These appear to have had a corrosive effecton behaviour. First among these was the policy of ‘catch and release’as it is repeatedly referred to,which came to signify an out of touch chain of command, helping to create a ‘them and us’situationbetween them andhigher command. This involved releasing detainees if there was no clearevidence of serious criminal misconduct or if they were not considered to be important enough interms of leadership. From a policy position, one can see the logic. Unlawful or unfair detention leadsto ill feeling that ultimately can fuel an insurgency, but the rapid release of ‘known’ insurgents waspossibly ‘the single most important factor in the population’s lack of confidence in the governmentin Uruzgan Province’.25

There was some admiration for US practice, especially when it came to maintaining the ‘shockof capture’on detaineeswhere their disorientation contributes to them sharing time-sensitive anduseful information. The maintenance of this pressure was deemed essential for the successfulextraction of actionable intelligence within the narrow window of opportunity following theapprehension of a target. The desire to maintain that pressure, unsurprisingly, led to some tension.

research in the British Army demonstrates thatwhile officers were generally well aligned with the army’s stated values, this was most prominentfor cadets, declined for lieutenants and captains and only partially recovered as majors, suggestingthat whatever ethics training British junior army officers received, it was insufficient to counter theirlived experience when it came to maintaining army values

8.T

There may well have been a sense, at least at Squadron level, not least because of the numbers of EKIA, and the number of them who were found to be unarmed, or armed with only a pistol,grenade or ICOM, but to have been ‘manoeuvring tactically against the FE’, that the ROE were beingexploited, and lethal force was being used when perhaps it was not always necessary

he presence of intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR)assets, particularly in the air, would provide ongoing observation and imageryof events ontarget, the ISR was typically pushed ‘off target’once the FE was there. Variouslegitimate reasons were given for why this was so. One –and perhaps the least persuasive –was sothat others with access to the ISR would not be able to observe tactics, techniques and procedures.Others, which are entirely reasonable, were that once the FE was on target it was a better use ofthe ISR to monitor escape routes for potential ‘squirters’, and approaches for potential threats.However, the result was that the ISR did not provide visibility of what happened on target. TheInquiry has confirmed this in its review of many hours of Heron UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle]imagery.

Australia requires a more surgical and refined national Special Forcescapability than thatrequired for the more or less conventional operations into which SOTG operations in Afghanistanevolved. The sustained use of Special Forcesto conduct what were in truth largely conventionaloperations meant that the limited pool of Special Forcespersonnel were required to deploy onmultiplerotations, with little respite between deployments. It also denied conventional forces anopportunity to deploy and learn from the experience of operations for which they were trained andsuited.While Government may have had an understandablepreference for using Special Forces,because of their proved success in the past and the lowerrisk profile, it was the ADF’s responsibilitynot simply to accede to that preference, but to provide fearless and firm advice that the protracteduse of Special Forces to conduct what were not in truth ‘special operations’, but missions that couldhave been conducted by appropriately trained and enabled conventional forces, was imprudent,unwise, and potentially jeopardising the welfare of Special Forcespersonnel.

the manner in which events were reported. It was seen asmore important to report in terms that met the expectation of higher command (such as,in theperiod 2012-2013, the practically universal description of operations as ‘ and the attribution of outcomes to the Wakunish partner force, when in reality theywere not involved in planning, were not included in orders, were not told about the objective ordestination in advance, there was a limited level of trust of them, those who inserted on the firstturn operated in effect as a patrol under the command of their Australian mentor, and most insertedon the second turn, also under the effective command of an Australian mentor)

All that said, it was at the patrol commander levelthat the criminal behaviour was conceived,committed, continued, and concealed. But for a small number of patrol commanders, and theirprotégées, it would not have been thought of, it would not have begun, it would not have continued,and, in any event,it would have been discovered. It is overwhelmingly at that level thatresponsibility resides

