But Deronda, who has beenraised in England as a Christian gentleman, discovers his Jewishancestry only as an adult; and his response is to commit himselfto the furtherance of his “hereditary people”:It was as if he had found an added soul in finding his ancestry—hisjudgment no longer wandering in the mazes of impartial sympathy,but choosing, with the noble partiality which is man’s best strength,the closer fellowship that makes sympathy practical—exchangingthat bird’s-eye reasonableness which soars to avoid preference andloses all sense of quality, for the generous reasonableness of drawing shoulder to shoulder with men of like inheritance.Notice that in claiming a Jewish loyalty—an “added soul”—Derondais not rejecting a human one. As he says to his mother, “I think itwould have been right that I should have been brought up withthe consciousness that I was a Jew, but it must always have beena good to me to have as wide an instruction and sympathy as possible.” This is the same Deronda, after all, who has earlier explainedhis decision to study abroad in these eminently cosmopolitan terms:“I want to be an Englishman, but I want to understand other points

But if there are friends of cosmopolitanism who make me nervous, I am happy to be opposed to cosmopolitanism’s noisiest foes.Both Hitler and Stalin—who agreed about little else, save thatmurder was the first instrument of politics—launched regularinvectives against “rootless cosmopolitans”; and while, for both,anti-cosmopolitanism was often just a euphemism for anti-Semitism,they were right to see cosmopolitanism as their enemy. For theyboth required a kind of loyalty to one portion of humanity—a nation,a class—that ruled out loyalty to all of humanity. And the onethought that cosmopolitans sjhare is that no local loyalty can everjustify forgetting that each human being has responsibilities toevery other

In both the developed and the developing world, nationalism is here to stay. There is currently no otherprinciple on which to base the international state system. (Universalistic cosmopolitanism, for instance,has little purchase outside the philosophy departments of Western universities.) And it is unclear iftransnational institutions such as the European Union will ever be able to assume the core functions ofnational governments, including welfare and defense, which would allow them to gain popularlegitimacy

by embracing both majorities and minorities,emphasizing their shared interests rather than pitting white men against a coalition of minorities, as isdone today by progressives and populist nationalists alike

Western governments should develop public goods projects that benefit people of all colors,regions, and class backgrounds, thereby avoiding the toxic perception of ethnic or political favoritism

hite working classes also resent their cultural marginalization by liberal elites, who championdiversity while presenting whites, heterosexuals, and men as the enemies of progress.

About one-third of all contemporary states were born in a nationalist war of independence againstimperial armies. The birth of new nation-states has also been accompanied by some of history's mostviolent episodes of ethnic cleansing, generally of minorities that were considered disloyal to the nationor suspected of collaborating with its enemies. During the two Balkan wars preceding World War I,newly independent Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia divided up the European parts of the OttomanEmpire among themselves, expelling millions of Muslims across the new border into the rest of theempire. Then, during World War I, the Ottoman government engaged in massive killings of Armeniancivilians. During World War II, Hitler's vilification of the Jews--whom he blamed for the rise ofBolshevism, which he saw as a threat to his plans for a German empire in eastern Europe--eventuallyled to the Holocaust. After the end of that war, millions of German civilians were expelled from thenewly re-created Czechoslovakian and Polish states. And in 1947, massive numbers of Hindus andMuslims were killed in communal violence when India and Pakistan became independent states

Loyalty to the nation can lead tothe demonization of others, whether foreigners or allegedly disloyal domestic minorities. Globally, therise of nationalism has increased the frequency of war: over the last two centuries, the foundation ofthe first nationalist organization in a country has been associated with an increase in the yearlyprobability of that country experiencing a full-scale war, from an average of 1.1 percent to an averageof 2.5 percent

Instead of graduated rights based onsocial status, nationalism promised the equality of all citizens before the law. Instead of restrictingpolitical leadership to the nobility, it opened up political careers to talented commoners. Instead ofleaving the provision of public goods to guilds, villages, and religious institutions, nationalism broughtthe power of the modern state to bear in promoting the common good. And instead of perpetuatingelite contempt for the uncultured plebs, nationalism elevated the status of the common people bymaking them the new source of sovereignty and by moving popular culture to the center of thesymbolic universe.

Nationalism allowed rulers to raise more taxes from the ruled and to count ontheir political loyalty

It held that the rulers and theruled both belonged to the same nation and thus shared a common historical origin and future politicaldestiny. Political elites would look after the interests of the common people rather than those of theirdynasty.

It has provided the ideological foundationfor institutions such as democracy, the welfare state, and public education, all of which were justified inthe name of a unified people with a shared sense of purpose and mutual obligation

Identifying nationalism exclusively with the political right meansmisunderstanding the nature of nationalism and ignoring how deeply it has shaped almost all modernpolitical ideologies, including liberal and progressive ones

At their core, all forms of nationalism share the same two tenets: first, that members of the nation,understood as a group of equal citizens with a shared history and future political destiny, should rulethe state, and second, that they should do so in the interests of the nation.

their presence in the political sphere, with statesand governments. As explained by Pablo Solon,Deglobalisation cannot flourish if social forces donot seize and transform State power. Democratisingthe management of the State property of publicenterprises, strengthening the communes thatexist and developing others to turn consumersinto producers, reinforcing self-organisation andself-management of society, and punishing corruption and nepotism are essential to ensure thatthe transition process does not come to a halt orregress (Solon 2017).The strengths of this vast alter-globalist movementare obviously impressive-such as the capacity to createimmediate coalitions to resist policies and propose alternatives, sometimes to the extent of changing the political leadership. At the same time, the weaknesses ofthese movements are apparent as mirror images of theirassets-Le., their dispersion, their fragmentation, theirinability to propose coherent and long-term programsbecause such proposals could jeopardize the narrowlimits of the alliances on which the movements are built.The old saying "think globally, act locally" nolonger applies because alter-globalists are indeed actingglobally. A striking example of this phenomenon concerns the devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic. It was firstaddressed by gay communities in northern California,later afflicted poor communities (mostly women) insub-Saharan Africa with terrible consequences, andthen was confronted by large-scale coalitions in suchplaces a

example, firm targets to limit emissions and legalenforcement mechanism s. As a result, it is up to thediverse spectrum of social movements and NGOs totake on the issue.

