The economic, political, and social frameworks that each society has—its laws, institutions, policies, etc.—result in different distributions of benefits and burdens across members of the society. These frameworks are the result of human political processes and they constantly change both across societies and within societies over time. The structure of these frameworks is important because the distributions of benefits and burdens resulting from them fundamentally affect people’s lives. Arguments about which frameworks and/or resulting distributions are morally preferable constitute the topic of distributive justice. Principles of distributive justice are therefore best thought of as providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies, and any principles which do offer this kind of moral guidance on distribution, regardless of the terminology they employ, should be considered principles of distributive justice.

e.8 Rawls now says that the primarygoods should not be viewed as all-purpose features of life plans, because this conception is insufficiently political. It is a philosophicalconception of what human flourishing requires in terms of its minimalessential

s." Rational contractors, deliberating behind a "veil of ignorance," agree toa scheme of justice prior to knowing how the scheme materially affectstheir individual interests or conceptions of moral or nonmoralgood(s).

Perhaps the most striking and certainly one of the mostcontroversial features of Rawls's Theory was his argument that "theright" subordinates (for purposes of the political order) not only material interests in the economic sphere, but also individuals' fully considered conceptions of the moral good, human flourishing, and finalends.2 Hence, Rawls's theory of justice was meant to be a systematicalternative both to the economic pragmatism of other modern contracttheorists as well as to the classical tradition of perfectionism in political theory.

According to the luck egalitarian, the aim of jus-tice as equality is to eliminate so far as is possible the impact on people’slives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of theirown. In the ideal luck egalitarian society, there are no inequalities inpeople’s life prospects except those that arise through processes of vol-untary choice or faulty conduct, for which the agents involved can rea-sonably be held responsible

The difference principle selectsseparated, it selects S2. Thus withothe least advantaged, the differencerule of social choice.

For, as he increases the uncertainty in the contract situationto fend off the problems that Wolff presented, Rawls makes the contract situa-tion more and more untypical of the actual practice situation. The contracteesknow that the 'veil of ignorance' will soon lift and that they will get informa-tion concerning their talents and their roles in the institutions and practices oftheir society

Desert, Rawls argues, is incoherent, aporetic, unstable. It rewards differences(in talents and abilities) that are "arbitrary from a moral point of view" (TJ:107, 102, 104). The bases of desert are not themselves deserved

uity. Unrelated to the basic structure, it isnot the subject of justice. But what if it is a product of Rawls' effectivedepoliticization of difference? What if genuine pluralism is a casualty of the(state-regulated) public/private distinction that Rawlsian justice postulates asthe condition of pluralism's possibilit

. Rawls insists that no single comprehensive vision of the goodlife may dominate the political space. But he sees no positive connectionbetween politics and pluralis

ion. Rawlsimagines a private realm in which different forms of life co-exist as lifestyles,there is no contest among them. None feels threatened by the existence of theother. None maintains itself at the cost of the other's existence.6 But in polit-ical life spaces of plurality and difference are often closed by the sedimenta-tion or naturalization of a dominant culture's form of life: Its own particularvision of gender identities becomes a standard by which all men and womenare measured. Its family structures become a norm of health and safety. Itsattitudes toward work and leisure become moralized. Its approved directionsof sexuality are touted as natural, not contingent, and deviations from themare treated accordingly, as curiosities, evils, or illnesses. Without the resourcesof politicization, those who deviate from these norms find that their rights areprotected in Rawls' regime but that they themselves are (at best) disrespected.Rawls does not address this ineq

ity. Unrelated to the basic structure, it isnot the subject of justice. But what if it is a product of Rawls' effectivedepoliticization of difference? What if genuine pluralism is a casualty of the(state-regulated) public/private distinction that Rawlsian justice postulates asthe condition of pluralism's possibil

The conception of justice which I want to develop may bestated in the form of two principles as follows: first, each personparticipating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal rightto the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all;and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable toexpect that they will work out for everyone's advantage, andprovided the positions and offices to which they attach, or fromwhich they may be gained, are open to all. T

