the critical significance of this phenomenon of uneven growthwhen he promulgated the law of uneven development

The most important factor for the process of international po-litical change is not the static distribution of power in the system(bipolar or multipolar) but the dynamics of power relationshipsover time. It is the differential or uneven growth of power amongstates in a system that encourages efforts by certain states tochange the system in order to enhance their own interests or tomake more secure those interests threatened by their oligopolis-tic rivals. In both bipolar and multipolar structures, changes inrelative power among the principal actors in the system are pre-cursors of international political change

markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unin-tended. In both systems, structures are formed by the coaction of theirunits. Whether those units live, prosper, or die depends on their ownefforts. Both systems are formed and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units. To say that the two realms are structurallysimilar is not to proclaim their identity. Economically, the self-help prin-ciple applies within governmentally contrived limits. Market economiesare hedged about in ways that channel energies constructively. One maythink of pure food-and-drug standards, antitrust laws, securities andexchange regulations, laws against shooting a competitor, and rules for-bidding false claims in advertising. International politics is more nearly arealm in which anything goes. International politics is structurally simi-lar to a market economy insofar as the self-help principle is allowed tooperate in the latter (Waltz, 1979, p. 91

In domestic society, as a resource becomes scarce relative tothe demands of society, the increasing cost of the resourcecreates an incentive for individuals, groups, or the governmentto pay the costs of innovations that will satisfy the unmet de-mand. The most important mechanism for stimulating this incen-tive is the creation and enforcement of new types of propertyrights: A right is conferred on the entrepreneur to enjoy thefinancial rewards of his endeavors (North and Thomas, 1973, p.16). Thus the innovation of the patent system extended the no-tion of property rights to intellectual creations in order to encour-age industrial invention

An increase in some inputs relative to other fixed inputs will, in a givenstate of technology, cause total output to increase; but after a point theextra output resulting from the same additions of extra inputs is likely tobecome less and less. This falling off of extra returns is a consequence ofthe fact that the new "doses" of the varying resources have less and lessof the fixed resources to work with (Samuelson, 1967, p. 26).Or, to put it more succinctly, "the output of any productiveprocess will increase at a decreasing rate if the quantity of onecooperating factor of production is kept constant while that of theothers is increased" (Hirschman, 1971, p. 17). Thus, every factorof production (land, labor, and capital) must increase together (inthe absence of technological advance) if any economy is to es-cape the threat of diminishing returns

When one inquires what these interests or objectivesare, one confronts a long-standing debate between what StanleyHoffmann (1973) called the classiques and the modernes. Theformer, mainly political realists, argue that national security andpower have been in the past and continue to be in the presentthe primary objectives of states. The latter counter that, how-ever true this may have been in the past, attaining domesticeconomic stability and ensuring the welfare of the populace havebecome the foremost objectives of states in the contemporaryworl

he state may be conceived as a coalition of coalitions whoseobjectives and interests result from the powers and bargainingamong the several coalitions composing the larger society andpolitical elite. In the language of Brian Barry (1976, p. 159),collective choice and determination of political objectives arecoalition processes (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 28)

Strictly speaking, states, as such, have no interests, or whateconomists call "utility functions," nor do bureaucracies, interestgroups, or so-called transnational actors, for that matter. Onlyindividuals and individuals joined together into various types ofcoalitions can be said to have interests

. Throughout history, in fact, states and political organiza-tions have varied greatly: tribes, empires, fiefdoms, city-states,etc. The nation-state in historical terms is a rather recent arrival;its success has been due to a peculiar set of historical circum-stances, and there is no guarantee that these conditions will con-tinue into the future

However, the state is the principal actor in that the nature of thestate and the pattern of relations among states are the mostimportant determinants of the character of international relationsat any given momen

If the state is to protect its citizens and their rights, and in theabsence of any higher authority and in a competitive state sys-tem, the state must be "self-regarding" and must look on allother states as potential threats

These internal and external functions of the state and theultimate nature of its authority mean that it is the principal actorin the international system. The state is sovereign in that it mustanswer to no higher authority in the international sphere. Italone defines and protects the rights of individuals and group

Within the territory it encom-passes the state exercises a monopoly of the legitimate use offorce and embodies the idea that everyone in that territory issubject to the same law or set of rules.

