After we have completed this investigation, we must thenemploy skills of translation; translating one world view intoanother. Employing the skills of translation is not easy. We needto be extremely careful and not assume that an idea or word willtranslate perfectly from one culture to another. We mustrecognize the meaning of the idea or word in its own culture,explain its underlying cultural context, and then translate thatmeaning as best we can to another legal culture, whether our ownor a different foreign culture. Translation will call upon us toexplain the underlying context of the culture the idea or word issituated in. Translation calls for understanding the multiplesemiotic systems and linguistic contexts that situate ideas, andthen determining how to adjust and transfer over that particularworld view into that of another. If we do this well, translation canbe a bridge to connect cultures.18 Or translation can illuminatedisjunction between legal orders. Illuminating either connectionor disjunction among cultures can yield valuable insights

For example, can we really understand the United StatesConstitution without an appreciation of the influence of theEnlightenment, natural law or Republican or English Whigtheory? Why, after all, do we refer to it as our "higher law?

We must also consider the underlyingconcepts, beliefs and reasons that underlie law, what we mightcall the legal mind or framework of legal philosophy that helpsdrive and structure law.

ule 1: The Skills of a ComparativistIt is the aim of comparative law to understand the legal rulesand patterns of order that drive a given society. To do this, weneed to develop critical reasoning skills that are applied in ascientific and neutral manner." Here we need to shed our built-in, native bias or "cognitive lock-in" so that we can review the dataobjectively. This will call upon us to engage in the exotic:exploring and explaining the substructural, underlying forces thatinfluence and form law. For natives of a legal system, this is aquestion of acculturation. Being a product of a culture, weintuitively sense the hidden forces that play out below theexternal manifestation of law. But in foreign culture, this is moredifficult. Here we must call upon the tools of the anthropologist orarcheologist: studying the underlying substrata of data that liewithin a culture. By employing these skills, we can betterunderstand a foreign culture

the law as stated and the law in action, we can assemble our data,(Rule 4) and conclude with comparative observations that canshed light on both a foreign and our own legal culture

The first part, (Rule 1) is acquiring theskills of a comparativist in order to evaluate law clearly,objectively, and neutrally. The second part, (Rule 2) is evaluationof the law as it is expressed concretely, in words, action, or orality.We can refer to this as the external law. Once we get anunderstanding of the law as actually stated, we can move on to thethird part, (Rule 3) of the methodology an evaluation of how thelaw actually operates within a culture. We might refer to this aslaw in action or the internal law.

My proposal for comparativemethodology consists of these steps: Rule 1 consists of acquiringthe skills of a comparativist. That skill calls for immersion in theculture under review, linguistic knowledge, and the application ofneutral, objective, and evaluative skills. Rule 2 will applycomparative skill to evaluate the external law, consisting of thelaw as written or stated. Here we must do a close assessment ofthe similarities and differences of the law of different countriesunder review. Rule 3 will involve applying the same methodologyto the internal law, consisting of the law that lies beneath externallaw yet has important influences on the formation of law. Finally,Rule 4 will involve assembling the results of comparativeinvestigation in order to determine what we can learn from aforeign legal system and how that insight might reflect on our own

But if there is one thing working people the world over can grasp, it’s budgetary constraints.What they also understand is the hypocrisyand the injustice of those constraints, which are onlyever applied to them, not to billionaires or the IMF. In the streets across the world, peopleare rejecting IMF-led austerity and market fanaticism and demanding a redress to longstandinginequities. Development organizations are joining in, recognizing that being liberals at home andcapitalists abroad won’t solve poverty. Oxfam has notably taken the unequivocal position thatpoverty in the Global South will be solved the same way it will in the Global North: progressivetaxation, public funding for basic services, and labor protectio

It is hypocritical to sit in Cambridge, enjoy its comparatively robust public goods regime, and actlike public goods have nothing to do with the well-being of Indians and Kenyans. The wealthyhave never been experimented on by economists in order to become wealthy, and no RCTs wereconducted in Cambridge before deciding to spend $28,000 per student per year. These are notquestions of science that need to be left to experts. They are political questions that requirepolitical solutions—even in the Global Sout