are unlikely to make a comeback, at least in theirclassic form. Some have suggested that remainingcommitted to neoliberal policies in an era of socialprotest leads to "de-democratization" as governments turn toward coercive measures in order tolimit dissent. However, more and more, commonpeople, social movements, and researchers are becoming convinced that the system has to be totallyreplaced, which Walden Bello has provocatively labelled "de-globalization."In this vision, de-globalization, "does not promote isolation or autarchy, but rather a differentkind of global integration that is not dominatedby capital" (Solon 2017). De-globalization does notsay that interests, competition, and efficiency arebad but that their pursuit must be subordinatedto values, cooperation, and community. It aimsto promote, according to Walden Bello, "effectiveeconomics, which strengthens social solidarity bysubordinating the operations of the market to thevalues of equity, justice, and community and by enlarging the range of democratic decision making inthe economic sphere" (Bello 2018). The idea of deglobalization comes from the conclusion, by various social movements and intellectuals, that thereis need for systemic alternatives, i.e., programs totackle the complexity and interactivity of the problems related to inequality, mass poverty, economicdestruction, and authoritarian regimes. Workingon these systemic alternatives requires goingbeyond opposition and embracing transformativepractices

Part of the anger about globalization was also capturedby right-wing reactionary forces who blamed progressive policies as being too "slack" to confront migrants and refugees. The Tea Party movement in theUS became the voice of large sections of the underclassthat had lost jobs and status through neoliberal austerity policies. And it was also the case with other populistmovements and political formations in Europe, India,the Philippines, Brazil, etc.Donald Trump was elected president of the UnitedStates to be a "disruptor" of the usual way of doingthings, which included American support for the worldorder that the country had built with its allies since theend of the Second World War. He brushed off policiesthat had dominated during the "golden era" of globalization, such as free-trade agreements, reduction ofcommercial barriers, and multilateral agreements regarding a whole range of issues. Commercial and economic conflicts of the US have multiplied with mostcountries of the world, including with its long-termallies such as Canada, Mexico, and the European Union,at the same time that military alliances such as NATO(the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) were questioned or rejected along with the multi-country cooperation to defeat ISIS in the Middle East and the Talibanin Afghanistan. The largest commercial confrontationcame about with China, the second-biggest economyof the world. Traditional American foreign policy con -cerns, such as support for democracy and human rightsabroad, were jettisoned in favour of personal comraderyand deal-seeking with some of the world's autocrats anddictators, such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, Brazil's JairBolsonaro, and North Korea's Kim Jong-un.Trump's narrow interpretation of an ''Americafirst" policy in which the United States tried to leverageits power in bilateral relationships to get "better deals"came at the expense of undermining the world order ithad created. Many saw this as symptomatic of the economic and military decline of the United States, nowfaced with rising powers such as China, which despiteits authoritarian system of government, remains committed to developing global free trade and investmentliberalization (Xi Jinping 2017).But we must also recognize that the election ofDonald Trump was a product of the electoral voice ofthe forgotten victims of globalization in the UnitedStates. For people who saw themselves as victims of freetrade and globalization and who found pride in traditional interpretations of American-ness and AmericanExceptionalism, Trump's promise to tear it all downstruck a chord.

In October 2011, a group of mostly young people decided to occupy an area right in the middle ofthe famous financial district of Wall Street in New York City. Zuccoti Park became for a few weeks theepicentre of a series of demonstrations, cultural events, and workshops in which many hundreds ofpeople protested against the corporate influence over the political system and political institutionsand against the privileges enjoyed by the "1 per cent," that is, the very rich people in the UnitedStates. Being located in New York City, the protest attracted world attention and went on until May2012 when 50,000 people demonstrated in the streets. One of the causes of that protest was thegrowing inequality in the US where those with higher incomes have gained a much larger share ofthe national revenue over the last decades. Among the important features of the movement were itsdecentralized nature, the apparent absence of hierarchy, and the fact that nobody appeared to bein charge other than the people themselves functioning through daily general assembly. The Occupymovement impressed onlookers as a flash mob of serious intent, and public opinion was struck, aswere some of the political actors, including US President Barack Obama. Similar protests were heldin Toronto and in Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, San Francisco, Boston, Houston, and many otherAmerican cities. The Occupy process later appeared in several other Canadian cities and in Europe,Asia, and South America. After a while, the camps were dismantled, and Occupy disappeared fromthe limelight.Occupy suggested that the idea of citizen mobilization was gaining more and more credibilityin the world as economic hardship and political deadlocks appeared, to many people, as obstaclesthat cannot be confronted by working within state and international institutions as they are currentlystructured

has become a truly world process led by civil societygroups, not only to protest the neoliberal institutionsof globalization but to define alternatives to the current system. Currently, more than 500,000 small andlarge social movements in the world participate in theWSF process, decentralized into many local, national,and thematic forums and using the most advanced information technologies to stage ongoing and complexdebates. In 2013 and 2015, after many years in SouthAmerica, the WSF moved to Tunis, the "capital" of theArab Spring, where it was attended by 65,000 delegates.Social movements there agreed on a program of socialaction:We have forged a common history and a commonstream of work which has led to some progress,with the hope to achieve a decisive victory againstthe ruling system and to create alternatives for asocially just development that respects nature.People all over the world are suffering the effectsof the aggravation of a profound crisis of capitalism, in which private transnational corporations,banks, media conglomerates and internationalfinancial institutions are trying to increase theirprofits by applying interventionist and neocolonial policies with the complicity of neoliberalgovernments .. . . We denounce the false discourseof human rights defense and fight against fundamentalism, which is often used to justify militaryoccupations. We defend the right to people's sovereignty and self-determination