Those who did try to wrestle back some control were ostracised, and oftendid not receive thesupport of superior officers. Indeed, this was not confined to troop level: a squadron commanderwho insisted on proper standards (and during whose command of FE-no relevant impropriety hasemerged) was permitted to be nominated by NCOs as ‘Cock of the Year’. This attitude fostered theempowerment of the patrol commanders and, thus, thedisempowerment of those who mightcontrol and restrainthem, and the ‘warrior culture’ that some, though by no means all, of the patrolcommanders embraced. A substantial indirect responsibility falls upon those in SASR who embracedor fostered the ‘warrior culture’and the clique of NCOs who propagated it. That responsibility is tosome extent shared by those who, in misconceived loyalty to their Regiment, or their mates, havenot been prepared to ‘call out’ criminal conduct or, even to this day, decline to accept that itoccurred in the face of incontrovertible evidence, or seek to offer obscureand unconvincingjustificationsand mitigations for it

82.The position

The combined effect of many of these factors is again powerfully illustrated by the SOTGresponse to being asked by HQ JTF 633 for clarification of the QA in respect of theincident at .35There is no suggestion that the staff officers and commanders who contributed to that indignant response . But the continuation of such behaviour was enabled by their truculent attitude to being questioned

command accepted with little question that complaints by local elders of civiliancasualty incidents were an insurgent tactic, in which the elders were either complicit or coerced,and/or motivated by compensation; yet there is little evidence to support this: to the contrary, manyof the complaintsnow appear to have been legitimate

those who were ‘behind the wire’being reluctant to questionthose who were on the ground,but in turn protective of their FE by being resistant to obtaining full and accurate accounts forprovision to higher headquarters, and embellishing operational reporting to demonstrate thelegitimacy of engagements

by at leastearly 2012, there was a consistent presumption on the part of the chain of command and a numberof inquiry personnel that complaints by local elders were part of an insurgent strategy, and that theelders had either been coerced or were a willing party to supporting insurgent messaging; or weredriven by compensation. This was reflected in the manner in which the three complaintsinvestigated by the IOI were handled at multiple levels, and also in the CommandingOfficer’s comments on the . The evidentiary basis for that presumption now appears tobe slight, but that does not deny that it was prevalent at the time

also supported by theevidence of , who when asked how far up the chain of command he thought knowledgeextended tha

Inconnection with the incident, ,then a patrol second-in-command, was questioning what had happened to the prisoners. There islittle doubt that his persistence in this respect contributed to his sidelining from the patrol andtransfer to mentoring responsibilities.

The criminal behaviour described in this Reportwas conceived, committed, continued, andconcealedat patrol commander level, and it is overwhelmingly at that level that responsibilityresides

The Inquiry has found no evidence that there was knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, the commission of war crimes, on the part of commanders at troop/platoon, squadron/company or Task Group Headquarters level, let alone at higher levels such as Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) 633, Joint Operations Command, or Australian Defence Headquarters.

The role of the patrol commanders in target development marginalised theprofessional intelligence advisers.The imperative of using air assets when they were available,coupled with an implied KPI based on EKIA achieved, caused SOTG personnel, particularly FE, topressure intelligence staff for target information, even when it was not actionable.Control ofintelligence reporting meant that command was denied an alternative perspective.Someintelligence staff developed suspicions, but were not in a position to challenge the accounts givenbythose who were ‘on the ground’

was asked about his relationship with intelligence staff working within the SOCC. ’sreply (italics for emphasis) was:Q123.... A.I don’t think they were well regarded or relied upon because thetargeting at thatpoint had been really delegated for particular targets to patrol commanders.And the patrol commanders really became the subject matter expert, if you like.It’s certainly what they wanted to be called about a particular target.So really, it undercut the int staff’s ability -the int staff’sability within the SOCC to do their job beyond the collation of different intelligence sources, the reporting that we were doing and orders of, you know,if we were about to do a targetingpackage we would get them to give a general outline.I think in terms of specific targets they were really just facilitating the patrol commanders to do the analysis and also to follow leads.