The delineation of property rights is necessary if any society isto operate effectively; property rights function by conveying"the right to benefit or harm oneself or others. Harming a com-petitor by producing superior products may be permitted, whileshooting him may not. A man may be permitted to benefit him-self by shooting an intruder but be prohibited from selling belowa price floor" (Demsetz, 1967, p. 347). Thus the nature anddistribution of property rights determine which individuals willbe most benefited and which will pay the most costs with respectto the functioning of different types of social institutions. For thisreason the basic domestic function of the state is to define andprotect the property rights of individuals and groups.

delineation

The absolute mon-arch or contemporary politician has personal objectives he seeksto achieve, the primary one being to maintain himself in offic

Principally through its definition and enforcement ofproperty rights the state protects the welfare of its citizensagainst the actions of other individuals and states and also pro-vides a basis for the resolution of disputes

can provide these "public goods" and overcome the free-riderproblem

The theory of the state that we shall use in this study is thatthe state is "an organization that provides protection and [wel-fare] . . . in return for revenue"

Although resolution of a crisis through peacefuladjustment of the systemic disequilibrium is possible, the princi-pal mechanism of change throughout history has been war, orwhat we shall call hegemonic war (i.e., a war that determineswhich state or states will be dominant and will govern the sys-tem). The peace settlement following such a hegemonic strugglereorders the political, territorial, and other bases of the system.Thus the cycle of change is completed in that hegemonic warand the peace settlement create a new status quo and equilib-rium reflecting the redistribution of power in the system and theother components of the system.

In this book, power refers simply to the military, eco-nomic, and technological capabilities of states.

However, the most destabilizing factoris the tendency in an international system for the powers ofmember states to change at different rates because of political,economic, and technological developments. In time, the differen-tial growth in power of the various states in the system causes afundamental redistribution of power in the system

They do not describe the actual deci-sion processes of statesmen, but as in the case of economic the-ory, actors are assumed to behave as if they were guided by sucha set of cost/benefit calculation

4 Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of furtherchange and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economiccosts of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economiccapacity to support the status quo.5 If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved,then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflectingthe redistribution of power will be established

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONALPOLITICAL CHANGEThe conceptualization of international political change to be pre-sented in this book rests on a set of assumptions regarding thebehavior of states:1 An international system is stable (i.e., in a state of equilibrium) if nostate believes it profitable to attempt to change the system.2 A state will attempt to change the international system if the ex-pected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., if there is an ex-pected net gain).3 A state will seek to change the international system through territo-rial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs offurther change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefit

e argument of this book is that an international system is estab-lished for the same reason that any social or political system iscreated; actors enter social relations and create social structures inorder to advance particular sets of political, economic, or othertypes of interests.

Internationalrelations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth andpower among independent actors in a state of anarchy.

. It is not sur-prising that International Relations has tended to be discussed in staticterms, and that stability has tended to be interpreted in terms of themaintenance of the status quo. A dynamic approach to InternationalRelations would immediately confront the analyst with no alternativebut to acknowledge war as the only available mechanism for chang

The facts show that DeNolf spoke both online and face-to-face as a private personabout important public issues that affected him directly and not in his official capacity as anemployee of OSU.

. In Demers, the Ninth Circuit held that “Garcetti does not apply to speech relatedto scholarship or teaching.” 746 F.3d at 406 (internal citation and quotations omitted).

In the alternative, if the Policy is tested at intermediate scrutiny, it meets the same fate as it doesat strict scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny requires means that are substantially related to animportant interest. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (1996). Under this test, the stateneeds to advance an “exceedingly persuasive justification” required to sustain its decision toclassify by sex. Id. Whether this is a third tier of intermediate scrutiny or a general description ofthe test itself is unclear. Id. at 596 (Scalia J., Dissenting). What is clear is that such a justificationmust be genuine as opposed to post-hoc. Id., at 533 (majority opinion). I do not doubt that theSchool is sincere in its intentions or that it believes that security will be improved. But that doesequate to an exceedingly persuasive justification. For that reason, intermediate scrutiny is notsatisfied. The Policy is unconstitutional. The District Court should be reversed.