Instead, the laureates’ strategy tries to get a poor school to produce the same educational resultsas a well-funded school, just without the funding. In fact, all the solutions actually involvefurther cuts to already dismal public school budgets: lower teacher pay and fewerpermanentteaching staff. Their “small solutions” not only let the government off the hook and fail to solvethe political problems at the heart of the matter, they also tend to make those problems worse byadvocating for further privatization and deregulation

Fifteen development experts, including three former Nobel laureates, publiclydenounced randomista methods in The Guardian in 2018, recognizing that RCTs in developmentignore root causes of poverty, excessively narrow the size of the problem, and focus solelyon behavioral issues, casting poverty as the problem of bad choices

with methodological, ethical, and politicalassumptions that follow no laws of physics. Do RCTfindings from Kenya apply to India? What gives economists license to use the poor as guineapigs?

Development economists, who seem inherently nobler and moreliberal than their financial crisis–inducing macroeconomist counterparts, might in fact be moredangerous to the world’s poor. If the injustice of global poverty is to be challenged, their workdeserves intense scrutiny, not uncritical celebration

. Thanks to SAPs, poverty and inequality increased dramatically throughoutthe Global South in the late 20th century. Since 1981, the world’s poor population is estimated tohave risen by 1 billion,

Theirwork, crossing science with humanitarianism—you might even call it an attempt to “save” poorblack and brown people—has been an instant hit with Western liberals. And even as povertypolicy in the West is, albeit slowly, becoming understood as a political matter having to do withpower and inequality, poverty in the Global South continues to be treated as a scientific matter,requiring data and deference rather than democracy and dissen

Yet economists’ efforts to pass themselves off as scientists continue. Take developmenteconomists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo—two of the 2019 Nobel laureates—who begintheir new book, Good Economics for Hard Times, by lamenting that economists are amongthe least trusted experts on both sides of the Atlantic, beating out even weather forecast

this faith in economists—and their long-held belief that growth, however unequal, is good—has helped get us to historic levels of inequality, a global crisis of chronic under–and unemployment(especially among young people), and, despite much false advertising, a risein global poverty documented by scholars such as Sanjay Reddy, Camelia Minoiu, ArjunJayadev, and Rahul Laho

legacy of past struggles remains itself a resource incombating new oppressions and destruction

hat does, or might, constitute the‘truly human’ is not already given but is a work in progress andwill be shaped by the sort of dialogue that led to slaveemancipation and the post-emancipation struggles. Thusfeminists have felt the need to insist that womens’ rights arehuman rights.

Marxism has sometimes been seen as exalting the workersand toilers, and thus rejecting any humanist claptrap. But Marx’sadherence to the necessity of class struggle did not prevent himfrom arguing that capitalism was frustrating the full developmentof humanity’s ‘species being’. Without essentializing or idealizingthe ‘human’, he and Engels concluded the Communist Manifestoby declaring that their goal was an association in which ‘the freedevelopment of each is the condition for the free development ofall’.

Those who wage imperial wars in itsname are adopting a risky strategy that can blow up in their faces.Equally obviously, movements of protest against torture, arbitraryarrest, imprisonment are desperately needed in many parts of theworld. Those attacking the $' or British governments for‘rendition’ and the torture of suspects, or those claiming labourrights in China, !nd succour in human-rights language even ifthey would also need to reach beyond it

ometimes misappropriated in past centuries, so‘humanitarianism’ has all too often been adopted as cover forpost-Cold War militarism in recent times. It is necessary todisentangle the different uses of human right

The Latin American leftist guerrillas were suppressed withgreat brutality in one country after another from the mid-60sonwards. From Kennedy to Carter, Washington turned a blind eyeto death squads, or even connived at their activities. Within theguerrilla movements an internal critique emerged, to whichDebray contributed with his 1974 Critique des armes. The memoirof an indigenous Guatemalan woman, I, Rigoberta Menchu, editedby Elizabeth Burgos Debray, exposed the horrendous slaughterand showed that the defence of human rights was a critical terrainif the leftist movements were to regain the initiative against astring of Latin American dictatorships. The book helped toinspire a momentous reorientation and resurgenc

