"the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two
Aquinas maintains a distinction between epistemic subject and object-- some relations are "imposed" by the reason of the subject onto the object, as when something is said to be "the same as itself." Other relations are inherent to the nature of the object.
which perfections preexist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied.
What would it mean for these perfections, expressed as certain properties or determinations, to exist in God "unitedly and simply" as opposed to "divided and multiplied" in creatures?
Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing
Even positive determinations would thus be read negatively.
actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought
Again, is this fair? Anselm makes the crucial first point that such a thing exists at least in the mind, so in order for Aquinas's point to hold, these people would have to deny such a concept exists even in the mind.
it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally.
Is this a fair critique? IIRC Anselm says that one would understand that what the word signifies exists actually on the condition that they properly think through and understand the meaning of the concept.
the predicate is included in the rationale of the subject
Sounds like the (later?) distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.
self-evident
Would that be called self-evident? It still requires a formal demonstration proceeding from the concept of God
But by such similitudes truth is obscured
Metaphor would obscure truth because it gets at it indirectly, by means of a comparison, rather than directly.
poetry, the least of all the sciences
Weird to treat poetry as a science at all.
If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections — if he has any — against faith
Faith itself must be defended in this case-- but how?
Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false:
Markedly different from Maimonides who encourages us to interpret scripture differently, i.e. allegorically, when it appears to contradict truths arrived at through reason.
to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed
The implication is that political science, in turn, is oriented toward the end of eternal salvation.
under the formality of being divinely revealed
Qua divinely revealed.
So it is that sacred teaching is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed
But Aquinas does not clarify how the "science of God and the blessed," upon which our sacred teaching is based, are known to human beings. This raises the question all over again: is the "science of God and the blessed" known to us by the natural light of intelligence, or by the light of a higher science?
individual facts
Instead they presumably deal with universal principles?
the truth about God such as reason could discover would only be known by a few
Already a difference from Maimonides, for whom fully revealed truth about God need/should not be accessible to everyone.
As for the whole body of the wheels of which he says that it was full of eyes
However, if you envisage His essence as it is when divested and stripped of all actions, He no longer has a derived name in any respect whatever, but only one original name that indicates His essence
Maimonides seems to think that God's pure "essence" must have no attributes or qualities, or else it could be broken down into these parts and would no longer be a unity. But if God has no attributes, what is his essence if not "nothing"?
indicative of a notion with reference to which there is no association between God, may He be exalted, and what is other than He.
Because it has no derivation in some other word or term, it does not refer to any other concept, such as "lord" or "king," which is not identical with YHWH himself.
The term is also used to designate the true notion grasped by the intellect. It is with a view to this third meaning that the word figure is used with reference to God, may He be exalted. Thus it says: And the figure of the Lord shall he look upon
As we have seen in many of the previous texts, Maimonides introduces concepts into his interpretation of Hebrew scripture which are foreign to its original culture.
Fine and bad,6 on the other hand, belong to the things generally accepted as known,7 not to those cognized by the intellect
Bears similarity to the translation of the Greek "endoxa," according to footnote 7. What does this imply? Good and evil are mere endoxa, not intelligible objects, like truth and falsehood? Is the status of endoxa inferior-- meaning moral facts are inferior?
Now it is a thing to be wondered at that man's punishment for his disobedience should consist in his being granted a perfection that he did not possess before, namely, the intellect
Interesting to hear a Jewish take on the story, which I'm most familiar with in the Christian context as a story of the "fall" and of original sin.
and it too signifies likeness in respect of a notion. For the scriptural dictum, I am like a pelican in the wilderness,1'}. does not signify that its author I resembled the pelican with regard to its wings and feathers, but that his sadness was like that of the bird.
This might be hard to tell without knowing the original, but I wonder if Maimonides is missing the importance of context here. Even in English, the "like" in "I am like a pelican in the wilderness" is the same root as "likeness" in "the boy's likeness to his father," yet it is clear from context that the former is metaphorical and the latter is literal. It wouldn't be right to try to claim either the metaphorical or the literal meaning for the word exclusively-- the meaning depends on its context.
Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.
Prof. Callaway last semester specifically remarked on how physical the Hebrew is with the terms "image and likeness."
The sixth cause
The only cause which admits the possibility of an actual internal inconsistency in the text.
that have not been inserted with a view to interpretation
How we should approach a text, for Maimonides, ultimately has its basis in the author's intentions.
truth as it is.
Truth as it is as opposed to that which is merely useful.
the external sense mani-festly contradicts the truth and departs from the intelligible
Scriptural interpretation is now held against the standard of human reason, to which each interpretation must be answerable. Interpretations must be rejected if they contradict reason.
Account cif the Beginning, which, as we have made clear, is natural science
Genesis is re-cast as an account of natural science.
this were the nature of this subject matter, be there much or little of it. For this reason, all the Sages possessing knowledge of God the Lord,16 knowers of the truth, when they aimed at teaching something of this subject matter, spoke of it only in parables and riddles.
Something about the subject matter makes it inaccessible to direct speech-- it can only be hinted at in parables, riddles, allegories, metaphors, etc.
concealed from the vulgar among the people those truths especially requisite for His apprehension
This is a far cry from the democratic (Christian evangelist?) understanding of truth as something that should be accessible to all.
