No
The Court disposes of group definition in a single sentence, adopting a wholly self-identification-based description: the Rohingya are "the group that is commonly called the Rohingya, self-identifies as such and claims a long-standing connection to Rakhine State." This is doing enormous latent work for a case about genocide, where Article II requires the intent to destroy a "national, ethnical, racial or religious group... as such." The jurisprudence on group definition under the Genocide Convention has oscillated between a subjective test (self- and other-identification, as in Akayesu, ICTR) and a more objective, stigmatization-based test (as the ICTY later preferred in Krstić and Jelisić, asking whether the perpetrator treated the victims as a distinct group, regardless of any formally verifiable ethnic marker). Myanmar's own domestic position — that the Rohingya are not a recognized ethnic group under its 1982 Citizenship Law and are properly termed "Bengali" — makes this a live methodological choice, not a formality. By adopting self-identification without engaging either test explicitly, the Court effectively pre-empts a threshold merits question (does a protected group exist at all) at the preliminary-objections stage, without saying so. My own view: this is probably the right practical result — a respondent should not be able to deny genocide jurisdiction merely by denying the existence of the group it is accused of destroying — but the Court reaches it by citation to its own provisional-measures order rather than by articulating why self-identification is the legally correct standard. That silent borrowing means the merits chamber inherits an unreasoned definitional premise it will eventually have to either defend on its own terms or quietly build on further.