In fact, that periodwitnessed a proliferation of movements that helped dramaticallyto widen notions of ‘human rights’: women’s liberation, gayliberation, the hopes for ‘socialism with a human face’ inCzechoslovakia, the overthrow of dictatorship in Portugal andSpain, the European surge of trade-union mobilization

oyn’s scanty coverage—barely a paragraph—of theinternationalist left in the 1960s and 70s is equally cloth-eared.He writes of the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunals, ‘theseversions of internationalism were a world away from the human-rights movement soon to form’. Quite why the Russell Tribunalcould be denied any concern with human rights is not clear. Oneof its members, Jean-Paul Sartre, declared in this journal that itsdeliberations were animated by ‘a certain idea of human life

the implicit alignment between movementsto end white rule in Africa and movements to end Jim Crow inthe $' was clear enough. The ‘human rights’ idea was taken upin different ways by the South African Freedom Charter, KwameNkrumah, Martin Luther King Jr, the Student Non-violentCoordinating Committee and the 1968 Olympic Project forHuman Rights. Moyn apparently does not regard the anti-racialistcomponent of much anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as adimension of the ‘human rights’ package—wrongly, in my view.The struggle against apartheid South Africa was an icon of theanti-imperialist movement and surely had an absolute claim tothe banner of human rights

One of the impulses that led to itsdrafting was an ‘Appeal to the World’ from the $' NationalAssociation for the Advancement of Coloured People ( %)),1),written in part by W. E. B. DuBois

Many of the social rights in the 1948Declaration echoed the Soviet Constitution of 1936 —drafted, itshould be noted, by Bukharin, not Stalin, as a widespread mythhas it.

There is a living tradition here that cannotbe arti!cially arrested at some privileged moment. The problemwith Moyn’s re-reading is that it overstresses one importantconjuncture—the 1970s—and plays down any sense of a longerhistory of rights, both before and after his magic moment. ThusMoyn argues that few directly cited the 1948 UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights in the twenty years that followed itsadoption by the $%; during this period, the New York Times barelymentioned ‘human rights’. Yet the Non-Aligned Movementformally adopted the Universal Declaration at its meetings inBandung and Lusaka

Moyn denies that the Haitian revolutionaries were animated by aconcern for ‘human rights’, and tries to buttress his claim bydrawing on what he takes to be the more hard-headed approach ofC. L. R. James in his Black Jacobins:James did not think of presenting Toussaint L’Ouvertureand his confederates as human-rights activists beforetheir time. A Trotskyist, James’ view of droits de l’homme,instead, seems to have been as the ‘wordy’ promises ofeloquent ‘phrase makers’ who, driven by the trueeconomic motor of history to ‘perorate’, were in the endonly willing to give up the aristocracy of the skin at thepoint of the gu

ggest that this is the !rst clear statement that Atlantic slaverywas incompatible with what could surely be described as a humanright, or of what Ted Honderich calls the ‘principle of humanity’.Wallace explicitly elaborates that ‘it is intolerable to abusemankind that our pockets may be !lled with money or ourmouths with delicates.’ He declares private property to be ‘thebane of human felicity’. His chapter on slavery achieved widecurrency. It was reprinted in several editions in a collectionpublished by the Quaker and abolitionist pioneer AnthonyBenezet. It also served as the basis for the entry under slavery inthe French Encyclopédie

‘human rights’ as much to the psychology of the novel readeras to the arguments of the philosophers —with Rousseau, asphilosopher-novelist scoring on both counts. While the politicalpamphlet appealed to the reasoning faculty, the novel or poemencourages the reader to imagine herself or himself in thesituation of another. It directly aroused sympathy and de-familiarized oppression. The ‘golden rule’—do unto others as youwould have them do to you—acquired new dimensions in therealm of print culture, autobiography as well as novels. The readercould be invited to identify with those unlike themselves. The verymodesty of Laurence Sterne’s ‘poor negro girl’ in Tristram Shandy,who brushes aside "ies with a feather rather than kill them, takesthe reader off guard. The Corporal asks ‘(doubtingly)’ if ‘the negrohas a soul?’ to which Uncle Toby replies: ‘I am not much versedin things of that kind; but I suppose God would not leave himwithout one, any more than thee or me. —It would be putting onesadly ahead of another, quoth the Corpora

) The historical record simply does not bear outMoyn’s claim that 18th-century appeals to natural rights ‘lednowhere’. The process by which, for example, some abolitionistsand slave rebels came to make such appeals was highly complexand contingent but no less momentous for that. Abolitionistsdrew on slave witness and a few reached out to slave rebels.Together they inspired social movements of great illocutionarypower and momentous acts of slave emancipation.