As the SOTG S2, was at a level on the Headquartersabove the FE intelligence staff;however,FE intelligence staff workeddirectly to the operations staff and the OC,and onlyhad a measure of indirect technical control over them

he devolution of operational command to the extent thatthe national command has no real oversight of the conduct of SF operations not only has thepotential to result in the national interest and mission being overlooked or subordinated, butdeprives national command of oversight of those operations

commanders were protective of their subordinates, including in respect of investigationsand inquiries. Again, that is an inherent responsibility of command. However, the desireto protect subordinates from what was seen as over-enthusiastic scrutiny fuelled a ‘waragainst higher command’, in which reporting was manipulated so that incidents wouldnot attract the interest or scrutiny of higher command.The staff officers did not knowthat they were concealing unlawful conduct, but they did proactively take steps toportray events in a way which would minimise the likelihood of attracting appropriatecommand scrutiny. This became so routine that operational reporting had a ‘boilerplate’flavour, and was routinely embellished, and sometimes outright fabricated, although theauthors of the reports didnot necessarily know that to be so,

It is evident that fear of the consequences of reporting misconduct to the chain of commandhas deterred some from doing so.In most cases this is fear for career prospects, although in somethere has been fear of physical reprisals.In any event, experience shows that where a complaint orreport is adverse to a member’s chain of command, there are powerful practical constraints onmaking it.To enable members to feel safe and secure in reporting concerns about their chain ofcommand, units need to have an alternative reporting line.Traditionally, this has been providedinformally by the Chaplain and the Regimental Medical Officer, but a more clearly authorised formaland confidential system, to which members can report concerns without fear of retribution, isrequired to overcome the inherent constraints on reporting about the chain of command throughthe chain of command. This needs to be embedded at unit level, so that it is not remote andunfamiliar from those who may wish to resort to it, and so that doing so is not perceived as ‘goingoutside the unit’.As a suggestion only, it might be based on the XO network

Theintroduction of a second officer into a troop as Executive Officer (XO) would reinforce theofficer influence, provide a sounding board, and enable oneofficer to be ‘on the ground’’withanother in an overwatch position.The troop sergeant, with equivalent rank to the patrolcommanders, has limited authority over them.The Inquiry has been attracted by the BritishSpecialBoat Service model, in which the troop sergeant equivalent has the rank of Colour Sergeant –superior to the sergeant patrol commanders, while still inferior to theSquadron Sergeant Major(SSM, Warrant Officer Class Two). While the requirement is less obvious in the CommandoRegiments, a similar approach could be adopted there

Junior officersin SASR, at troop command level,were not well-served by mentoring andsupport, and were able to be sidelined by the dominant patrol commander clique.Operationalfactors contributed to this, enabling the troop commander to be dislocated for plausible reasons inan overwatch position.The empower of junior officers requires the support -previously lackingbecause of the ‘rite of passage’ and ‘sink or swim philosophy’ –of Commanding Officers andSquadron Officers Commanding, and of Warrant Officers

were routinely embellished, often using boilerplate language, in order to proactively demonstrate apparent compliance with ROE, and to minimise the risk of attracting the interest of higher headquarters. This had upstream and downstream effects: upstream, higher headquarters received a misleading impression of operations, and downstream, operators and patrol commanders knew how to describe an incident in order to satisfy the perceived reporting requirements.

42.Professor Whetham has observed, in his Recommendation 1 (Deliver education to all SOCOMDpersonnel on the causes of war crimes), that educating military personnel about the causes of warcrimes so that they understand how such crimes can come to be seen as almost required andtherefore justified,is vital, but not easy.He suggests that military ethics training should employ casestudies drawn from military personnel ‘from the same services and country as themselves’,so thatthey understand that they too could become torturers or murderers –thatthe ‘good guys’ can alsodo bad things. He recommends that every member of SOCOMD should receive education on thecauses of war crimes, tobe delivered by SOCOMD soldiers themselves and reviewed by appropriateexternal (ie, non-SOCOMD) reviewers who can act as critical friends; and that members of theSOCMD community should be recorded talking candidly, and on the record, about the ethical driftthat took place over a period of time, how hard itwas to resist the prevailing organisational cultureand the missed opportunities that could and should have been taken to address the failures that somany people appeared to recognise at the time,but felt powerless to change.The Inquiry adoptsthese recommendations.43.In particular, the Inquiry believes that in high stress situations, soldiers will default to theirpractical training experience, rather thanto theory learnt in a classroom. They will respond as theyhave practised responding in exercises.This can be addressed by embedding in continuationtraining, as well as in the selection process, practical ethical decision-making scenarios, based onthe types of incidents described in Part 2, in which trainees are under pressure to make unethicaldecisions

