verreached in Somalia when they expanded the initial mandate without providing the means to carry it out.

the distinction remains politically important: an operation that is perceived to be defending civilians under threat will tend to elicit a very different response than one that is seen as a self-interested war.

The Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction

capacity building Modified usage as building partner capacity in common English usage. No longer formally defined. comprehensive approach Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. conflict transformation Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. crisis state Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. disarmament Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. fragile state Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. governance Adopts the joint definition. reconstruction Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. reintegration Proponency moved to ADRP 3-07. rule of law Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. security force assistance Adopts the joint definition. security sector reform Adopts the joint definition. stabilization Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. vulnerable state Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. whole-of-government approach

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233248302Unilateral and Multilateral Military Intervention: Effects on Stability andSecurity

Review: Theorizing Military Intervention

Peace enforcement may be in tension or even in contradiction with state-building, let alone broader goals such as reconciliation, political institution-building and improved state–society relations

The neutralization of armed groups, as per Security Council Resolution 2098, implicitly presumed that that all armed groups are hostile to peace and cannot or should not be integrated into a political process.

Goma was indeed a disaster. It amounted to a massive failure of mandate implementation, notably civilian protection and the task to assist the government in extending – or rather protecting – state authority. The M23 offensive sparked the displacement of 140,000 people as well as numerous human rights violations, both by the rebels and the army

One of the main challenges with new equipment brought to Mali is the unwillingness to paint helicopters and planes white.

One of the more possible scenarios for Mali is that the aggressive stance of the mission will be self-fulfilling, turning it from a peacekeeping to a counter-terrorism mission, leading to an escalating circle of violence with a high likelihood of civilians being targeted and killed

The term stabilisation was introduced to peace operations with the establishment of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995.

The article draws a line between the peace operations that operate under a UN flag, and those only wielding a mandate from the UN Security Council authorising peace enforcement, such as the ISAF operation in Afghanistan during the past decade and Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. T

expanded the initial mandate without providing the means to carry it out.