In the United States and Canada, the "OccupyWall Street" movement reached more than 70 cities inNorth America, led by a new generation of educatedyouth dispirited by the lack of suitable job opportunities. The third country of North America that wesometimes forget, Mexico, was also shaken by protestsand mobilizations against state and gang violence andcorruption.Many anti- or alter-globalization movements arenot caught up in the idea of replacing a "system" withanother but in articulating a new perspective that proposes to break down the structures of domination andexclusion that marginalize the poor. This push hasbeen exemplified in South America, where progressivegovernments came into power after the first wave ofanti-globalization protests in Venezuela, then Brazil,Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, and elsewhere.After more than a decade in power, people's movements are still struggling, facing unfulfilled promisesand manipulative rules preventing popular movementsfrom effectively participating in the process of power.

Then, in 2008, the world seemed to enter a newphase. The crash of large financial institutions onWall Street and across the planet led to social and economic dislocation of a scale not seen since the GreatDepression of 1929. As millions of people lost theirjobs and sometimes their homes while others had toface scarcity and uncertainty, a widespread sentimentcame about that the status quo was untenable. A fewyears later, popular uprisings erupted across the world.The "Arab Spring" in 2011 pushed out long-establisheddictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt. It was triggeredby the self-immolation in December 2010 of a youngunemployed street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, protesting his condition. Thousands of Tunisians took tothe streets and, unarmed, confronted security forcesleading ultimately to the collapse of the regime. TheArab Spring was followed by protests against economicausterity in southern Europe, notably in Spain andGreece. The occupation of public places, the takeoverof closed-down factories, and the massive use of socialmedia to spread the word and to systematically exposethe negative impacts of neoliberal policies, massiv

In 1994 in southern Mexico, Indigenous communities represented by a group known as the ZapatistaArmy of National Liberation, otherwise known assimply the Zapatistas, appeared on the world stage,apparently out of the blue, to express their rejectionof NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)and the neoliberal globalization policies attached tothat process, which, according to them, was threatening the livelihood of the large peasant and Indigenouspopulations of that region. The movement capturedthe imagination of media around the world, partly because of the symbolism attached to Emiliano Zapata(a leader of the Mexican revolution in the early 20thcentury) and also, more substantially, because therevolt was led by farmers and Indigenous people who7 I Beaudet: Globalization and Development 121had traditionally been left out of the political arena,even by anti-systemic movements. In rather uniquelypoetic language, Zapatistas demanded the end of neoliberal policies (see Marcos 2001). They became widelyknown through their audacious use of modern communications at a time when use of the Internet was stillembryonic for social movements and radical projects.Moreover, the Zapatistas were capable of creating anddeploying new codes and modes of social interactionand communication, different from the traditionalleftist approaches. They clearly asserted, for example,that their rebellion was not about "taking" power butabout "changing" it. It might have been just a brilliantformula, but it has indeed changed the paradigm formany social movements.In Seattle in 1999, that cry was taken up by a widecoalition of US and international NGOs and social movements that was later defined as an alliance of"teamsters"(trade unions) and "turtles" (environmentalists). Theoccasion was the ministerial meeting of the recentlyformed World Trade Organization. A large "movementof movements" became visible after Seattle, with its adherents demonstrating in the streets of many cities indifferent parts of the world. Later, the anti-globalizationmovement spread out in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Beyond the recent phenomenon of states challengingneoliberal globalization, of course, is the ascendancyof a global civil society expressing itself through numerous demands, demonstrations, movements, andnetworks (see Chapter 13). And beyond the image ofanti-globalization protests and riots, a "movement ofmovements" seems to be in the process of becominga significant factor in world politics. Radical authorssuch as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000)and Naomi Klein (2015) think that new alternative"alter-globalist" movements and demands could eventually turn globalization upside down. Thus, just as theempire appears to be expanding, an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges is growing alongside it.

The Global South is "re-" and "de"-composing itselfinto a myriad of contradictory processes. Out of thecurrent chaos, various proposals are emerging. Earlyin the millennium, under the influence of a new generation of centre-left South American government andChina, there were various initiatives to restructure theworld economy away from the traditional dominanceof the United States and its G7 allies. Proposals toreform the United Nations, the World Bank, and theIMF, even the World Trade Organization, went alongwith boosting regional bodies, such as the Mercosur(in South America) and the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (in Asia). Some of the "emerging"countries that were advancing in terms of economicgrowth came together under a relatively informal alliance, the "BRICS" (Brazil, Russia, India, China, SouthAfrica), with the intent to access the global marketon an equal footing (Chapter 14). All in all, these approaches aimed at reforming, not bypassing, currentpolicies to promote a more stable and equitable globalization. By the