As operations in Afghanistan evolved, SOTG were, at least to a substantial degree, notconducting ‘special operations’, but missions that could have been conducted by properly-enabledand supported conventional forces. In particular, FE was predominantly involvedin kill/capture and disruption type missions, which were a form of cordon and search; whileForceElement (FE)was predominantly engaged in company-strength attacks and clearances

, the devolution of operational command to the extent that thenational command has no real oversight of the conduct of Special Forcesoperations not only hasthe potential to result in the national interest and mission being overlooked or subordinated, butdeprives national command of oversight of those operations.What is ‘special’ about Special Forcesis the operations they conduct. If anything, the secretive nature of their operations makes effectiveoversight by National command all the more important. That they conduct ‘special’ operations doesnot mean that they should be excepted from ordinary command and oversight arrangements

Moreover, ISAF SOF, under the operational command of which the SOTG sat, were stronglyinfluenced by a predominantly ISAF SOF attitude and strategy which was focussedon killing or capturing insurgent leaders and disrupting insurgent lines of communications

When soldiers are exposed to that environment repeatedly, over a decade, without lengthydwell times between deployments, it is unsurprising that the moral compass of some may shift.It isno coincidence that it was in the later years of Operation (OP) SLIPPER – in particular –thatthe problems reached their nadir

All this occurred in a foreign and different environment, isolated from the norms of Australiansociety, and out of sight of those whose supervisionor presence would ordinarily impose restraintson behaviour.Those are conditions which are fertile for a ‘Lord of the Flies’ syndrome to prosper,and there are strong signs of that afoot on Rotation , Rotation and Rotation

Catch and release,and the kill count

Typically, the troop commanders were ontheir first SOTG deployment. Their patrol commanders were vastly more experienced.Of itselfthat is not unusual.However, in a carry-over from domestic counter-terrorism tactics,techniques, and procedures, the patrol commanders became the lead planners for operations.The operational control and influence of troop commanders was diminished, if notmarginalised.

Those who did try to wrestle back some controlwere ostracised, and often did not receive the support of superior officers. Indeed, this wasnot confined to troop level: a squadron commander who insisted on proper standards (andduring whose command of Force Element [FE]no relevant impropriety has emerged)was permitted to be nominated by NCOs as ‘Cock of the Year’.

The officers who might have counter-balanced this were disempowered. This commencedfrom selection, where non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were effectively the gatekeepers.There is a perception in many quarters that officers were selected on the basis that they wouldbe compliant.Junior officers were poorly supported. They were not well-mentored, but wererather left to swim or sink.

rom 2010, rotary wing assets became increasingly available to support SOTG operations, anda pattern developed by which there would be alternating four day windows during which rotarywing assets would be available. As a result, a cycle was established of four days planning and targetdevelopment (during which the Force Element remained positioned to conduct vehicle-mountedoperations if necessary), followed by a four day ‘rotary wing period’ (during which operations wereconducted).

FE-A – Force Element Alpha , based on a SASR troop, or troop plus

Composition

The deployment pattern was structured around the Afghan fighting season, whichtraditionally begins in April as snow melts in the mountains and slows in November as winter setsin. Generally, there was a rotation from February to July, a rotation from July to November, and awinter rotation from November to February

For East Timor it is about 20 per cent; for Afghanistan it is higher than that at about 40 per cent. These are volunteers and, in most cases, very enthusiastic volunteers. For those who are on a second tour in a specific theatre— and I am still talking about Special Operations Command—about 20 per cent are on a second tour of East Timor, and because Afghanistan is more topical, about 30 per cent are on their second tour. For Special Operations Command, because they do tend to be more specialised and because they are not so great in number, we are inside the respite period for a number of them

Special Operations Task Group Rotations

Commandos are very well equipped. They have very heavy firepower

May 2006 - October 2008 (four rotations)

May 2007 - December 2013 (17 rotations)

August/September 2005 - September 2006 (three rotations)

October 2001-November 2002 (three rotations)