Applying strict scrutiny to the case at hand, the Policy fails. OSU lacks a compelling state interest.While the nation and Olympus do have a history of sex discrimination, more of the same will notsolve that problem – one that is in the rear window. We have or have had female judges andjustices, governors, mayors, cabinet secretaries, a speaker of the house (twice), and a vicepresident. Rather than solving a problem, the School has created new problems. Even if the Schoolproffered a compelled interest, which it has not, its means do not advance that interest in a mannerthat is narrowly tailored. Put simply, OSU could have pursued a course of action that was lessrestrictive. There are many ways to attract female students beyond the discriminatory practicesemployed here. The School, for instance, might utilize enhanced recruitment techniques, advertisein female dominated media markets, or aggressively recruit female candidates, to name but afew. Such methods might accomplish similar results. The existence of such alternatives undercutsthe argument that the Policy is least restrictive and thus not narrowly tailored.

But even a program that educates a high number of future police chiefs andfederal law enforcement leadership does not qualify for the service academy exception referencedin Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 600 U.S. at 214, n. 4 (2023). While such a program may beprestigious and important for law enforcement, it lacks several key characteristics that distinguishmilitary service academies. First, it has no direct connection to national security: While lawenforcement is crucial for public safety, it does not have the same direct link to national defenseas military academies. Second, unlike service academies, criminal justice programs are not underdirect federal control or supervision

hat is more, the School assertsa general need for a more balanced crop of law enforcement leadership, not necessarily a morebalanced student body, but provides no evidence as to why this is compelling or how it improvesthe education of its students let alone law enforcement leadership or the nation’s security.

he correct test for affirmative action cases—including those involving sex classifications—should be strict scrutiny. I am persuaded by JusticeBrennan’s argument in Frontiero v. Richardson that strict scrutiny should be the correct test forsex discrimination. 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality) (finding “implicit support” for theargument that classifications based on sex are “inherently suspect and therefore be subjected toclose judicial scrutiny”). Sexism, and sex discrimination, are wrong – they are stains to beremoved from the larger body politic. But the government must resort to them to achieve itsobjectives. After all, two wrongs do not equal a right.

Most on point is Renkenv. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Garcetti to a dispute arising from a universityprofessor’s claim that his employer, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, had retaliated againsthim after he criticized the university itself). In its decision, the Seventh Circuit found that Garcettiapplied because “Renken made his complaints regarding the University's use of NSF fundspursuant to his official duties as a University professor.”

In essence, this approach instructs courts todetermine where the speech occurred—namely, did it occur in the workplace—and whether itconcerned a subject matter relevant to the employee’s employment. Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006).

Under cross-examination by attorneys for DeNolf, two witnesses called by the School who wereinvolved in the Policy conceded that had DeNolf been a woman he would have been accepted

2) that Respondent violated his First Amendment rights when it fired him for complaints he madeabout the admissions policy.

(1) that Respondent’s admissions policy thatgives preferential weight to female applicants violated his right to equal protection of the law

alumni donations, and how it would affect OSU’s highly ranked athletic programs, especiallysince recruiting future student-athletes was dependent on these donations.

and large, the persons who contacted OSU were upsetthat the university, by virtue of the fact that it employed DeNolf, appeared to endorse his pointof view.

A great many of these messages came from the parents of students, donors,and alumni. Several elected officials who called upon OSU to take action in defense of the femalegraduate students at the School—many of whom had been “trolled” on social media and had beenlabeled “Affirmative Action Babies!” B

he asserted, “I believe men and women are equal in every way, I simply want everyoneto be treated equally – a level playing field.”

DeNolf, who was very concerned and distraught by events that had occurred on campus, wasexcited about the festival. DeNolf asked several of his colleagues at OSU, including ProfessorBronner, for suggestions as to which of his poems he should recite. DeNolf did so because severalprofessors were familiar with his work. The consensus was that DeNolf should present a poemhe had written about the Policy entitled “Imagine a Level Playing Field.” The poem followed thelyrics and beat of John Lennon’s song entitled “Imagine.” It addressed society’s use ofaffirmative action to supposedly level the playing field for all. The poem’s theme was that totruly create a world that was fair for all society must forgo affirmative action. Before presentingthe poem, which he sang, while playing an acoustic guitar, DeNolf blasted “the powers that be”and asserted that “affirmative action is inconsistent with true equality.” He called for “an end tolaws that favor people based on immutable characteristics” and called for “students to rise up andchallenge inequality whatever form it takes and wherever they find it—including at OSU

At two academic conferences where he presented papers. The first was at aforum on sex discrimination and the law held on OSU’s campus and the secondwas at a professional association meeting held out of state that was funded byOSU travel support. These papers identified DeNolf as a lecturer at OSU

