First, it seems plausible that some freely flowing inorganic substances, such as H2S, which hitherto have “only” been used in spa towns to pickle and macerate affluent pensioners or have been wasted entirely

incoherent

some depth

weaker character, defined by and reliant upon other men rather than herself.

too literally the ontological commitments of this notion of a “we.”

Nonetheless, this federation model is not without its problems—problems that affect other versions of the union view as well. For if the federation (or the “we”, as on Nozick’s view) is understood as a third entity, we need a clearer account than has been given of its ontological status and how it comes to be. Relevant here is the literature on shared intention and plural subjects. Gilbert (1989, 1996, 2000) has argued that we should take quite seriously the existence of a plural subject as an entity over and above its constituent members. Others, such as Tuomela (1984, 1995), Searle (1990), and Bratman (1999) are more cautious, treating such talk of “us” having an intention as metaphorical.

third unified entity

Whiting’s way of formulating the second objection in terms of an unnecessary egoism in part points to a way out: we persons are in part social creatures, and love is one profound mode of that sociality. Indeed, part of the point of union accounts is to make sense of this social dimension: to make sense of a way in which we can sometimes identify ourselves with others not merely in becoming interdependent with them (as Singer 1994, p. 165, suggests, understanding ‘interdependence’ to be a kind of reciprocal benevolence and respect) but rather in making who we are as persons be constituted in part by those we love

Given my view that the romantic ideal is primarily characterized by a desire to achieve a profound consolidation of needs and interests through the formation of a we, I do not think a little selfishness of the sort described should pose a worry to either party.

The objection, however, lies precisely in this attempt to explain my concern for my beloved egoistically. As Whiting (1991, p. 10) puts it, such an attempt “strikes me as unnecessary and potentially objectionable colonization”: in love, I ought to be concerned with my beloved for her sake, and not because I somehow get something out of it. (This can be true whether my concern with my beloved is merely instrumental to my good or whether it is partly constitutive of my good.)

merely to call it a paradox, as Solomon does, is not to face up to the problem.

“certain kind of division of labor” (p. 72): A person in a we might find himself coming across something interesting to read yet leaving it for the other person, not because he himself would not be interested in it but because the other would be more interested, and one of them reading it is sufficient for it to be registered by the wider identity now shared, the we.

A slight error in a theory may make little difference in providingan explanation of the observed facts out of which the theory grew.But when the theory is projected to explain more remote phenomena,the error may be magnified, and the inferences from the theory may becompletely false. A very slight error in the understanding of Tennyson'sflower may give a grossly false understanding of man. Thus every theorydeserves the greatest respect in the area from which it was drawn fromthe facts and a decreasing degree of respect as it makes predictions inareas more and more remote from its origin. This is true of the theoriesdeveloped by our own group.

including your true name, which I promise to utter only to save you from mortal danger.

extractive industry

marginal growth

he went to Mali to meet the people involved and to record their tale

Lactobacillus kunkeei YB38 from honeybee products enhances IgA production in healthy adults

it is impossible for a trait or aesthetic to remain authentic once it has been shared on a medium like Instagram

Biochemical memory experiments