Despite its talk, the strategicgoal of the Clinton White House was the expansion of %)*+ andnot ‘human rights’. If accepted as a partner, the Russiangovernment was pathetically anxious to be of help, as I argued inthese pages at the time. Determined to exploit Moscow’sweakness to the hilt, it treated the ,',- and the Treaty of Paris asmere scraps of paper. If the Russians had denied oil andmunitions to the Serbian forces, and if funds had been availableto the federal Yugoslav authorities, Milosevic could have been !rsthalted and then removed by domestic opponents—as eventuallyhappened, but only after hundreds of thousands of deaths and theethnic cleansing of millions. There is, of course, room forargument over details but the key point is that the West,notwithstanding its clamour about human rights, did notseriously attempt the peaceful regulation of the Yugoslav break-upby means of the established treaty. Moyn’s iconoclastic challengeto pious myths in the early chapters is abandoned when he comesto the sorry latter-day adventures of ‘./0 ’

its deployment, from Clinton and Blair onwards, as a!g-leaf for Western war-mongering in the name of ‘humanitarianintervention’

More importantly, thelarge philosophical literature discussing the intellectualfoundations of human rights is completely ignored.

There are important intellectual lacunae in Moyn’s account.He provides a brisk account of the treatment of human rights ininternational law, but has barely two lines on Myres McDougal,the militant Cold Warrior who was a towering !gure in the !eld,and scarcely a mention of Hans Kelsen, universally acknowledgedto be the global doyen of the disciplin

instead of assessing the short-term impacts of micro-projects, we should evaluate whole public policies

But the real problem with the “aid effectiveness” craze is that it narrows our focus down to micro-interventions at a local level that yield results that can be observed in the short term. At first glance this approach might seem reasonable and even beguiling. But it tends to ignore the broader macroeconomic, political and institutional drivers of impoverishment and underdevelopment. Aid projects might yield satisfying micro-results, but they generally do little to change the systems that produce the problems in the first place. What we need instead is to tackle the real root causes of poverty, inequality and climate change.

Development efforts over the past few decades have not been as effective as promised.Global poverty remains intractable: more than 4 billion people live on less than the equivalent of $5 (£3.80) a day, and the number of people going hungry has been rising. Important gains have been made in some areas, but many of the objectives set by the millennium development goals – to be reached by 2015 – remain unfulfilled. And this despite hundreds of billions of dollars of aid.

Development economics has gone some distance to curing itself of this error. The best development scholars today, such as Esther Duflo,

Rigorous statistical methods are increasingly used, and in recent years economists have implemented a range of randomised controlled trials. Much greater attention is paid to the minutiae of social context, as it has become clear that a vaccination programme that works well in one location may fail in another, for reasons relating to social order that outsiders do not understand. Expectations have been lowered; the goal is no longer to convert poor societies into rich societies, or even to create market institutions and eliminate corruption; it is to help a school encourage children to read in one village, or to simplify lending markets in another

However, in practice, international human rights law does not require western countries to change their behaviour, while (in principle) it requires massive changes in the behaviour of most non-western countries. Both foreign aid and human rights enforcement can be corrupted or undermined because western countries have strategic interests that are not always aligned with the missions of those institutions. But the major problem, in both cases, is that the systems reflect a vision of good governance rooted in the common historical experiences of western countries and that prevails (albeit only approximately) in countries that enjoy wealth, security and order

The reasons are varied. Giving cash and loans to a government to build projects such as power plants will not help the country if government officials skim off a large share and give contracts to cronies incapable of implementing those projects. Providing experts to improve the legal infrastructure of the country will not help if local judges refuse to enforce the new laws because of corruption or tradition or incompetence. Pressuring governments to combat corruption will not help if payoffs to mob bosses, clan chiefs, or warlords are needed to maintain social order. Demanding that aid recipients use money in ways that they believe unnecessary can encourage governments to evade the conditions of the donations. The Washington consensus failed because economic reform requires the consent of the public, and populations resented the imposition by foreigners of harsh policies that were not always wise on their own terms.