After DeNolf’s application to the School was rejected, he began to complain in class about thePolicy. Specifically, DeNolf complained that his right to equality had been violated. At timeshe called on female students to defend the Policy. DeNolf was critical of men in class who eitherdid not agree with him or were not actively trying to end the Policy. As the term progressed,DeNolf’s attitude became more vociferous, and he began to complain in settings outside hisclassroom. For example, DeNolf voiced his complaints in the following settings

The faculty at OSU is not unionized.

he School does not deny any of the aforementioned. The School contended in the District Court,however, that the female students in question all brought soft variables and experiences, whichallowed them to add to the overall quality of the incoming class in ways in which DeNolf did not.Some of the admitted female students, for example, came from impoverished backgrounds, hadlived abroad, spoke languages that are frequently critical to the success of law enforcementagencies because of the populations they serve, were single parents, had started their ownbusinesses, had been student-athletes in college, and/or had unique artistic talents. DeNolf hadnone of these soft variables or experiences. Thus, while sex was a factor in their admission (and,by extension, in DeNolf’s rejection), the School argues it was not the deciding factor

On March 17, 2023, DeNolf was notified that his application had been rejected. DeNolf’s GREscore of 164 verbal and 166 quantitative put him just above the 75th percentile nationally,6 his 3.5undergraduate GPA placed him in the top 20% of his graduating class at Kedesh College, but justbelow and his 3.75 graduate GPA in graduate school placed him in the top 20% of his graduatingclass at Kedesh College.7 Using the Freedom of Information Act to get data from the School,DeNolf discovered that while every accepted male met or exceeded his portfolio, many of theaccepted female students did not exceed his GPA or his GRE. In fact, female students wereadmitted with undergraduate GPAs as low as 3.25 and with GRE scores as low as 156 in verbaland 158 quantitative—but not necessarily in combination with each other. Many of the successfulfemale applicants had better work experience than DeNolf

Alfie Sasaki, told DeNolf that what he had done was “admirable” butthat “there was no place for nice guys in mock trial and suggested that he try moot court becausethat was where the law students who were not ruthless enough for mock trial went.

6only; offering female applicants who sign up for tours of the School free tickets to athletic eventsor Amazon.com gift cards; offering two season tickets to all female applicants who choose toattend the School (they can choose from the School’s male or female basketball or volleyballteams); creating five faculty lines dedicated to hiring qualified female faculty; creating severalscholarships for qualified female applicants; and offering School hoodies to the first 500 femalestudents who apply. In addition, the School created the Preparation Program for Female CollegeStudents enrolled in OSU’s criminal justice undergraduate program. This program, which is runby OSU Professor Caitlyn Smith, is funded by a $300,000 grant award from the National FemaleLaw Enforcement Professional Association. This program was designed to reverse the trend thatstarted around 2015, as reported in Table 2, by providing participants mentoring, assistance withpreparing for admissions tests, guidance for interviews, and help with personal statements. Despitethese efforts, the gap between male and female enrollment persists, and the School remains anoutlier regarding female matriculation as compared to other schools regionally and nationall

These included raising its recruitment budget by 20%; targetingtalented female students through the School Admissions Council’s Criminal Justice CandidateReferral Service; visiting every police department within 500 miles of the School twice a year;offering 80% of all females who apply fee waivers; hosting application workshops for females

Nor is there is evidence that it used sex as a stereotypeor as a negative when evaluating applicants. Put another way, the School did not treat all womenor men as being monolithic – as representatives for their sex. To the contrary, the School drilleddeep when it considered each applicant looking past demographics. No applicant was awardedpoints or denied points because of demographic factors such as race, sex, ethnicity, religion, orsexual orientation. The Pettus-Cole Policy, which went into effect on July 1, 2022, afforded eachapplicant an individualized review that gave consideration to a range of attributes that would addto the overall makeup of each entering class, that went beyond sex. For example, life experiences,geographical factors, such as where applicants grew up or where they live, languages spoken, ifthey describe themselves as religious, involvement in their community, the background of theirparents, athletic or artistic abilities, and prior relevant vocational experiences. The Schoolconsiders letters of recommendation, the quality and significance of the candidate's prior workexperience, post-graduate degrees, regional and national leadership, community involvement, andthe quality of their personal statement. Applicants are welcome to discuss how their race, sex,ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation have affected their lives and any discrimination that theyhave faced. Not all female applicants who were admitted chose to submit a statement along theselines – in fact, most did not. In addition, just over half of the female applicants who wrote such astatement were rejected.