What was the cause of this crisis? By and large, it wasin fact the turn toward the finance sector - the "financialization," that had been so successful in the firstage of globalization. Indeed, in the wake of the neoliberal program of the 1980s, finances became thedriving force of the economy. According to WaldenBello, "Financialization involves the massive creationof indebtedness to substitute for stagnant incomes inorder to create demand for goods and services." Largefinancial institutions like JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup,Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, andMorgan Stanley own an estimated $100 trillion comingfrom rich people looking for tax shelters (Bello 2019a).By 2010, a recession had started to hit the GlobalSouth, including economies that had been rapidlygrowing in Asia and Latin America. Other regions, inparticular North Africa and the Middle East, were alsoaffected by rising unemployment, cutbacks in basicservices, etc., which contributed to a series of political crises and social confrontations. In many countries, the economic conditions of the "middle classes"became more precarious. Countries that were onceseen as members of the group of"emerging economies"like South Africa and Brazil also experienced high un -employment, declining wages and income, increasedindebtedness, stagnation of the social safety net, andimportant reductions in the provision of basic publicservices. Similar problems were found in the economies of the Global North (Milanovic 2016).The COVID-19 economic crisis could have evenworse consequences for developing countries, althoughat the time of writing the impact of the recession is unclear. In the short turn, the estimated losses for 2020are greater than 10 per cent of total world GDP. ManyAfrican countries, still dependent on income generated by resource exports, could lose tens of billions ofdollars (Roberts 2020). Some believe a full recovery isunlikely before 2023. The IMF has described the falloutfrom the pandemic as a "crisis like to no other":many countries now face multiple crises-a healthcrisis, a financial crisis, and a collapse in commodity prices, which interact in complex ways.Policymakers are providing support to households,firms, and financial markets, and, while this iscrucial for a strong recovery, there is considerableuncertainty about what the economic landscapewill look like when we emerge from this lockdown .... We project global growth in 2020 to fallto -3 percent. ... This makes the Great Lockdownthe worst recession since the Great Depression,and far worse than the Global Financial Crisis of2008 (IMF 2020).While it is unlikely that the world economy will be"deglobalizing" as a result of the pandemic crisis, wemay expect that more constraints on the global flowof goods will be imposed by leading economic powerslike China, the US, and the European Union. More andmore conflicts will arise around border controls, tariffs, and commercial measures in the context of greatercompetition. The poorest countries are going to bemore vulnerable to these changes, while internationalinstitutions (like the UN and the World Bank) will bemore limited in their actions due to budgetary cutbacks and political divergences among their members.

Prior to 2007-8, deepening globalization seemed inevitable and unstoppable. Since then, a series of criseshave contributed to undermining the global consensuson globalization and its benefits.In 2007-8, the financial systems of several capitalist countries were shaken when important institutions in the United States lost billions of dollars.Because of the interconnectivity of financial systemsworldwide, this crash rapidly contaminated manycountries.

Globalization has a profound impact on politics. Thenation-state, at the centre of the political architectureof the modern world, is losing parts of its sovereigntyas economic actors such as large multinational corporations (MNCs) and financial institutions transactfreely across borders (see Chapters 8 and 12). KenichiOhmae, in a provocative book, The End of the NationState, explains: "the workings of genuinely global capital markets dwarf their ability to control exchangerates or protect their currency." Consequently, "nationstates have become inescapably vulnerable to the discipline imposed by economic choices made elsewhere bypeople and institutions over which they have no practical control" (Ohmae 1995, 12).For many experts, political structures inherited from the nation-state are becoming obsolete.Fundamental policies governing macroeconomicsare discussed and determined by agencies far removed from the public arena (Lenhard 2010). Whilethe powerful have influence, most developing countries are left out of the process. For example, the IMFand the World Bank are directed by a small groupof countries because these institutions, unlike theUnited Nations, are governed by powerful states thathave larger voting shares because of their greater fi.nancial contributions to institutional functioning,contrary to the UN system in which all memberstates, in principle at least, have an equal footing (seeChapters 10 and 11).The governments of smaller or weaker states aretherefore losing their influence in the internationalarena-but also at their own national level. At worst,this process ends up in a breakdown, as we have seenin several sub-Saharan countries (as well as in southeast Europe and elsewhere). This disjuncture between the economic/private and the political/publicspaces is creating a vacuum. It remains to be seen, forexample, whether the United Nations will be able torecover from its current semi-marginalization, considering that the rich and powerful may not want itto do so

This bleak picture, however, needs to be nuanced. In the past decade, African social global indicators have been improving, in great part becauseof the good economic performance of a small groupof countries. In countries rich in oil and other natural resources, such as Angola and Nigeria, highgrowth rates have been registered. Some countrieshave even been able to improve access to basic socialservices, making progress toward achievement of theMillennium Development Goals (UN Department ofEconomic and Social Affairs 2010) and their replacement, the SDGs.More critical views, however, suggest thateconomic growth has not led to major social improvements and, moreover, remains fragile, linkedprincipally to the scramble for African natural resources by developed-country investors from the US,the European Union, and China. In addition, Africa'srecent surge in growth was driven by commodity exports that did not induce much structural change.Instead, they merely reinforced Africa's narrowexport base. Moreover, since 2013 many commoditieshave lost much of their previous value while externalmarkets have been squeezed because of the slump inEurope and Asia (IMF 2014). In the meantime, Africaaccounts for less than 1 per cent of the world's GDP. Toadd to the catastrophe, external debt has explodedfrom $89 billion (1980) to $149 billion (2010). In 2014,while aid and investment flows into Africa represented $134 billion, financial outflows from Africawere almost $192 billion, thus creating a net deficit ofnearly $60 billion for the African economy (JubileeDebt Campaign 2014). (See Chapter 15.)Walden Bello, a political economist from thePhilippines, reminds us that the income gap continuesto grow between "rich" and "poor" countries even if,within these countries, similar patterns are at play between social groups:There has been too much dissonance betweenthe promise of globalization and free trade andthe actual results of neoliberal policies, whichhave been more poverty, inequality, and stagnation. One of the very few places where poverty diminished over the last 15 years is China.But interventionist state policies that managedmarket forces, not neoliberal prescriptions, wereresponsible for lifting 120 million Chinese outof poverty. Moreover, the advocates of eliminating capital controls have had to face the actualcollapse of the economies that took this policyto heart. The globalization of finance proceededmuch faster than the globalization of production.But it proved to be the cutting edge not of prosperity but of chaos