And while NGOs do press countries to improve their behaviour, they cite the human rights they care about and do not try to take an impartial approach to enforcing human rights in general. Sophisticated organisations such as Human Rights Watch understand that poor countries cannot comply with all the human rights listed in the treaties, so they pick and choose, in effect telling governments around the world that they should reorder their priorities so as to coincide with what Human Rights Watch thinks is important, often fixing on practices that outrage uninformed westerners who donate the money that NGOs need to survive. But is there any reason to believe that Human Rights Watch, or its donors, knows better than the people living in Suriname, Laos or Madagascar how their governments should set priorities and implement policy?

But while governments all use the idiom of human rights, they use it to make radically different arguments about how countries should behave. China cites “the right to development” to explain why the Chinese government gives priority to economic growth over political liberalisation. Many countries cite the “right to security,” a catch-all idea that protection from crime justifies harsh enforcement methods. Vladimir Putin cited the rights of ethnic minorities in Ukraine in order to justify his military intervention there, just as the United States cited Saddam Hussein’s suppression of human rights in order to build support for the Iraq war. Certain Islamic countries cite the right to religious freedom in order to explain why women must be subordinated, arguing that women must play the role set out for them in Islamic law. The right of “self‑determination” can be invoked to convert foreign pressure against a human-rights violating country into a violation of that country’s right to determine its destiny. The language of rights, untethered to specific legal interpretations, is too spongy to prevent governments from committing abuses and can easily be used to clothe illiberal agendas in words soothing to the western ear.

The reason these kinds of problems arise on the international but not on the national level is that within countries, the task of interpreting and defining vaguely worded rights, and making trade-offs between different rights, is delegated to trusted institutions. It was the US supreme court, for example, that decided that freedom of speech did not encompass fraudulent, defamatory, and obscene statements. The American public accepted these judgments because they coincided with their moral views and because the court enjoys a high degree of trust. In principle, international institutions could perform this same function. But the international institutions that have been established for this purpose are very weak

Thus, the existence of a huge number of vaguely defined rights ends up giving governments enormous discretion. If a government advances one group of rights, while neglecting others, how does one tell whether it complies with the treaties the best it can or cynically evades them

Then came September 11, 2001 and the “war on terror”. America’s recourse to torture was a significant challenge to the international human rights regime. The United States was a traditional leader in human rights and one of the few countries that has used its power to advance human rights in other nations. Moreover, the prohibition on torture is at the core of the human rights regime; if that right is less than absolute, then surely the other rights are as well.The rise of China has also undermined the power of human rights. In recent years, China has worked assiduously behind the scenes to weaken international human rights institutions and publicly rejected international criticism of the political repression of its citizens. It has offered diplomatic and economic support to human rights violators, such as Sudan, that western countries have tried to isolate. Along with Russia, it has used its veto in the UN security council to limit western efforts to advance human rights through economic pressure and military intervention. And it has joined with numerous other countries – major emerging powers such as Vietnam, and Islamic countries that fear western secularisation – to deny many of the core values that human rights are supposed to protect.

As the historian Samuel Moyn has argued in his book The Last Utopia, it was not until the late 1970s that human rights became a major force in international relations. President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights seems to have been a reaction to Vietnam and the gruesome realpolitik of the Nixon era, but Carter himself was unable to maintain a consistent line. Allies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia were just too important for American security, and seen as a crucial counterweight to Soviet influence. Still, something changed with Carter. His five successors – Republicans and Democrats alike – have invoked the term “human rights” far more frequently than any president before him. It is not that presidents have become more idealistic. Rather, it is that they have increasingly used the language of rights to express their idealistic goals (or to conceal their strategic goals).

it was on December 10, 1948, that the story began in earnest, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN general assembly. The declaration arose from the ashes of the second world war and aimed to launch a new, brighter era of international relations

Why, for example, do more than 150 countries (out of 193 countries that belong to the UN) engage in torture? Why has the number of authoritarian countries increased in the last several years? Why do women remain a subordinate class in nearly all countries of the world? Why do children continue to work in mines and factories in so many countries

We live in an age in which most of the major human rights treaties – there are nine “core” treaties – have been ratified by the vast majority of countries. Yet it seems that the human rights agenda has fallen on hard times. In much of the Islamic world, women lack equality, religious dissenters are persecuted and political freedoms are curtailed. The Chinese model of development, which combines political repression and economic liberalism, has attracted numerous admirers in the developing world. Political authoritarianism has gained ground in Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Venezuela. Backlashes against LGBT rights have taken place in countries as diverse as Russia and Nigeria. The traditional champions of human rights – Europe and the United States – have floundered. Europe has turned inward as it has struggled with a sovereign debt crisis, xenophobia towards its Muslim communities and disillusionment with Brussels. The United States, which used torture in the years after 9/11 and continues to kill civilians with drone strikes, has lost much of its moral authority. Even age-old scourges such as slavery continue to exist. A recent report estimates that nearly 30 million people are forced against their will to work. It wasn’t supposed to be like thi