The School has stated a preference to have as much balancebetween men and women as possible and it admits that, in some instances, female applicants areadmitted with lower grades and GRE scores than their male counterparts, but it did not utilize anyfixed numerical quotas or sex balancing.

the decision of Respondent to terminatehis employment.

Respondent’s preferential-admissions policy(hereinafter “the Policy” or “the Pettus-Cole Policy”)

d (2) that Respondent violated his FirstAmendment rights when it fired him for complaints he made about its admissions policy.

(1) that theRespondent’s admissions policy that gives preferential weight to female applicants violates theEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

Whether Respondent’s admissions policy, which gives preferential weight tofemale applicants, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment to the United States Constitution

Whether Respondent violated Petitioner’s right to freedom of expression underthe First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the statesthrough the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a home. We have previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if any, is too much. While we upheld enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex in Dow Chemical, we noted that we found "it important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened," 476 U. S., at 237, n. 4 (emphasis in original).

As Justice Harlan's oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable

In assessing when a search is not a search, we have applied somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). Katz involved eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening device placed on the outside of a telephone booth-a location not within the catalog ("persons, houses, papers, and effects") that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. We held that the 1 When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to "search" meant "[tJo look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief." N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989). 33 Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because he "justifiably relied" upon the privacy of the telephone booth

The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." "At the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980).

All 16- and 17- year-olds misdemeanors start in Family Court New Youth Part within Criminal Courts presided over by specially-trained Family Court judges

On October 1, 2018, the first phase of the Raise the Age law took effect in New York State, meaning the state no longer automatically charges all 16-year-olds as adults. In October 2019, the law phases in 17-year-olds.

anuary 17, 2011

From late December 2010 through mid-January 2011

December 23, 2010

December 21, 2010

December 21, 2010,

December 20, 2010,

90 days.

ecember 19, 2010,

December 18, 2010

in June of 2011

On the afternoon of December 17, 2010

n the meantime,Petitioner returned to classes the next wee

n mid-November 2010,

January, 2011.

In 2010,

By election day 2008

In September 2008

Petitioner Chester Comerford, a tenured law professor at a publically funded andoperated law school known as Olympus State University School of Law,

etitioner, acting as the chat room moderator, was present at all times in the chat room.

heseblackboard pages are the property of the law school.4 Petitioner used these sites to post classassignments. A survey of the site found that roughly two-thirds of the assignments on the FirstAmendment website pertained to speech about threatening federal officials, while half of theassignments on the criminal law website site related to developing arguments related to thedefense and/or prosecution of assassins of federal official

Visitors to the site could read materials about the Constitution and allegations pertainingto the president’s true country of birth that were intended for public viewing. Members of thegroup occasionally referred others to the site so they could learn more about the cause. Guestswere encouraged to inform the public and elected officials about the group’s concerns.Suggested tactics included writing their members of Congress about the cause, starting petitions,picketing at appearances by Senator, and later President, Obama, writing letters to the editor,posting messages on-line, and going on television and radio talk shows. Their efforts to―expose‖ the president as foreign-born intensified after he was inaugurate

f a group called"The Guardians of the Constitution" (the Guardians), of which Petitioner was the creator.1 Thewebsite was the sole conduit used by the Guardians to disseminate information, conductmeetings, and recruit and enlist new members. To become a member, an individual would haveto pledge to protect other members' anonymity, recruit new members, and donate ten percent oftheir annual income in monthly payments not under $100 U.S.D

overnment’s warrantless entry into his chat room violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Heargued that his arrest violated the First Amendment.

The government did not obtain a warrant, but insteadcomplied with the administrative subpoena requirement of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) and2705(1)(B) of the Stored Communication Act (SCA)

Petitioner ran the website and chat room which, along with the Blackboardwebsites, give rise to the immediate case

a joint task force of the Secret Service (SS) and the FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI) began to investigate Petitioner

Blue noted that the presidentwas scheduled to give the commencement address at Olympus State University in June of 2011and that students and faculty of the law school had been invited

a group called"The Guardians of the Constitution" (the Guardians), of which Petitioner was the creator.

DeNolf Communications.