However, by the late 1990s, it became apparent thatthe promises made about inclusive growth andbetter living conditions for all were elusive. Beyondthe important achievement of a global decline inthe number of the poor (from 43 per cent of theworld's population in 1990 to 17 per cent in 2011),the situation for the majority in most of the deprivedcountries remained problematic. Indeed, the mixedrecord of poverty reduction calls into question theefficacy of conventional approaches involving economic liberalization and privatization. Amartya Sen,a well-known economist from India, believes that themain issue is not globalization itself but inequitablesharing of its benefits.The traditional North/South fracture persists.Advanced capitalist countries control more than 90per cent of financial assets, 85 per cent of foreign directinvestments worldwide, more than 65 per cent of theworld GDP, and 70 per cent of industrial exports. Thissituation is compounded by the fact that, in manyrespects, the East Asian "tigers" still depend on theGlobal North in key sectors such as finance and hightechnology.Even the most ardent promoters of globalizationwill admit that Africa is facing a tough challenge.Exclusion from the benefits of globalization for thepoorest countries, defined by the UN as the "least developed countries" (LDCs), remains a dreadful reality. Currently, many African countries appear to betrapped in a vicious cycle of interlocking handicaps,including poverty, illiteracy, civil strife, environmentalpressures, poor governance, and inflexible economieslargely dependent on exports of a single commodity.For example, income from African exports declinedfrom s255 billion in 2014 to $190 billion in 2016. SubSaharan Africa remains far behind

Given this global panorama, we arrive at a simplequestion: what is new about globalization? Are we notseeing the same thing, under new conditions perhaps,that has been restructuring the world since the expansion of Western capitalism? Is it not the same patternobserved by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels more than160 years ago?The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation ofthe world market, given a cosmopolitan characterto production and consumption in every country.Instead of the old local and national seclusion andself-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, the universal interdependence of nations.National one-sidedness and narrow-mindednessbecome less and less possible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arisesa world literature (Marx and Engels 1967 [1848]).What does appear to be new is the speed and intensity of interconnections among entities across theworld. Around the world, 24 hours per day, financialmarkets are imposing immediate economic decisions.New technologies, at least partially, have created another reality-namely, the "world factory," managed bythe world firm, under a world label, where everythingfrom production to marketing and design is integratedacross continents and communities. For Luis Hebronand John F. Stack (2009), for example, globalization ispowerful because it brings together politics, economics, law, social structures, media, and informationtechnologies

Put simply, globalization translates into new sets ofrelations and activities, mostly in the economic arena,that are taking place irrespective of the geographicallocation of participants. Globalization underpins atransformation in the organization of human affairs bylinking together and expanding human activity acrossregions and continents (Held and McGrew 2003).Territory as a geographic reality no longer constitutes the whole of the "social space" in which humanactivity occurs (see Box 7.2). Because of these majorchanges, social geographer David Harvey (2005) believes that modern capitalism has integrated the worldmuch more profoundly than ever before. Time andspace are no longer insurmountable, as they were in thepast, because with modern communication and transportation, everything moves everywhere, includinggoods, services, and people. Therefore, the geographicdivide between the North and the South appears tohave become blurred (Golub 2013). This is not to saythat the gap has disappeared. Rather, globalization isgenerating a new pattern whereby poverty and wealthare redistributed through a reconstituted structure ofexclusion. For Harvey (1990, 147), current patterns ofdevelopment under globalization lead to "shifts in thepatterning of uneven development, both between sectors and between geographical regions."

found competitive niches and succeeded in attractingforeign capital, thereby triggering economic growthand development. This strategy seemed to have workedin China, South Korea, and other smaller "tigers" and"dragons" that emerged at that time, reducing poverty(from 78 per cent in 1981 to 8 per cent in 2011). Morethan 600 million Chinese were lifted out of poverty(World Trade Organization 2018, 23). Parallel to theseachievements, North America and western Europestruggled to come out of the financial and economicslump of 2008, the most severe since 1929. Indeed,China has become the workshop of the world, exporting a vast surplus of industrialized goods and, increasingly, high-tech products. The United States' shareof world industrial production decreased from 25.1per cent (2000) to 17.7 per cent (2015), while China'sshare exploded from 6.5 per cent (2000) to 23.6 percent (2015). China's share in global merchandise tradein 2017 was 11.5 per cent while the United States' was11.1 per cent. Yet globalization was broadly thought tocontribute to economic growth and prosperity in theGlobal North, even though a large part of productivecapacities was moved to low-wage Southern economiesoften managed by authoritarian governments.Much of this increase in exports from developingcountries has to do with the fact that they have beenencouraged by the IMF and World Bank to open theireconomies, liberalize trade, and increase exports.Under the influence of the powerful agencies promoting globalization, trade is expanding faster thanproduction. The theory is that the soothing influenceof the market (the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith)will help every country to find its "niche" selling andbuying where its comparative advantage dominates(see Chapter 16). Everyone wins in the end, so the storygoes. Most countries of the world are now membersof the World Trade Organization, the champion ofin •ternational globalization, liberalization, and economicintegration.The World Bank also remains convinced thatglobalization-Le., integration into the world marketis working for the poor and the developing world.For David Dollar (2004), an economist working forthe Bank, the simple proof that globalization worksis that poor-country growth rates were higher thanrich-country growth rates for the first time in