Such initiatives may have the potential tobegin to subvert dominant racialising narratives, but, if anything, the rebalan-cing of prosecutorial focus beyond Africa is framed more in geographic andnational terms than explicitly racial ones, once again avoiding the discomfort ofacknowledging the significance race continues to exhibit globall

The scepticismtowards traditional justice, 95 or even sui generis transitional justice solutions, 96by advocates of international criminal justice suggests a hard universalist stancethat positions one, highly peculiar, form of justice—that is, criminal justice—assuperior to all other alternatives

it is also worth bearing inmind that the standard utilised in complementarity assessments itself feeds intoold tropes about African countries being unable to govern themselves, as well asa denial of legal pluralism, at least when it might clash with fundamental co-lonial interests.

For example, more direct and intimate processes of killing andabuse, which may be the only means available to relatively less powerful andtechnologically-sophisticated actors in a global context, who tend to be mem-bers of racialised communities, especially within Africa, tend to be portrayed ashighly deliberate and hence, especially ‘criminal’. By contrast, the sort of diffuse,attritive or structural processes of killing resulting from actions such as theinvasion of Iraq, tend to be seen as an inevitable by-product of war; one thatis entirely severable from the question of its legality

. In particular, the convictions of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,Germain Katanga, and Jean-Pierre Bemba have had, amongst other things,the effect of associating Black Africans with physical and sexual violence, theabuse of children through the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and theinability to hold ‘civilized’ elections. Rather than the invasion of Iraq, torture inGuantanamo or Abu Ghraib, or the threat posed by nuclear weapons, the workof the ICC has myopically highlighted the destruction of cultural property orthe sexual violence against ‘bush wives’ as emblematic of African violence

Conversely, how might the ICC be implicated in a broader global ten-dency to essentialise Black women and young children as agency-devoi

f the ICC could achieve the task of operating in a truly ‘race-neutral’ manner, itwould still exist in a deeply racialised world, one whose racialised constructionsneed to be critically borne in mind and engaged with, lest they be simplyreproduced. This much is evident, for example, in the parallel, but in someways more accomplished, effort to stamp out sexual violence as part of inter-national crimes, an effort that hardly relieves international criminal justice ofthe need to think critically about gender—indeed, of thinking critically abouthow it deals with gender

Racial connotations also infiltrated longstanding biases con-cerning the poorer, more criminally-inclined, and coincidentally generallydarker-complexioned residents of Southern Italy in comparison to the weal-thier, less criminally-inclined, and, of course, generally fairer-complexionedNortherners. 52 Indeed, Lombroso’s quite explicitly racist ideas about predilec-tions to criminality led him to make connections between criminals in Sicilyand Southern Italy, and ‘Negroes in the United States’, whom he deemed toshare broadly similar characteristics

This explicitly racist perspective was used by Lombroso to explainthe criminality of the Mafia in Italy, who were viewed as descendants of Arabconquerors of Sicily and were thus, deemed connected to the criminally-inclined Bedouins.

Historically, certain criminal offences have long targeted certainsocial groups, to the point of being virtually indistinguishable from them. Forexample, in the US context, explicitly racist slavery laws and thereafter ‘BlackCodes’ criminalised certain minor offences (such as, for example, public intoxica-tion or vagrancy) extremely harshly if committed by African-Americans. Thesewere progressively replaced by more facially-neutral laws which nonetheless hada similarly drastic, disproportionate effect on African-American populations, not-ably in the context of certain criminal drug laws

As overrepresentation of certain racial groups in any criminal justice systemgoes, the ICC is almost cartoonesque. As of April 2019, the Court had issuedindictments against 45 individuals, juridically transforming them from ‘sus-pects’ into ‘defendants’. All of these individuals are Black and/or Arab-Africans. 9 Given that anti-Black racism continues to be especially prevalentglobally, 10 and anti-Arab racism is on the rise, one might think that the denun-ciation of the ICC’s ‘racism’ would have led to a more deliberate and intro-spective soul-searching, and perhaps even to a sophisticated effort at grapplingwith questions of race and racism. Yet, for the most part, the ICC and its coreproponents have strongly rejected any notion that race plays a significant role inthe work of the Court

