protesters assembled outside the convention hall.
They actually marched outside the city, which I think is particularly import since if they were gatheredy. outside the convention hall it might land in a grey area of protected speech? I guess it depends if they were actually on the convention hall property.
The Court agrees and argues that the most important principle behind the First Amendment is that government may always prohibit the expression of an idea whenever society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. As a result, the Texas law is a permissible regulation of speech.
The court actually argues that the burning of the flag is one of the things the first amendment protects the most, which is political speech. Punishing someone who burns the flag is unconstitutional since the flag represents their ability to do so. The Texas Law is therefore unconstitutional.
Looking at Johnson's actions, there is no evidence of an expressive element in his actions.
Brennan explained that his actions were political expression
Dissent by Justince Kennedy
Justice Kennedy actually concurred with Brennan.
Does an act of Congress
The origin of the violation is of state regulation, not an act of congress.
Second Amendment
Wrong amendment--should be the First Amendment
n American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down
Johnson lit the flag on fire.
Arthur Smith,
Wrong name: Gregory E. Lee Johnson
491 U.S. 397
include year: 491 U.S. 397 (1987)
Additionally, the constitutionality of this program turns on whether most schools in the program are religious.
Rehnquist is actually saying that the number of participating religious schools is irrelevant since the aid package in itself is neutral to whether that private is school is religious or not.
Here, the program is not one of true private choice. It is not neutral in all respects toward religion and is part of an attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens who send their children to religious schools. Only certain religious groups are free to participate.
The argument made is completely the opposite. Rehnquist is adamant that the tuition assistance is not establishing any preference toward religious schools. School choice is a completely private choice and the number of choices for private schools is immaterial. In fact, Rehnquist argues that the aid package doesn't cover the whole of tuition and families must pay a certain amount, which in actuality is a disadvantage.
Baltimore
Cleveland
only 5 percent of students used their vouchers at private schools.
This figure isn't provided in the textbook. Although, the text does mention that about 96 percent of parents who did opt to use vouchers for PRIVATE schools did choose a religious school.
10 percen
Correction - 80 Percent were religious
violated the First Amendment's free exercise clause
Violated the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment, not free exercise.
Stevens: dissenting
I don't believe Stevens issued a separate dissenting opinion
O'Connor: dissenting
O'Connor should be concurring
No. By a vote of 7–2 the Court ruled in favor of Zelman
No by a vote of 5-4/
Does the voucher program offend the 14th Amendment to the Constitution?
The legal issue is not regarding the 14th amendment, rather the questions is whether the voucher program violated the Establishment Clause
Epstein and Walker, p194
Legal citation should be Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the Government of the Union
Except, consequently, the 10th amendment, right? Aren't the federal and state governments actually quite codependent?
The people of all the States have created the General Government, and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation
This bothers me: the federal government, congress, is composed of representatives and senators elected by the people within their state, so what gain could come from the federal and state governments acting with such impunity? Doesn't the state government see the federal government as a collection state governments? Silly!
But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the magic of the word CONFIDENCE
What does Marshall mean by "confidence" in this context? The English is old and difficult to understand in these old cases.
(1952)
It is not the correct format to include the year in the case name title. It's included in the official legal citation.
concurring in the judgment of the Court
I think just "concurring" is the correct format.
In the president's favor is the fact that his order commands the steel industry to follow policy set by Congress, not the president himsel
President Truman actually cited his military power as Commander in Chief as defined in Article II, not congressional policy.
ongress has clearly chosen to rid itself of that power and give it to the president.
Justice Black explicitly states that Congress did not and does not lend lawmaking power to either the President or military control, especially the authorization to seize private property and intervene among employer/employee relations.
Truman's action can be upheld as an exercise of the president's inherent military power as commander-in-chief.
Justice Black does not say this as a reasoning. Instead, he explains that the action of seizing property from a private citizen cannot be done under military authority, but only under the lawmakers of congress.
Vietnam War
Incorrect: the Korean War
sugar manufacturing
Incorrect: steel industry.
Yes. By a vote of 6-3 the Court ruled against Youngstown Sheet & Tube.
6-3 vote is correct, but the holding was actually that the President did NOT have the executive authority take over the steel mills.
Can Congress take over an industry in order to prevent a union from striking?
Incorrect interpretation of the issue. The issue at hand is, does the President have the constitutional authority to take nation control of a private steel mill?
Roberts: dissenting
Justice Roberts didn't participate in this case. I don't think he was even born yet!
The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."
Is this the problem then--that forcing Madison to deliver the commission would be unconstitutional since there's no law?
Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
Is Marshall here then expressing his opinion that mandamus shouldn't be used in either appellate jurisdiction, as well as original? If so, would not exercising mandamus be in defiance of the Judiciary Act?
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?
Was there no law at this time regarding the commission of judges? This would help me understand better why mandamus couldn't be executed even though the Judiciary Act permitted it. Basically, is Marshall saying that the Supreme Court couldn't enforce this because there was no law regarding the commission of judges?
And -- and so long as the money is granted based on neutral criteria that are faithfully applied, I don't know how you can draw a distinction between a program that's open to everybody and a selective program
In one long example, I think Alito showed his support for cert here. He's trying to show Layton the state is not being selective and showing favoritism. Instead, there might be a perception of favoritism. I think Alito is trying to ask Layton to make something of that distinction
Stephen G. Breyer Have they ever said that it prevents the State from, say, having a -- a border guard, you know, crossing guards or fire protection? Or, let's say, health inspections?
Breyer seems to be building an argument here that churches and religious institutions have always been given basic safety rights like police protection and health inspections. I believe he's affirming and building the argument for it here.
hat are we going to end up with when secular people say religious people are being discriminated in favor of and against us? If status should not be an effect on free exercise, what are we going to do with tax benefits?
It seems Sotomayor is very cautious and being strategic about what would happen if Cortman won his case. She's explaining that if the public funding is granted, then how will secular organizations react?
But why is that coercion with respect to your beliefs?
Isn't Sotomayor contradicting herself? Isn't the safety of children is being compromised unless the school doesn't do away with religious affiliation?
Elena Kagan
I'm quite sure she dissented. She's very legalistic in the way she separates the Foundation clause. She mentions, that religious institutions can exercise religious activities, and the state simply doesn't fund them.
that extends into a State's decision to deny some uses
I don't think he's extending his argument, it seems more to me that he's clarifying his argument. Isn't the distinction between state funding and private religious exercise the aspect of safety?
I think it would depending on how religious it is.
I'm not trying to be facetious, but is there a scale of religiosity? Religious is sort of one of those fuzzy words, malleable words Levitin article about categories mentions.