25 Matching Annotations
  1. Mar 2024
    1. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say ‘so-and-so-and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in kind, e.g., a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this is to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man is to be the good and noble performance of these

      What he is saying is basically that humans differ from other animals in that they have an ability of complex reasoning and, therefore, in order to fulfill their purpose, they need to excel at reasoning "in accordance with virtue". I'm not sure whether he already includes that in the "rational principle", but I think I would also include the ability for introspection as one of the distinguishing capabilities of humans that they have to utilize to reach their potential. Because if we were incapable to reflect on our past reasoning, we wouldn't be able to become better.

    2. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

      This paragraph reminded me of the philosophy of Tibetan monks that create sand mandalas. After working on them for weeks or months, they ritualistically destroy them in minutes. It's interesting that in this case, they don't make mandalas to preserve them and hang on the wall or for the sake of developing a skill. But they still derive a spiritual "end" out of this process: by making and then destroying their hard work, Tibetan monks teach the belief that nothing lasts forever.

    3. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.

      I find this list of requirements for building a truly virtuous personality very comprehensive. Here Aristotle explains that a virtuous individual is the one who (1) has some sort of a moral framework and is deeply aware of it, (2) who makes conscious choices to act in a virtuous way, and (3) who does it consistently. If all of these features are present, a person is more likely to stay virtuous regardless of the situation they are put in.

    4. Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just and temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them.

      I think this idea can be tied back pretty well to "The Ring of Gyges" concepts. Here Aristotle specifies that to be a just person, doing a just thing in a vacuum isn't enough, it needs to be done for the sake of being just, because you merely can't imagine doing anything else since justice is your core belief (not out of fear of punishment, etc.).

    5. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the difference between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

      We all have an equal potential for good and bad, what builds our character depends on what activities we choose to engage in. It's interesting that to learn to be good you often need an example of good behavior in front of you ("a teacher"), but slipping into some bad behavior is extremely easy: people tend to do it out of weakness. On the other hand, building a good character is like training a muscle.

  2. Feb 2024
    1. If we were cut off from our social inheritance of language, thought, and art, none of us could aspire to anything much above a purely animal existence. One of the highest responsibilities of the morality of aspiration is to preserve and enrich this social inheritance.

      In other words, as members of the society, we should cultivate the desire to reach our highest potentials in each other. The value of being good is taught socially, by showing each other examples.

    2. What is being argued here is that we should face the difficulties of this problem and not run away from them under the pretext that no answer is possible until we have constructed a comprehensive morality of aspiration. We know enough to create the conditions that will permit a man to lift himself upward. It is certainly better to do this than to try to pin him to the wall with a final articulation of his highest good.

      I agree with this statement. I think there should be some established norms for how people need to behave in order to maintain peace in the society, but it's not necessarily fair to expect everyone to surpass those norms. One of the reasons being that humans can't always do the best thing in a given situation, but hopefully, most of us strive to do OUR best.

    3. But there is no way open to us by which we can compel a man to live the life of reason. We can only seek to exclude from his life the grosser and more obvious manifestations of chance and irrationality.

      There are no objective reasons to criminalize smoking tobacco, but there are ways in which the government is trying to discourage it, thus "compelling a man to live the life of reason". Taxation or price increases and smoke-free policies in various areas are among them. So, aspirational morality finds its place in the legal world.

    4. He will have to decide what to do about games of skill or games in which the outcome is determined partly by skill and partly by chance. As a statutory draftsman he will confront the difficulty of distinguishing between gambling for small stakes as an innocent amuse­ment and gambling in its more desperate and harmful forms.

      This could be translated to alcohol or some drug use, in my opinion. For example, some people don't have much of an inclination to alcohol abuse, or they have a good self-control, or they only partake in drinking on holidays. And then there are people who are very vulnerable to getting addicted. However, alcohol is legal and there are no laws that regulate "drinking for fun" and "drinking abuse".

    5. It does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.

      I've never thought of laws in this way. I think the bare minimum legal requirement in our society comes down to a simple message: "do no harm". It's quite applicable to a lot of spheres in life (traffic regulations, business negotiations, medical service, etc.).

    1. Tell me then, oh tell me–what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations? EUTHYPHRO: Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do. SOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?

      This seems to be the reason for being pious in Euthyphro's eyes: to satisfy gods by doing things they allegedly love, in order to receive some divine participation in human affairs (like wars, health, etc.)

    2. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this.

      Neologian is a person who holds or tends to adopt novel views. What Socrates does here is just questions and digs deeper into the beliefs established in his society and court.

    3. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others?

      I think one of the reasons why some masses are attracted to organized religions, is that they provide a structured set of beliefs that doesn't need to be questioned. Sometimes it's easy to have an authority giving you all of the answers without you needing to seek the truth yourself.