By the early 1990s, the dominant discourse argued that capitalism had triumphed worldwide with thecollapse of the Soviet Union. "Underdeveloped" countries would follow the policies promoted by theadvanced capitalist "core." The World Bank predicted that most of the world would prosper and progress through fully "globalizing" and integrating with the world economy. Globalization was then definedby former World Bank official John Williamson as implying the adoption of "Washington Consensus"policies. The term has been associated with neoliberal policies first adopted by the United States andBritain in the early 1980s and later promoted by the World Bank and the IMF in developing countries. The"consensus" recommended the liberalization of capital flows and trade (through free trade agreements),the privatization of the public sector, and the abolition of market-restricting regulations. It became a central component of structural adjustment programs imposed by the Bank and the IMF on countries thatrequired loans

In the early 1990s, when the concept of globalization became widely used, many scholars and policymakers working on development were taken aback.One of those was Fernando Henrique Cardoso, oneof the founders of the famous dependency school thathad such great influence on thinking in developmentstudies in the 1970s (see Chapter 3 and 4) . He changedhis earlier interpretation of the causes of underdevelopment, giving this globalization-and-developmentdebate a rather provocative spin. After becoming thepresident of Brazil in 1994, Cardoso (2007) argued thatpast development theories were dead and buried andthat everything he had said about development waswrong! Instead, he proposed that development requiredfull integration into the world system, which implied,in turn, accepting the terms of current macroeconomicpolicies as they were defined a decade before in theWashington Consensus (Box 7,1). Under Cardoso'spresidency, the social and economic priorities of Brazilwere refocused to adjust to the needs and requirementsof international markets. Yet a few decades previously,Cardoso and many of his colleagues in developmentstudies had been arguing that the only path to development was to "delink" from international capitalism.Globalization meant that Brazil and other developing countries that had challenged a world economicsystem that had seemed to benefit the rich countrieswere changing paths, and as a result, most of the nationsof the world sought to further integrate into the capitalist system under the rubric of Washington Consensusstyle policies. These broad policies were promoted bythe G7, an informal association of the richest countriesin the world (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,the United Kingdom, and the United States)

Since the 1980s, "globalization" has been a buzz-wordin international development. What became known asthe "Washington Consensus" (see Chapter 3) deeplyaffected the theory and practice of development by emphasizing trade and investment liberalization, publicsector reduction in favour of private capital, and cutbacks to public services and institutions. Borders weretr espassed if not abolished, and thanks to technological innovations, the world became one single economicentity. But the heralded benefits of globalization didnot always materialize. First, the impact of these polici es was problematic in terms of rising poverty and political instability in many countries. Social movementsstarted to question how globalization was shaping theworld, and out of this critique came the idea that someso rt of "alter-globalization" was necessary.But globalization has also faced other challenges.In 2007- 8, the world system was struck by a huge financial crash that destabilized many countries. Despiteattempts to reform some of the liberal policies of globalization, the crisis aggravated income gaps, contributed to environmental deterioration, fomentednationalist responses and political competition between superpowers, while, at the same time, a wave ofnew conflicts threatened millions of lives. In 2016, theelection of Donald Trump as president of the UnitedStates was at once a symptom and an accelerator ofthis evolution. The COVID-19 pandemic that began inChina in early 2020 simultaneously thrived within andthreatened the processes of globalization. Through thedense global web of international chains of productionand mass tourism, it rapidly reached Europe and, later,the Americas and Africa, infecting tens of millions, andkilling almost 1.7 million people, as vaccines were beingrolled out in late 2020. While states and internationalagencies are still trying to develop coping strategies andthe World Bank predicts a substantial global economicdownturn, it is still unclear how the pandemic will affectthe process of globalization (World Bank 2020).At a time when globalization seems to be underthreat, this chapter focuses on its impact on development and developing countries. It aims to trigger newdebates and reflections, especially for those who areWorking on and studying development

To conclude, the confounding of globalization with Westerni-zation is not only ahistorical, it also distracts attention from themany potential benefits of global integration. Globalization isa historical process that has offered an abundance of oppor-tunities and rewards in the past and continues to do so today.The very existence of potentially large benefits makes the ques-tion of fairness in sharing the benefits of globalization so crit-ically important.The central issue of contention is not globalization itself, noris it the use of the market as an institution, but the inequity inthe overall balance of institutional arrangements-which pro-duces very unequal sharing of the benefits of globalization. Thequestion is not just whether the poor, too, gain something fromglobalization, but whether they get a fair share and a fair oppor-tunity. There is an urgent need for reforming institutional arrange-ments-in addition to national ones-in order to overcome boththe errors of omission and those of commission that tend to givethe poor across the world such limited opportunities. Globali-zation deserves a reasoned defense, but it also needs reform.