Neither Pegg nor Thomas werefound to possess any weapons – though Pegg had a license to possess a firearm in Olympus andThomas, a former U.S. Marine who had trained in and was decorated for marksmanship, claimedthat he had not touched a gun since his honorable discharge and that he ―did not believe inviolence – he believed in the Constitution.‖

There was noclear statement or discussion of what the term ―let him have it‖ meant. Nor was there anyevidence that Rider had made specific arrangements to do so – but fellow Guardian TimothyPegg, a resident of Olympus, noted that the president was due to give the commencementaddress at Olympus State University and a second Guardian, Will Thomas, offered to contact atravel agent. No Guardian posted a message taking Thomas up on his offe

On December 21, 2010, achat room member, Casey Rider, an Olympus Law graduate and former student of Comerford’s,initiated a conversation in which she expressed a desire to ―rid us of this imposter and take backour country!‖ Rider stated in the chat room that it would be ―easy‖ for anyone to find thepresident’s travel schedule and to be on-hand when he gave a speech to a group at a fund-raiseror event such as a commencement address. In fact, she wrote that she ―planned to attend such anevent herself in the not so distant future and would really let him have it.‖ Several members,including Petitioner, responded that ―to let him have it would be a good idea.‖

7December 20, 2010, federal law enforcement officials began receiving the content of the chatroom conversations. They did so without being detected by the Guardians. Formerly, livemessaging, such as chat room conversations, was temporary and could not be tracked in theaforementioned manner. New technology, known as "instant messenger reflectors," allowedDeNolf Communications to store chat messages in an archival system as they were sent. Thisenabled third parties to review past post

n December 19, 2010, task force members issued anadministrative subpoena7 to DeNolf Communications requiring DeNolf Communications topreserve and turn over all present and future content occurring in Petitioner's chat room for thenext 90 days. That request was granted that same day by DeNolf Communications

Finding the website was fairly easy. Chat room entry,however, was considerably more difficult.

Petitioner was running in a seminar on the First Amendment, contactedBobby Bronner, the Dean of the Olympus State University School of Law. La Champcomplained the project was ―scary‖ and that the professor ―had crossed a certain line of commondecency.‖ The dean assured La Champ that he would investigate the charges. Dean Bronnerbegan by making an unannounced visit to Petitioner’s class on the First Amendme

Several of the posts lauded Rep. Giffords’ assailant as a ―true American hero,‖ ―apatriot,‖ and ―a role model who we should emulate.‖ The Guardian website featured a map thatpurported to list known public events planned by the president. Members were encouraged to―let their voices be heard‖ at such events. Some posts called for ―showing that we meanbusiness‖ and ―letting him have it in person.‖ One post, wondered if ―there were an Oswaldamong them?‖ Petitioner responded that ―the question is a good one – wish I knew the answer –but don’t we all?‖ In another post Petitioner wrote ―Thomas Jefferson thought a revolution wasin order every 20 years‖ and that ―violence can be a legitimate form of political action

DeNolf Communications, like all ISPs,store and have access to customer’s websites or chat rooms, but never examine the actual contentof those websites or chat rooms.6

In addition, the Secret Service discovered that Petitionerhad an Internet account with DeNolf Communications

This investigation, headed bySecret Service agent Carmen Pettitte, began by requesting that the law school turn over allinformation contained in the Blackboard websites for Petitioner’s two courses

According to La Champ, Petitioner did not changehow he presented issues in class other than to say that ―he was sorry that some of his students didnot understand the First Amendment.‖ His First Amendment class finished working on the mootcourt hypothetical which culminated in an in-class two week oral argument tournament held inearly Decembe

Both blackboard sites containedlinks to a variety of political websites including that of the Guardians.

embers were encouraged to―let their voices be heard‖ at such events

isitors to the site could read materials about the Constitution and allegations pertainingto the president’s true country of birth that were intended for public viewing. Members of thegroup occasionally referred others to the site so they could learn more about the cause. Guestswere encouraged to inform the public and elected officials about the group’s concerns.Suggested tactics included writing their members of Congress about the cause, starting petitions,picketing at appearances by Senator, and later President, Obama, writing letters to the editor,posting messages on-line, and going on television and radio talk shows. Their efforts to―expose‖ the president as foreign-born intensified after he was inaugurated

Thewebsite was the sole conduit used by the Guardians to disseminate information, conductmeetings, and recruit and enlist new members. To become a member, an individual would haveto pledge to protect other members' anonymity, recruit new members, and donate ten percent oftheir annual income in monthly payments not under $100 U.S.D

