They actually marched outside the city, which I think is particularly import since if they were gatheredy. outside the convention hall it might land in a grey area of protected speech? I guess it depends if they were actually on the convention hall property.

The court actually argues that the burning of the flag is one of the things the first amendment protects the most, which is political speech. Punishing someone who burns the flag is unconstitutional since the flag represents their ability to do so. The Texas Law is therefore unconstitutional.

Brennan explained that his actions were political expression

Justice Kennedy actually concurred with Brennan.

The origin of the violation is of state regulation, not an act of congress.

Wrong amendment--should be the First Amendment

Johnson lit the flag on fire.

Wrong name: Gregory E. Lee Johnson

include year: 491 U.S. 397 (1987)

Rehnquist is actually saying that the number of participating religious schools is irrelevant since the aid package in itself is neutral to whether that private is school is religious or not.

The argument made is completely the opposite. Rehnquist is adamant that the tuition assistance is not establishing any preference toward religious schools. School choice is a completely private choice and the number of choices for private schools is immaterial. In fact, Rehnquist argues that the aid package doesn't cover the whole of tuition and families must pay a certain amount, which in actuality is a disadvantage.

Cleveland

This figure isn't provided in the textbook. Although, the text does mention that about 96 percent of parents who did opt to use vouchers for PRIVATE schools did choose a religious school.

Correction - 80 Percent were religious

Violated the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment, not free exercise.

I don't believe Stevens issued a separate dissenting opinion

O'Connor should be concurring

No by a vote of 5-4/

The legal issue is not regarding the 14th amendment, rather the questions is whether the voucher program violated the Establishment Clause

Legal citation should be Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)

Except, consequently, the 10th amendment, right? Aren't the federal and state governments actually quite codependent?

This bothers me: the federal government, congress, is composed of representatives and senators elected by the people within their state, so what gain could come from the federal and state governments acting with such impunity? Doesn't the state government see the federal government as a collection state governments? Silly!

What does Marshall mean by "confidence" in this context? The English is old and difficult to understand in these old cases.

It is not the correct format to include the year in the case name title. It's included in the official legal citation.

I think just "concurring" is the correct format.

President Truman actually cited his military power as Commander in Chief as defined in Article II, not congressional policy.

Justice Black explicitly states that Congress did not and does not lend lawmaking power to either the President or military control, especially the authorization to seize private property and intervene among employer/employee relations.

Justice Black does not say this as a reasoning. Instead, he explains that the action of seizing property from a private citizen cannot be done under military authority, but only under the lawmakers of congress.

Incorrect: the Korean War

Incorrect: steel industry.

6-3 vote is correct, but the holding was actually that the President did NOT have the executive authority take over the steel mills.

Incorrect interpretation of the issue. The issue at hand is, does the President have the constitutional authority to take nation control of a private steel mill?

Justice Roberts didn't participate in this case. I don't think he was even born yet!

Is this the problem then--that forcing Madison to deliver the commission would be unconstitutional since there's no law?

Is Marshall here then expressing his opinion that mandamus shouldn't be used in either appellate jurisdiction, as well as original? If so, would not exercising mandamus be in defiance of the Judiciary Act?

Was there no law at this time regarding the commission of judges? This would help me understand better why mandamus couldn't be executed even though the Judiciary Act permitted it. Basically, is Marshall saying that the Supreme Court couldn't enforce this because there was no law regarding the commission of judges?

In one long example, I think Alito showed his support for cert here. He's trying to show Layton the state is not being selective and showing favoritism. Instead, there might be a perception of favoritism. I think Alito is trying to ask Layton to make something of that distinction

Breyer seems to be building an argument here that churches and religious institutions have always been given basic safety rights like police protection and health inspections. I believe he's affirming and building the argument for it here.

It seems Sotomayor is very cautious and being strategic about what would happen if Cortman won his case. She's explaining that if the public funding is granted, then how will secular organizations react?

Isn't Sotomayor contradicting herself? Isn't the safety of children is being compromised unless the school doesn't do away with religious affiliation?

I'm quite sure she dissented. She's very legalistic in the way she separates the Foundation clause. She mentions, that religious institutions can exercise religious activities, and the state simply doesn't fund them.

I don't think he's extending his argument, it seems more to me that he's clarifying his argument. Isn't the distinction between state funding and private religious exercise the aspect of safety?

I'm not trying to be facetious, but is there a scale of religiosity? Religious is sort of one of those fuzzy words, malleable words Levitin article about categories mentions.