The injustices that characterize the world are closely related tovarious omissions that need to be addressed, particularly ininstitutional arrangements. I have tried to identify some of themain problems in my book Development as Freedom (Knopf,1999). Global policies have a role here in helping the develop-ment of national institutions (for example, through defendingdemocracy and supporting schooling and health facilities), butthere is also a need to re-examine the adequacy of global insti-tutional arrangements themselves. The distribution of thebenefits in the global economy depends, among other things, ona variety of global institutional arrangements, including those forfair trade, medical initiatives, educational exchanges, facilitiesfortechnological dissemination, ecological and environmentalrestraints, and fair treatment of accumulated debts that wereoften incurred by irresponsible military rulers of the past.In addition to the momentous omissions that need to berectified, there are also serious problems of commission thatmust be addressed for even elementary global ethics. These in-clude not only inefficient and inequitable trade restrictions thatrepress exports from poor countries, but also patent laws thatinhibit the use of lifesaving drugs-for diseases like AIDS-and that give inadequate incentive for medical research aimedat developing nonrepeating medicines (such as vaccines). Theseissues have been much discussed on their own, but we must alsonote how they fit into a general pattern of unhelpful arrange-ments that undermine what globalization could offer.Another-somewhat less discussed-global "commission"that causes intense misery as well as lasting deprivation relatesto the involvement of the world powers in globalized arms trade.A6 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT GLOBALISM AND POVERTYThis is a field in which a new global initiative is urgently required,going beyond the need-the very important need-to curb ter-rorism, on which -the focus is so heavily concentrated right now.Local wars and military conflicts, which have very destructiveconsequences (not least on the economic prospects of poorcountries), draw not only on regional tensions but also on globaltrade in arms and weapons. The world establishment is firmlyentrenched in this business: the Permanent Members of theSecurity Council of the United Nations were together respon-sible for 81 percent of world arms exports from 1996 through2000. Indeed, the world leaders who express deep frustrationat the "irresponsibility" of antiglobalization protesters leadthe countries that make the most money in this terrible trade.The G-8 countries sold 87 percent of the total supply of armsexported in the entire world. The U.S. share alone has just goneup to almost 50 percent of the total sales in the world.Furthermore, as much as 68 percent of the American armsexports went to developing countries.The arms are used with bloody results-and with devas-tating effects on the economy, the polity, and the society. Insome ways, this is a continuation of the unhelpful role of worldpowers in the genesis and flowering of political militarism inAfrica from the 1960s to the 1980s, when the Cold War wasfought over Africa. During these decades, when military over-lords-Mobuto Sese Seko or Jonas Savimbi or whoever-busted social and political arrangements ( and, ultimately,economic order as well) in Africa, they could rely on supporteither from the United States and its allies or from the SovietUnion, depending on their military alliances. The worldpowers bear an awesome responsibility for helping in the sub-version of democracy in Africa and for all the far-reachingnegative consequences of that subversion. The pursuit of arms"pushing" gives them a continuing role in the escalation ofmilitary conflicts today-in Africa and elsewhere. The U.S.refusal to agree to a joint crackdown even on illicit sales ofsmall arms (as proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan)illustrates the difficulties involved

need

The central question is not whether to use the market econ-omy. That shallow question is easy to answer, because it is hardto achieve economic prosperity without making extensive useof the opportunities of exchange and specialization thatmarket relations offer. Even though the operation of a givenmarket economy can be significantly defective, there is no wayof dispensing with the institution of markets in general as apowerful engine of economic progress.But this recognition does not end the discussion about glob-alized market relations. The market economy does not work byitself in global relations-indeed, it cannot operate alone evenwithin a given country. It is not only the case that a market-inclusive system can generate very distinct results depending onvarious enabling conditions (such as how physical resourcesare distributed, how human resources are developed, what rulesofbusiness relations prevail, what social-security arrangementsare in place, and so on). These enabling conditions themselvesdepend critically on economic, social, and political institutionsthat operate nationally and globally.The crucial role of the markets does not make the other insti-tutions insignificant, even in terms of the results that the marketeconomy can produce. As has been amply established in empiri-cal studies, market outcomes are massively influenced by publicpolicies in education, epidemiology, land reform, microcreditfacilities,appropriate legalprotections, et cetera;and in each of thesefields,there is work to be done through public action that can radi-cally alter the outcome oflocal and global economic relations.

benefits. Indeed, this is why many of the antiglobalization pro-testers, who seek a better deal for the underdogs of the worldeconomy, are not-contrary to their own rhetoric and to theviews attributed to them by others-really "antiglobalization."It is also why there is no real contradiction in the fact that theso-called antiglobalization protests have become among themost globalized events in the contemporary world

Likewise, one cannot rebut the charge that the global systemis unfair by showing that even the poor gain something fromglobal contacts and are not necessarily made poorer. That an-swer may or may not be wrong, but the question certainly is. Thecritical issue is not whether the poor are getting marginally pooreror richer. Nor is it whether they are better off than they wouldbe had they excluded themselves from globalized interactions.

By analogy, to argue that a particularly unequal and sexist fam-ily arrangement is unfair, one does not have to show that womenwould have done comparatively better had there been no fam-ilies at all, but only that the sharing of the benefits is seriouslyunequal in that particular arrangement. Before the issue of gen-der justice became an explicitly recognized concern (as it has inrecent decades), there were attempts to dismiss the issue of un-fair arrangements within the family by suggesting that womendid not need to live in families if they found the arrangementsso unjust. It was also argued that since women as well as menbenefit from living in families, the existing arrangements couldnot be unfair. But even when it is accepted that both men andwomen may typically gain from living in a family, the questionof distributional fairness remains. Many different family arrange-ments-when compared with the absence of any familysystem-would satisfy the condition of being beneficial to bothmen and women. The real issue concerns how fairly benefits as-sociated with these respective arrangements are distributed.

is unfair simply by noting that all the parties are better off thanthey would be in the absence of cooperation; the real exerciseis the choice between these alternatives

GLOBALJUSTICE AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEMEven if the poor were to get just a little richer, this would notnecessarily imply that the poor were getting a fair share of thepotentially vast benefits of global economic interrelations. It isnot adequate to ask whether international inequality is gettingmarginally larger or smaller. In order to rebel against the ap-palling poverty and the staggering inequalities that character-ize the contemporary world-or to protest against the unfairsharing of benefits of global cooperation-it is not necessary toshow that the massive inequality or distributional unfairness isalso getting marginally larger. This is a separate issue altogether.

Much depends on the region or the group cho-sen and what indicators of economic prosperity are used. Butthe attempt to base the castigation of economic globalizationon this rather thin ice produces a peculiarly fragile critique.

This may require extensive insti-tutional reform, even as globalization is defended.

Rather, themain issue is how to make good use of the remarkable benefitsof economic intercourse and technological progress in a way thatpays adequate attention to the interests of the deprived and theunderdog.

