Pigs, Missiles and the CIA Volume One: Havana,Miami, Washington and the Bay of Pigs, 1959-1961& Volume Two: Kennedy. Khrushchev, Castro andthe Cuban Missile Crisis.

and Italy, Khrushchev (with Castro’s agreement) began an,initially, secret placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba.The Russian buildup was detected by U–2 flights,while the Russians rushed to construct the supporting in-frastructure for the missiles, bombers, and defending SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites and MiG fighters. Russianmerchant ships bound for Cuba were scrutinized for sus-pected weapons systems. Eventually there was clear evi-dence that intermediate and medium-range missilelaunch pads hade been constructed despite Khrushchev’sassertion that no construction was ongoing—only themovement of agricultural machinery to aid in moderniz-ing the Cuban agrarian sector.Bromley then follows a timeline illustrating moves andcountermoves by the two key players. US aircraft conductedreconnaissance over Cuba. Strategic Air Command dis-persed its forces and maintained armed, airborne B–52s inanticipation of possible nuclear strikes. Soviet submarinesreached their stations off the US Atlantic coast and in theCaribbean, while the US Navy aggressively tracked them.Soviet anti-ship missiles were activated in Cuba. Kennedydeclared a blockade (quarantine) of Cuba (an act of war?).The Soviets, on October 27, 1962, shot down a US U–2, po-tentially pushing the crisis to the brink. A few days later aSoviet submarine crew, unsure of whether or not they werealready at war, came far too close to launching a nucleartorpedo at threatening US Navy surface vessels.The Cuban Missile Crisis was the single most unnerv-ing crisis of many during that era, one complicated by achain of often unanticipated events. It might sound like ahighly imaginative Cold War novel, but it did happen, asthis monograph makes very clear.A complicating sideshow was the need for each side torein in its own players. The Pentagon’s JCS wanted to in-vade Cuba. Submariners were ready to employ nuclear tor-pedoes. US destroyer commanders were itching to depthcharge Soviet submarines. Somehow, both direct and indi-rect exchanges between the two sides managed to end thecrisis.These monographs very effectively revisit Cold Warmoments of incredible consequence. For those of us whohave firsthand memories, reading the two volumes broughtthem all back. For readers with no firsthand knowledge,Bromley has provided an easy-to-follow account of whathappened, the impacts, and how we escaped a nuclear war.Without a question, these are very good reference materi-als and well worth the time to read.John Cirafici, Milford DEA6M2/3 Zero-sen; New Guinea and the Solomons1942 & Operation RO-GO 1943; Japanese Air PowerTackles the Bougainville Landings. Both by MichaelJohn Claringbould. Oxford UK: Osprey, 2023. Maps. Tables.Diagrams. Illustrations. Photographs. Appendices. Bibliog-raphy. Index. Pp. 80 and 96. Cost: $23.00 and $25.00 pa-perback. ISBN: 978-1-4728-5749-1 and 978-1-4728-5557-2-1In these two books, Michael Claringbould take thereader to the South Pacific at the time when the Japanesejuggernaut was stopped, and the allies began to take theinitiative in the theater. The A6M2/3 plays a leading rolein both books. Claringbould is an accomplished writer andan even better researcher, using his Japanese languageskills to bring new anecdotes and lessons to a well-knownstory. He frequently drops Japanese terms and phrasesthroughout his writing (ofttimes, it seems more to establishhis bona fides than to enlighten the reader).A6M2/3 Zero-sen is most effective when it provides auniquely detailed picture of the life of a Japanese aviatordeployed to a forward area. By mid-1942, the Japanesesupply chain was already stretched and under increasingpressure, so daily life and operations were harsh by anystandard. Claringbould’s research seems to have found aunique supply of anecdotes. He does not hesitate to callother writers to task for their failures to do the same, e.g.,criticizing Martin Caiden for his sterilization of the 1957Saburo Sakai biography Samurai for being an unrecogniz-able version of the original Japanese publication.This book abandoned the usual color profiles in favorof color schematics of air engagements. While eye-catching,the two-dimensional diagrams were more confusing thanhelpful. In his previous publications, Claringbould alsomakes clear that he believes regional geography and cli-mate are unappreciated factors that had significant tacti-cal and strategic impact.The A6M2/3 fighters were the heart of his story. Thebook shows that Japanese fighters were capable of domi-nating opposition when in the hands of skilled pilots. Inthe hands of novices, however, engagements with P–39s,F4Fs, and P–40s were more of an even match—and Japan-ese aircraft losses were much harder to replace. Pilots wereirreplaceable. Claringbould notes that, while the upgradeof the A6M2 to the A6M3 standard was significant, theSakae radial had reached the end of its evolution. Melzerstates in Wings for the Rising Sun that the Sakae radialdesign was a direct outgrowth of the Pratt & Whitney-Mit-subishi partnership. Once the war ended that partnership,Mitsubishi hit a technological dead end.Operation RO-GO 1943 moves the clock forward sixmonths as the Japanese struggled to regain the theaterinitiative. In doing so, Claringbould shows the results ofthe Japanese inability to both effectively redress the Zero-sen’s shortcomings and replace the loss of skilled aviators.He again beats the drum of geography and climate as op-erational factors that impacted the Japanese more thanthe allies. What began as a Japanese offensive strokequickly turned into a defensive battle to protect Truk andRabaul with demoralized and ill-equipped Japanese Army149JOURNAL OF THE AFHF/ SPRING 2024