Third, by its very design, the ICC is engineered to focus primarily on indi-vidual intentionality when it comes to racism. It is almost, then, as if ICL could onlysee broad social phenomena through a prism of professional deformation. Whatmatters, for example, cannot be the structural racism of colonial and post-colonialRwanda, but the particular identification with that racism by individuals who haveeither bought into the flawed logic of such racism or instrumentalised it for theirown political ends. The ICC and contemporary international criminal justice arethus more interested in racists than racism, despite ICL’s occasional acknowledg-ment of the significance of specifically racist ideologies.20Viewing racism in others as primarily a form of individual malevolencefundamentally limits the ability to see racism for what it is. If race only existsthrough intentional agency, then the ICC can (probably) make a cogent argu-ment that it is in no way racist. The Court, when viewed in this manner, is ‘race-neutral’; not itself implicated in the global production of race, let alone racism,and hence necessarily innocent of that which it prosecutes. This impoverishedconceptualisation of race and racism has often led the Court to step into thetrap of believing that an institution working in a deeply racialised world cannonetheless operate in a manner wholly emancipated from race and racis

In order to explore these questions, we suggest that much can be gained byadopting a perspective that is informed by conversations that have been goingon far longer and in much more explicit and sophisticated ways domestically,most notably in countries such as the US with long histories of racial discrim-ination and oppression. In particular, we are concerned that the overall enthu-siasm for international criminal justice has tended to insulate it from the muchharsher tones with which criminal justice has come to be viewed domestically inrelation to the prism of race. We draw, in particular, on the considerabletheorising that has emerged around the extremely disparate treatment ofAfrican-Americans within the US criminal justice system. 8 We suggest thatmany of the debates and much of the research sparked by the encounter be-tween race and criminal justice in the US can help us to better frame andunderstand the continuing impasse at the ICC in its dealings with race. Byexamining this domestic encounter between race and criminal justice, weargue that thin understandings of racism grounded in deliberate racist acts,and neglectful of structural racism, impoverish legal discourses on race andracism both in the US and international criminal justice contexts.

The ICC has frequently been criticised for focusing too much on Africa.There are several dimensions to this criticism. Some have pointed out the morepersistently neo-colonial aspects of such a focus.

the intent standard in the civil tort context requires only that the criminal conduct be the "natural consequence of [one's] original act," whereas criminal intent to aid and abet requires that the defendant have a "purposive attitude" toward the commission of the offense

holding that the publication of a Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors , whose detailed and concrete instructions on "how to murder and become a professional killer" assisted a man in taking three lives, wasn't protected abstract advocacy

Though a statute proscribes certain speech, in this case counseling, the defendant does not have a First Amendment defense simply for the asking. Counseling is but a variant of the crime of solicitation, and the First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the objective meaning of the words used are so close in time and purpose to a substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself. United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1982); Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 624. In those instances, where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is foreclosed even if the prosecution rests on words alone.

We hold that where, as in Patillo's case, a true threat against the person of the President is uttered without communication to the President intended, the threat can form a basis for conviction under the terms of Section 871(a) only if made with a present intention to do injury to the President. Such intent may take the form of a bad purpose to personally do harm to the President or to incite some other person to do the injury.

However, it seems evident that an officer’s failure to adhere to the boundariesof a given statute should preclude him from relying upon it in the face of a constitutionalchallenge.18 Once the officer steps outside the scope of an unconstitutional statute, themistake is no longer the legislature’s, but the officer’

As we noted in Warshak II, “[t]he Stored CommunicationsAct has been in existence since 1986 and to our knowledge has not been the subject ofany successful Fourth Amendment challenges, in any context, whether to § 2703(d) orto any other provision.” 532 F.3d at 531. Furthermore, given the complicated thicketof issues that we were required to navigate when passing on the constitutionality of theSCA, it was not plain or obvious that the SCA was unconstitutional, and it was thereforereasonable for the government to rely upon the SCA in seeking to obtain the contents ofWarshak’s emails.1