But itwould be a great mistake to see globalization primarily as a fea-ture ofimperialism. It is much bigger-much greater-than that

th the whole native literature of India and Arabia," hedeclared. Partly in retaliation, the advocates of native educationresisted Western imports altogether. Both sides, however, ac-cepted too readily the foundational dichotomy between twodisparate civilizations.

The misdiagnosis that globalization of ideas and practices has tobe resisted because it entails dreaded Westernization has playedquite a regressivepart in the colonial and postcolonial world. Thisassumption incites parochial tendencies and undermines thepossibility of objectivity in science and knowledge. It is not onlycounterproductive in itself;given the global interactions through-out history, it can also cause non-Western societies to shootthemselves in the foot--even in their precious cultural foot

of the Chinese.

ting the diagnosis of globalization as a phenomenon ofquintessentially Western origin, we have to be suspicious notonly of the anti-Western rhetoric but also of the pro-Westernchauvinism in many contemporary writings

A similar movement occurred in the Eastern influence onWestern mathematics. The decimal system emerged and becamewell developed in India between the second and sixth centuries;it was used by Arab mathematicians soon thereafter. These math-ematical innovations reached Europe mainly in the last quarterof the tenth century and began having an impact in the early yearsof the last millennium, playing an important part in the sci-entific revolution that helped to transform Europe. The agentsof globalization are neither European nor exclusively

To illustrate, consider the world at the beginning of the lastmillennium rather than at its end. Around 1000 A.O., global reachof science, technology, and mathematics was changing the na-ture of the old world, but the dissemination then was, to a greatextent, in the opposite direction of what we see today. The hightechnology in the world of 1000 A.O. included paper, the print-ing press, the crossbow, gunpowder, the iron-chain suspensionbridge, the kite, the magnetic compass, the wheelbarrow, and therotary fan. A millennium ago, these items were used extensivelyin China-and were practically unknown elsewhere. Globali-zation spread them across the world, including Europe

They have not necessarily taken theform of increased Western influence. Indeed, the active agentsof globalization have often been located far from the West

From the opposite perspective, Western dominance-some-times seen as a continuation of Western imperialism-is thedevil of the piece. In this view, contemporary capitalism, drivenand led by greedy and grab by Western countries in Europe andNorth America, has established rules of trade and businessrelations that do not serve the interests of the poorer people inthe world. The celebration of various non-Western identities-defined by religion (as in Islamic fundamentalism), region (asin the championing of Asian values) , or culture (as in theglorification of Confucian ethics)-can add fuel to the fire ofconfrontation with the West

LOBALIZATION IS OFTEN SEEN AS GLOBAL WEST-ernization. On this point, there is substantial agree-ment among many proponents and opponents.Those who take an upbeat view of globalizationsee it as a marvelous contribution of Western civ-ilization to the world. There is a nicely stylized history in whichthe great developments happened in Europe: First came theRenaissance, then the Enlightenment and the IndustrialRevolution, and these led to a massive increase in living stan-dards in the West. And now the great achievements of the Westare spreading to the world. In this view, globalization is notonly good, it is also a gift from the West to the world. The cham-pions of this reading of history tend to feel upset not just be-cause this great benefaction is seen as a curse but also becauseit is undervalued and castigated by an ungrateful world.

Globallinkshavespreadknowledgeand raisedaveragelivingstandards.Butthe presentversionof globalismneedlesslyharmsthe world'spoorest

The purpose of some genres of hip-hop is focused on getting people to dance and relax and have fun, but message rap has a more serious purpose. The primary purposes of songs in the subgenre of message rap are to make a political statement by exposing injustices and to persuade the audience to take action.

Each genre of a speech is approptiate in a specific kind of situation (a political rally, a grad-

Mediums and modes are closely related. If a mode is a channel of communi- cation—oral, visual, digital, print—then a medium is the tool that the com- poser uses within that channel to deliver his or her message.

ypically sociologists don’t use informal language in research reports, and some of Greg’s choices of words (for example, two-fold or certain common occurrences or supplement) would sound overly formal in a casual conversation about men’s behavior in bathrooms or a stand-up comedy performance about men and bathrooms.

Your idea of what the appropri- ate persona is for a particular academic essay will also be shaped by what your high school teachers told you about college writing, the writing expec- tations of the teacher who assigned the essay, the academic field of the class, the genre of the essay, and so forth.

The ability to move effectively between different audiences and adjust your language and delivery is what linguists call code switching.

White America must now pay for her sins against twenty-two mil- lion “Negroes.” White America’s worst crimes are her hypocrisy and her deceit. White America pretends to ask herself: “What do these Negroes want?” White America knows that four hundred years of cruel bondage has made these twenty-two million ex-slaves too (mentally) blind to see what they really want.

Molotov combines hip-hop, heavy metal, and traditional Mexican music genres to create a new genre of hip-hop.

In addition to being able to communicate in a variety of genres, the ability to combine genres to create hybrid forms is a valuable skill for twenty-first-century literacy.

These channels of communication—print, digital, visual, and oral—are what communication theorists call modes.

Because of the increasing ethnic diversity of America

Twenty-first-century readers and writers need to ¢ Develop proficiency with the tools of technology ¢ Build relationships with others to pose and solve problems collaboratively and cross-culturally ¢ Design and share information for global communities to meet a variety of purposes ¢ Manage, analyze, and synthesize multiple streams of simultaneous information

To find our way around this emerging world of meaning requires a new, multimodal literacy.

linguistic modes of meaning are part and parcel of visual, audio, and spatial patterns of meaning.

Today information about the world around us comes to us not only by words on a piece of paper, but also more and more through the powerful images and sounds of our multimedia culture,