The conception of justice which I want to develop may bestated in the form of two principles as follows: first, each personparticipating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal rightto the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all;and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable toexpect that they will work out for everyone's advantage, andprovided the positions and offices to which they attach, or fromwhich they may be gained, are open to all. These principlesi65JOHN RA WRLSexpress justice as a complex of three ideas: liberty, equality,and reward for services contributing to the common good.3

iples and institutions mustalso be conceived in a way that permits an overlapping consensus fora political society marked by a "reasonable pluralism" (p. 133). Reasonable pluralism is not a mere fact, but the achievement of a peoplewho have prospered and developed within the context of free institutions. Therefore, overlapping consensus also is not just a limitplaced upon the employment of "public reason" but an end of politicalinstitutions. Whatever the abstract scheme of justice, it must providefor the citizens' ability to connect the scheme to their own respectivecomprehensive doctrines

owhere is the new emphasis on political rather than moraltheory more apparent than in Rawls's treatment of the primary goods,namely, that minimal list of goods considered by the rational contractors in the original position. In Theory, the primary goods?rightsand liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and selfrespect?were those things needed by any agent, because they are theelements of any rational plan of

10 Rawls's understanding of the primary goods is now based on a political rather than a general moral oranthropological conception of human needs. They are the needs ofcitizens in a certain kind of regime, namely, the liberal regime. Therefore, Rawls asks not what anyone needs but what citizens of a liberalregime need

Nothing has made this fundamental asymmetry of relations between Amer-icans and Others clearer than the September 11, 2001, events and American reac-tions to them. Before September 11, most Americans were ignorant of the factthat many people outside of the United States were furious and frustrated atthem for real or imagined abuses and deprivations that they blamed on America’seconomic and military policies. And among the few Americans who did knowabout it, most did not care because there was nothing the Others could do abouttheir anger.And then, suddenly, a handful of the previously invisible Others did “getback” at Americans in a very big way. They gained the full attention of Americansbecause they were able to inflict a tremendous killing force and destruction onmajor American icons of capitalism and militarism

slamic civilization was born in the context of tribalism, focused onpunishment and sameness (eye for an eye) and in violent opposition to forcesbent on its destruction. Justice thus became central in terms of external politics.Internally, however, Muhammad’s contribution was adl, or distributive justice,focused more on multiple levels of fairness (social, economic, political, and en-vironmental). Thus Islamic civilization exhibits a tension between justice andfairness—between retributive justice and the fight against injustice, and distri-butional justice, focused on creating a caring society

But as humans became more mobile and able to live in larger and largersettlements packed with people who did not know one another personally andcould not “get back at” others if they were injured or insulted (or praised andstrengthened) by them, the Golden Rule became less and less sufficient as a moralguide. Indeed, as people from once-separate cultures came into closer proxim-ity, “doing unto others what you want done to yourself” often became a causeof conflict itself! What is a tribute in one society might well be an insult in an-other. In our modern, congested, multicultural world, a better, new Golden Rulemight be, “Do unto others as they wish you to do unto them.” In this sense,then, ethics becomes “situational” (something to be negotiated between strangersor newcomers) rather than something absolute and obvious for people who livetogether from birth to death.

Thus a “well-ordered political system as a fair system of co-operation over time from one generation to the next” is designed on the basis oftwo rules.1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme ofequal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme ofliberties for all.2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they areto be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fairequality of opportunity; second, they are to be to the greater benefit of theleast-advantaged members of society

Rawls says that a “well-ordered” political society is “a fair system ofcooperation over time from one generation to the next, where those engaged incooperation are viewed as free and equal citizens and normal cooperating mem-bers of society over a complete life.”

But if this is so, the contractees will certainly not decide upon a strategysuch as "no advantage to me is acceptable unless it is to the advantage of thoseworse off." For, while this may be reasonable in a situation of uncertainty, itis not reasonable in a situation with information. In the latter case, a rationalegoist will adopt a new strategy that will maximize his interests alo

lity. An egoist will not bind himself toa policy which does not promise to maximize his future expectations; so it isodd for Rawls to suggest that "they understand further that the principles pro-posed and acknowledged on this occasion are to be binding on future occasions.... They will be bound by it in future cases the circumstances of which areunknown.

The 'difference' principle is not sufficient either, since it gives no specifi-cation of the size of the inequality allowed in comparison with the amount ofthe advantage provided. Any inequality, no matter how great, would be justi-fied by any advantage, no matter how slight, to the badly off. Rawls does notcall this perfectly just, but he considers it 'just' all the sam

"Given the circumstances of the original position, it isrational for a man to choose as if he were designing a society in which hisenemy is to assign him his place. Thus, in particular, given the complete lackof knowledge . . . it is rational to be conservative and so to choose in accor-dance with an analogue of the maximin principle.... Moreover, it seems clearhow the principle of utility can be interpreted: it is the analogue of the La-placean principle for choice uncert

The second, or 'difference' principle is much too strong. It specifies thatinequalities are arbitrary unless they will work out to the advantage of therepresentative man. But this Pareto-inclusive rule prevents any redistributionwhich lowers the wealth of the rich from being considered just.