Baker also describes the successes and failures ofmany supersonic designs, including the Tu–22, T–4, Tu–160, and the Tu–144 supersonic passenger aircraft. Theseprovided lessons learned that will ultimately lead to thenext generation of Russian aircraft.This book is eminently readable and enjoyable. It pro-vides a wealth of detailed knowledge and inside stories onthe politics and technological development of weapons sys-tems in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia. There aremany high-quality photographs and layouts. It is a worthyreference book for historians and technologists alike andis definitely worth the readFrank Willingham, NASM docentPigs, Missiles and the CIA Volume One: Havana,Miami, Washington and the Bay of Pigs, 1959-1961& Volume Two: Kennedy. Khrushchev, Castro andthe Cuban Missile Crisis. By Linda Rios Bromley. War-wick UK: Helion & Co, 2021 and 2023. Photographs. Illus-trations. Maps. Notes. Bibliography, Pp. 62 and 92. $21.00each. ISBN: 978-1-91-437714-3 and 978-1-91-507075-3The 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco was the precursor to thefar more ominous Cuban Missile Crisis just a year later.The latter event brought the USSR and US closer thanever to a mutually annihilating thermonuclear war. Be-cause this country should never again precipitate a crisisof that magnitude, it is essential to understand the eventsleading up to it. Volume 1 revisits one critical portion ofthat equation by examining CIA activities as it preparedto conduct an attack on Cuba itself.That the CIA pursued operations against the sover-eignty of other countries independent of congressionaloversight and known to only a handful of people is disturb-ing. It orchestrated the overthrow of legitimately electedgovernments in Iran and Guatemala and interfered in thepolitical process in other countries, such as Italy. It was nota reach to pursue the overthrow of the Castro government.Additionally, the State Department justified official rejec-tion of Castroite Cuba’s legitimacy by identifying it as aSoviet client posing a threat to the western hemisphere.Bromley summarizes Cuban history from the revolu-tion against Spain to Castro’s overthrow of the Batista gov-ernment. Why did the US strongly reject Castro’s reforms?Recall that clandestine operations to overthrow the Iraniangovernment in 1953 were in response to its nationalizationof foreign oil interests. Highly successful CIA operationsthere created a sense of confidence for future clandestineoperations. The Agency acted in 1954 to overthrow theGuatemala government on behalf of US commercial inter-ests. When Castro nationalized the huge land holdings ofUS sugar corporations and oil refineries, the CIA focusedon overthrowing the Cuban regime. Efforts to recruit pilots,aircraft, soldiers, equipment, and ships and establish basesfor a planned attack on Cuba are described in thisoverview.Very senior Pentagon officers were asked to assess theplan and said it had only a fair chance of success—and onlywith absolute air superiority. Choosing the Bay of Pigs areafor the invasion only increased the possibility of failure.President Kennedy’s closest advisors told him the plan wasdeeply flawed and would probably fail. As landings com-menced, Kennedy wavered in his support causing furtherconfusion leading to catastrophe—not his finest hour.The final section provides a play-by-play description of theinvasion, failure to support the troops on the ground, andthe final abandonment of the brigade. The poorly plannedand supported invasion wasn’t the end of crises forKennedy. Khrushchev soon humiliated him at the ViennaSummit followed by the Berlin Wall.Volume Two seamlessly picks up the story with anoverview of the two superpowers’ confrontational relation-ship. Cuba, rightfully fearing a US invasion, played only asecondary role at that point. To counterbalance America’splacing of nuclear intermediate-range missiles in Turkey

brought on by arms reduction talks, has increased thevalue and flexibility of both strategic and tactical bombing.Nonetheless, effectiveness of that bomber force also de-pends on operational readiness. Russia’s program of rearm-ing and modernizing its bomber fleet has been challengedby international economic sanctions and the draining of re-sources by the war in Ukraine.Baker begins his excellent presentation of Russianbombers with the astounding Soviet reverse engineeringof the B–29, which provided the stimulus for developmentof long-range bombers in the 1950s. He describes the Sovietparallel development of the turbojet engine which had beenput on hold during World War Two. This ultimately led tothe design of tactical, medium-range, jet bombers to com-pete with the introduction of these types by the UK andthe US. Stalin’s perception of threats from combined attackby Western nations provided the ultimate incentive forlong-range, strategic, jet bombers.The design efforts of the main bomber design bureaus(Tupolev, Myasishchev, and Ilyushin), coupled with paralleljet- and turboprop-engine evolution, arrived at the desiredsolutions. Baker provides an excellent overview of the po-litical and technological struggles to develop needed long-range-bomber designs.He devotes one chapter to the “Ubiquitous Bear,” theinimitable Tu–95 long-range, turboprop bomber that metthe desired trade-offs between power, range, and speed.It has served in many roles, such as midair refueling,cruise missile launch platform, maritime patrol and sur-veillance, anti-submarine warfare, electronic countermea-sures, and as a flying research laboratory to measure theradiation environment of a nuclear propulsion system.This aircraft will continue to serve Russian air power intothe 2040s

At the turn of the 20th century, labor unions across Latin America were unevenly distributed and ideologically diverse. Only a small minority of working people were in industrial jobs, but these were often in key export and export-related sectors, such as oil, railroads, and mining. Some workers were inspired by anarchist and syndicalist ideas, others by socialist ideas, and, after the Russian Revolution, Communist precepts.

economic and political systems that had some margin for autonomy but were fundamentally shaped by U.S. power.