One can perceive an abstract intelligible (only) with theabstract intellect. It is something apprehended, not something spoken.
This raises the problem of how the intelligible can be communicated, because to communicate it is already to turn it into something sensible (spoken or written word).
there is no extension[hayyiz]or place[
Is this to say that the soul/mind has no location?
for it manages thebest interests of the lower world and sensible states
Practical knowledge is that which manages sensible states.
receives all the forms
Should we read "forms" here as having any connection to Plato's forms?
the intellect is the commander [7r.] and superior of the ratio-nal soul
There is even hierarchy WITHIN the rational part of the soul.
but the psychic (soul) is not susceptible to mortality
Reminds me of Prof. Miller on how Aristotle might have considered some particular faculty of the rational soul to be able to exist separately from the body-- Avicenna takes a more definitive stance.
to be first conceived is the necessary
Avicenna determines one of the three concepts to be prior to all others so that he might define the others in terms of it without circularity.
estimative [faculty] and the intellect
If we can conceive of something in the intellect, this is a kind of existence for Avicenna.
impressed in the soul in a primary way
A priori knowledge?
is not separable in subsistence from nature
It is separable only in mind, in definition, as an abstraction.
Thus, in its own right, this science should be prior to all the [other] sciences; but, from our point of view, it is posterior to all of them
Echoes Aristotle's distinction between "better known in itself" and "better known to us."
if we divide absolute benefit into its divisions
Are all these divisions really necessary? lol
Hence, if we take "benefit" in the absolute sense, then this [metaphysical] science does have a benefit
Since there is no science higher than metaphysics.
Otherwise, there would be no substance that is not sensible.
Why is this impossible?
And it is not the case that, if two things are concomitants, it then follows necessarily that one of them is the cause of the other
Hume will take up this argument centuries later!
) The existence of God — exalted be His greatness — cannot be admitted as the subject matter of this science; rather, it is [something] sought in it.
IIRC Avicenna is the first of the texts we've read so far not to take the existence of God for granted.
separable from matter in subsistence and definition.
Are mathematical objects separable from matter in definition but not in subsistence?
principle of an action inasmuch as it is a principle of action.
"Inasmuch as" looks a lot like Aristotle's "qua" -- theoretical sciences might sometimes tackle a similar subject matter as the practical sciences, but not insofar as it pertains to action.
nor can any affirmative or negating statement apply to it
Even negative statements apparently do not apply.
who plunge into the darkness where truly dwells
A reversal of ordinary Christian thinking, in which God and truth are associated with light.
being beyond all positive and negating distinctions
This is how PD responds to the objection that he is speaking in contradictions.
all things that the senses or the mind can perceive
Goes a step farther than Platonism-- leaving the senses for intelligible objects is no longer enough. We have to leave behind even the intelligible objects for something unintelligible.
but by understanding himself
As the source and cause of all things, knowledge of himself implies knowledge of all things.
absence of reason to him because he is above reason
Similar to the point about God's non-existence -- in saying this we mean that he is beyond existence.
the end
Not just the efficient cause but the final cause.
. Life itself is the source of everything alive. Similarity itself is the source of everything similar, Unity itself of everything unified, Order itself of everything orderly.
Clear relationship to Plato's forms as causes.
He is the time within which things happen
A kind of ground of existence, which according to PD is time itself -- prior to existence. God is understood as this time which precedes existence, within which things can come into being.
The more a thing participates in the one infinitely generous God
These greater levels of faculties give one greater participation in the "one infinitely generous God."
him who truly exists
God, or not? God was previously spoken of as beyond existence.
exercises no rational process, no act of choice, and yet by the very fact of its existence it gives light to whatever is able to partake of its light, in its own way
Seems to suggest that God does not "choose" anything but simply emits goodness of his own nature.
dwells indivisibly in every individual and who is in himself undifferentiated unity
Similar to what Olivia brought up in a comment before -- he tries to get out of the objections that Parmenides brings against Plato's theory of Forms insofar as it would also apply to God.
nor yet a total of parts
Not oneness in this sense, or else he would be divisible.
wholly and completely took on our human substance
If Jesus is wholly and completely human, and wholly and completely divine, and if to be human and to be divine are mutually exclusive, do we arrive at a contradiction? Are they not mutually exclusive?
being there
"Being there" -- is this not existence? In what sense is God?
It is at a total remove from every condition, movement, life, imagination, conjecture, name, discourse, thought, conception, existence, rest, dwelling, unity, limit, infinity, the totality of existence.
God is spoken about only negatively, in terms of what God is not. Pseudo-Dionysius seems to refuse to say anything positive about God, since that would imply ascribing to God concepts and words which remain in the realm of existence and understanding.
transcends existence
What would it mean to "transcend existence"? The implication is that God does not exist, but if not, how are we to speak of God as a reality?
we must not dare to apply words or conceptions to this hidden transcendent God
But how can we speak about God if not in words and conceptions? Do we already fail by saying the name "God"?
gathered up by no discourse
Some trace the origin of the ancient Greek "logos" to a root meaning "to gather." God cannot be spoken of, "gathered up" by discourse.