    4. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

      This reminds me that myths were created and developed by a human oral tradition, meaning that they are basically stories people told. Since they were made by people, they reflect real human interactions that repeat from generation to generation and emotions associated with those interactions. So as gods in the myths have different perspectives on conflicts, so do humans. Therefore, myths like this one portray an ongoing conversation that humanity has about what is bad or good, just or unjust.

    5. The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone;

      I wonder in what circumstances a murder would be just according to Euthypro? Wasn't the fact that the servant is himself a murderer enough for his father's act to be just?

    1. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust.

      Earlier I mentioned conscience as something that can drive a person to justice. So, I'm also curious what Plato would think about altruism and how natural it is to humans?

    2. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice

      Whether something is profitable depends on what one finds valuable. I believe that some people value how they see themselves just as much or even more than how others view them. So sometimes being aware that you did a just thing can be worth more than some material or physical satisfaction. In other words, conscience.

    3. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither;

      I think another thing that might encourage people to agree among themselves to have neither is the need for reciprocity. "Treat others as you would like others to treat you".

    4. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards;

      This idea of "seeming" rises a lot in the conversations about celebrities announcing that they donate to charities, for example. A lot of people would argue they do that to seem generous, because generosity is admirable and attracts attention = money. However, the fact that the donation is done out of the desire to seem good doesn't diminish the value of that donation.

    5. only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law.

      This makes me think that the concept of justice is, in some ways, an imposed societal norm. When there are certain laws around it, the order in a society is established more easily. I believe that since order is rather a positive thing, being just in a society is valuable to a single individual as much as to a group.

    1. everything in my own immediate experience supports my deep belief that I am the absolute centre of the universe; the realest, most vivid and important person in existence. We rarely think about this sort of natural, basic self-centredness because it’s so socially repulsive.

      I felt quite conflicted about this paragraph when I first read it: on the one hand, I acknowledge that usually my thoughts tend to instinctively revolve around my needs, but on the other hand, I consistently think about how to make others happy and try to prioritize people I love. However, maybe that desire to make others happy is coming from the need to be accepted and liked... which comes back to me thinking about myself.

    2. Because it’s hard. It takes will and effort, and if you are like me, some days you won’t be able to do it, or you just flat out won’t want to.

      It really is hard because reframing your thinking takes years and decades of consistent exercising of one's mind. It's also hard because our primal self-centeredness gets aggravated by individual traumas that we often acquire early in life. And often we can't even identify what traumas push us to react in certain ways (a state Wallace described earlier talking about close-mindedness: "the prisoner doesn't even know he's locked up"). Therefore, in a lot of circumstances it takes more than just thinking exercises: it takes colossal hard work together with a specialist.

    3. The point is that petty, frustrating crap like this is exactly where the work of choosing is gonna come in. Because the traffic jams and crowded aisles and long checkout lines give me time to think, and if I don’t make a conscious decision about how to think and what to pay attention to, I’m gonna be pissed and miserable every time I have to shop. Because my natural default setting is the certainty that situations like this are really all about me.

      I like this idea, but it's fascinating how twenty years after this speech was written the reality has changed significantly: most people today don't give themselves a chance to think even while being in traffic jams or checkout lines. Our minds are afraid of boredom because it gives freedom for thoughts, and now it's easier than ever to keep yourself distracted and entertained by phones and other technological devices. So before we can start making "a conscious decision about how to think", we have to make a conscious decision to face our current thoughts to begin with.

    4. The point here is that I think this is one part of what teaching me how to think is really supposed to mean. To be just a little less arrogant. To have just a little critical awareness about myself and my certainties.

      I agree with this and I believe that this is one of the functions of higher education! I also think it's ironic that some people perceive the fact that they have a degree as a proof that they do in fact know more than others (those who didn't have the privilege of going to school) and become overconfident as a result. It takes vulnerability and humility to see and accept the fact that we might be wrong about something, and whether we learn it in school depends on the level of our readiness/maturity.

    5. As if a person’s most basic orientation toward the world, and the meaning of his experience were somehow just hard-wired, like height or shoe-size; or automatically absorbed from the culture, like language. As if how we construct meaning were not actually a matter of personal, intentional choice.

      While I do agree that an individual's beliefs are not "hard-wired" like biological characteristic they are born with, I also think that at the early stages of life (the period when a human is the most impressionable) we do absorb beliefs from the culture of our families, countries, and even eras we live in. And when you are a child, you don't always have agency over what beliefs to adapt (sometimes adopting a certain set of beliefs can even serve as a method of survival). I believe that these fundamental beliefs adopted in childhood can dictate the trajectory of one's life in adulthood, and changing them takes a lot of effort. So how one constructs meaning is truly an intentional choice only when one has agency over their life and is an independent adult.