Because it was easy to findthe website, Petitioner established an elaborate high-tech security system to enter the Guardians'chat room. For instance, Petitioner administered an advanced encryption method through the useof "one-time pads," which are mutually known codes for two parties to communicate messageswithout intrusion via a neutral third-party site. This is not unlike secure credit card transactionsthat many individuals conduct on a daily basis via a third party secure website such as Snookie.These passwords were granted upon the members' payment of the monthly dues, and theychanged twelve times a year. Beyond that, Petitioner sporadically re-routed the website addressto protect members from archiving the same Internet address, generally known as "cookies," intheir computers' histories for extended periods. In addition, all members agreed to certaincommon-sense methods of security such as never listing identities on the website, and tocommunicate in the chat room via fictitious screen names. These measures were meant tomaintain the Guardians' members’ anonymity and guard the chat room from uninvited eye

In 2010, the Republican Party took control of the U.S. House of Representatives. ManyGuardians expected that the Republicans to whom they had written or whose offices they hadcalled would immediately investigate their claims about the president’s true country of birth.When they did not, there was considerable ―chatter‖ in the chat room among the Guardians aboutRepublicans being ―traitors‖ and ―taking matters into their own hands.‖

In September 2008, Petitioner started a website via his Internet Service Provider (ISP),DeNolf Communications. According to Petitioner, the main purpose of the site was ―to providea peaceful and private forum for concerned Americans to discuss whether Barack Obama was

The field test at issue could disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent -- whether or not a suspicious white powder was cocaine. It could tell him nothing more, not even whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder. We must first determine whether this can be considered a "search" subject to the Fourth Amendment -- did it infringe an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable? The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities. [Footnote 22] Indeed, this distinction underlies the rule that Page 466 U. S. 123 government may utilize information voluntarily disclosed to a governmental informant, despite the criminal's reasonable expectation that his associates would not disclose confidential information to the authorities. See United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 401 U. S. 751-752 (1971) (plurality opinion). A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. This conclusion is not dependent on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate interest has been compromised. But even if the results are negative -- merely disclosing that the substance is something other than cocaine -- such a result reveals nothing of special interest. Congress has decided -- and there is no question about its power to do so -- to treat the interest in "privately" possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably "private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest. [Footnote 23]

The fact that, prior to the field test, respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the package had been largely compromised is highly relevant to the reasonableness of the agents' conduct in this respect. The agents had already learned a great deal about the contents of the package from the Federal Express employees, all of which was consistent with what they could see. The package itself, which had previously been opened, remained unsealed, and the Federal Express employees had invited the agents to examine its contents. Under these circumstances, the package could no longer support any expectation of privacy; it was just like a balloon "the distinctive character [of which] spoke volumes as to its contents -- particularly to the trained eye of the officer," Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 460 U. S. 743 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 460 U. S. 746 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment); or the hypothetical gun case in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 442 U. S. 764-765, n. 13 (1979). Such containers may be seized, at least temporarily, without a warrant. [Footnote 19] Accordingly, since it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags contained contraband and little else, this warrantless seizure was reasonable, [Footnote 20] for it is well settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize "effects" that cannot support a justifiable expectation Page 466 U. S. 122 of privacy without a warrant, based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband. [Footnote 21]

Similarly, the removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the agent's visual inspection of their contents enabled the agent to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search. [Footnote 17] It infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Respondents do not dispute that the Government could utilize the Federal Express employees' testimony concerning the contents of the package. If that is the case, it hardly infringed respondents' privacy for the agents to reexamine the contents of the open package by brushing aside a crumpled newspaper and picking up the tube. The advantage the Government gained thereby was merely avoiding the risk of a flaw in the employees' recollection, rather than in further infringing respondents' privacy. Protecting the risk of misdescription hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest, and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. [Footnote 16] Respondents could have no privacy interest in the contents of the package, since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express employees had just examined the package and had, of their own accord, invited the federal agent to their offices for the express purpose of viewing its contents. The agent's viewing of what a private party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

This standard follows from the analysis applicable when private parties reveal other kinds of private information to the authorities. It is well settled that, when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information. Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate information: "This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be betrayed." United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 425 U. S. 443 (1976). [Footnote 13] The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a case, the authorities have not relied on what is in effect a private Page 466 U. S. 118 search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment if they act without a warrant. [Footnote 14]

The additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search. That standard was adopted by a majority of the Court in Walter v. United States, supra. In Walter, a private party had opened a misdirected carton, found rolls of motion picture films that appeared to be contraband, and turned the carton over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Later, without obtaining a warrant, FBI agents obtained a projector and viewed the films. While there was no single opinion of the Court, a majority did agree on the appropriate analysis of a governmental search which follows on the heels of a private one. Two Justices took the position: "If a properly authorized official search is limited by the particular terms of its authorization, at least the same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any official Page 466 U. S. 116 use of a private party's invasion of another person's privacy. Even though some circumstances -- for example, if the results of the private search are in plain view when materials are turned over to the Government -- may justify the Government's reexamination of the materials, surely the Government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search. In these cases, the private party had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the Government screening, one could only draw inferences about what was on the films. The projection of the films was a significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party, and therefore must be characterized as a separate search." Id. at 447 U. S. 657 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (footnote omitted). [Footnote 11] Four additional Justices, while disagreeing with this characterization of the scope of the private search, were also of the view that the legality of the governmental search must be tested by the scope of the antecedent private search. ""Under these circumstances, since the L'Eggs employees so fully ascertained the nature of the films before contacting the authorities, we find that the FBI's subsequent viewing of the movies on a projector did not change the nature of the search,' and was not an additional search subject to the warrant requirement.""

The initial invasions of respondents' package were occasioned by private action. Those invasions revealed that the package contained only one significant item, a suspicious looking tape tube. Cutting the end of the tube and extracting its contents revealed a suspicious looking plastic bag of white powder. Whether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, [Footnote 10] and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character.

When the wrapped parcel involved in this case was delivered to the private freight carrier, it was unquestionably an "effect" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable. [Footnote 7] Even when government agents may lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of suspected contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package. [Footnote 8] Such a warrantless search could not be characterized as reasonable simply because, after the official invasion of privacy occurred, contraband is discovered. [Footnote 9] Conversely, in this case, the fact that agents of the private carrier independently opened the package and made an examination that might have been impermissible for a government agent Page 466 U. S. 115 cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unreasonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that invasion occurred.

The first Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." This text protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. [Footnote 4] A "seizure" of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property. [Footnote 5] This Court has also consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official."

This argument does not withstand scrutiny. The fortuity of whether or not the phone company in fact elects to make a quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does not, in our view, make any constitutional difference. Regardless of the phone company's election, petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information that it had facilities for recording and that it was free to record. In these circumstances, petitioner assumed the risk that the information would be divulged to police. Under petitioner's theory, Fourth Amendment protection would exist, or not, depending on how the telephone company chose to define local-dialing zones, and depending on how it chose to bill its customers for local calls. Calls placed across town, or dialed directly, would be protected; calls placed across the river, or dialed with operator assistance, might not be. We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be dictated by billing practices of a private corporation.

This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here. When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that, if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3 5, 11-12, 32. We

Second, even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 361. This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he Page 442 U. S. 744 voluntarily turns over to third parties

subscribers, on a page entitled "Consumer Information," that the company "can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls." E.g., Baltimore Telephone Directory 21 (1978); District of Columbia Telephone Directory 13 (1978). Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.

Petitioner argues, however, that, whatever the expectations of telephone users in general, he demonstrated an expectation of privacy by his own conduct here, since he "us[ed] the telephone in his house to the exclusion of all others." Brief for Petitioner 6 (emphasis added). But the site of the call is immaterial for purposes of analysis in this case. Although petitioner's conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed. Regardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same way if he wished to complete his call. The fact that he dialed the number on his home phone, rather than on some other phone, could make no conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber rationally think that it would.

This claim must be rejected. First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies "for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 174-175. Electronic equipment is used not only to keep billing records of toll calls, but also "to keep a record of all calls dialed from a telephone which is subject to a special rate structure." Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 266 (CA9 1977) (concurring opinion). Pen registers are regularly employed "to determine whether a home phone is being used to conduct a business, to check for a defective dial, or to check for overbilling." Note, The Legal Constraints upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 Cornell L.Rev. 1028, 1029 (1975) (footnotes omitted). Although most people may be oblivious to a pen register's esoteric functions, they presumably have some awareness of one common use: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene calls. See, e.g., Von Lusch v. C & P Telephone Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 816 (Md.1978); Note, 60 Cornell L.Rev. at 1029-1030, n. 11; Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 Drake L.Rev. 108, 110-111 (1970). Most phone books tell