labor dispute began in the steel manufacturing industry, not sugar.

Two issues: The opinion of the court stated that, no, the president could not take over an industry in this scenario. Secondly, the ruling of the court was in favor of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.

The question was not one of Congressional authority over an industry, but Executive authority over an industry.

Justice Clark did not concur in the judgment of the Court, conceding that the power of the president could be expanded in times of national emergency.

At this time, there was no Justice Roberts serving on the Supreme Court.

Jackson was a concurring justice in this case.

Obviously Justice Marshall holds a high view of the Constitution, but what procedures for change are considered to be above 'ordinary means'? The way he speaks of the Constitution seems like he believes it should remain unchanged.

Does Justice Marshall use the word 'interesting' in the same connotation as it is used today? We know what his thoughts on the matter are, but what is he getting at? How is it 'deeply interesting'?

Does this quote indicated that Justice Marshall views the Constitution as a 'dead' document? Obviously, his tenure was not long after its drafting, but I wonder how he should view it today.

Justice Breyer, like Justice Alito, seems to be pointing out extreme examples of how far discriminatory use of public benefits could go with respect to religious institutions, and I think he favors the church based on this line of inquiry.

Justice Alito seems to be setting up a foundation of examples to point out examples in recent history of federal money being used for actual, physical improvements to religious institutions. I think he favors the church, and is using more extreme examples to bolster that opinion.

Given the examples Justice Kagan is presenting, and the direction they take in picking at the arguments presented by Mr. Cortman, I think Justice Kagan is one of the dissenters.

If he thinks the states have incredible leeway, why is the case ascending to the Supreme Court? Shouldn't this argument produce a deference to state law?

Based on this section, and her points thereafter, I think Justice Sotomayor may be one of the dissenters. She does her due diligence to flesh out the background of the counterargument while not explicitly counterarguing, but the thrust seems to go against Mr. Cortman's premise.

What is the definition of 'church' under federal law?

How far can states go in determining state law with regard to the Establishment Clause, or does the Establishment Clause largely have to do with Federal programs, money, etc.?