But Miller is distinguishable. First, Miller involved simple business records, asopposed to the potentially unlimited variety of “confidential communications” at issuehere. See ibid. Second, the bank depositor in Miller conveyed information to the bankso that the bank could put the information to use “in the ordinary course of business.”Ibid. By contrast, Warshak received his emails through NuVox. NuVox was anintermediary, not the intended recipient of the emails. See Bellia & Freiwald, Stored E-Mail, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. at 165 (“[W]e view the best analogy for this scenario as thecases in which a third party carries, transports, or stores property for another. In thesecases, as in the stored e-mail case, the customer grants access to the ISP because it isessential to the customer’s interests.”). Thus, Miller is not controllin

Nor is the right of access. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation points out inits amicus brief, at the time Katz was decided, telephone companies had a right tomonitor calls in certain situations. Specifically, telephone companies could listen inwhen reasonably necessary to “protect themselves and their properties against theimproper and illegal use of their facilities.” Bubis v. United States, 384 F.2d 643, 648(9th Cir. 1967). In this case, the NuVox subscriber agreement tracks that language,indicating that “NuVox may access and use individual Subscriber information in theoperation of the Service and as necessary to protect the Service.” Acceptable UsePolicy, available at http://business.windstream.com/Legal/acceptableUse.htm (lastvisited Aug. 12, 2010). Thus, under Katz, the degree of access granted to NuVox doesnot diminish the reasonableness of Warshak’s trust in the privacy of his emai

An ISP is the intermediary thatmakes email communication possible. Emails must pass through an ISP’s servers toreach their intended recipient. Thus, the ISP is the functional equivalent of a post officeor a telephone company

to friends, family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings,and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button. Commercehas also taken hold in email. Online purchases are often documented in email accounts,and email is frequently used to remind patients and clients of imminent appointments.In short, “account” is an apt word for the conglomeration of stored messages thatcomprises an email account, as it provides an account of its owner’s lif

Email is the technological scion of tangiblemail, and it plays an indispensable part in the Information Age. Over the last decade,email has become “so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essentialmeans or necessary instrument[] for self-expression, even self-identification

This is true despite thefact that sealed letters are handed over to perhaps dozens of mail carriers, any one ofwhom could tear open the thin paper envelopes that separate the private words from theworld outside. Put another way, trusting a letter to an intermediary does not necessarilydefeat a reasonable expectation that the letter will remain privat

First, thevery fact that information is being passed through a communications network is aparamount Fourth Amendment consideration. See ibid.; United States v. U. S. Dist.Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[T]he broad and unsuspected governmental incursionsinto conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate theapplication of Fourth Amendment safeguards.”). Second, the Fourth Amendment mustkeep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its guarantees willwither and perish. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting thatevolving technology must not be permitted to “erode the privacy guaranteed by theFourth Amendment”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to theInternet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1007 (2010) (arguing that “thedifferences between the facts of physical space and the facts of the Internet requirecourts to identify new Fourth Amendment distinctions to maintain the function of FourthAmendment rules in an online environment

we find that Warshakplainly manifested an expectation that his emails would be shielded from outsidescrutiny. As he notes in his brief, his “entire business and personal life was containedwithin the . . . emails seized.” Appellant’s Br. at 39-40. Given the often sensitive andsometimes damning substance of his emails,15 we think it highly unlikely that Warshakexpected them to be made public, for people seldom unfurl their dirty laundry in plainview

A “search” occurs when thegovernment infringes upon “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared toconsider reasonable.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Thisstandard breaks down into two discrete inquiries: “first, has the [target of theinvestigation] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of thechallenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation asreasonable?” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Smith v. Maryland,442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979

wever, because the agents relied in good faith on provisions of the StoredCommunications Act, the exclusionary rule does not apply in this instance

e Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”  Article XV, (1870) Section 1. “The rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.  Section 2.  The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

Its high and noble words are tuned against it, because they are contradicted in every syllable by the treatment of the American Negro for three hundred and twenty-seven years.

But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each house, remove such disability.

Article XIV, (1868) Section 1. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

In the Constitution of the United States, Negroes are referred to as fellows although the word “slave” is carefully avoided before the thirteenth amendment.  Article I (1787) Section 2, apportionment of members of the House of Representatives: “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.”  “Other persons” means Negro slaves